


# SYNTHESIS OF HUMAN NATURE AND LEADERSHIP

A Multifaceted Discourse

Doctoral Dissertation by  
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October 06, 2001

The University of Wales, Lampeter, United Kingdom



In the name of Allah, the Compassionate, the Merciful

## **DEDICATION**

I dedicate this exercise to the remarkable kaleidoscopic vision of my beloved father and illustrious teacher, Khurram Murad (1934-1996), whose spectrum of thoughts reflects the facts and values from east and west, and ancient as well as modern. Blending all the diverse strands, he reinforced the universality of Islam the natural and the nature. The contents of this dissertation could have been a stylish mosaic instead of a clumsy puzzle, had he seen them just once! Alas!

**H.S.M.**

## **ABSTRACT**

This study explores the interface between human nature and leadership. The objective is to identify the unifying themes of authentic representatives from diverse disciplines of philosophy, science, and Islam. The central idea holds what is required for leadership act is very much integral to human nature and the self. Conversely, human nature as the innate, universal, and practical concept is basic to the theory of leadership. The creative discourses employ hermeneutic-interpretivism tradition of textual inquiry enabling integration within the disciplines and overlays of synthesis. All in an attempt to articulate an evolutionary concept of harmony providing pathways for linking essential elements of composite self intandem with the dynamics of Nature and historical emergence of society.

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
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DECLARATION

This work has not previously been accepted in substance for any degree and is not being concurrently submitted in candidature for any degree.

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STATEMENT I

This thesis is the result of my own investigations, except where otherwise stated.

Other sources are acknowledged by footnotes giving explicit references. A bibliography is appended.

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## SUMMARY OF THESIS

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Candidate for the Degree of: Phd (Mphil or Phd)

Full title of thesis: Synthesis of Islam an Nature and Leadership: A Multifaceted Approach.....

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### Summary:

The basic premise that motivated the inquiry was Qur'anic assertion that human beings have been created in the best of moulds and as vicegerents of God on this Earth. One may, then, justifiably expect that nature of humans should also contain the elements of the nature of leadership. As such, the objective of this multidisciplinary investigation is to enrich the understanding of a complex and archaic issue. Many sensitive issues pertaining to the scope of scientific inquiry, philosophical relevance, and Islamic thinking are discussed to determine how an emerging synthesis of human nature and quality of leadership can be conceptualised on the basis of the strengths of these perspectives.

The first chapter introduces the theme of harmony of leadership and human nature. It lays down the background to the premises upon which the basis inquiry for the thesis is founded. The second chapter outlines the methodological issues in historical context to underpin the evolution in the ways of research into human affairs. The third, fourth and fifth chapters compare and contrast the respective focuses of philosophical, scientific, and Islamic perspectives. In chapter six, a unique and comprehensive model of the human self consisting of Spirit, Heart, Soul, Mind, and Body is presented. This composite model then becomes a departing point for further synthesis. It is a unique model and as such raises new questions, opens new avenues, and provides new orientations. The position of humankind as microcosm in the macrocosm is ascertained through the consequential events that following the creation of first man -Adam. In chapter seven, the notion of physical and psychic health is employed to conceptualise the harmony within human self. In chapter eight, the inner most self is more extensively focused to see how alignment between soul and virtue as well as union between God and spirit assures and ensures harmony and peace.

The ninth chapter is on motivation-the nexus or the root of leadership nature. It sets the context for behaviour and throws light on the internal psychic processes concerning pleasures and pains on which a theory of human nature can be founded. The tenth chapter analyses the demonstrated facets of human behaviour in the society and describes the paradoxical nature of human is seen in terms of behavioural continuum pronlising the potential of wide range of possibilities. This chapter shifts the analysis from human nature to that of leadership nature. In the final chapter, the processes of change and dynamics of human nature are explored. The role of conscience, reactive learning, and proactive learning in achieving and enhancing the harmony is described.

The study ends with the conclusion that through the integration of philosophical, scientific, and Islamic thinking, it appears that humankind is naturally driven to act in the capacity of a position nothing less than that of a vicegerent to the supreme sovereign power of the universe, i.e., God. This is the highest attainable position. What makes harmony a viable linking pin between philosophical, scientific, and religious paradigms is the common emphasis on self-concept. There is process of mirroring between self and the self-concept, self and the Nature, and self and the society. That is essence of human nature and root of leadership, too. Human beings experience, intrinsically, a deeper knowledge of their self and discover purpose that guides their activities. Thus history of human experience is evolution of the synthesis of human nature and leadership.



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My personal experience, as part of the leadership team facilitated discernment into the complex processes modelling the human behaviour and enthralling the dynamics of human nature.

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May this humble work help those who lead and follow, follow and lead!

H.S.M

### CHAPTER 1.0 INTRODUCTION

Why a thesis on human nature? How human nature is relevant to leadership? Why pursue an elusive ideal of synthesis of human nature and leadership? What is the scope of present study? What should and should not be expected from this thesis? These questions genuinely form the basis of introduction of this work. The importance of the concept of human nature is briefly highlighted in historical and contemporary context. Its inevitable intersection with the theory of leadership is broadly identified. The objectives of the study guiding the research process are enumerated. Assumptions that shape the course of inquiry and outline the bounds of discourse are laid down.

#### 1.1 Importance of Human Nature

Human nature has been an object of study of humankind since people started learning about themselves. The contribution made by the famous philosophers like Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, along with the many infamous ones, forms the bedrock of intellectual discourses generated over the span of last two millenniums. The quantum of knowledge embodied under the disciplines of social sciences, biological sciences, and human sciences has enriched the understanding of this intricate issue, albeit, mostly, within the scope of the respective perspectives (Wilson 1978, p. 7). The core issue of human nature is the focus of discussion by researchers coming from variety of disciplines (Stevenson and Haberman 1998, p. 3-21).

Human history is testimony to the arguments of competing views about the role, responsibility, and freedom of human beings. In the current epoch, this particular topic has seen revival of scholarly interest due to the scientific and technological developments requiring redefinition of the basic assumptions about potentiality of human beings and construct of human societies (Young 1974, p. 235-74). The

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forthcoming millennium promises significant enlargement in the role of ordinary human beings. Technology is unleashing empowerment of individuals who can now perform at the level corresponding to that of states and large-scale organisations. The far-reaching consequences of such drastic changes in all aspects of collective and individual life are not easy to fathom. The permanent changes in the landscape of personhood have weakened the institutions representing the forces of societal superstructure. The new ways and means to assert freedom and assume autonomy have generated fresh debate and launched rethinking of the definition and purpose of human beings (Fukuyama 1992, p.287-328) .

The surge of research into the nature and other aspects of humankind is an outcome of the general disenchantment with the existing body of knowledge (Young 1994).

The roots of disenchantment lie deep down in the history. Human history is witness to controversies and debates surrounding the topic of human nature. The attempts to truly comprehend and reliably capture the dynamics of human nature, and, thereby, produce an agreement among all humans have singularly failed. "The entire imposing edifice," says Francis Fukuyama (1995, p. 18), "of contemporary neoclassical economic theory rests on a relatively simple model of human nature: that human beings are rational utility-maximising individuals." In contrast, Marxist postulates that man is a 'species' being giving priority to society over self-interest. The deep ideological cleavages and consequent hegemonic struggles that marked the last century were founded on the basis of their particular views about human nature. The philosophers and governments collided and colluded to expedite their own understanding of the human entity.

Over the last few centuries, the ways and means whereby humans can inquire about themselves, identify alternate sets of choices, determine the best course, and select or elect the one most suitable have evolved, matured, and now almost have been institutionalised. Yet the debate on facts and values concerning human nature is being pursued now with more vigour and at a much wider and deeper scale in the

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realm of leadership roles, governance practices, religious ideologies, and community preferences. Often, in the wake of competing interests, the ignorant and the weak has to make way for the knowledgeable and powerful. The power structures within society always have had a great influence over processes determining what is right and what is true (Marx 1964). The price of lack of understanding and vacillation between extreme poles has been paid dearly by none other than humans themselves. If there is any indication about future, it is towards further escalation, inasmuch as the stakes of the governing ideologies continue to increase with the passage of time.

The apparently confounding nature of humans is at once a source of mystification and bewilderment. On the one hand, it reflects godly attributes seemingly chartered to co-command the overwhelming forces of nature and the elements of the universe. On the other hand, it appears to be easily susceptible to bondage and prone to self-destruction. In a similar vein, some strands of leadership **thinking** leaned towards configuring humans as composed of intelligent muscles' capable of moving and making, relating and visualising without any consideration of the role of the heart and soul of the human beings. ~~While~~ other strands of leadership theory, human beings were considered to be emblem of ego, factory of desires, and fountains of emotions. Most commonly, not in too distant past, and even today in some places, the apparent physical denominations such as eyes, hands, and feet led to crude conceptualisation of humans as material beings with capability to move around and act at will. Scanty attempts to galvanise the potential of humans reflective of the full spectrum of life and scope of society integrative of outer functions and inner forms of human self and indicative of the perspectives of leadership behaviour could not have the necessary impact. The infinite spheres of heart, mind, spirit, and soul have rarely been appropriately considered in totality (Weiner 1993, p. 1-22). The position and interaction of **humankind** in relation vis-a-vis metaphysical realities are not considered mostly within the limited scope of religious thoughts (Cupitt 1979).

Humankind today is in possession of advanced technologies providing for fulfilment of its penchant to exploit creative processes of own self and that of other human and living beings. Many notable scholars have expressed reservations on provision of such facilities in a cultural milieu where human nature is not appropriately understood and defined and where decadent values and commercial motives dominate (Young 1981). The consequences of freedom to choose genetic composition should not be difficult to understand. Stephen Frosh (1991, p. 189) noted that the debate is between those celebrating the dissolution of the self and those mourning it. Those celebrating the dissolution disavow the ideological constraints while those mourning it would like to resist the explosive powers of interference yielded by modern technology (Frosh 1991, p. 189).

There has always been a need to rethink and there is all the more a stronger need today to address the critical issues adjoining the role of human, its potential, its working, and its significance. The recent flurry of literature on human development views society as an arena of possibilities, human as a movement in itself, human performance as a bundle of potentialities, human groups as a portfolio of competencies and human self as a blend of skills (Wheatley 1994, p. 1-14). Never before has there been a situation when resources and powers at the command of an individual could truly and vastly match the human potential. The question is, how the bundle of potentialities that a human being is, can be fully and positively explored, and, allowed to achieve its zenith. It behoves upon humans to renew its interest in research and dialogue on human nature to respond to the consequences of new perspectives and developments (Wilson 1998).

### **1.2 Human Nature and Leadership**

The first humanlike primates appeared on earth about twelve million years ago.

During most of the time, the human beings were hunters and gatherers. Human evolved in a much simpler social context than the one in which they currently live.



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Institutions more complex than small clans or nomadic communities came into existence only in the last ten to fifteen thousand years. While large organisations, symbolic of today, emerged to dominate the landscape in the last century. A large variety of groups, communities, and organisations vie for behavioural commitment and invoke interaction. Humans invest partially their behaviour. As a result of mutual interlocking of several partial behaviours, the interaction transforms into organising (Weick 1969). The leaders of organising settings have to deal with thousands of interdependent relationships with people, groups of people, or organisations. The typically enormous diversity of organisations makes understanding of human nature critically important (Drucker 1998, p.538-556).

The theory of leadership and management is essentially a theory of human being and a variant of the theory of personality (MacGregor 1978). Similarly, the theory of organising is based upon the theory of socialising and collective action (Weick 1979). The theory related to human nature that fundamentally includes the issues such as the purpose and stages of human life, the interaction between humans and the nature, the role of ideologies and values in the development of human character, the governing processes of human relations, the behavioural and motivational paradigms, and the nature of work, plays an important role in the understanding of the management and leadership framework. The process of leading and managing can also be considered as a process of dealing with human nature (Schermerhorn 1993). Leadership studies focus on the interplay of characteristics of humans with reference to their capability to influence other humans. The practices of leaders evolve out of their understanding of the nature of the people surrounding them. The underlying theory of all leadership mindset consists of a unique set of assumptions, theories, about how organisations work and why people behave the way they do. It broadly refers to a set of ideas that attempts to perform the basic functions of explanation, prediction, and control for leadership behaviour.

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The art of governing humans is one of the oldest. But the science of governance and leadership is still an emerging discipline. It draws upon the variety of social, physical, and human sciences and integrates all the relevant research and findings. Due to diverse theoretical base, several major schools of thoughts have emerged. This dissertation represents an attempt to provide a viable synthesis and integration of the major theoretical traditions relevant to the understanding of the crucial link between leadership and human nature.

The art of managing human affairs has always been influenced by the dominant **paradigms and thinking** · g patterns of the time and place (Northouse 2001, p. 1-12). In the modern era, the theory and practice of management style as popularly adopted in the world over is largely an outgrowth of the developments taking place in the knowledge disciplines after the Enlightenment through interaction of scholars and practitioners from diverse fields. The historical development of the modern theories cannot be overlooked in determining the application (Bass 1990; Hickman 1998).

States, institutions, organisations, communities, and families, all are facing many problems in all spheres of activities despite intensive research efforts for continuous improvement. There are many issues that need resolution. Leaders and followers both feel frustrated as and when expectations are not met. Relations among members are laden with unrealistic expectations and tinged with negative feelings. Many efforts for the improvement of the practices of leading and following are frequently thwarted mainly because of lack of proper understanding of human nature.

Philosophical, behavioural, and relational aspects are not adequately addressed and catered by the organisational and society actors (Fukuyama 1999, p 154-167 ; Chomsky 1998, p. 70-93; Gauchet 1997). Human civilisation spins within the evolving context of time, space, source, and direction. The emancipation of ideals and artefacts of culture incorporates the ideas and values concerning the human nature dominating the milieu of a particular civilisation. History of leadership is thus



embedded in development of thinking about human nature. Ethos of civilisation mirrors the values and understanding about human nature (Fukuyama, 1992).

The shifting currents of **thinking** on human nature always had a recasting influence over the concepts of leadership. Lately, leadership is now conceived in the mould of followership and servicership (Greenleaf 1996). In contrast to the Great-Man and Trait-based theories, the most important role of leadership is envisaged as that of a head of orchestra who tunes performance of his or her team in view of the external expectations. The functions of leadership essentially consist of human engineering, charting organisational architecture, talent scouting and mentoring, strategizing, and management of stakeholder relationships. Leaders become super leaders by helping others become leaders.

### 1.3 Objectives of the Study

The primary focus of this dissertation is human nature. The objective is to develop a synthesis of human nature and leadership qualities through reconstruction of meanings from different perspectives. The leadership potential of human beings is explored from philosophic, scientific, and Islamic perspectives.

The inquiry for this thesis that initially began as a study of leadership has finally ended up as the study of human nature. Originally, it was not meant to focus so extensively on human nature. The conclusion that emerged in the course of inquiry, and led to this shift of focus, is that leadership in its essence reflects attributes of human nature. It is a state of expression and articulation of human nature. Basic ingredients of leadership do not need to be imported; they already exist. Thus, culture is treated as the tissue from which the quality of leadership is harnessed. This thesis calls for certain conceptual and theoretical modification and revamping of human nature and human culture.

## CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

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The present discourse on human nature originates within the multiple disciplines of philosophy, psychology, sociology, and religion. Thus, inevitably, the thesis employs and delves deep into constructs and theories found in literature. The awesome historicity of the topic almost forecloses the possibility of discovering any utterly new theoretical ground about human nature. It would be presumptuous to hope that any study can make an innovative contribution to one of the most archaic topics of human inquiry. This thesis does not even claim to initiate a new debate. Rather, it is a fresh attempt to conduct a dialogue of perspectives within the limited scope of its inquiry. Nevertheless, the attempt deserves to be called a fresh not the least, because a search for thesis on similar topic came with zero result-but because of the variety of perspectives from ancient as well as modern, classic as well as neoteric, and religious as well as secular are blended in a new sequence and with a new approach to yield a novel cross-fertilisation. The new paradigmatic glance would help in establishing the key relationship between leadership and human nature. The multifaceted approach is adapted to discern into the question that whether human nature fits the mould of leadership or not. It is hoped that the ensuing discussions and research at theoretical and empirical levels will help in accumulating data and in figuring out the logic required to substantiate the postulate that innate nature and natural quality of human being is tuned to the leadership character.

The resultant paradigm must respond to the challenges of the new age while building upon the sum of human experiences about human nature in the preceding millennia, dated and predated. The challenge of history of the future is not to repeat the basic errors that could again lead to new injustices (Fukuyama 2000). New age deserves enlightened view about human beings and more honourable outcomes of history.

More specifically, the objectives driving the research process are stated as follows:



1. To critically review the evolution in the paradigms of human inquiry in order to assess the significance of the existing body of knowledge and configure the research design for the proposed study.
2. To identify the themes from philosophy and psychology having resonance and concurrence with the themes in Qur'an for developing synthesis.
3. To apply multidisciplinary approach towards developing unified **thinking** for the study of interface between human nature and leadership.
4. To conceptualise the making of human self and determine its position in the world from the Islamic perspectives with a review of implications for leadership.
5. To conduct theoretical discourses drawing selectively from psychological, philosophical and Islamic perspectives to develop synthesis.
6. To analyse the suitability of the concept of health and harmony as the primary source of motivation and character formation for human self.
7. To understand the dynamics of human self and track plausible routes to optimality or infirmity, recognition or opprobrium.
8. To relate the suitability of harmony based human nature to the concept of leadership and management.

### 1.4 Assumptions

The topic of human nature and leadership can be approached in different ways and raises a variety of issues. It is impossible to satisfy all the expectations that this topic might generate. Accordingly, at the very outset, it is important to clarify what should

be and should not be expected of this exercise? There are two negative points in this identification. First, narrowly analytical questions are not dealt with here. Thus issues like how a view of free will relates to the key problem in leadership functions such as decision making are not explored. Neither this exercise is engaged, as Hume said he was, in anatomising human nature. There are no discussions as such of reason or the emotions and how these affect the meanings and character of leadership. Nor, unlike Charles Taylor, this thesis seeks to traverse the historical evolution of the conception of human nature and bearing those have on questions of responsibility, autonomy, behaviour, and so on. This thesis also does not put forward an interpretation as to what leadership and human nature is. The aim is not to advocate a particular view of the substance and the structure of human nature. The positive aim of this dissertation is to focus on the potential of correlation between conceptual constructs of human nature and leadership. Determination and understanding of that link is the purpose of this thesis.

The importance of human nature from leadership perspectives can be seen at two levels. Firstly, while at conceptual level, while 'human nature' is not obviously an issue like justice or authority; it will not be too far to hypothesise that conceptions of human nature are basic to leading, organising, motivating, and the rest of leadership activities. This construct is elusive because it has not been extensively pursued on its own right. The link can be established by identifying analytical structure that forms and informs the interface. Secondly, the notion of human nature is important from the point of view of leadership. The significance of the elusive and ambiguous concept of human nature can be seen from the fact that how frequently it is invoked to justify and explain the realities. Definitely, more clarity is needed to throw light on the real world of leadership experience.

As with any other thesis, assumptions made at the outset played important role in the dialogue contained in this dissertation. The fermentative premises of the original context are outlined below:

## CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

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First, the discussion here responds to the need of relating the theory of leadership, primarily conceived as trait theory in the early literature, to the theory of human nature (Schermerhorn 1993). Essentially, the theory of human nature has implications on theory of leadership and vice versa. However, rarely, in literature, has there been any explicit discussion on the relation between these two constructs on theoretical grounds.

Second, the theory of leadership evolved independently of the theory of human nature because human nature is considered as a general study of innate processes particular to humankind aiming at validity across the cultures, while leadership is thought of as a study of highly select group of humans. Leadership studies focused on the behaviour of very limited number of people supposed to be holding leadership positions. The paradigm has not been regarded as universally applicable to be able to explain the human nature, in general.

Third, there has been a very little effort made by scholars from the both sides for cross-fertilisation. Historians, management scholars, and sociologists study leadership. Philosophers, psychologists, anthropologists, and biologists study human nature. The phenomenon of leadership is not debated at all when human nature is studied. Each of these two perspectives can inform the other if they are brought to bridge each other.

Fourth, the study of leadership and administration (Weber 1992) cannot remain oblivious to the trends and the influences of religion. Religion has always played a key role in the human affairs. Religious philosophies always influence, often determine, the thinking of humans about human beings. The Judeo-Christian, Islamic, and other religious denominations and thinking need to be further studied to determine more enlightened applications in solving the present problems.

Fifth, Islamic thinking has been altogether just not included in studies about human nature. Its importance has been felt but not attended to (Stevenson and Herberman

1998; Yasien 1996). This thesis considers the point of view that there are many ideas found in the realm philosophy and science that can be seen as partially or fully compatible with the Islamic perspectives. Inclusion of Islamic **thinking** on human nature should qualitatively enrich the overall understanding of the issues.

Sixth, in an attempt to reconstruct the notion of human nature, traditional western ideas need to be seen in juxtaposition of the contemporary **thinking** in order to, then, integrate them with the Islamic paradigm. A survey of dominating streams of western thought is also important for understanding of the human nature. The notions of virtue and human nature as conceived by philosophers starting from Plato and Aristotle need to be rediscovered to reconcile this stream of western **thinking** with the Islamic thought.

Seventh, one continuous line of analysis will try to draw from the natural law tradition of the science with the prospects of comparison with natural ethos of Islam. Islam calls itself as the way of nature. The surmise that shapes much of what is in this thesis is that short of the concept of the origins of human beings, there is a resemblance between the Islamic concept of evolution and selective **thinking** patterns visible in philosophy and psychology. The history of Islamic tradition of knowledge highlights similar attempts before but not related to the topic of this thesis.

Eighth, from the very start, it is set out to be a thought experiment in philosophical likelihood to integrate facts and values rooted in ancient and modern **thinking**. Avoiding to be either metaphysical or reductionist, linguistic or religionist, empiricist or spiritualist, this iridescent construction of synthesis blends several schools of thoughts to determine a viable framework which is, then, compared with the Islamic framework.

Ninth, there is a growing realisation that an overemphasis on the rational and technical side of leadership has often contributed to the neglect of human dynamics (Boltan and Deal 1991:14). Leadership and human nature is part of artistry. Artistry

is neither exact nor precise. The artist interprets experiences and expresses it in imaginative and aesthetically satisfying forms. Art allows for emotion, subtlety, and ambiguity. An artist frames the world to give a deeper understanding of what it is and what might be (Martinez 1989). Hence, there is inevitable mention of soul and spirit, in addition to mind and intellect.

Tenth, in the aftermath of scientific revolution as a consequence of reductionism and deconstructionism, tendency of scholars has been to codify the knowledge and realities into two major divisions or split the whole into two (Nasr 1996). Notions such as mind and body, subject and object, culture and nature, fantasy and external reality, fact and value, whole and part tugged away the organicist mode of Aristotelian **thinking** which largely dominated till the advent of scientific **thinking**. In the present century, the backlash to splintering and euphemisation of concepts has slowly begun to pick its momentum. It has evoked efforts towards monism such as Gestalt, holism, organicism, emergentism, phenomenology, and totality. Since, Islamic concept of human life is based on unitary and wholistic modes, it deserves consideration as the basis for new paradigm of inquiry – the paradigm of integration.

### 1.5 About the Content

The contents of this thesis flow in six steps. In the first step (chapter two), methodological issues are addressed in historical and comparative context. In the second step, themes originating from philosophy (chapter three) and science (chapter four) are discussed. These themes come from the core of the disciplines and act as building blocks in developing the synthesis. Interlace between the themes from philosophy and science is established during the discussion of themes in science (chapter four). The third step (chapter five) draws from the **thinking of Islamic** philosophers – in the backdrop of the themes already discussed before – to develop a multidisciplinary approach. After having established a new framework, the fourth step deals with four primary and integral issues concerning physical health and

psychological harmony (chapter six), motivation (chapter seven), paradoxes (chapter eight), and dynamics (chapter nine). The fifth and the conclusive step involves determining the implications for synthesis between human nature and leadership. This is done at the end of third and fourth steps, as well as finally, in the concluding chapter.

In a work that indulges into deep penetration in a variety of disciplines, the issue of terminology, bibliography, and references is somewhat complicated. The approach has been to bring into analysis the works which are considered representative within the domain of subject area. The Glossary provided at the end briefly defines the important terminology used in this dissertation. Throughout the text, the term 'humankind' is used instead of 'Man,' which is normally used by early authors. Similarly, when referring to human nature, the term 'human nature' is consistently used to distinguish 'nature' which means the physical world around **humankind**.

### **CHAPTER 2.0**

#### **SUMMARY OF METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES**

The wide array of methodologies and methods available to contemporary researchers forms a complex maze. Identifying pathways to pursue the orderly research and inquiry is a difficult task. It requires delineation of the philosophical underpinnings of each methodology and clarification of the relevance of methodology to theoretical foundations of the proposed inquiry.

There are three key questions that need to be answered. First, what are the objectives of the research? Second, what methodologies will be employed? Third, how to justify the choice? The answer to the second question lies in the purpose of the research.

Indeed, the process should be capable enough to meet the requirements of the purpose. The justification comes from the reality to be explored during the course of the work. The epistemological questions arising out of the inquiry are partially circumscribed by the assumptions. These need to be configured explicitly and described in given the objectives of the present study. Theoretical assumptions define the issues related to selection of perspectives from the existing body of human knowledge about human nature, the quality of inputs from that can be achieved from different ways of knowing about human nature, and the type and characteristic of knowledge to be expected of the research.

The beginning steps should lay out the framework guiding the observer in the evaluation of the research. The pivotal issue of how should observers of the research regard the outcome should be addressed in the methodology.

It is important to distinguish the meanings and implications of the terms: methods, methodology, theoretical perspectives, and epistemology. Often forms of these different process elements are considered as comparable terms causing great

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difficulty in defining and explaining the proper approach. Michael Crotty (1998, p. 3) has defined these terms as follows:

Epistemology: the theory of knowledge embedded in the theoretical perspective and thereby in the methodology.

Ontology: the knowledge about being which comes first.

Methodology: the research process or design dictating use of particular methods and linking the methods to the desired outcomes.

Theoretical Perspective: the philosophical stance informing the methodology and thereby laying out the context for the process and grounding of its logic and criteria.

Methods: the techniques or procedures used to gather and analyse data related to some research question or hypothesis.

This is a qualitative research and employs a diversified and enriching matrix of research tools. Qualitative research, as Denzin and Lincoln (1998, p. 5) describes, is a set of interpretive practices void of any theory or paradigm, that is distinctly its own. The field is influenced by many political and ethical viewpoints when it comes to interpretation of human experience. The following essays, perhaps, could not and cannot escape this predicament. The research process conceived here is not commensurable with positivism. Ostensibly, positivism and constructionism cannot be logically accommodated.

The epistemology is grounded in the tradition of constructionism deploying range of interconnected interpretive methods in an attempt to capture the complexity of the intersection of human experience and leadership. The theoretical perspective of research undertaking draws from interpretivism and critical inquiry with special reference to hermeneutics all in an inescapable postmodern setting. The

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methodology employed is discourse analysis and methods are narrative techniques, theme identification, interpretative methods, content analysis, and comparative analysis.

Three major perspectives notably: philosophic, scientific, and Islamic have been uniquely brought together with reference to the issues identified in the next chapter with a view to develop a synthesis. The ambit of knowledge thus consists of representative works within these three primary disciplines about which there is relative consensus among those competent to interpret the substance of the construction. It is assumed in constructionism that multiple knowledge can coexist when equally competent interpreters disagree or because of social, political, cultural, economic, ethnic, and gender factors that differentiate the interpreters. These constructions are subject to continuous revision, with changes most likely to occur when relatively different constructions are brought into juxtaposition in a dialectical context. Knowledge accumulates, in a relative sense, through the formation of ever more informed and sophisticated constructions via the hermeneutic/ dialectical process, as varying constructions are brought into juxtaposition. The contribution can be measured on the basis whether ultimately, more informed and sophisticated discourse would lead to convergence of views from diverse disciplines.

The culturing through and breaking down the selected texts from philosophy and psychology entails, among other things, an intertextuality that brings the 'plurality of the text' to the fore. Intertextuality brings all texts together as a matrix within which one text is transported into one another. It has played key role in bringing human sciences together. It made it possible for researchers to draw at will among different types of discourses and schools of thoughts. It also enabled them to making sense of the things without conforming to the traditional Jir nitations and prescriptions of any one discipline or any one text (Bannet 1989, p.244). This constant intertwining and blending of elements once seen separately and detached, and the resultant paradigm after entangling them to redefine and review the issues is a formidable source of

revival of texts as well as renewal of disciplines. The pivotal theme of postmodernism is a process entailing unification as well as diversification, disengagement and blurring of demarcation. New approaches and innovative dimensions unfold through such cross fertilisation.

Behind all these phases of interpretive works, stands the researcher's self, who is biographically situated and multicultural, often, incapable of restricting the self from permeating the research process. The voice of researcher is that of a 'passionate participant actively engaged in facilitating the multivoice reconstruction' (Guba and Lincoln 1998, p. 215). As a moderator and facilitator of the meaning, the inquirer seeks to construct a different world view. All qualitative researchers are philosophers in that 'universal sense in which all human being...are guided by highly abstract principles (Bateson 1972 p. 320). These principles combine beliefs about ontology (What kind of being is the human being? What is the nature of reality?), epistemology (What is the relationship between the enquirer and the known?), and methodology (How do we know the world or gain knowledge about it?) (Guba and Lincoln 1998).

Reporting research requires setting forth the research process faithfully and comprehensively. The account of the research process establishes credentials of the research. The process of investigation itself is the only justification. Thus, expounding evolution of the research process, including its theoretical moorings and the assumptions brought to methodology and method, assumes obvious and crucial importance.

The objective of this review is to assess the kind of conclusions that can be drawn from such a study. The conclusions yielded by such a discourse do not qualify to be presented as objective truths, claiming validity and generalisability. They are reported as interpretation and as a certain spin on the inter-textual data. The survey would help readers in weighing interpretation and judging whether it has been

## **CHAPTER 2: SUMMARY OF METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES**

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soundly arrived at. Only then, it can be figured out whether the conclusions are plausible or convincing even. It is hoped that conclusion will also find application to the interests and concerns of those pursuing inquiry into these areas.

This chapter is lengthier than a typical first chapter on methodology in a dissertation. It goes beyond the explanation of the choices made in searching and selecting the appropriate grounds in the areas of epistemology, ontology, and theoretical perspectives. A rather detailed survey of the evolution of philosophy of human inquiry is intended for the formative purpose of laying the foundation for further discourses. In a way, this chapter sets out the research design, as well as in itself, can be considered as the beginning of the inquiry. The inquiry to pursue the topic of thematic connection between human nature and leadership begins with the investigation into the way humans inquire. The result is not only articulation of the issues and finalisation of the paradigm but also knowledge about how human nature expressed itself in the debate. More formally, it is to determine an appropriate research process that serves the primary objective best, one that helps more than any other to satisfy aims of research.

The history of the development of orientations, tools, and, paradigms, represents the changes in the ways and modes of learning of humans about themselves and their affairs. This section surveys the ongoing debate among the proponents and antagonists of various paradigms in the historical context. The way humans attempted to understand themselves evolved with the passage of time (Denzin and Lincoln 1998, p.2). There is a distinctive link between dynamics of the overall growth of civilisation as a result of the knowledge gained from the paradigms known before. What is known also identifies what is unknown and necessitates subsequently change in the ways of knowing. A dialog conversation among the researches from different streams is attempted here evaluating their strengths and weaknesses to render a research process that suits requirements of the objectives. The intended end result is not to pluck a research approach off the shelf. Rather than to entrench and

defend one of the established paradigms, the survey is undertaken to delineate the relevance and illustrate the logic of the approaches employed.

### 2.1 Ontological Foundation

This discourse is about human nature and as such ontological issues need to be addressed at primal level. The theoretical perspectives in the case of human nature would be better informed if they embody understanding of *tvliat is* (ontology) as well as of *tvliat it means to know* (epistemology). This dissertation is cast in the Heidegger's conception of the relationship between ontology and philosophy. Ontology is the study of Being (Crotty 1998, p. 10). Blaike (1993, p. 6) defines it as 'the science of the study of being' or as 'the claims or assumptions that a particular approach to social enquiry makes about the social reality'. It focuses on the nature of existence and structure of reality. Realism that is based on the idea that meanings exist outside the mind comes from ontology while the idea that meanings should come from the object itself as such apart from the consciousness that comes from objectivism. There is necessary link between objectivism and ontology when a reality is assumed (Guba and Lincoln 1994:108). A thing is always already there and an objective study would reveal how that thing really is. But that thing becomes meaningful when meaning-making beings try to understand it. Concerning human nature, the great debate between nominalists and realists in the middle ages raged on extra-conscious reality or unreality, of universals. The questions raised were about the very existence of human beings. Whether humankind has a real existence or it exists in the human mind only? Thus existence of a thing without human consciousness is conceivable but meanings without a mind is not (Crotty 1998). It also demonstrates that realism and constructionism are compatible and inform each other if taken side by side. Heidegger considers philosophy as an universal phenomenological ontology. For him, philosophy is ontology (1962, p. 62). And phenomenology is the way to access to what is to be the theme of ontology, and it is the way of giving it a demonstrative

precision. Only as phenomenology is ontology possible (Heidegger 1962, p. 60). Heidegger notes that, 'meaning of phenomenological description as a method lies in interpretation.' To him, philosophy is ontology and ontology, by the same token, is phenomenology. To recall, phenomenology is an attempt to return to the primordial contents of consciousness, that is, to the objects that present themselves in our very experience of them prior to our making any sense of them at all. The culture provides understanding of them but it is important to lay aside the tendency to immediately interpret. He does not hide his scepticism about the culturally derived meanings. He lays down the foundation for phenomenology of human being, or Dasein, the word he used to refer to it. The phenomenological process, first of all, confronts the pre-understanding of Being, then moves on to manifestation of Being itself, and unfolding of other phenomena in the light of the understanding of Being. This process is conducted in hermeneutic tradition. In a remarkable way, Heidegger brought together in a unique way not only ontology and phenomenology but through hermeneutics, the element of language also. For Heidegger, hermeneutics is not only a way of interpreting the texts nor a methodology for human science but a phenomenological explication of human existing itself (Palmer 1969, p.42).

In the quest to understand human nature, the task is to discover pre-understanding of Being. By unfolding this rudimentary understanding and rendering explicit and thematic what is at first implicit and random. This understanding leads to grasping the existential structures of being that make human existence and behaviour possible and onto realisation of Being itself. The Qur'anic and philosophic traditions are brought into consideration for this purpose in this thesis. The more enlightened understanding of Being then enriches the experience in the world. Heidegger believed in the originality about the thought of the early Greeks. He took the challenge of painstakingly going through still more originally what was thought at first, before anything else. This approach again signifies the relevance of religious scripts, Bible and Qur'an. They claim to contain what was first thought before

anything else came into being. In the similar vein, this dissertation considers the works of Aristotle as representative of the thoughts of early Greek period. This acts as the basis of textual analysis and is utilised throughout keeping in view the guidelines noted above in the section under interpretivism.

In this shift in approach – the move from an analytic of Dasein to a running conversation with the early Greek thinkers – there is a new emphasis on history. The Greek thought was considered as self-blossoming emergence (Heidegger 1977, p. 14). There at the dawn of Western civilisation is a new beginning. The beginning conceived firstly, Being itself. It is a circling process between Being and beings. This is a coming of Being into beings and therefore a revelation of Being. Yet it is also the arrival of beings and this means a concealing of Being. Hermeneutics means, for Heidegger, an unveiling of Being. Heidegger sees the history of the West as the history of Being and became pre-occupied with the event that gives Being. Being, in his view, grants an experience that all humans must make every effort to render faithfully (Caputo 1982, p.11).

Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900) sees human beings as thoroughly historical and as, indeed, historically effected consciousness. Human beings stand in tradition and the tradition is wedded to language and artefacts that is the core of understanding. In historical hermeneutics, past and present are mediated and Gadamer describes this process as fusion of horizons. The discourse contained in this dissertation attempts a fusion of horizons by bringing together texts produced over thousand of years from different backgrounds. Understanding to him is less of a subjective act than as participating in an event of tradition. The highest type of hermeneutics is 'the openness to tradition characteristic of historically effected consciousness. The fusion of horizons is required so that concepts of a historical past are gained while they also include comprehension of them and responses to the questions raised in there.

'History does not belong to us;' Gadamer (1989) says, 'we belong to it.' Long before humans understand themselves through the process of self-examination, they understand themselves in a self-evident way in the society. The self-awareness is only a flickering in the closed circuit of historical life. The prejudices and mental models play a far greater role than the judgement.

In Islam, Qur'an is the source and criterion of knowledge. This thesis draws from Qur'an in view of its claim that it is a Word of God and sent down and protected by Him. For Muslims, it is a book of guidance and is held beyond any doubt. The claim that it is solely a Word of God is now 1400 years old and remains unchallenged so far. The information revealed in Qur'an informs not merely as a perspective but as the core perspective with which other perspectives are integrated. Generally, Qur'anic information is not even discussed or included in the studies focusing on leadership and human behaviour. Thus blending the ideas and findings about human nature from diverse perspectives on the basis of Qur'an is the unique feature of this thesis. However, this is not the first attempt in this direction. Many distinguished scholars have made similar attempts over the centuries.

Humankind is the focus of Qur'an. It invites humankind to reflect and ponder upon what it says. It identifies behavioural forms, delineates causes of good and bad behaviours, informs about the consequences of human actions, and outlines the code of individual and collective life. It delineates into the causes of rise and fall of nations and success and failure of people. Qur'an presents itself as the book of God revealed to guide humanity. The ultimate objective of Qur'an is to constantly raise, maintain, and guide a nation as a standard bearer of righteousness and justice. Its aim is to create Islamic civilisation as a dominating mould for living in this world. It deals with only the essence and the most important, at micro as well as macro levels, about all aspects of human activities in a bid to introduce the principle framework, in the light of which the ideological edifice for human life can be built upon in any given context.

Qur'an provides valuable insights about human nature and offers guidance toward right beliefs and righteous conduct. It delves into the inner workings of the character of human and outlines social, cultural, political, historical, moral and the spiritual aspects. Qur'an accords highest status to humans. It positions humans as deputy or vicegerent to God. Then it delineates what is good and what is bad, what is natural and what is unnatural. In its discourse, Qur'an reverts to this topic intermittently, and throws light to its dynamics and complexities, its orientations and manifestations, its inherence and formulations, its strengths and weakness, its ambiguities and paradoxes. Two questions inspired and initiated this effort. First, how Qur'an proves and approves the suitability of human nature for the role of vicegerent. Second, how Qur'an conceives human nature in its mould so that it becomes congruent to the given status of human nature. Qur'anic portrayal of human nature can be instrumental in making sense of the nature of human leadership. In nutshell, the leadership character is embedded in the human nature and this hypothesis can be taken as the basis of human nature and leadership studies within the Qur'anic paradigm.

The Qur'anic notion of the term psyche includes ontological processes, incorporeal relations, spiritual dimensions of humans, and enmeshes the psychological self with the soul and spirit having metaphysical dimensions. Qur'an illustrates **humankind** as cast in the perfect mould having innate capability to recognise good and evil endowed with highest conceivable freedom and equipped with creative abilities. It seeks to direct and harness the human energies to establish harmony with the overall nature and ultimately to relegate it to the state of supreme goodness and total success. The creative execution of powers enables human to influence the forces of universe by way of construction as well as deconstruction as part of an evolutionary process. Qur'an is very eager to protect **humankind** from the ill consequences of misadventures in seizing wrong opportunities and misappropriation of trusts. The goal of Qur'an is to guide **humankind** in steering its course of transcendental life

toward a point where the real sense of time, space, source, and direction could be synchronised without any perceptual barriers.

### **2.2 Epistemological Alternatives**

Epistemology is a way of understanding and explaining the process of knowing what is known. It is concerned with providing a philosophical grounding for assessing what kinds of knowledge are possible. It explains the nature and scope of knowledge (Hamlyn 1995:242). Depending upon the perceived role of human consciousness and experiences in ascertaining the meanings, three fundamental types of epistemologies are referred to in the literature. Objectivist epistemology holds that reality exists, as such, independent of the observation. If a 'thing' exists, then, it does so, regardless of any engagement at the level of human consciousness and recognition at the level of society. As an object, things carry their intrinsic meanings (Crotty 1998:8). The objectification of perceptual orientations and values of the researchers, and the design itself, is what make the findings reliable as well as valid. Notwithstanding its problematic nature, there is no other way to find out objectively, 'the truth.'

The second major type of epistemology is known as constructionism. It emphasises the role of human mind and engagement of human behaviour, as a consequence of which human experiences take shape. Meanings of the experiences and observations are constructed by humans themselves and are largely influenced by context and culture. Context provides the background for interpretation and culture directly and indirectly influences the content of meanings. It is assumed that reality can not be discovered objectively. It is constructed socially and it changes with the changes in mental models governing the process. This approach is based on the interplay and interaction between the subject and the object in the research process. It can account for the recent development of many new paradigms and theories in the social sciences.

The third epistemological school of thought can be seen most prominently in postmodernist forms. In this tradition of research design, the subject imposes meanings on the object. In constructionism, meanings are generated out of a 'thing' so object does have a role to play. In subjectivism, meanings are generated irrespective of any consideration of the meaning giving potential of the object. Meanings are imported from and implied by objects, subjectively. Meanings can be implied without any relation to the interaction between the object and the subject.

Is there an objective truth about human nature waiting to be discovered? Can it be identified with precision and certitude? Do human beings have their own peculiar ways of sense making guided by complex dynamics of motivation which partially influence or totally determine meanings? What is most efficacious method of inquiry and research: objective, constructive, or subjective? Response to these questions depends upon the epistemological stances. A look into these philosophical schools would unfold the progression of human ability to engage itself into inquiry and investigation, about own self. Along with it, an account of characteristics of the conception about human nature that emerged within different schools of thought at various stages would also enlighten the purpose of the study.

### 2.2.1 Limitations of Objectivism and Positivism

The positivist perspective builds upon intellectual thrust of the Enlightenment, which attempts to assure unambiguous and accurate knowledge based on reason. The positivism has now evolved into post-positivism attenuating some of its claims while remaining faithful to its basics and orientation. Francis Bacon (1561-1626) first introduced this concept and later Auguste Comte (1798-1857) aptly popularised this term. In the wake of industrial revolution, Comte was concerned about the reconstruction of the society and development of its *sine qua non*, a valid and comprehensive social science. Comte believed that wellbeing of the society requires the human mind to function at its very best. In his view, scientific method has the

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potential to provide the framework in social science as it has done remarkably in the physical sciences. The objective is to study the facts that regularly characterise particular types of beings and constant relationships that can be shown to obtain among various phenomena. The universality of scientific method, which emanated from positivism, was suggested as a unifying mean between knowledge disciplines and all spheres of the society. Attribution of universality to scientific method was made on the basis of its capability to remain homogenous in a multitude of contexts in human and natural worlds. Comte also believed that different phases of human history are characterised by their way of thinking, and the final stage will be marked by the universal triumph of positive thought (Aron 1965, p. 70). One of the gifts of the era of Enlightenment is highly optimistic faith and a melioristic spirit because of the results demonstrating that humanity has been set on a path of inevitable progress. Technological changes were driving the force of this progress and ordinary citizens were witnessing dramatic changes in the way of living.

What Comte sought from positivism was not numerical precision and certainty in social sciences but a mindset towards the study of human, nature, and society (Simpson 1982, p.69). Taking cautionary approach, he warned against propensity for quantification, because it obviates folly of ideas under an imposing dictum (Simpson 1982, p.80). The ideology of Positivism is based upon the supremacy of what is posited over what is natural. Natural is something that people reason their way to, naturally and, often, individually and simultaneously. In contrast, positivism is based on something given rather than natural reasoning. Natural law contains complex of responsibilities and obligations that people have reasoned their way to while adapting to community living. It is based on the understanding of the nature of the world and human nature. Things are prohibited because they seem to be evil. In positive tradition, law is posited by the legislature and things are evil because they are prohibited.

Speculation and abstract reasoning have no place in scientific methodology. Results are grounded firmly on something that is posited. What is posited or derived by way of direct experience is what is observed. The observation in question being the scientific observation carried out by way of the scientific method. The direct methods whereby human nature can be established scientifically are observation, experiment, and comparison. Nevertheless, Comte was aware of how social thought and social conditions in grasping an objective meaning. He recognised, like Hegel and Marx, that human consciousness is determined by the social and there is an inevitable interdependence between the construct and the context. Human led events can not be deciphered like scientific experiment such that sociologists have no control. Comparative studies are also required from cross-cultural and historical dimension to analyse from the social context.

The challenge of the application of scientific method invoked concerns among scientists as well as philosophers. Scientists wanted to determine possibility of using the same tool in human sciences. Philosophers wanted to assess what truth claims can be made about scientific findings (Crotty 1998, p.23). The works of Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell and Alfred North Whitehead reinforced the discussion of logic. The Vienna Circle took the debate further and sought to introduce the mathematical methods to the study of philosophy. Wittgenstein (1889-1951) provided a basis for linking truth to meaning in a way that nothing except science could escape to be called as genuine knowledge other than that of science. Soon, metaphysics, theology and ethics found itself being excluded from the acceptable domain of human knowledge, only to be embraced later.

The urge to regard a statement as truth and meaningful only if it is verifiable. The principle of verifiability became the central tenet of logical positivism. Verification is carried out in two ways: analysis and synthesis. Analytic method is used when ascription of a predicate to a subject can be verified. Its meaningfulness is established through an analysis of the subject. Synthetic method when what is predicated of the

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subject is not included in its definition. Something new is being said about the subject. Synthetic experiments are verified by experience and only by direct experience. Experience means data given by senses, precisely. What is experienced through our sense data, directly or with the technological aid, is verified knowledge and is liable to be taken as fact.

Thus, science came to be known as a source of facts. The task of philosophy was to clarify and analyse propositions made as a result of scientific findings. The domain of this philosophy excluded metaphysics, ethics, aesthetics, and religion from the precincts of genuine philosophy because they are unverifiable in the empirical manner as demanded by logical positivism. Notwithstanding the spiritual and functional value, the scientists declared these subjects as cognitively meaningless. The rise of scientific method precluded all possibilities to know the human nature in totality. Scientific methods could not go beyond the sense data. The diversity and richness, complexity and dynamics remained out of the bound of scientific territory.

Scientists projected the view that human knowledge should have validated meanings through the process of detached observation and controlled experiment invoking evidence of the senses. The science of physics is where thoroughgoing empiricism is most obvious. From the positivist viewpoint, objects in the world have meaning prior to, and independently of, any consciousness of them. The supreme confidence in science stems from a conviction that scientific knowledge is both accurate and certain. The distinction between fact and value stems from the difference in the objective meaning inherent in the objects and subjective meanings ascribed to the objects. Science is supposed to be value-neutral. The real properties of the Galilean world are those that can be measured and counted and thereby quantified. Scientific world is an abstraction from the real world. Science has been eager to see a world that is systematic, organised, regularised, certain, and compliant of absolute principles.

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The claim that only scientific knowledge is utterly objective, valid, and certain saw itself being dislodged slowly under pressure from many different intellectual domains. There was no argument against attempts to articulate the scientific knowledge in line with positivist tradition. It was the claim that increasingly faced questions. The less attenuated form of positivism that emerged is known as post-positivism. Werner Heisenberg (1901-76) articulated an uncertainty principle, which expounds that it is impossible to determine both the position and momentum of an atomic particle with any real accuracy. The independence of observer and observed was challenged. Heisenberg's criticism was on epistemological grounds as he found limitations in the very way in which we humans know what they know. For Bohr, the limitation is ontological rather than epistemological, as he believes that limitations are not due to how humans know but due to how the particles actually are. What emerged is that scientists actively construct scientific knowledge rather than passively noting the laws that are found in nature. The facts underlying the theories have been purposefully contrived and introduced as mere heuristic and explanatory devices such as particles, waves, and fields. The scientific discovery meant reification of these presumptions. Sir Karl Popper (1902-94) challenged one of the pivotal notions and pointed out that scientists engage in a continual process of conjecture and falsification rather than observation and experimentation and pinpointing scientific laws evident in nature. Consequently, the claims of scientists to objectivity, precision and certitude have declined. Even the laws of physics began to be treated as subjective perceptions and relative rather than objective certainties. The chasm and contradiction between what science does and what it purports to do surfaced within the scientific community.

Science ascribes great significance to induction method whereby a general law is established by accumulating particular instances. David Hume aptly stated that repetition might increase confidence but that is a psychological conditioning not an outcome of logic. Bertrand Russell and C.D. Broad also found induction as very

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much the weak link in the chain of empiricist science. Scientists must reckon that a non-empirical logical principle remains intrinsic to scientific method. The development of theories requires more than direct conclusions from sense data. Disinterested observation is not possible. Observation takes place selectively within the context of theory and is always shaped by theory. Olympian dogmatism was replaced by measures of tentativeness and humility. Popper's solution to this impasse is to substitute falsification for verification. No matter how many examples confirming, it is still not proven logically in absolute terms. But it takes only one example to prove it false.

The Baconian understanding of science as an inductive process was substituted by the idea of science as hypothetico-deductive. Scientific theories are proposed as hypothesis, propositions are deduced from theories, and the propositions are then tested. Every effort is made to prove them false. It is this falsifiability that sets scientific claims apart from non-scientific or pseudo-scientific claims. Theories are accepted provisionally to be true if all efforts to refute them fail. Thus all scientific statements remain tentative forever (Popper 1959, p.280).

Thomas Kuhn (1922-96) extended the argument further by raising serious doubts about objectivity and value-free neutrality of scientific discovery. Scientists do their work in and out of a background of theory, which comprises a unitary package of beliefs about science and scientific knowledge. It is this set of beliefs that Kuhn calls a *paradigm*. It is an overarching conceptual construct, which acts as a background in making sense. The prevailing paradigm is the matrix that shapes the reality to be studied and legitimates the methodology and methods whereby it can be studied. The contemporary scientific ethos takes it for granted. Challenges that are mounted are dismissed in the start at least as they are considered to be subversive of its basic commitments (1970, p.5). The normal science is a sort of puzzle-solving activity,, highly convergent based firmly on a settled consensus and its aim is to elucidate the prevalent scientific traditions. Paradigm shift occurs when existing paradigm proves

unable to explain the findings within the scope of paradigm-induced expectations. Paradigm is called into question by new theories because of explicit discontent. As a result, changes in science make the science change. Significant changes in science occur through radical changes in the way scientists view reality. These changes come about due to the non-scientific factors. Kuhn relates the 'doing' of science to the broader sweep of history and to social factors. Scientific work is an utterly human activity characterised by interests and values, and tasked by human frailties and foibles. There is little room left for the scientist working with detachment for objective, valid, unchallenging findings through the spirit of unalloyed scientific spirit. The pedestal at which logical positivism enshrined the science came down.

There was little scope for theories of human nature to be conceptualised within scientific traditions. The onslaught of Poppers and Kuhn created the space necessary for development of other frameworks more conducive to capturing such an elusive phenomenon. Nonetheless, during this period, writings from scholars influenced by religious orientations continued. These works could not find respectable place in the entrenched world of academia.

Paul Feyerabend (1924-94) went beyond Popper and Kuhn and alleged that science has become a tool of indoctrination and subjugation of academic freedom. He bluntly questioned the role of reason in science, the petrified and tyrannical versions of it. He apprehended that science couldn't be grounded philosophically in any compelling way despite its ostensibly rigorous methodology. Hence, scientific findings are no more than beliefs and should not be privileged over any other kind of beliefs. He called for a pluralistic methodology (1993, pp.36, 38). The chaos and irrationality that appears in science play a very important function in the development of theories. He went so far as to saying that anything goes in science. This is the only principle that can be defended under all circumstances and in all stage of human development (Feyerabend 1993, pp. 18-19). He suggested perceptions should be tested to ascertain their usefulness through counter-induction. It is a calling of

colru lonly used concepts into question by developing something with which they can be critically compared. Examination from inside is not sufficient, he opines. Thus he highlighted the importance of an external standard of criticism. Scientific ideas are historically conditioned and never absolute so they need to be pushed to their extremes. Scientific truths are no less cultural, and no less socio-political. Feyerbend, along with Popper and Kuhn questioned the basic tenets of positivism such as objective existence of meaningful reality that is value-neutral, ahistorical, and cross-cultural. Any claim to validity is tentative and uncertain. The tendency to view findings as absoluteness and certitude surrendered to the attitude of uncertainty and humility.

### **2.2.2 Suitability of Constructionism**

Constructionism implies that meanings are not discovered but constructed. Meaning does not inhere in the object, the world and objects in the world are indeterminate as such. Knowledge is contingent upon human practices. All Meanings are constructed in and out of interaction between human beings and their world. The view about reality is developed and transmitted within an essentially social context. So engagement of consciousness is a precondition to the creation of meanings. The world held no meaning before the appearance of consciousness. The modes of interpretation rest upon consciousness working on it.

Constructionism enmeshes objectivity and subjectivity irrevocably. Subject and object, distinguishable as they are, are united; dichotomy between them is untenable. The basic message is that when mind becomes conscious of something, it reaches out to, and into, that object. Conscious is directed towards the object; the object is shaped by consciousness. Meaning is, thus, neither subjective nor objective. Constructionism mirrors the concept of intentionality, which means referentiality, relatedness, directedness, and aboutness. Intentionality brings to the fore the mediation between subjectivism and objectivism without lending an edge to any single framework

Some researchers, espousing subjectivism of high degree, suggest that meanings be simply imposed on reality. They reject the existentialist concept of humans as beings in the world and the phenomenological concept of intentionality. There are strong trends within postmodernist thought, structuralist and post-structuralist in favour of subjectivism but constructionism is different. When humans engage with human world, meaning is born due to in and out of this play. Experience does not constitute a sphere of subjective reality separate from, and in contrast to, the objective realm of the external world. Thus, it represents both realms and owes its meanings in relation to both.

When humans engage with a reality, it is possible for different human beings to make sense of the same reality in quite different ways. There are no true or valid interpretations. There are useful interpretations and they stand above the others and not so useful interpretations. The possibility of multiple meanings of the same event has given rise to pluralism and paradoxes. Interpretations of the same principles, laws, events can be oppressive for some and liberating for others, can be fulfilling for some and exploiting others. This is an interesting outcome of activities at the level of human consciousness and explicates the complexity in the understanding human nature. The full potential of human mind its imagination and creativity is invoked in relation to a 'thing' which can also be an event or human behaviour. This discourse also favours a methodology wherein object is taken seriously. Yet the process of subjective construction of meaning is not also given proper place in view of its potential to capture the interaction between humans and the world.

When it comes to interplay, the involvement of the art and politics in the understanding of human nature cannot be discounted. There is a tradition in the research that allows researcher to act as do-it-yourself person (Denzin and Lincoln 1994, p.2). Such kind of researcher known as *bricoleur* seeks to juxtapose many diverse interpretative paradigms that can be brought to understand human behaviour. A large number of diverse tasks ranging from interviewing to observing,

to interpreting personal and historical documents, to intensive self-reflection and introspection are performed (Denzin and Lincoln 1998, p.4). The researcher as *bricoleur* develops expertise to simultaneously draw upon different streams and paradigms. Not confined to the bounds of any singular paradigms, the researcher navigates between and within competing and overlapping theoretical perspectives and interpretive paradigms. The question of human nature, the focus of this dissertation, requires researcher to be resourceful, inventive, and imaginative. As engaged in self-reflexive mode, *bricoleur* can frame the key question as what can be made up of the various facets of human beings? What do the individual and collective tendencies lend themselves to becoming? Levi-Strauss (1966, p.18) says that bricoleur's first practical step is to turn back and consider already existent work done in the field. A survey of research tools and resource materials is undertaken to consider what it is possible and what has been already accomplished. The second step is to engage in a dialogue, with reference to the research questions, and index the possible solutions, which the existent information can offer. A bricoleur interrogates all the heterogeneous objects, views, knowledge, traditions, discoveries, solutions, and etc. The purpose is to discover what each of them could signify and so contribute to the response to the research question. Research in constructivist vein in the mode of the bricoleur requires that the new work does not remain confined to the conventional meanings. It should be imbued with a radical spirit of openness in search of new and richer meanings.

Inasmuch the do-it-yourself research is attractive, it can also create some problems. One is the possibility that the research will reflect the biases and prejudices of an individual, and hence it will be too individualistic, lacking any wider acceptance. If it escapes individualistic overtones, then, it might become influenced by prevailing culture. That, too, is problematic. However, the way interpretative mode works leaves no provision for subjectivism to impel the proceedings. And it also does not

reduce the whole thing to individualism either. The social origin of meaning is to reckon with in the dialogue.

The social character of interaction inevitably influences the direction of research. The belief that objects are made and not found and meanings are communicated through social institutions, which precede the researchers. Research is embedded in these institutions, and it is only by inhabiting them or being inhabited by them that the researchers have access to the public and conventional senses. Institutions are publicly available systems of understanding and intelligibility (Fish 1990, p. 186).

While institutions represent social structures, culture symbolises the social processes. It is considered as an indispensable guide to human behaviour because it contains belief systems, values and norms, and perceptual assumptions. Culture is the basic ingredient in human functioning. As a direct consequence of the way in which humans have evolved, humans depend on culture to direct behaviour and organise experience. Culture is the result and the source of the human behaviour and thought. It summarises complexes of concrete behaviour patterns—customs, languages, traditions, habit clusters. It is a set of control mechanisms—plans, recipes, rules, and instructions—for the governing of behaviour (Greetz 1973, p. 44). Culture and institutions play a significant role in determining the meanings and they precede the researcher. While human may be described in constructivist terms as agents engaging with the world and making sense of it, this description needs to be seen in social and historical perspectives. Each individual does not encounter each and every phenomenon nor all humans make sense of every thing one by one. Instead, humans are born into a world of meaning where a system of intelligibility prevails and there is a system of symbols.

The social constructionism has the potential to envelop into its fold the whole gamut of meaningful reality about human nature. The social in social constructionism is about the mode of meaning generation and not about the kind of object that has

meaning. The object could be human nature or nature. Accordingly, social scientists as well as the natural scientists deal with realities that are socially constructed.

Giddens postulates that human do not create the natural world but have to make sense of a world already there (Giddens 1976, p. 79). The very existence of social phenomena stems from human action. Consequently, the process of bringing the social realities into being is one and same as with the process of interpreting and reinterpreting them. Unlike the natural world, then, social realities are meaningful by virtue of the very act that brings them into existence.

The difference is that social scientists engage in double hermeneutics when they engage in inquiry into human nature. Social scientists have to understand the frames of meanings involved in the construction of social meanings. Then they have to reconstitute these within the frames of meanings involved in the conceptual theoretical meta language concerning human nature (Giddens 1976, p. 12). The so-called meta language is not a language in itself. It is an ordinary language adapted to serve the specific purpose of human nature. On the contrary, natural science can ignore the categories used by the people. Blaikie (1993, p.36) also supports this point of view. Natural scientists study nature as it were, from the outside. For human nature, the scientists then have to invent concepts and theories and then start describing it.

This dissertation takes the view that social and natural worlds are not to be seen as distinct worlds existing side by side. They are one human world. Humans born into an already interpreted world and the world are at once natural and social. What is true of the social world is also true of the natural world: people develop meanings together and it already stands interpreted before the arrival of scientists.

It is important, however, to distinguish accounts of constructionism where this social dimension of meaning is at the centre stage from those where it is not.

Constructivism is primarily an individualistic understanding of the constructionist

position and different from social constructionism (Schwandt 1994, p. 125).

Constructionism focuses on collective generation of meanings. Social constructionists hold culture as the ingredient in the making of humans. Constructivists are of the view that objective knowledge and truth is the result of perspective. Constructivism focuses on epistemological considerations of one mind's meaning making activity.

Constructivism suggests that each person has a unique sense of meaning making and it is as valid and worthy of respect as that of any other group of person.

Developing a critical spirit vis-a-vis inherited understanding about human nature is a difficult task. Humans tend to take the sense they make of things to be the ways things are. They do it blithely and regard it as the truth. The knowledge transmitted this way takes deep roots, a process described as sedimentation. The familiar becomes tyrant when results in building mental models. Another aspect of the process can be described as sedimentation. Layers of interpretations get placed one after the other. No longer it is a question of existential engagement with realities in the world but of building upon theoretical deposits already in place. In sedimented culture, meanings already gained serve as barrier between researcher and the changing realities. These masks and screens (Ortega y Gasset 1963, pp.59-63) give a false sense of the realities and adversely influence the perceptual processes.

Awareness of the closed thinking systems resulting from the constructionist research led the scientists to engage in phenomenological endeavour (Marcel 1964, p.35). The urge to go back to the things themselves gained momentum as inherent restrictiveness of cultural understandings increased. The critical mode of inquiry has been even more suspicious of the constructed meanings that culture bequeaths. The particular sets of meanings emerging out of social existence serve as hegemonic interests. Each set of meanings supports particular power structures, resists moves towards greater equity, and harbours oppression, manipulation and other modes of injustice. The dominant cultural forms, thus, become tools of dictatorship. Some content with the social origin of human ways of understanding the world and take

comfort in the fact that living within it is enough to guarantee their objectivity and validity.

Interpretivism is overwhelmingly oriented towards an uncritical exploration of cultural meanings. Certainly, there was a need to see human affairs in critical terms. The mode of critical theory, along with many streams of feminist and postmodernist research, invites researchers to take a much more critical stance. Marx's premise links ideology to the economic base of society. He also believed that economic needs configure the basics of human nature. Those who own the means of production in any society have the power to effect the kind of consciousness that in that society (Marx 1961, p.67).

One of the major strands in the tradition of constructionism is phenomenology movement spearheaded by Jean-Paul Sartre and Maurice Merleau-Ponty. The study of human nature has gained more insights from this research tradition than any other. It is based on the notion that social being determines consciousness. It is thoroughly imbued with the spirit of social constructionism and strongly embedded in anti-objectivism. It declared itself from the start a philosophy of radical criticism, albeit with none of the economic determinism which orthodox Marxism is often charged with. Charles Hiedegger presented human beings in existentialist terms and swayed the phenomenology towards existentialism in purpose and orientation.

Charles Sanders Pirce, William James and John Dewey maintained the critical side of constructionist tradition as well as the pragmatic side and were known for attitude of compromise and accommodation. Their uncritical character of investigation remained a focus of criticism. Due to overarching nature of their inquiry, they were able to conjecture more about human nature by aggregation and cross fertilisation.

Randolph Bourne (1977, p.345) appreciated the openness, optimism and progressivism of the pragmatism but decried the eagerness for action and effectiveness and search for influence as vulgar and unethical. The lack of vision and

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consequent lack of values meant abandonment of human purposes (Mumford 1950, p.48). Pragmatists severed the charges of conformism and compromise. George Mead (1863-1931), a renowned social psychologist, put forward the idea that every person is a social construction. His account of social genesis projects the point of view that humans become persons in and out of the interaction with the society. He posits that human behaviour is social in origin, shaped by social forces, and permeated by the social even in its biological and physical aspects. Mead (1964, p. 337). To see the world as a whole, he requires researchers to enter into 'the most highly organised logical, ethical, and aesthetic attitudes of the community' and 'to recognise the most extensive set of interwoven conditions that may determine thought, practice, and our fixation and enjoyment of values.'

Mead's important innovation in phenomenology is symbolic interactionism which has been instrumental in understanding the social and cultural processes laden by intersubjectivity, interaction, community and communication, in and out of which humans grow to be persons and learn to live as persons. The inability of symbolic interactionism to deal with the contrast, conflict, power play, and struggle so common in human life and so integral a part of human nature led to development of a new branch of critical theorists. Their works focus on striking disparities, battleground of hegemonic interests, oppression, manipulation, and coercion.

The relative nature of understanding gained through constructionism has never been in doubt. The understanding gained through social interaction remained tentative and far less dogmatic. The influence of history and culture made it all relative and contingent. Many divergent explanations are possible of one event across different people and regions. As a result, different people can live in different kinds of world they have made for themselves in this one world. Thus, Constructionism in epistemology is perfectly compatible with realism in ontology. The way things are is really the way humans believe, they make sense of the things. The descriptions and narration can no longer be seen as straightforward representation of reality.

### 2.3 Implications of Theoretical Perspectives

The philosophical stance lying behind the methodology is discussed in this section. The theoretical perspectives provide a context for the process involved, a basis for its logic and its criteria. Each methodology is based on a complex set of assumptions that constitute theoretical perspective concerning the world the methodology envisages. The positivists approach when applied to the social sciences sought to identify universal features of human nature, society and history that offer explanation and hence control and predictability by way of allegedly value-free and detached observation. In contrast, the interpretivist approach looks for culturally derived and historically situated interpretations of the social life-world.

As discussed before, there has been a debate whether natural reality and social reality are in themselves different kinds of reality and whether their investigation requires different methods. Given the topic of this dissertation, this debate is relevant to the search for appropriate way to develop a synthesis. Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911) proposed that different methods are required. Wilhelm Windelband (1848-1915) and Heinrich Rickert (1863-1936) both rejected the notion that there is distinction. Max Weber (1864-1920) contrasted the interpretative approach (*Verstehen*, understanding) needed in human and social sciences with the explicative approach (*Erklaren*, explaining), focused on causality, that is found in the natural sciences. The attempt to match the methods to the context evolved into clear distinction of qualitative and quantitative methods.

However, there is logical distinction, one posited by the mind and necessitated by different purposes in view. Windelband says that natural science seeks what is nomothetic and the human and social science seeks what is idiographic. Nomothetic delivers consistencies, regularities, and the law that obtains. Idiographic gives details of the individual cases and trace their unique development. So, differences and commonality can be ascertained on the basis of two factors: uniqueness and historicity. Both are manifest in nature as well as humanity.

Weber holds that one scientific method should be utilised in both sciences. Human affairs require generalisation. For this purpose, empirical research is needed to find out what regularly occurs. The natural world is investigated to understand abstract phenomenon exhibiting quantifiable and empirical regularities. It is also a matter of interest that research in sociology focuses on unique, individual and qualitative aspects. While biology, too, has shown interest in knowing the unique phenomenon. Weber's *Verstehen* sociology locates the study of society in the context of human beings acting and interacting. He defines sociology as 'science which attempts the interpretative understanding of social action in order to arrive at a causal explanation of its course and effects' (1968, p. 3). Sociology's 'concepts and generalisations are fashioned on the premise that it can claim to make a contribution to the causal explanation of some historically and culturally important phenomenon' (Weber 1962, p.51). This position is contradicted by Silverman (1990, p. 126) who says that interpretivism rests on the emphatic denial that cultural phenomenon could be understood in causal terms.

According to Lewis (1975, p. 39), Weber attempted to establish a science of social fact on the basis of a methodology which would explain social, political, and historical facts schematically and deduce experimentally the laws-system of society. Weber calls the centrepiece of this appropriate methodology *the ideal type*. This is the principal diagnostic tool, a heuristic device for the precise purpose of analysing empirical data in order to subject social behaviour, for all its subjective dimensions, to the scientific need for empirical verification of all knowledge. In reality, each case is featured with fortuitous and confusing features. The ideal type is applicable to rational goal oriented conduct only. The focus of study is the outcome of persons acting under a common motivation and choosing suitable means to the ends they have in view. Over a period of time, the *Verstehen* approach has come to accept what Weber refused to accept and the passion for empirical verification or explanation in causal terms faded away.

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Three historical streams have utilised the interpretivism namely symbolic interactionism, phenomenology, and hermeneutics. The study of human nature from interactionist perspective can be undertaken on the basis of three assumptions about the interplay of meanings, as pointed out by Blumes (1969, p.2). Firstly, human beings act toward things on the basis of the meanings that these things have for them. Secondly, the meaning of such things is derived from, and arises out of, the social interaction that one has with one's fellows. Thirdly, these meanings are handled in, and modified through, an interpretative process used by the person in dealing with the things he encounters.

For Mead and Weber, the meanings refer to the subjective meaning actors impute to their actions (Cosser 1971, p.340). This implies that observers should apply sufficient discipline on themselves or herself to ensure that actors' meanings or insider view is recorded. Only through dialogue can one become aware of the perceptions, feelings and attitudes of others and become capable of interpreting the meanings and intent. In conclusion, analysis of meanings is an analysis of certain kinds of action in certain contexts with a reference, however remote that might be (Thayer 1968, p.429). Thus experience and culture become interchangeable. The view of the human world is a world to be explored and to be made the most of, not the world to be subjected to radical criticism.

One way to define pragmatism is to consider it as a method of reflexion with the purpose of rendering the ideas clear and intelligible (Pierce 1931-58, vol.5, p.9). Pierce looked to determine the elemental categories present to the mind in their 'Firstness' or qualitative immediacy. To a great extent, this resembles the phenomenologist's efforts to delineate phenomena encountered in immediate experience (Spielberg 1981). Pragmatism embodies the code for liberal, progressive, tolerant, and optimistic living. Functionally, it stands for acquiescence in the social order (Harowitz 1966, p.29). The simplistic notion that propelled pragmatism to popularity is that efficacy in practical application is a valid standard for

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determination of truth in the case of statements, rightness in the case of alternate actions, and value in the case of evaluation (Rescher 1995, p.70).

In the works of John Dewey and William James, pragmatism became essentially an uncritical exploration of cultural ideas and values in terms of their practical outcomes. Pragmatism is the attitude of looking away from first things, principles, categories, and supposed necessities; and of looking towards last things, fruits, consequences, facts, and results.

The pragmatist-naturalist philosophy focuses on the nature and genesis of a shared world, intersubjectivity, and communication (Mary Rogers 1981, p. 140). Mead attributes the very personhood to social forces that shape human behaviour. A person is a personality because he belongs to a community, because he takes over the institution of that community into his own conduct (Mead 1934, p. 162). The whole (society) is prior to the part (humans). The spotlight is now on the practices found in any culture because they are the source of the personhood. The making of personality begins in childhood through early imitative acts and learning. It proceeds via play and games when children start to **think** in terms of the generalised other or broader social institutions. To enter the attitude of the community and take over the institutions of the community is the way of the emergence of the personhood.

Methodologically, symbolic interactionism directs the investigator to take, to the best of his ability, the position of those who are being studied (Denzin 1978, p.99).

Interaction begins when people start taking roles using language and other symbols, that humans share. The emphasis is on putting oneself in the place of the other and seeing things from the perspective of others. This kind of tool is used in cultural anthropology.

In this method, culture is not called into question; it is not criticised, least of all from someone from another culture. Instead one is to observe it as closely as possible, attempt to take the place of those within the culture, and dig out the insider's

perspective. It has also spawned the research methodology known as grounded theory. It is a process of inductive theory building based squarely on observation of the data. Theory emerges from the data and not from some other source.

Through application of phenomenological methods, new meanings about human nature can be gained, former meanings can be authenticated or enriched, and, in some cases, the prevailing might be overruled. Intentionality, as the axis of phenomenology, symbolises the essential relationship between conscious subjects and their objects. Consciousness is always of something and object is always an object for someone. Both cannot be described without reference to each other. The relationship between the two is itself a focus of study. The existentialist point of view is that humans are beings in this world and the world cannot be described without reference to humans and humans cannot be described without reference to world.

The cultural melange provides the medium in which meanings are transmitted and transmuted. By and large, culture shapes human **thinking** and behaviour.

Constructivism describes the individual human subject as engaging with objects and making sense of them. It introduces the whole world of meaning directly. The problem is that cultural heritage pre-empts the task of meaning making and it becomes difficult to do what Constructivism requires. Phenomenology requires that experience is taken first without having the prior meanings impact in any way. As a first person exercise, each human being explores own experience, not the experience of others (Crotty 1998, p. 84). Experience or phenomena is instructive if it is immediate based on original data unadulterated by culture. Experience should be, in primordial fashion, original manifestation to the consciousness.. The point is to capture as truly as possible what has been directly experienced with usual understanding in abeyance. It is a reflective enterprise and has a note of objectivity about it. It is in search of objects of experience rather than being content with the description of the experiencing subject. It calls into question what is taken for

granted. This framework is good to identify, understand, describe and maintain subjective experiences of the respondents.

Merleau-Ponty (1962, p. xiv) points out that world should be seen in paradoxical terms breaking from acceptance of the familiar understanding of the inherited. He added the element *of* criticism in phenomenology to ensure purity of the experience. At first, phenomenology should be most basic critique which is a necessary element in all human enquiry. The outcome of such an exercise would be renewal of the world and its conditions. The criticism levelled in culture has a liberating effect on humans. It then performs the dual function of subscribing meanings as well as becoming a source of emancipation.

### 2.3.1 Hermeneutic Interpretivism and Human Enquiry

The research modes discussed above were related to the study of objects through experimentation or observation or experience. In this research, evidently, interpretation is the most crucial step. Since Qur'anic teaching will also be referred to, the hermeneutic interpretivism provides the basis. The set of theories and rules governing the explanation and interpretation of the Biblical Scriptures has come to be known as hermeneutics. Since then it has been used to interpret not only Scriptures but also other texts and unwritten sources such as human practices, human events, human situations in an attempt to read these in ways that bring understanding. One consequence of utilisation *of* hermeneutics is that language emerges as the central in the study of concept of human being. Humans are essentially language beings. Language is pivotal to the understanding of human nature. It shapes the events and practices, and through all this enhances the understanding. In ancient philosophy, it was believed that Language represents and articulates concepts of reality. The way things are shapes the way humans perceive things and this gets expressed in the way they speak. Now **this** sequence has been reversed. The way

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humans speak shape what they see and how they see, and it is these things shaped by language, which constitute reality for humans.

Kearney (1991, p.277) defines hermeneutics as 'a method for deciphering indirect meaning, a reflective practice of unmasking hidden meanings beneath apparent ones. While this method had originally been used by theologians to investigate the inner meanings of sacred texts, it was radically redeployed by modern **thinkers** like Dilthey, Heidegger, Gadamer, and Ricoeur to embrace man's general being in the world as an agent of language.'

Etymologically, 'hermeneutics' derives from, the Greek word *hermeneuein* which means to interpret or to understand. As a disciplined approach, hermeneutics can be traced back to ancient Greeks studying literature and to biblical exegesis in the Judeo-Christian tradition. In Greek tradition, grammar, style and ideas were thought to be consistent in a text or writings of an author or school of thought. They proceeded to codify the grammar and style and identify the logic. The more enduring theme in interpretive methodology is relating of part to whole and whole to part.

The Jewish hermeneutic practices yielded another way of interpretation by making it possible to creatively embellish several texts. There were also different procedures for legal and narrative texts. The tools of interpretation provided deeper lining for meanings. Interpreters looked for literal as well as spiritual meanings that text bears. It was taken for granted, however, that the interpretation of the religious texts requires guidance from someone who already knows about it. There are certain assumptions derived from the religious tradition for the interpretation of the texts. Then there were attempts to apply biblical data to present-day situations rather than limiting their relevance to historical context only.

The hermeneutic mode of understanding is based on several assumptions. Firstly, text is viewed as strange and far off just like object in positivist tradition. It is because

of this distance that interpretation is deemed to be problematic. Secondly, hermeneutics also assume affinity between reader and text – a commonality that provides a basis for the interpretation that is to emerge. Texts are assumed to be a source of transmitting meanings, experience, beliefs, and values – from one person or community to another. Thirdly, hermeneutics is not merely an academic exercise. The objective in religious texts has been to identify textual meaning and intent and it is very much a form of inquiry into how the texts can and should be applied by the followers of the text. Abstract theorising is replaced by determination of meaning through practical judgement and common sense. Fourthly to consider hermeneutics as sharing of meaning between people and community is to situate hermeneutics at once within history as well as culture. Fifthly also implicit is the assumption that authors' meanings even go beyond what even authors understood. Interpreters make explicit the awareness of meanings that even authors themselves would have been unable to articulate. Sixth, to understand the text bearing upon human affairs or a culture that guides human lives, one needs to be able to move dialectically between parts and part and whole.

Friedrich Ast (1778-1841) and Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834) applied the tools of hermeneutics beyond the realm of religious texts to illuminate human understanding. For Schleiermacher, reading a text is like listening to a speaker. The empathy that exists between listeners and the speaker can also be extended to the interpretation of the texts. Readers understand the language, its grammar and style, and put themselves in the place of the writer. Attention to grammar and style put the text in literary context while empathy elucidates not only the intention but also the assumptions of the authors. Dilthey regarded philosophy as science of the real; that is, of all real without truncations (Marias 1967, p.379). He believes that human understanding can never exhaust the real and that in the real there will always remain something unknowable and ineffable. All researchers have a worldview *Weltanschauung* that guides actions and is grounded in the real life. Convinced of

'peculiar ephemerality of the historical event that all people live within history,' Dilthey projects the historical character of human existence. He distinguishes sharply between natural reality and social phenomena and emphasised humanness of science without compromising the objectivity. The purpose of scientific experiments is to explain while inquiry into human affairs seeks to understand. He aims at elaborating a methodology for gaining objective knowledge that escapes the reductionism and mechanism of natural science and escapes its failures by taking into account the historicity of life. He is of the view that there are universal spiritual forms shaping the event one encounters in social experience. The texts, the art, the speech are all expression of meanings. He acknowledges that author's historical and social context is the prime source of understanding. The human context is an objectification or externalisation and keeping it in view, is to study objectively. The psychological focus found in his work to date gives way to a much more sociological pursuit. Cultural analysis or examination of socially derived systems of meanings replaces empathy. He wants to give interpreter a lesser and lesser play. He requires interpreter to move from the text to the historical and social circumstances of the author to increase the objectivity and validity. All in an attempt to reconstruct the world in which the text came to be and to situate the text within it.

Ricoeur (1976, p. 87) offers the notion of a hermeneutical arc that moves from existential understanding to explanation and explanation to existential understanding. Heidegger (1962) brought phenomenological dimensions of hermeneutics to the fore. Hermeneutics for him is the revelatory aspect of phenomenological seeing whereby existential structures and then Being itself is known. The lifetime focus of Heidegger was ontology, the study of Being. In this regard Heidegger differs from early philologists who considered hermeneutics as body of principles and rules for interpreting texts and also from Dilthey who took it as a methodology for human sciences. Heidegger's hermeneutics refers to his phenomenological explication of human existing itself (Palmer 1969, p. 42).

There is disagreement among the those involved in interpretivism about how much weight should be given to authorial intent or textual form or the core content. This has to be balanced with the freedom of the interpreter to read and interpret in a variety of ways. The texts used in this dissertation are approached in four steps. Firstly, there is openness and receptivity in the course of research. The curiosity is to know how the author arrived at it and what argument forms the basis. Interpreter tries to enter into author's mind and personage seeking to see things from the author's perspective. The next step is interpretation. This involves **running** conversation in which responses engages with the text and author. Dialogue of this kind has the most formative impact on ideas brought to this interchange. The next step is transaction. The insights emerge into the mind of interpreter are not in the author's text. It is much more than refinement, enhancement, or enlargement of what an interpreter brings after engagement with the text.

Straw and Sadowy (1990, p. 22) point to a movement 'from transmission motion of reading (1800-1890) to a translation motion of reading (1890-1970s) to an interactive notion of reading. The further development that is taking place is from transactional and constructionist notions of reading. In the transmission mode, emphasis was on author's intention. Positivist and expressive notions of realism dominated. It was believed that a text means what its author intended it to mean (Knapp and Micheals 1985, p. 469). In translation mode, formalist approaches to texts emerged. The movement was actually from deification of the author to the reification of the text. The critics insisted on the presence within the work of everything necessary for its analysis and they called for an end to any concern by critics with matters outside the work itself. The translation phase then gave way to the interaction phase. Systems approaches were applied and structures were used to reach the interpretation of any particular texts.

### 2.3.2 Critical Inquiry and Humanism

The present dissertation is basically a study of texts and involves interpretation to formulate a synthesis. A wide variety of literatures are used to penetrate into the **think** ing of representative scholars from philosophic, scientific, and Islamic perspectives. But the efforts was not only li nited to interpretation. The discourse went beyond interpretation to critical inquiry. The conception of human nature resulting from critical inquiry had indelible mark on the course of human history. This section surveys the impact of Marxism on the thought about human nature.

Interpretivism, as discussed above, is largely an uncritical form of study.

Phenomenology is somewhat critical in a restricted manner. The purpose of research employing interpretivism is to understand the situation, read it in terms of interaction and community. It is a research that is oriented towards accepting and strengthening the perspectives on status quo. In contrast, the critical inquiry unleashes research that challenges, research that reads in terms of conflict and oppression, and research that seeks to bring about change.

From Socrates on, social criticism has always been in tradition. The criticism, modern times, is levelled against the social order, its institutions and structures. The critical inquiry gained momentum in reaction to the power of ideas wielded by the ruling elite. The possession and use and control of the knowledge have become the key tool in their hands in addition to finance and other resources. The power depends on the effectiveness with which they control the ideas governing the distribution of authority and formation of values. Nothing disturbs those in authority as the possibility of upsetting the gover lling structure protective of elitist interests through freedom to criticise. The social critics today are not alienated or isolated. They participate from within the institutions. They stand close to the power structures but maintain distance to claim freedom and avoid ending up being engulfed.

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Karl Marx (1818-1883) is seen as having a pioneering role in developing social critiques. One important contribution of Marx was to fuse philosophy, history, and economics into a grandiose synthesis. Notwithstanding the synthesis is incomplete, misleading, irrelevant to the theory of socialism, but he embarked upon a path not touched by Comte, Mill or others (Lichtheim 1968, 1985). Another distinguished thing about Marx is that he focused his thoughts on real-life men and women, society as it is experienced, and not on mere abstractions. He took an extremely activist view of philosophy. "The philosophers have only interpreted the world in different ways, the point is to change it. The practical focus in Marxian sociology is its distinguished feature, he says, 'all social life is essentially practical.' The rational solution can be found in human practice and in the comprehension of this practice (Marx 1961, p. 84). Life is not determined by consciousness but consciousness determines life. He begins with real and active men in the society, and from their events in real-life processes, shows the genesis of ideological currents. Hegel was too abstract for Marx. In his view, Hegelian philosophy is engrossed with pure thoughts and has an esoteric and speculative character.

The social philosophy of Marx has the twin features of dialectic and historical materialism. The central notion is that the succession of societal forms and regimes also represents stages in human self-understanding. The dialectic feature means that realities are never isolated entities standing in a linear, causal relationship to one another. The real picture is always full of contradictions and conflicts, paradoxes and struggles because of multifaceted interaction. The distinguishable periods of human history are actually at war with itself (1961, p. 156). Marx characterised that history as the history of the class struggle. The class struggle between capital and labour mirrors the conflict in ancient times between free persons and slaves or between aristocrats and peasants in the agrarian society. These conflicts are not destructive in nature and outcome. They epitomise the egoistic essence of human nature. Hegel's dialectic holds not only the notion of thesis and antithesis and their interaction

leading to a synthesis. The central element in Marxian thought is relations of production. Ultimately, liberating process is contained in relations of productions. The action of human beings on the world lies at the heart of history. It is through such action that humans become fully human. The way in which humans produce their means of subsistence is a definite form of activity, way of expressing their lives and a mode of life. What human beings become, therefore, depends on the material conditions of their production (Marx 1961, p. 70). A determinate mode of production, subsequently, is always bound up with a determinate mode of cooperation, or social change (Marx 1961, p. 77). When productive forces change, social relations also change. Marx concedes that this change is uneasy and is realised through many difficulties.

The thoughts of Marx inform the concepts about human nature in a way not done before. And had an unprecedented impact. To Marx, the social being is essentially an economic being. Those who hold economic power are able to shape the perceptions and viewpoints of those who do not. What goes on at the level of superstructure derives its effectiveness from the economic forces at work. The effective action for change stems from legal, political, or religious awareness of the conflict between productive forces and the social relations of production. Thus economic forces determine how humans **think**. It is not the consciousness of men that determine their being. On the contrary, in agreement with social construction of reality, he believed that the social being determines their consciousness. Marx described, more extensively than ever before, the oppression that touches the entire gamut of human life. He argued that deep-rooted alienation develops among workers due to the false consciousness owing to beliefs adopted for not what they are but for how they expect to be the way reality is.

Another observation that Marx makes about human nature is that capitalist system succeeds in making worker stranger to the work. Because of alienation, Marx notes, the work becomes external to the worker, that it is not part of his nature. Marx views

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human beings as productive by their very nature. But in capitalist system, work no longer belongs to the worker, he assumes. What ought to be an expression of their very beings becomes merely a means of subsistence. In addition to alienation of the self, alienation of the thing also takes place. That is product of the labour comes to dominate the person. So, natural as well as human worlds stand against the workers. This inhuman condition is inflicted by the capitalist system and dominates with the sway of inhuman power. Revolution is revolt against this inhumanity by an ineluctable, irremediable, and an imperious distress (1961, p. 236-237). The proletariat emancipates itself by destroying the inhuman conditions and by abolishing itself and its opposition. The alienation is overcome, 'every emancipation is a restoration of the human world and of human relationships to man himself' (Marx 1961, p. 236-41).

A number of emphases found in Marxist theory are due to the cultural atmosphere abroad in Europe in the late nineteenth century. His thoughts led to the development of sociology pondered over the Marx. Ferdinand Tönnies, Emile Durkheim, Georg Simmel, Max Weber developed the Marxian thesis in the light of subsequent changes. The revisionist who felt that Marxism had gone astray and wished to see it return to a more authentic form were guided by Kautsky. In contrast, Bernstein (1850-1932) argued that trends discernible within Western capitalism were not those predicted by Marx and that Marxist theory needs revision. On the other hand, Bolshevik revolution failed to see the victory of Proletariat. Instead the dictatorship over proletariat emerged. Two streams of thought ensued from this stark reality. One regarded the soviet regime as true reflection of Marxist thoughts. The other called for wedding of socialist planning and collective ownership with political democracy. Still another stream took the early version of humanist Marx gave way to the scientific Marx loaded with structuralism.

The lasting effect of Marx is concerned about welfare and empowerment of ordinary people. His conceptions about the adverse impact of capitalism can be argued but his

purpose can not be debated. That it turned the other is dictum of the real world. His another contribution is the critical approach to the existing society. Attempts were made to blend a modernist critique of society with Marxism. Radical challenges to the structures and beliefs cherished by leading thinkers were made. Horkheimer and Adorno pursued a theory which becomes a genuine force, consisting in the self-awareness of the subjects of a great historical revolution. He wanted a social theory that could blend philosophical construct and empirical detail. Philosophy and science informing each other in dialectic fashion.

The other stream led by Adorno who was obsessed with irrationality, anything that opposes reason. Horkheimer and Adorno took radically anticapitalist stance. Adorno abandoned immanent critique on Marx's theory of history for a total critique.

Habermas wanted to provide a normative basis for the interpretation of the history.

His threefold typology of human knowledge is based on the fact that human beings constitute their reality and organise their experience in terms of cognitive (or knowledge-guiding) interests. Thus the empirical sciences are led by a technical interest in predicting and controlling objectified processes. This is the realm of instrumental action. Secondly, historico-hermeneutic sciences that is, cultural or human sciences are guided by a practical interest in achieving inter-subjective understanding. This interest is styled practical because of the crucial importance to human beings of securing and developing mutual understanding in the everyday conduct of life. Then there are critical sciences, which are governed by the intent to bring about emancipation from the relations of dependence that ideology has set in place and that appear as natural.

Habermas's interest later shifted to language because he saw it as the only thing whose nature is known and through its structure, autonomy and responsibility are posited. It is precisely in communication that he hopes to find a foundation for his critical theory. According to McCarthy (1984, p.272) Habermas provided theoretical and normative account of communication that goes beyond hermeneutics without

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being reducible to empirical-analytic science. He presented the idea of discourse that is basis of this thesis. Discourse is 'unrestrained and universal' and enables an 'unconstrained consensus' to emerge whereby the idea of truth can be analysed. It requires communication that is free from systematic distortion, allows unimpaired presentation, and is characterised by mutuality of expectation rather than one-sided norm. Discourse is distinguished from communicative action. The latter is interaction that takes place every day life. Acceptance of the claims of validity is naively accepted. Discourse, on the other hand, is an unusual form of communication in which better arguments are sought with the view to coming to an agreement. Beliefs, values and assumptions are expressly considered as theme and subjected to critique. The more social circumstances approximate to an ideal speech situation, the more a social order based on the autonomous action of free and equal individuals will emerge. Addressing the issue of social critique and social evolution as the ultimate goal, normative principle of universalisation is, for him, the stepping stone to social critique. Universal are those norms that are agreed upon through consensus and are representative of common good.

Habermas sees the evolution of society proceeding by way of processes of learning that on within it and adaptations that occur at every level. The theory of social evolution is reconstruction of the theory of historical materialism. He reviewed dilemmas of modernity in terms of philosophy of language and a theory of communication. The communicative reasons are embedded in language and are not the same as subject-centred, instrumental reasons.

Paulo Freire (1921-97) has greatly influenced the field of social inquiry. He posited that there is indivisible solidarity between humans and their world. Authentic reflections should consider neither abstract man nor the world without men, but men in their relations with the world (Freire 1972a, p.54). Humans are rooted in this world and in humans the world has come to consciousness. The world is thus subject to not only natural evolution but also historical evolution, in which human beings

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have a guiding hand. The task of humans is to exercise in the world the creative responsibility that is characteristic of humans. As conscious beings, humans are endowed with creative imagination. This means that humans not only confront factuality and material determination but a situation that is utterly a human situation. Humans see their situation as not only what it is but also what it can be. Humans are with this world and related to it. They are called upon to do something about their situation. The freedom in this world is a situated freedom, an embodied freedom – not the freedom to realise absolute and abstract ideals – but to address themselves to their situation, seize upon its growing points, and to create the better out of the worse. Human beings must emerge from the situations – here and now – reflect upon it and intervene in it. Their state is not outcome of some inexorable fate, not as something unalterable, but merely as limiting and therefore challenging (Freire 1972a, p.57). The ongoing interplay between humans and their environments constitutes human history. History is the enterprise where human efforts and initiatives are reported in retrospect. There is no history for men, there is history of men, made by men, and in turn making them. Humans have a sense of history, value, and project.

Despite indivisible solidarity between humans and their world, they are not in this world as one object alongside other expressions. As a living and free being, human presence has made this world a human world not only a material world. Humans should be seen as beings in the process of becoming – as unfinished, uncompleted beings in and with a likewise unfinished reality (Freire 1972a, p.56-7). The position of Freire on the interface between human and the world and on the development of history is a basis for the development of synthesis pursued in this dissertation.

The solidarity between human beings and their world bridge the classical objective/subjective dichotomy. Freire's epistemology rejects 'mechanistic objectivism' wherein consciousness is merely considered to be a copy of objective reality and solipsism which reduces the world to a capricious creation of

consciousness' (1972b, p. 53). He talked about the unity of objectivity and subjectivity in the act of knowing and experience. He also uses the term intentionality to denote the fact that dynamic structure of consciousness is inseparable from the objects that inform it, in other words, that authentic thought language is generated out in and out of a dialectic relationship between human beings and their concrete historical and cultural reality. Consciousness is not merely a reflection of reality but reflection upon reality. Praxis is a reflection and action upon the world to transform it (1972a, p. 99). True praxis can never be only cerebral, it must involve action. Reflection and action are inseparable, they constantly inform each other and illuminate each other.

Friere introduces the concept of conscientisation. It is an awakening of, or increase in, consciousness. It can be increased only through praxis. Action means critical self-insertion into the reality of one's situation. Human beings are called to be re-creators, not mere spectators. The world is to be seen not as static reality but as reality in process. Humans are called to transform it. Hence, we find Friere speaking of 'the unfinished character of men and the transformational character of reality (1972a, pp. 56-7). The critical conscious develops when human beings are engaged in transformation of the world. Humans, as Subject of the history, cease to see history as enveloping reality but as reality capable of transformation.

What direction humans should give to the history? Friere's response is that the historic task of human beings is to become more fully human. No one escapes this ontological and historical vocation of becoming more fully human. Humans become dehumanised, or fail to become human or become less human. The forces of oppression and injustice dehumanise. To liberate themselves and their oppressors from dehumanisation is the basic task of humans. This task can not be carried in isolation or on individual basis. It can only take place in action/reflection through the processes of fellowship and solidarity. This is how he defines dialogue.

Without dialogue there can be no conscientisation. It takes place in human beings and among other human beings. These are human beings united by their action and

their reflection upon the action and the world. True dialogue requires critical thinking. What resists dialogue is the culture of silence in which the masses mute and have no voice. In culture of silence, the dominated have interjected the myths the do llinators. The myths of natural inferiority are induced and internalised. People come to see themselves as the oppressors would prefer. The oppressed become submerged in their situation, sometimes even unaware of lack of freedom and absence of self-respect. The methodology of practical dialogue is based on dialogue, problem posing, and conscientising. Problem posing is consciously critical confrontation with the problem. The problem-posing cause them to emerge from their situation, take a focalised view of the reality, become aware of the culture of silence, and develop a total view of the reality with all its consequences and causes. Dialogue is the only way to transform the situation.

### **2.3.3 Postmodernism and Possibility of Synthesis**

Postmodernism remains in broad continuity with modernism and embodies many of its concerns. Modernism is characterised by the industrial revolution and the social changes that followed as a consequence of it. The new form of h ll llan societies emerged with its own complexities and dynamics different from the societies preceding it. The rationality of the modem society embedded in the Enlightenment, is embodied especially in the certainty and precision of its science and the astounding control and manipulation of nature that science n\_lakes it possible. Seen synonymous with progress, the age of Enlightenment dissolved myths and substituted knowledge based on reason and discovery of absolute reality through scientific methods.

Postmodernism shatters the entire epistemological basis for any such claims to truth. It is rejection of generalised, indubitable truths about the way things really are. It colru lts itself to ambiguity, relativity, fragmentation, particularity, and discontinuity instead of clarity, objectivity, and certitude. However, it should be

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noted that what is commonly attributed to postmodernism was known and debated much before. Constructionism rejected the objectivism inherent in the Enlightenment theory of knowledge. Adorno fought against the tyranny of the concept and call for remedy of the inadequacy of the frameworks and to look into the important things that constitute the remainder and escape the frameworks. Henry James (1843-1916) refused to resolve paradoxes or dissolve differences into identity (Posnock 1991, pp. 16). Modernism itself thus was a paradox. It was neither an enthusiastic embrace of Enlightenment nor an outright rejection of it. Weber did not contemplate his age of reason with equanimity or with the cheerful complacency seen in later authors. Modernism is far from retreating from the bourgeois world it finds itself inhabiting. Instead it mounts a challenge to bourgeois beliefs and values from within, drawing not on relics of the past, nostalgically preserved, but on what the modern itself has to offer.

Modernity holds firmly that what is presented is neither sure nor true. It welcomes the phenomenological purpose of calling such understanding into question. Much of the experimental activities erupted in reaction to the bureaucratic dominance of abstraction, rational cognition, and instrumentality that had mechanised modern life.

Postmodernity, like modernity, is a distinctive historical stage in societal development. Postmodernism, in contrast, is a response to a qualitatively new society and a profound mutation in recent thought and practice (Sarup 1993, p. xi).

Postmodernity is a structural transformation in the thought and practice of advanced industrial societies. On the other hand, postmodernism implies exhaustion of the dynamic principles of modernism and heralds major transformations in relation to other patterns of practices. Milner makes yet another distinction between postmodernism and the postmodern debate: postmodernity is a complex of human behaviours and postmodernism is the attempts to theoretically conceptualise these behaviours. Postmodernism is marked by the deletion of the boundary between art and everyday life, the collapse of the hierarchy between elite and popular culture, a

stylistic eclecticism, and mixing of codes. With the dissolution of differences and distinctions, the process moves on inexorably. Fragmentation replaced totality, ambiguity replaced clarity, and tentativeness replaced uncertainty. The hierarchical opposition between thought and language, nature and culture, reason and emotion, theory and practice, also blurred. Society is experiencing a state of implosion in which distinctions are obliterated and a postmodern condition of radical ambiguity, hyperreality, chaos, and simulation prevails. Structuralism looks for decisive factors in shaping forms discoverable within society. Foucault (1980) shifted the focus from linguistic determination to the paradigm of power as the ultimate principle of social responsibility. He argued that human behaviours are characterised by power relation. Power is not a reality lying somewhere for its meanings to be discovered in positivist search. In itself, it is a generator of meaning. Power reaches into the very grain of individuals, touches their bodies and inserts itself into their actions and attitudes, their discourses, learning processes and everyday lives (Foucault 1980, p. 39). Power produces domains of objects and rituals of truths. All one can do is to engage with the dominant discourse from within in an attempt to disrupt and demystify it by revealing its indeterminacy or, paradoxically, to seize the possibilities it thereby has to offer.

Postmodernist stance is not only about rejecting the claims to reproduce reality truly and faithfully. It is also about fully recognising that reality is too rich for reason (Crotty 1998). The liberating and creative embrace of ambiguity and diversity is the distinguishing character of postmodernism. This paradigm also rejects Objectivist epistemology and the bourgeois realism that feeds on it in order to perpetuate its power structure. Benjamin (1969) uses constellation and Adorno (1974) uses mimesis to characterise human thought. The repression of the richness of reality is caused by obsession to have a firm and total grip on reality. In a similar vein, it is assumed here, that complete and certitudinal portrayal of human nature is impossible. Yet, a few dimensions can be investigated to see how they appear in a particular set of

conditions. No matter that the modernist narrative speaks of emancipation rather than speculation.

The intellectual world has a way of labeling major thought movements and driving ideas to bracket and facilitate stereotyping. All that emerges later is classified forcefully into one of those overarching thought frames. The credibility of such type of grand narrative has diminished regardless of what mode of unification is used and whether it is a speculative narrative or a narrative of emancipation. At a functional level, there is no meta-narrative that can bring things together. The big stories of science, progress, Marxism, humanism, which culture identifies, in order to understand and legitimize their practices, are fragmented into a disorderly array of little, local, stories and struggles, with their own irreconcilable facts and values. The field of human sciences has gained from the increasing loss of broad distinctions coupled with overpowering sense of fragmentation. The postmodern world, Crotty (1998) rightly argues, is a world of massification and, paradoxically, a world of fragmentation, too.

### CHAPTER 3.0

#### THEMES FROM PHILOSOPHY

This section introduces the themes are selected for the purpose of comparison and integration in the discourse. The divergent views within the discipline are debated to see how they can be related to the views held by thinkers in other disciplines.

The lead question, to initiate any dialogue on human nature, should be who are human beings? When they came? How they came? Why they came? How they fit into the cosmos? What norms and rules govern the nature? Is humankind created by God or is an outcome of chance and circumstances? Do they born with innate characteristics or develop within a context? Are they all same or different? Do they have unidirectional qualities or they vacillate in paradoxical continuum? Do humans represent image of God or are they product of physical nature? Do they have a given role or purpose or are given to their own purpose? And lastly, what is the end of this life? The complex questions such as these about the behaviour, nature, attitude, physical body, psychic, purpose and meanings have invoked countless responses with multitude dimensions. The responses have been linked to the philosophical orientations concerning mind, body, and soul. Ethical issues, transformational issues, are behavioural processes are also discussed within the psychological perspectives.

#### 3.1 Conception of Humankind

To begin with, the dominant tendency has been to view human self as composed of various elements. The Greeks held the mosaic conception of mind and believed that the mental life was organised around a series of independent centres within the self: the psyche, the *thymos*, and the *nous*. Behaviour is manifested through body, which has a direct contact with the environment while mind is part of historical processes. Socrates stated that soul and body are two different things. Plato was clearly a mind-body dualist. He held the view that a person is a rational entity, the body is a trap,

and the soul operates like a puppet. Aristotle also held the view that soul is inseparable from the body. Pythagoras distinguished between soul and body and considered that soul could exist without the body and that body can corrupt the soul.

The first identification with soul in the sense of the conscious self is found perhaps in *Ionia*, and the earliest full identification with the rational as well as with the emotional side of personality has been attributed to Socrates. In early Greek mythology, *psyche* was regarded as the personification of the human soul. In Platonic philosophy, the importance of love in its highest sense as an agent of the soul's progress leads one, in arts, for example, to representations, allegorical or playful.

Initially, in all this there was no opposition between soul and body. The doctrine that the soul is a prisoner in the body that Plato took over from *Orphic* had reached Greece, perhaps from *Scythia*, before the time of *Pythagoras*, probably in association with a doctrine of transmigration. In one sense, it was considered as the principle of life, defined as what makes living things alive. The Greek word for 'alive' like the equivalent Latin word '*animatus*' and its English derivative 'animate', is etymologically the same as 'ensouled'; such is the ancient connection between the ideas of soul and of life.

Plato, presumably following Socrates, identified the soul with the person who reasons, decides, and acts. He assumed that this person or soul is not the familiar creature of flesh and blood but rather the incorporeal occupant and director of, even prisoner in, the corporeal being. The separate Greek word translated 'soul' or 'mind' later became English 'psyche', which is also the root in 'psychology', 'psychosomatic', 'psycho-physical', etc. The relationship between body and soul established by Plato found acceptance both in popular religion and early philosophical thought. Plato also contended that souls, like common-sense persons, are substances and for various reasons-including the fact that it is the principle of life-must be immortal. Soul was believed to be a substance in the sense that it can have a significantly

separate existence. If soul were treated as substance then it would be difficult to suggest that it survives the dissolution of body. The presence and activity of a substantial soul is mainly responsible for bringing about all the various phenomena of life and mental activity.

Indeed, Plato clearly favoured the two component picture of the human person. Body and soul or psyche are the two distinct, ontologically disparate, things or entities. The self, soul, or mind, in his view, is something distinct from a gross material and observable body. For instance, in one of Plato's dialogues, Socrates is portrayed on the day of his death arguing about immortality and the nature of the soul. And he begins by defining death in a way that plainly seems to presuppose a two-component conception of the person. In his view at the time of death, body comes apart. But soul and body are separated (Plato 1961).

Socrates also believed that soul is most similar to what is divine, immortal, intelligible, uniform, indissoluble, unvarying, and constant in relation to itself; whereas body, in its turn, is most similar to what is human, mortal, multiform, non-intelligible, dissoluble, and never constant in relation to itself.

This picture of humankind consisting of the body which is of earthly stuff and the soul, which has a touch of the divine, is repeatedly endorsed by early as well as modern philosophers. Elsewhere in the *Phaedo*, the mental functions (or at least the higher ones) are attributed to this non-material soul. Descartes (1641) announces in *Meditations* that one of the two central aims of that work is to demonstrate the distinction between the human soul and the body. He clearly mentions that on the one hand there is a body that is closely joined to the self; and on the other hand, there is a distinct idea of the self that is non-extended thing, only a **thinking**. It also recognises the possibility of existing without the body.

In the foregoing quotes, one can discern a sharp contrast between two entities. One of which has physical characteristics such as being extended (i.e., taking up a certain

amount of space) but is not conscious, the other of which has mental characteristics such as consciousness but lacks physical properties. These two separable entities being normally 'closely bound up' together to make up the composite being, the embodied human person. Similar to Plato who emphasises twin elements in the form of rational soul (*psyche* or *nous*) and body (*soma*), Descartes also talks about self-consciousness, on the spiritual substance, the whole essence of which is to 'think'. With Descartes, the human person tends to become primarily a self-enclosed substantial conscious subject in contradiction to its physical body.

The seventeenth century outlined three major theories, which turned out to influence the concepts of humans in the next two centuries. Spinoza (1677) believes that the soul and the body are ultimately one, i.e., merely two aspects of one reality. Leibniz (1646-1716) refuted the concept that immaterial soul can act upon a material body. Descartes, as noted above, builds the thesis further by stating that mind and body are separate substances. The body consists of something matter with a physical location while mind is a non-physical entity whose essence is consciousness (Hogan 1976). Epiphenomenalists assert that physical events cause mental events while mental events have no physical effect. Interactionists claim that physical events cause mental events, and *vice versa*. Parallelists maintain that mental and physical events run parallel to each other without having any mutual causal relationship.

### 3.2 Understanding of Human Nature

Scholarly research concurs on inconclusive and unclear nature of findings' (Berry 1986; Yankelovich 1973; Young 1988, 1994) on human nature. Darwin considers human nature as the product of biological evolution and thus, according to his doctrine, its biologically determined horizons are limited by the stages of evolution. Marxism views human nature an ensemble of social relations. Marx highlighted the role of ideological determinations of the epoch in the process of investigation. Marxism had a great difficulty in squaring its romance with the historical

determinism and the voluntarism of the society (Young 1995). Efforts have also been made to link Marxism to nineteenth century positivistic scientism. Still some believe that Marxism had no psychology and hence no particular notion of human nature.

According to Freud, human nature can be characterised as the struggle between Eros and Death, between the instinct of life and the instinct of destruction, as it works itself out in the human species. Freud also adds that the sense of guilt is the most important problem in the development of civilisation. The price that humankind pays for advancement in civilisation is a loss of happiness through the heightening of the sense of guilt (Freud 1930).

Judea-Christian story of origin takes the view that to begin with human nature was all-good but it succumbed to temptation and since then there has been no true innocent human (Stevenson and Haberman 1998). Due to disobedience, Adam and Eve were banished to Earth – the land of Nod. Human beings are born in sin and are in need of redemption by repentance; and reparation and struggle to do what is good in the face of profoundly ambivalent impulses, including the perverse urge to do wrong and enjoy it.

In the postmodern era, the philosophy of humanism professes that humanity should be seen in seclusion from the rest of nature and accorded priority. Therefore, humankind is not thought of as amenable to the objective and reductive explanations of natural science. Another version insists upon the subordination of human beings to the economic structures and societal regulating forces such as labour, kinship, and the unconscious. Still other versions deconstruct the meanings of human nature prior to or in exclusion of the cultural systems it is supposed to explain (Soper in Urmson and Ree 1989, p. 138). Ironically, the many versions of Darwinism, Marxism and Freudianism treated human nature within a deterministic framework leaving no room for transformation and morality. In psychology, the ego psychologists, most notably Frank Sulloway (1979), attempted to design process of psychoanalysis based on energies, forces, structures, adaptations and biology of the mind. Scholars like

Marcuse (1964) forwarded with the notion that instinct for negativity, refusal, and rebellion is at the core of human nature. Darwinians and sociobiologists thought of cultural influences and religious inclinations as 'viruses' and suggested creating vaccines against these forms of irrational streams of thinking (Dawkins 1994).

The next direction of the move from dominant reductionism was towards relativism, which entailed 'anything goes'. The process of assiduously dismantling human presumption led the movement of humanism to structuralism and then to deconstructionist anti-humanism. This movement led to an exhaustive explication of determinations to the point where what was left could not justifiably be called human nature. Mysticism and modernism gained weight as the escape routes. Scholars like Richard Young believed that human nature is a societal category and that 'truth is made, not found', in so far as these ways of thinking have been applied in the biological and human sciences (Young 1971, 1973, 1979). Alfred North Whitehead (1926) criticised concepts such as mind-body dualism and the associated doctrine of primary and secondary qualities. According to him, the relativism suffered from the fallacy of misplaced definiteness. The doctrine of primary and secondary qualities implies that the nature is dull, merely having matter and motion. Secondary qualities such as colour, sound, and scent emanate from human mind. Thoughts are taken to enhance understanding and appreciation of things. He mounted strong critique of the internal inconsistencies in the dualistic scientific view.

Edwin Arthur Burtt (1924) eloquently criticised the philosophy for causing terrible problems in understanding of human nature. To boast revolutionary achievements, he opines, philosophers attributed absolute reality and independence to the many enacted entities in terms of which they were attempting to reduce the world. The modern science, he argues, is a result of metaphysical barbarism undertaken in the last few centuries. For example, there are two approaches to study mind: as an object of scientific study or as something special and exclusive. He criticised philosophers

who treated mind as a convenient receptacle for the refuse and whittling *of* science, rather than taking it as an object for scientific knowledge.

John Dewey (1957) classified schools *of* thoughts about human nature into three broad groups. The first school of thought considers morality as an outgrowth of inner freedom within the human self. According to this school, the only way to change society is to purify the heart of the human and then consequently change will take place in society.

The second school of thought attributes all powers of the making *of* human nature to the external environments. It believes that humans are products of the cultural, social, political, and natural forces *of* the context. As such, this school of thought denies any moral or ethical forces within the self. It treats human nature as ductile, adaptable, and mouldable. There is no room for changing the societal nature since the environment is assumed to be the constant factor.

John Dewey projected a third school *of* thought by saying that interaction between environment and person is important. He was cognisant *of* the forces within a human as well as those outside a human. To him, humans are part of the society and society is the extension of humans.

### 3.3 Nature and Moral Truths

Within the natural tradition of the Western **thinking**, there are several streams of **think** ing running in literature. On the one hand, Nietzsche claims that human beings are earth and nothing more. This kind of symbolism represents the worst possible view of the human nature. It says that human consciousness is not different from other thoroughly natural things. It is part and extension of nature not different as the living nature. In this view, the conception of moral consciousness appears to be severely tattered. Greek Sophists in the ancient times, and most prominently, Hegel and Marx in the modern times, conceived the nature as an amoral force and in

opposition to value. This way of ancient thinking identified humans as spirits and nature as an authoritative force.

Contrariwise, another school of philosophers postulates that moral consciousness and sense of good and bad is an integral part of the human nature. They also believe that there does not exist any antagonism between nature and the aspirations of the human spirit. For the possibility of spiritual life too, this kind of reasonableness on the naturalistic supposition makes more sense. Some elements of the naturalistic position are closer to the Islamic way of **thinking** on the issue of development of humans and the role of contextual conditioning.

The union of the good and the natural has been a fundamental element of philosophical schools right up to the modern times. With due exceptions, nature or natural law has been taken as the source of moral truth. The modern phenomenon of separation of fact and value is thus very much against its own philosophical traditions that stretched back from the scholastics to *Anaximander*.

From the earliest beginnings of Greek philosophy right up to the birth of modern times, the moral and the natural were generally thought to have an intimate connection. The nature was understood by everyone to be the source of moral truth. The biblical creation, the Homeric sense of history, most of early Greek philosophy, Plato and Aristotle were all in agreement with the notion that whatever happens is governed by some sort of moral law. The entire Western natural law tradition was simply an elaboration of this original unity of fact and value. In the East, wherever the story of reincarnation is a part of religious or philosophical thought, the natural order still embodies certain principles of cosmic justice. Qur'an also explicitly mentions justice and balance as the order of Universe (Qur'an 55:7)

Plato insisted in the *Republic* that from strictly rational point of view, there could be no truth (and hence no being) apart from the goodness that gave rise to it. Plato defended the value-laden nature against attack of the Sophists. He believed that

nature is the moving image of an eternity that is self-determined by the idea of goodness (Timaeus 37d). In the *Republic*, he explicitly formulated the concept that intertwines logical necessity with what is morally upright.

The notion of the creation of the world by a benevolent God, called *boum* (goodness) by Plato, was one of the transcendental predicates, i.e., standing above the human law and other ordinary factors. Plato's thinking, if seen in the background of its context, appears to be an outgrowth of the dominant religious and metaphysical thinking. The basic ontological vision of pre-Socrates age also articulated the commonplace thoughts and feelings.

One can see that in *Iliad* as in *Anaximander* and *Heracitus*, the situation is strife with struggle and chaos, and a sense of primitive justice governs the events. Achilles is allowed to take the revenge only after he pays the penalty through the death of a friend to balance the misery caused by raging pride. In *Anaximander's* terminology, the things that are unjust to each other-encroach on or oppose each other-must be punished by death or non-being, the return into the limited from where they came. This concept of *ananke* or ineluctable factual necessity mixes logical and/or causal necessity with the force of what is morally due or owing.

Nonetheless, the great gulf between nature and common moral values is a late development even in the Western philosophy. The divorce between fact and value took place during the last three hundred years. The self-conscious attempt to devalue nature defines much of the modern West. The question is why in the modern West, the nature has been denied the high regard. What was considered earlier as an embodiment of divinity, justice, spirit, purpose, *Eros*, at least some kind of intelligence, came generally to be seen as mere stud, ordered to be sure, but unreliably (Hume); or to no end that could be usefully discerned (Bacon, Descartes, Hume); or to an end that had only aesthetic value, but no concrete moral value (Galileo, Kant).

The role of teleological **thinking** in the interoperation of nature became increasingly ever more dormant in the wake of rise of science. Infact, the absence of teleological thinking became a precondition to the development of scientific approach. This position was alluded to by many. Even before the recently raised concerns about the environments (Burt 1924; Collingwood 1945; Stace 1952). Gradually, the natural law tradition was sidelined in the Western moral philosophy. Notwithstanding the

trends, some early scientists incorporated theological meanings back into their scientific work (Kepler and Newton, for example). Even a modern philosopher like Locke could not avoid falling back on a notion of natural law of ethics.

### 3.4 Truth and Justice

Socrates makes an important point that true happiness within the self, and justice in the society, strengthens each other and helps the individual, in achieving the harmony of self. This however cannot happen to someone who has merely forced himself or herself to engage in morally correct behaviour. The key issue is achievement of real happiness and attainment of justice, as a matter of self-determination within an atmosphere of freedom. What follows from here is that to establish justice, one needs to find answer to the question as to how an individual must respond to the various desires. Further, how balance and coherence among desires could be achieved to realise harmony of self.

In the ancient times, the knowledge of ethics was concerned with issues of psychology and human character rather than with abstract moral values and logical justification. The primary question in ethics was not how an individual should behave in order to conform to the correct rules. Addressing much more deeper issues, it was what must an individual do to bring soul into a coherent, balanced, harmonious condition so as to achieve real happiness and be just (Weiner 1993).

Those who were able to achieve harmony of self were thought of as very wise. They were considered as a gift of nature; able to secure a rare achievement. Plato was

committed to the goodness of nature and harmony of the soul, primarily, as a matter of rational construction at self-conscious level. The extraordinary individuals of those times were profiled to empirically substantiate the theory. Socrates depicted that in the texts of *Pltaedo* and *Symposium*, as an example.

In the *Republic*, the good is the truth; a judge in itself, not to be judged. Absolutely, it is there within its own self. It is the sole motive force in the realm of universe. In contrast, desire is the motivating force in humans. If harmony is to be achieved, all desires at the individual level should be directed toward the good at the universal level. Plato believed it to be the true state, a healthy state wherein existed natural harmony of desire and justice.

Qur'an presents itself as the usher of what is right and removal of what is wrong. Achievement of harmony is impinged upon the establishment of justice. Justice is the goal of the nations that Qur'an seeks to raise as leader for all people (Qur'an 2:143). Desires need to be directed toward the common goal of giving and sharing. People who reflect on nature find themselves in the right path and are indeed referred to as wise and truthful. The freedom of desires if surrendered to the pleasures of the self would tantamount to self-injustice as well as corruption. If desires are disciplined and coerced in view of the norms of justice and morality, the happiness and harmony would be achieved. Qur'an informs that it would have been easier for God to force all towards the way of submission to Him. The right to self-determination is being entrusted as a consequence of the trial, which forms the context of human life in this world.

### **3.5 Duplicity of Desires**

Throughout the history of philosophy, desires have been categorised into two categories. Plato divided them into real and apparent. Aristotle differentiated natural from unnatural. Christian anthropologists viewed man's fallen nature as inferior to the original nature. The fallen nature is commonplace while the original nature was,

it is supposed, manifested only in the personality of Jesus and the Saints. Thus the harmony of self is a result of only real, natural, and original desires. In the *Republic* (IX, 583b ff.) Plato also talks about real and false pleasures. The pleasure of justice, to him, is the real pleasure. Establishment of justice is the object of the people developed as nation by Qur'an.

The dual potentiality of desires led Plato and Aristotle to concur that only a few would ever reach the status of harmony of self. This belief became the source of traditional elitism. It gave credence to the paradoxical view about the humans and their nature. It raised the possibility that not only the inner and the outer self can be different but that they can also be opposed to each other. However, not all of this obliterated the ideal of harmony for those who could achieve it. For elitist minority-the people of wisdom-the outer and inner selves mirror each other and conform to the good in the universe. For majority, i.e., people lacking wisdom, the harmonious and the natural good selves are rare and hidden. The obvious and the outer self are often at variance with each other and consequently also in discordance with the nature and the universe.

In the natural path, human can be good, just, and happy merely by following own desires. In the unnatural path, a life spent in the pursuit of desires would be the most unmoral and unhappy of lives. In the tradition, another way of classifying natural and unnatural is natural and the normal self. What then implies is that normal condition is actually unhealthy or sick. Animals are what they ought to be merely by doing what they want. . . d, by doing what it 'wants' cannot achieve its own true desires and be its own true self.

In the introduction to his book, *Human Nature and Conduct*, John Dewey argued that man's nature in western scholarship had been regarded with suspicion, with fear, with sour looks, and sometimes with enthusiasm for its capabilities but only when these were contrasted with its actualisation and realities. It has been assumed that

morality could be superfluous were it not for the inherent weakness of human nature. In his description of western writers, Dewey (1957 p. 1) says, "Some writers with a more genial conception have attributed the current blackening to theologians who have thought to honour the divine by disparaging the human. Theologians have doubtless taken a gloomier view of man than have pagans and secularists."

### 3.6 Logical Criteria for Morality

The tradition sees attainment of nature as an achievement. "Art perfects nature," says Aristotle. For human life, the name of this art was ethics. The purpose of ethics was thus to help people in elevating themselves to their natural conditions. Ethics was originally thought of as a kind of healing, aiming at recovery from the abnormal self followed by restoration of the natural self and then rehabilitation toward happiness. Ethics in those times was concerned with attainment of happiness and the process to maintain harmony of self a requisite of happiness. Taking happiness as the general pursuit, to be achieved through harmony of self, ethics was concerned with issues related to character-building, norms-making, and psychological understanding of desires and human nature.

The quest for abstract moral rules in the shape of values and their logical justification, a major preoccupation of ethics today, was not an issue at that time. The idea of morality as a governing ideal in behavioural choices also developed in much later period. This transformational and therapeutic vision of ethics is something very different from the justification of the rules of correct behaviour that constitutes much of moral philosophy today. The predisposition of modern philosophy toward empirical and scientific methods erects barriers in the conceptualisation of morally ordered and happiness-bearing concept of human (Weiner 1993). Consequently, law substituted virtue as the motivational force in the scientific age. Transformational power sought from ethics was replaced by spiritless obedience of increasingly controversial web of laws. The intrinsic value of happiness was sacrificed at the altar

of externally assessed vacuous concept of success. Humans became persons in the societal and corporate jungle ruled by technology. Major philosophical orientations, notably Roman stoicism, social contract theorists, and Kant swayed the **thinking** toward this direction.

The most important distinction of modern philosophy is its utter negation of any bearing that nature may have on moral order. Under this postulate, there is no room for belief in goodness of human desire, too. Consequently, the nature of human desire is deciphered to be exactly what it seems to be. It appears to be a confusing mix of good and bad, real and apparent, natural and unnatural. In the tradition, the disorder of human nature was taken as a deviation from nature – a form of sickness, to be precise. The modern philosophy conceives human nature as free to act, as it seems to be. The difference between the natural and the wicked is vague, the healthy one can be almost also a bad one. The moral rhyme and reason are perceived to have little implications over the human desires. The free behaviour can be checked and manoeuvred through punishment and discipline.

Machiavelli, the most recognised voice in this line of **thinking**, talked about mutual exclusivity of the two kinds of life: the life that is and the life that it is ought to be. He also opined that rules of nature do not dance to the moral tune and one is bound to choose between moral propriety and a successful life. The possibility of harmony between the natural and the normal, to him, simply does not exist. The popularity of this point of view can be seen in its reflection in the war mongering ideologies, despotic governing norms, and immoral cultural ideals. 'Every thing goes,' was the key to success, security, and expediency.

### 3.7 Freedom or Wisdom

The most cherished, the overarching, and the paramount value of modern era is characterised by words such as freedom, independence, liberty, liberalism, and now empowerment. Each of these words, in turn, represents a particular shade of

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freedom gaining currency at a particular time in a particular context. However, not unsurprisingly, there is almost nil or little reference to this ideal in the ancient philosophy (Berlin 1958, p. 13). Plato and Aristotle were only tangentially interested in it. Plato mentions that democratic rule is based on freedom but for Aristotle democratic rule is actually the rule of poor rather than freedom.

The modern sensibility would not easily accept the idea but inherent in the notion of freedom is also a role for traditional concept of virtue. Interestingly, Greeks used to call it wisdom instead of freedom. It is also quite akin to the notion of freedom found in psychoanalysis. This is not a freedom over nature. It also does not transcend nature. It is a freedom that understands nature and carves out a role as a naturalistic agent keeping in view the need to maintain total harmony. It has nothing to do with the Kantian autonomy of the will or the existential ideal of non-reified selfhood. This kind of wisdom based freedom is achieved with the knowledge of one's true self, true desires, and true good as the Bible also claims that 'you shall know the truth and the truth shall make you free.' The entire debate of free will and determinism can be avoided by adopting this type of ethically satisfying notion of freedom that exists within nature.

Freedom in the Western civilisation has gradually come to assume the meaning of absence of restraints. It is a freedom from interference of all kinds not for a particular act. Over a period, though, it has come to exclude the freedom from tolerance of other people's freedom. Alternatively, in some cases minimal adjustments are negotiated as a mutual compromise. Absence of restraint is a negative type of freedom that is lauded as not another good but the ultimate good. All collective institutions as well as individuals are required to adhere to it and contribute their full allegiance.

The basic flaw in negative freedom is that it gives the right to do as one chooses, but fails to give any guidance on right choices. It is this vacuum that is filled by the

substance of ethics and virtue. That absence of restraint for doing good should be a part of the just and a good society is incontestable. However, if this absence is also for doing bad then it does need to be supplemented by some other forces which can prevent bad. This supplement will actually complete the negative freedom and will be good for the society.

The discussion now needs to thrash out the nature of restraint and its working to see how supplementary force needs to reinforce. Usually the restraint is thought of as an external force whether it is natural, cultural, social, or political. But the self itself has restraint forces built into it. One can drink but there are internal restraints, which prevent from excessive drinking. Indeed there is also politics between the inner restraints and human behaviour. Tendency of self-deception is a political tool to escape ruling from internal restraint (Young 1986, p.53). Democracy cannot operate if those voting do not have knowledge about their own selves, interests, and opinions. A measure of self-knowledge is assumed in civilised set-ups where legal and sociocultural ethos protects the absence of restraint. Without self-knowledge, negative freedom cannot be completed. The self-knowledge also contains innate virtue and moral contents. This position is satisfying for Kantians as well.

In ancient philosophy, the notion of power has been discussed in details. It also helps in understanding the freedom. Freedom is of course associated with power.

Powerless cannot have freedom freely and justly. In *Gorgias*, Plato narrates an event where Socrates refutes a young man who says that he and everybody else knows what she wants and deserves power to get it (466b – 467b, 468e). Socrates says that the apparent good is not always the true good, and that the ability to change things without knowing how to guide them toward one's own betterment is not true power. Since power is the ability to get what one wants, self-knowledge is its precondition. Thus, traditionally speaking, the philosopher who knows about desire is far closer to freedom than the politician who only knows about manipulating the desire.

This type of freedom is a genuine freedom, a responsible freedom. It should not be confused with Mill's political liberty, or Kant's and Sartre's rational spontaneity, or with freedom as the acceptance of sheer necessity as argued by the stoics, Hegel, and later on, by Marx. This genuine freedom establishes and relates the self to itself in which the not-self is exposed. It is a kind of power over oneself based on self-knowledge rather than power over the external world.

### 3.8 Ethical Inherence

It is worth mentioning that a great deal of ethics and morality concerns precisely with humans to God, human to nature, and human to human relations. The notions of ethics and morality influence the conditions for social life and collective governance. Ethics is also ingrained within the original configuration of pleasure and behaviour. This leads to the oldest and the most widely accepted idea of natural goodness. It implies that original configuration of behaviour is based on ethics and morality. No one in the philosophical pantheon has ever denied this widely accepted belief.

Aristotle deserves the pioneering credit for its explicit formulation. He claimed that humans are by nature political and that the function of the political life is to perfect them. St. Thomas codified the same **thinking** in conception of natural law. In the modern times, Rousseau talked about this idea and Marxism, too, in early period, supported this doctrine. Some philosophers of emergent capitalism disagreed with this notion because they based economic activity on self-interest and considered ethics as subservient to the self-interest. Hobbes has also opined that morality is part of the laws of nature. To him, laws of nature also include the necessary conditions for social life. He mentions the desire for peace as the foremost among these. But also includes prohibitions against ingratitude, arrogance, pride, iniquity. For Hobbes, war is the natural human condition. He thus constrains the true naturalness of this natural law and presents this as a discovery of reason rather than natural inclinations

of soul. In this case, humans ought to desire it not that desires are formed by it. Humans are not obligated to them prior to the establishment of the social contract (1651:1.15).

How natural law can inhere into humans is also a very interesting topic. Here, a very interesting comparison can be made between Thomas Aquinas and Hobbes because the two point of views represent the two mainstream views on the subject matter.

Hobbes thinks that inherence can come into effect only through reason. Passionistic inclinations should be made to conform to the natural law. The human behaviour that is generated by passions does not completely conform to the natural law. It needs to be restructured and constantly governed to make possible the society and ensure implementation of the natural law. He detaches anthropological roots of naturalness of the natural law. From Hobbes point of view, humans have no natural tendency in the direction of goodness and it needs to be imposed by law. It is art, but only finally is it the art that perfects nature. In fact, it is art that simply reshapes nature in accordance with art's own wishes, the art of the carpenter rather than the gardener, of the tyrant rather than the parent or king.

In contrast, Thomas Aquinas says that natural law can inhere in humans primarily through reason but also through non-rational inclinations (Q.91, A.2, esp. Reply Obi. 3). He is careful to account for the dual or fallen nature of human nature and questions the conformity of human passions with the natural law. But still opines that to the extent that Edenic, biological inclinations of man have survived in the fallen condition, the natural law is still present in the passions. Thus honesty and peacefulness can be assumed to be part of human nature. One criticism is that natural inclinations cannot be trusted for specific moral injunction and interpretations in variety of situations. The injunction against murder is absolute (in the sense that all societies must have it) but has been subject to wide variety of interpretation. Similarly, different groups of people have different sets of

inclinations. Furthermore, inclinations can be moulded, triggered, depressed by various external means. Social life can survive under numerous interpretations of the basic prohibitions.

Thou shalt not kill; thou shalt not steal; thou shalt not lie – these basic moral rules lay down the basic preconditions for the existence of human beings together in a common space. If people living close to each other have to continually worry about being killed or about the changes in rule of property or being unable to trust each other than society would become dysfunctional. The evolutionary process based on natural selection will not work. Such a society would be rather more like Hobbes's state of civil war than a civil society. In order to have a stable society, the moral rules are critically important. Even the proverbial band of robbers must treat each other with a minimum of decency if they are to work together (*Republic* 1,3S2h - e).

To be sure, Hobbes, in the first place, saw rampant immorality as the natural condition of humankind. He admitted that bulk of traditional morality is geared to make possible the social life and only that is why he believed that it had to be natural in some sense. What that would also mean is that the primordial outlines of morality must be included within the basic harmony of the soul.

It is important to discriminate between morality that is natural part of the harmony of self and critically necessary for making and maintaining social setting and the morality which is determined and adopted to manage the functions of social settings. For example, moral values such as equality of opportunity, rights of privacy, freedom of speech, religion and so on may or may not be part of the primitive configuration. Society can exist without the recognition of these rights, and so there is no reason to **think** they have the biological status of the basic moral rules. Furthermore, the configuration of pleasure on the original harmony of the soul needs to apply moral treatment only to those in one's own immediate community. The idea

of universal human rights is a new addition and may not have roots in the original configuration.

The concept of the morality of the original harmony of the soul, within naturalist brackets, is not without problems. Whenever attempts are made to find all that is decreed as moral in a particular form of social-culture, then the idea goes through gymnastic of logical exercises and ultimately becomes a comic. For instance, the popular democratic ideals of today are a priori not only in all respects the best form of society, but whether the most natural is debatable.

The basic preconditions of society are at least partly supplied up by Hobbes in the golden rule. One can derive from the golden rule innate and rather parochial prohibitions against gross forms of misbehaviour which is presumably the reason why it is an almost universally acknowledged moral principle. No one can tolerate life-threatening neighbours, being stolen from by them, or generally lied to by them.

However, there are two defects in its application. Firstly, it is not helpful in yielding the finer moral discriminations in ambiguous situations. Secondly, the golden rule is rooted within the person's subjective desires. Hence, if someone does not value freedom, privacy, or equality, than he will not be inclined to give it to others. These defects stem when the golden rule is taken as a matter reason (Hobbes viewpoint) that is applied to the emotional material of human nature. The proponents of natural selection like to **think** of the golden rule as a matter of emotion itself, very much part of the original configuration of the pleasures. The parochialism of the original harmony is mitigated to some extent if harmony of pleasures is taken to be including the needs of social life.

### 3.8.1 Example of Compassion

A natural inclination towards compassion (sometimes called 'sympathy,' 'benevolence,' 'humanity,' or 'altruism') has formed a good part of most moral

psychology. It is to be found in Hutcheson (1728), Hume (1736, P.5), (1751: appendix 11), and Smith (1759-9). It is the foundation of Rousseau's theory of the natural goodness of man (1755, p. 223ff); and something like it in contemporary sociobiology (Wilson 1979, p. 148). Compassion is the tendency to feel what other feels, or what is sometimes now called 'empathy.' Humans are put together in such a way as to be able to feel the feelings of others. It can be seen in operation when a human being cries at the sight of the pain and misery of a fellow or smiles back to return the smile. It does not require tutoring. However, learning can influence the application of compassion. To describe emotional life, human beings have developed a common vocabulary because of the commonality of the emotion of compassion.

How this natural compassion works? How far does it extend? Put simply, the more the other looks like same or the more one can identify with the other, the more compassion is felt. The potentiality for compassion extends as far as the experience of pain or pleasure can be imagined or how far that goes depends on how much like own self, the other seems to be.

Compassion can be classified as an essential element of the moral sensibilities. It mitigates the parochialism of natural morality by extending the list of prohibitions and prescriptions beyond what is required at the minimum for social life. Its existence does not preclude the existence of aggressive instincts such as jealousy.

Compassion acts as a brake and holds them within certain limits. As Rousseau puts it (1755, p. 227), the maxim that expresses the effect of compassion on the totality of human behaviour is "do good for yourself with a minimum of harm to others."

While this certainly does not define a life of pure compassion, and while it is possible to imagine higher moral ideals, such a life is not a bad one.

To sum up the above argument, an effort is to be made to look into human nature without trying to recreate itself in its own aesthetic, moral, or political imaginations.

Human nature appears to be social and compassionate by nature and somewhat

selfish, parochial, and aggressive, all of it blended in a more or less amiable hodgepodge or logically inconsistent behaviour. Moreover, certainly, there is decency at the centre of human being. Going a step forward, add to this basic decency a tendency to respect the customs and traditions of one's own people, thereby, opening the possibility of a relatively painless enhancement of innate virtue into the full virtue of a civilised human being through education, imitation, and what is called 'socialisation'. As long as the basic harmony of feeling and function is not much upset by this education, it is presumably all too good. Human beings end up not only decent, but also fully acculturated members of the social tribe. In this process, the basic social forms are not forced on some recalcitrant or indifferent material. Human nature is already disposed that way. It is just a question of keeping out the weeds - a little pruning here and there, a bit of decoration.

### 3.9 Ethical Knowledge

The purpose of philosophical ethics has been to determine ethical principles and truths, values and norms. Delineating rationally the existence or absence of justification is the major focus of debates of philosophers from ancient times. There are two distinctive streams of **thinking** in philosophy. Modern attempts to seek logically founded and reasoned ethical principles have ultimately skewed philosophical **thinking** towards relativism. In contrast, ancient philosophers were never comfortable with the idea to satisfy the demands for reason and empirical proofs of ethical principles. They envisaged that rational and universal demonstration of all ethical principles is difficult if not impossible. Further, they tried to explain why rational justification for all people is not possible and thus should not be sought, in the first place. Ancient philosophers tried to drive this argument without undermining the importance of intellect and application of rationality. Plato considered ethics as a part of rational knowledge but simultaneously took the pain to explain that such rationality would not be convincing for many. He provided an epistemic clause to manage escape that guarantees the unavailability of rational

account. Aristotle, too, found that mode of practical reasoning to arrive at ethical philosophy is incapable of purely scientific elaboration.

However, the lack of a science of ethics never threatened the basis of moral reasoning. The notion of the fallen condition of man was sufficient for unavailability of a universally accepted moral rationality in Judea-Christian doctrine. In the wake of Enlightenment, the movement to establish ethical principles on logical ground and rational methodology picked up greater momentum. The modern theories of social contract, utilitarianism, and deontology developed when religious ideologies were thought to be ill suited to the rigor of rationality. During this time, faith in human reason and the continual improvement in the human condition were unabashedly adhered to by all.

The reconstruction of political philosophy by Hobbes was in alignment with the reconstruction of science as proposed by Descartes. In Hobbes, the functions of social contract were taken as a kind of Cogitio for the generation of moral truth and elimination of moral uncertainties. He apprehended that the state of limited capacity to decide on moral issues would lead to condition of civil war. Kant wanted to create science of ethics but hesitated for he thought that it would become a victim of parochialism. In conclusion, one may say that it should not be uncommon sense to expect that pure practical reasoning should testify the foundation of morality. For moral resolution, the proof under the law of noncontradiction should be enough. Utilitarianism too wished to make ethics as certain as logic itself. Nonetheless, the overall failure of reason to furnish convincing justification of moral truth is now generally accepted in the literature. Consequently, the indemonstrability of ethical truths has led to the conclusion that these are matters of either social constructs or conventions. As such, they exist because of choice and become part of belief system and cannot be claimed to have intercultural and interpersonal validity.

Notwithstanding the efforts of Kantianism and utilitarianism, the post enlightenment

thinking never acknowledges or appreciates the idea of fallen nature of humans colling from religious domain.

The notion of reunion of health and virtue, however, can fill this vacuum of rational demonstration. A framework can be developed to allow the elaboration and discovery of these truths by the social sciences. It holds a view similar to that of traditional school of thought. It suspects the quest for precision and certainty in these concerns as misguided and ill founded. From the traditional point of view, the content of ethical knowledge is an ineluctable part of human condition.

The full-scale theory of virtue facilitates the understanding of ethics and explains as to why a justification is neither possible nor needed. Aristotle clearly understands that ethical knowledge is not equally comprehensible to all. He states that it is impossible for the people who lack experience or who are swayed by strong emotions. He sees an interface between cognition and the character of the knowledge seeker. He also makes a very interesting point that moral condition cannot be changed merely through intellectual exercises. Not only this, but he extends the argument further by saying that a vicious person cannot know the moral truth. The intellect of the bad character distorts, restricts, and blocks the ethical truth. The ability to know cannot transcend the selfhood of the seeker. To know the good or bad, one must live through it or one must bear it in practice. Thus, it follows that good people cannot know the bad and the bad cannot know the good. Also follows that to good or bad one needs something in addition to the intellect.

The role of character is more critical in understanding the moral reasoning than any other discipline or knowledge base. The character of the person becomes involved in the naming and calling of truth. In some other areas, such as engineering or chess playing, the character of the engineer or the player has no bearing on the identification of the principles of mechanics or the manoeuvrings of the horse. The life of a philosopher professing ways to happiness may be itself in shambles or looks

like a cluttered mess. There are no child prodigies *of* practical wisdom. For Aristotle, intellect is corruptible, and as far as the morality is concerned, it is intimately linked to character. Herein one can find a basis of a certain kind of relativism.

Vice, in the understanding of Aristotle, systematically hides the starting points *of* actions, more so if they originate within the self. To begin with, the doers and sayers of vice do not see that it is vice that they are engaged in. They tend to **think** that it is absolutely good, or relatively good, or little bad but for or because *of* a greater good, or worse but because of greater worst factors causing it or to avoid greater worst. So is created the epistemology of vice because *of* corruptibility of intellect. It is not just a tendency or a habit, it is a character and a soul. They also judge the character of others from the same point *of* view. For the sake of certain so-called unnatural pleasures or not-truly pleasant pleasures they even **think** it proficient to injure others (N.E. 7, 1154b14 - 17). To the mind of a vicious character, all of this is a kind of virtue. Only a virtuous nature is able to recognise a vice as a vice. Due to systematic blindness that hides from them the true state *of* behaviour, the vicious cannot see that vice is a behaviour that is disloyal to one's own self, happiness and pleasure.

Seen from the perspectives of Freudian psychodynamism, the knowledge of ethical truth cannot transcend the psychology *of* its embodiment. It is the operation *of* the unconscious, which causes the self to hide. The human capacity for self-deception corrupts the intellect. The pleasures of the vicious are the pleasures of the neurotic pain relief. Through the processes of resistance and denial, the access to the relevant truths is systematically blocked and the acts *of* wilful ignorance anaesthetise the self to the ethical truth. The process can be reversed only through therapeutic mode of discourse. Reason, even the most rationalistic expects, can play only a limited role in this regard.

### 3.9.1 The Inevitable Circularity

The interdependence of intellect and character in the reception and appreciation of ethical knowledge inevitably introduces circularity. The discussion and dialogue on ethical issues should be restricted to the people of virtuous character. But virtuosity is also a consequence of ethical clarity and moral resolutions. Analysis of the selfhood becomes part of the process of settlement of the disagreements. Those engaged in false pleasures cannot see the relevance of virtue to happiness. Thus, dialectically forced agreement will not be possible. Those who have not seen the true pleasures cannot be forced to see the distinction between virtue and vice. Virtuous relies on the formula of the mean to explain virtue. The mean of the behaviour is a mean to happiness and happiness is the difference between true and false pleasures. Precision is not plausible in the realm of ethics. This Aristotle understood, too well. Practical ethics in different fields can be invented in view of the context and the ideologies as did Hobbes, Kant, and Mill. But the issue of virtue is different and the knowledge about virtue cannot be invented. It has to come from nature, not discourse. The efforts to equalise the judgement or to contextualise the argument will not solve ethical disagreements. It has not been able to do so, as it appears from the history of human existence.

One way to answer the question of circularity lies in emphasising the mechanism of unconscious. The relief of pain and the unconscious anxiety relief are undoubtedly empirical sources of motivation that infect certain kinds of behaviour. Virtue can be defined within naturalistic bracket as the state of character that belongs to the person without the need for neurotic pain relief. In this case, freedom from anxiety is one of the criteria of virtue. However, the particular brand of empiricism does not provide criteria that can be classified as the one that is equally appreciable by all. Though this line of argument breaks the circularity but creates the danger of elitism. Virtue escapes relativism and partially resolves empiricism but then faces the question of elitism.

### 3.9.2 Elitism in Virtuosity

The elitism in virtuosity is the elitism of character and values. It is intrinsically different than the elitism based on status one achieves from possession of wealth, education, and power. The access to virtue is neither restricted nor selective. It is not based on discrimination in economic, social, cultural, or educational classification.

The elitist qualification comes from the fact that only the virtuous can know the virtue and that it is not really convincingly explainable. People who are relatively free of anxiety and self-deception can claim to be in that elite group, whatever may be their status otherwise. So even if it is elitist, it is devoid of any prohibitive clause and contains an open clause for inclusion of any person. The people in this group possess the knowledge of how to live well irrespective of their wealth, intellectual development, and inheritance.

In contrast, the notion of scientific elaboration of ethical truth is inherently highly elitist concept because it makes ethical truths demonstrable to only those who belong to an academic class. Only they have the ability to evaluate rational arguments. Just like mathematics that can only be learned by a specific group having achieved certain qualifications. The suspicion of elitism can be removed if insistence on the universal demonstrability is understood in terms of the capacity of ethical truths to make it known and clarified in various situations. Keeping in view the dominant norms of relativism and tolerance, the academics may also conclude that virtue is not a matter of objective or interpersonal knowledge. The business of ethics, then, is reduced to a democratic ideal, i.e., asking people to vote for their preferred choices. But intellect alone is not the final arbiter of the ethical truths. Relativism has shown a lot of appeal to the oppressed as well as the intellectuals. The poor see elitism of the virtue as an opportunity for them to shift their social class. The kind of education that is required in ethical truths is what takes to cultivate the entire person, the education 'sentimentale' referred to by Macintyre or as Aristotle explained acquiring good habits in childhood. Elitism of character has its own ways to bring about its

recognition and appreciation. It involves emotionally significant self-knowledge. In education, it is ensured that curriculum is not out of tune with the level of intellectual sophistication of the students. In the education for ethical truths, the stage of character development would be treated in the similar manner. In the class of philosophy, Plato barred admission of those who had not mastered the fear.

The foregoing discussion helps in better understanding of the logical factors because of which theoretical and empirical paucity of ethical truths should always remain unresolvable. The synthesis of virtue and health remedies the problem to some extent. However, not all this means that ethical truths are relative. By arousing conscience, one can solve the riddle to the best possible way.

## CHAPTER 4.0

### THEMES FROM SCIENCE

The objective of this chapter is to pluck some of themes found in the literature of philosophy of science with a view to develop an integrative picture. The themes discussed here provide a basis for their relevance to the similar thoughts found in the previous chapters and in the next chapters.

#### 4.1 Science and Human Purpose

The persistent application of various scientific versions including the linguistic one, to human nature left the issue utterly bereft of any common framework allowing for humanity or moral discourse. The rigor of analysis eclipsed the essence of the issues.

In attempts to apply scientific framework, basic conceptions of human nature remained undeveloped. For example, the libido theory of classical psychoanalysis is an attempt to ground human nature in a developmental scheme rooted in biology.

Libido is a notion used for human energy or life force. It embraces everything from *Eros* to eroticism. It was conceived as the human form of the basic thermodynamic notion that life opposes the tendency of all systems to drift to equilibrium. Its

psychological form is based on the *niroana* principle, whereby humans seek to minimize perturbation and constantly try to maintain the general entropy form.

Libido is negative entropy, going from a simpler state of lower organisation and energy to a higher state of complexity and energy.

The field of orthodox psychoanalysis was influenced by the scientific paradigm and popular notions of physics, chemistry and biology of its age (Rapaport 1959, 1967; Rapaport and Gill 1959). The underlying motive could be to earn respectability in the realm of science and to unify psychology with other sciences. At a deeper level, one can see that in Descartes' account, human nature is conceived as made up of body, as defined by new physics, and mind. Mind was negatively defined as an entity not

pertaining to body but having thought, free will, and responsibility. The concept of a language and association of ideas come from natural science and seventeenth century Newtonism. Locke and Hume are quite explicit about taking their analogies from Newton.

The modern psychology is replete with analogies drawn from the natural sciences: mental elements, compounds, forces, energies, structures, functions, adaptations. Even the notion of mental distress draws its language so routinely from the somatic. The use of terms like psychopathology is implicitly embedded in the assumption that analogies from medicine: the dichotomy between normal and pathological, the disease/syndrome model can be applied to psychotherapy. The search for classification of behaviour has culminated into the development of Diagnostic and Statistical Manual in Psychiatry (APA 1994).

Humankind has always attributed purposes, human and social characteristics to nature. It is because all of science and especially biological science makes covert or overt appeal to value systems. All facts are theory-laden, all theories are value-laden and all values are part of a worldview, an ideology. Values are not contextual; they are constitutive. In literature, one can find many forms of Social Darwinism and Social Darwinist writers, who attribute to nature the qualities of political and social philosophies. Most notable citations may include Herbert Spencer, Alfred Russel Wallace, Benjamin Kidd, Prince Kropotkin, Lester Ward, Graham Wallas, William Bateson, Andrew Carnegie, Konrad Lorenz, C.D. Darlington, Robert Ardrey, E. O. Wilson, Richard Dawkins, and Robert Richards, etc.

Much known ideological concepts such as naturalistic ethics, lifeboat ethics, eugenics, racism, imperialism, terrorism, and fascism are rooted in the scientific theories of evolutionary biology and physiology-structure (Young 1999a). The concepts of function, morphology, adaptation, organism, equilibrium, development, homeostasis and evolution have been employed to characterise human nature. The

values ascribed to nature and human nature were drawn from a particular view of society. From Herbert Spencer's essay on 'The Social Organism' in 1860 to Radcliffe-Brown's 'On the Concept of Function in Social Science' (1935), the analogy between societies and organisms became more and more commonplace until it became common sense in the social sciences and their application to industry (Baritz 1960; Demerath and Peterson 1967; Young 1981, 1990, 1990a).

The question that needs to be answered is whether there can be situational non-contingent knowledge outside of purely deductive systems (Berger and Luckmann, 1967; Habermas 1971; Young 1971, 1973). The disciplines of history, human sciences, economics, psychology, psychoanalysis, and behaviourism, all of these are scientific as well as ideological disciplines. There was a time when behaviourism presented itself as 'purely' scientific. Nowadays it would be more likely to be seen as more nearly purely ideological. Psychoanalysis went through a very scientific phase from the mid-1930s until the 1960s, but is now largely proud of its humanistic strains (Rayner 1990; Young 1986, 1992a). Recent inroads into the claimed objectivity of biology, chemistry and physics are also now known.

Successive waves of challenges to the objectivist account did not stop at the threshold of natural science. Those who sought to separate the substance of knowledge from its context, or the context of justification from the context of discovery, often lost hold of their neat distinctions. Robert Merton highlighted the sociology of scientific knowledge in his studies of Puritanism and the Scientific Revolution (1938). Others, for example, Paul Forman (1971), in his work of Weimar Culture and Quantum Physics discussed how the latter adapted to the former.

Orthodox scientists, historians and philosophers defended those ramparts but the citadel of science was being both outflanked and undermined in so many ways that modern ideologues should, by contrast, have looked tame. Indeed, the perceived view of science free of metaphysics and worldviews had since long been in peril.

Eminently unradical philosophers of science had already historicised and exposed the philosophical muddles in the most basic ideas of science. For example, the subversive metaphysical explorations of the contradictions even the absurdities in the world view of modern science penned by Alfred North Whitehead in *Science and the Modern World* (1925) and by Edwin Arthur Burtt in *The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science* (1932).

A related challenge was being mounted by Arthur O. Lovejoy, whose *The Great Chain of Being: A Study in the History of an Idea* (1936) was the model for research in the history of ideas and the periodical his research inspired, *The Journal of the History of Ideas* (1940). The notion that ideas have histories has always been respectable, but the claim that scientific ideas have histories, whose study could be a legitimate domain of research, relatively independent of empirical data, was anathema to traditional inductivist and hypothetico-deductivist notions of science and of scientific progress. Science is not just or even largely about facts: it is about traditions and ways of looking at things. The history of ideas was, in its way, profoundly ahistorical in its willingness to eschew the social context of scientific research, its roots in the productive process and other aspects of the socio-economic and cultural base.

Study of the history of scientific revolution brought to surface the contradictions and compromises, illogicality and orneriness of what had been idolised as a result of the domination of scientific tradition of dogma and the subsequent progress of the advancing 'edge of objectivity' (Gillispie 1960). Leonora C. Rosenfeld (1941) and Aram Vartanian (1953, 1960) showed that debates about human nature and mechanist reductionism of animals and humans were utterly philosophically driven (Young, 1967). Walter Pagel (1951, 1967) made similar claims for the histories of physiology and medicine, E. J. Dijksterhuis (1950) and C. C. Gillispie (1951) demonstrated respectively, that the mechanisation of the world and the origins of scientific geology were inseparable. All this happened at the very moment of scientific triumph from theological preoccupations and controversies. It was science

in the context of theology. The mechanical philosophy of Robert Boyle was integral to his natural theology. Newton's mathematical principles were of a piece with his Biblical run linations. Charles Lyell's uniformitarian geology was carefully composed so as to be consistent with his views on Genesis, and he never deviated from believing in the separate creation of man, no matter how much he conceded to Darwin with respect to the evolution of other forms of life. Similar claims about science being conceived within a framework of basically theological assumptions were later to be convincingly made about Darwin (Moore 1979; Desmond and Moore 1991, but cf. Young 1994), Wallace and their generation (Smith 1972; Durant 1979).

By virtue of these and other excellent historical researches, science came more and more to be seen as rooted in wider intellectual history, conceived in the broadest cultural terms, although there was much less tendency to root it in contending class forces and movements in the socio-economic base. We were made privy to sects and interest groups, but their social and economic bases were not explored until much later. Even so, the notion of the unencumbered scientific mind testing value-neutral facts as they bore on purely intellectual hypotheses never had a chance at the hands of historians of thought.

In the 1950s and 1960s, N. R. Hanson (1958), Gerd Buchdahl (1969), A. C. Crombie (1959), Mary Hesse (1980) and others enriched understanding of the philosophical bearings of scientific thought. A subsequent generation, including P. M. Rattansi (1973), Charles Webster (1975), Quentin Skinner (1969) and John Dunn (1969), linked those ideas to wider political and social concerns. Thereby the epistemological goals of modern science came eventually to be rooted in genuine social history, not merely the history of ideas.

Cartesian dualism is in no way a clear distinction between two forms of ontologically basic kinds: extended substances and           ing substances. Descartes' conceptions of body and of mind make up an historic compromise between the claims of the church,

certain notions of the individual soul and the requirements of his peculiar version of mechanism. Cartesian dualism was a resolution of historical forces rather than a scientific law.

Thus, the union of the history of ideas with the history of culture played a very subversive role with respect to received accounts of the history of science and its epistemological status as a bastion of rationalism. The science/ideology dichotomy was very hard to maintain if one reads the writings of historians and philosophers who were not cut off from the connections or articulations of science. Nature is a societal category, and there is no way of characterising nature which does not involve values. Science, as discussed above, is the embodiment of values in theories, therapies and things, facts and artefacts. The truth is that there is no value-neutral viewpoint for contemplating and representing nature. (Wasr 1996)

### 4.2 Harmony with Nature

The devaluation of nature that began with the scientific revolution was subsequently completed by what is called 'the Enlightenment.' Hume spoke of the fact and value dichotomy, as early as 1776. Gradually, philosophers started forgetting that at one time the learned people used to **think** that the true, the good, and the beautiful are all the same thing. The revolution set a new scholastic mind, which banished teleological **thinking** from the putatively authoritative reconstruction of nature that was called science. There were some nostalgic conservatives (Berkeley; Leibnitz), neo-Pythagorean mystics among the scientists (Kepler), and critiques from romantic counter-current (Blake; Keats; Rousseau; Novalis; D. H. Lawrence and Schelling), but the general drift was in the opposite direction.

In the early century, Russell (1918) rightly portrayed the paucity and vacuum of scientific ideals. He recognised that in ethics the conceptual orientation to the nature has serious implications for the perceived relationship of human beings to their own desires. The body or the self of the human being embodies and represents the nature.

Desires exist in the body having moral as well as physical connotations. Bodily desires stem from the natural forces that have a role in the development of human beings. By understanding the human desires, their relationship to each other, and the consequences of fulfilling them, one can unravel the dynamics of human nature. The insights thus yielded are said to constitute a very special kind of knowledge, sometimes referred to as 'wisdom.'

Within the pre-scientific tradition, two opposing views of human desires can be identified. Both of these views have roots from ancient thoughts and they continue to influence human thinking since then. In one tradition, the desires are not considered harmonious or good and so they are frequently treated with disparagement and debasement. Human desires have been incarnated necessarily as evil, uncontrollable, irresistible, narcissistic, egoistic, and brutish. It is unfortunate that it is this view that generally forms impressions about classical psychology.

In contrast, those who conceived moral order as a basis of nature were of the opinion that desires are integral part of it – the same order that governs the cosmos – the good nature. Thus desires, in this line of thinking, are simply good because their source is good, their basis is good, their object is good, and their outcome is good. The beauty is seen as the essential characteristic of good. There is also only one nature and one good for human life. Aristotle at one time took a naively simple view and went on altogether to dismiss the possibility of basic conflict between desires. He perceived that all desires form a coherent motivational framework to attain the single good – the common good. This pursuit of the single moral good by all and coherence of desires generates the intrinsic consequence of harmony of self. The harmony of self or soul was also known as 'centeredness' or 'the absence of intra-psychic conflict.'

Qur'an differentiates between good and bad desires and recognises that conflict between these two sets of desires is inescapable. However, Qur'an draws the

attention of believers towards the possibility of orchestrating the desires, tuning the good while purging the bad in an ongoing process of purification. The harmony of the self is achieved by subordinating the desires to the Will of God Who acts as the source of Good. Such alignment of the self with the God results into centeredness and absence of contradictions.

### 4.3 Virtues and Happiness

Today the ideas dominating the philosophical horizon of the Western civilisation grant maximum of freedom to the individuals for the pursuit of pleasures, limited only by the need to prevent harm to others. This liberal form of relativism is taken as an overarching moral truth. It tries to maintain equilibrium between freedom to fulfil the desire and protection from oppression by others. This notion, in as much as clear on individual freedom, at best is grossly opaque on the ideals of freedom. The important issue of freedom for what and how ensues as a raging debate among interest groups. The answer is largely left to group and individual interpretation. In democratic republic, the sums of individual desires of various groups compete and vie for scarce resources without which success and happiness can not come about. The final decision rests on the courts and the lawmakers.

In the last few decades, there has been shift of interest toward virtue as a goal for individual freedom and desires. The moral possibilities offered by the classical theories of virtue are being reconsidered in the wake of growing suspicion about is/ought distinction and the so-called naturalistic fallacy that rests on it. Peter Geach (1956), Elizabeth Anscombe (1958), Philippa Foot (1978), James Wallace (1978), N. J. H. Dent (1984), and Henry Veatch (1985) are some of the notables among the scholars who critically argued against the divorce of morality and law. Just as biologists are concerned with conditions under which creatures flourish; moral philosophers, they argue, must be concerned with the conditions under which human beings flourish. They view human character as a complex in which virtues and vices are primary

functioning elements. They see virtues as those character traits that promote human flourishing, vices as traits that detract from it.

The most influential role in this reassertion was played by Alasdair MacIntyre, who posits that, in the post-Enlightenment era, deviation from matters of character (virtues and vices) to matters of rule or law was a grave mistake. According to him, it has led to the contemporary dead end of moral philosophy (1981, chapter 5). The solution, he says, lies in reviving the notion of virtue, with its traditional emphasis on human character, and its potential of learning and flourishing. In the age of enlightenment, scholars were obsessed with high standards of rationality, and blindly, sought demonstration of moral truths on the same grounds. It was supposed that these moral truths have no requirement of validity on the interpersonal nature.

In an attempt to revive the ethics of virtue, the question is in what ground it should be founded? Can there be a way of reconstituting the union of nature and goodness? What should be the foundation for the harmony of the self? The notion of harmony of self has indeed been a powerful idea throughout the history of philosophy. It is still a very commonplace recurring idea that projects into human psychology the entire problem of human nature versus nature and of evil and good. The relationship between God and human beings lies at the core of this analysis. As a general trend, the people defending the faith when discuss these issues resort to the philosophical grounds of epistemology and metaphysics and interpretation of values and facts through the principle of sufficient reason. The view of nature that emerged from this debate is free of rationalistic constraints as well as commonplace moral sentiments. This dominant trend to free nature from metaphysical and sentimental enmeshing continued for over three hundred years.

However, the opposition to the dominant trend of relativism never waned. This continued unabated. Again, in psychological medicine, strong references to concrete virtue-ethics recaptured the hesitant minds. In a similar vein, the constructs of virtue

and the presupposition of the harmony of the soul regained consideration in the scientific and semi-scientific literature. There were also many romantic, anti-intellectual reactions against the scientific deconstruction of emotion-laden and value-bearing notions.

This new way of **thinking** that began as a critique can now rightfully claim a firm position on its own. It is now deep-seated in literature and more firmly established in popular thought. It is based on quasi-scientific construction and semi-moral grounds. It is most rapidly growing popular thought. The writers in that realm could not and did not appreciate the subtle and complex issues of is/ought and the philosophical overlays. They daringly short-circuited the dogmatic reservations to attract the minds glowing in success but unhappy with disharmony of soul.

Early psychology and astronomy were embedded in the notion of the presupposed goodness of the natural order and harmony of self. Those who subjected interpretation of desire, happiness and goodness to the common observation and common sense rejected this notion. For Machiavelli, the achievement of success requires and poses immorality and injustice. Hobbes, another ideologue of the modern attitude further develops the notion by saying that happiness lies in success. He misinterprets the traditional notion regarding the harmony of the soul as an inert absence of the desires, instead of taking it as a positive and fruitful channelling of desires. To him, all of it is meaningless and quite impossible.

In the modern **thinking**, happiness is understood as a capacity to satisfy the endless succession of desires. Whether such a 'success', even when attainable, would really be worth calling happiness has also remained a focus of debate. Kant does that the endless succession of satisfaction is happiness. He, however, never confused it with morality. In the later period, Hume's distinction between is and ought is also based on the philosophical kernel of Machiavelli that rules of life have little in common with the rules of morality. Hume generalised this line of thought. Kant

detached ethics from anthropological interpretation. He found the morality on a priori principles and laid the foundation of 'deontological' ethics, i.e., ethics that has as little as possible to do with the empirical realities of nature.

The philosophy of utilitarianism focused on exploring the specifics of human nature, desires and satisfaction. It defines the moral good as the means to happiness. What really matters is the operative conception of happiness. A crudely hedonistic notion of happiness makes utilitarianism a grotesquely unsatisfying moral philosophy. It can become somewhat palatable when used in philosophical domain of Plato and Aristotle where true justice really is true happiness.

In the scientific period, the concept of value-free nature instead of the union of justice and happiness directed the development of utilitarianism in a way that nature and happiness were regarded as consequent of the empirical condition of human life. The ideas of tradition and scientific period represent two fundamentally different viewpoints. The origins of the theories of management and behavioural sciences can be traced back to the development of the conception of the nature of human beings.

### **4.4 Sociobiology and Psychological Body**

It appears from the survey of literature, that the bracketing of the human behaviour was more critically taken than the bracketing of human body from naturalistic tradition. The bracketing of human motivation has invoked fervid and ardent response from scholars who refuse to acknowledge the controlling role of natural selection in the genesis of human beings. Even those who do not object to let science and nature have the body want to retain the motivational autonomy of the person and the emotions. This ambivalence about the relation of the different aspects of the person to natural causation can easily be seen as the source of contemporary debate on mind/body dualism.

Indeed, the naturalisation of the selfhood is deeply offensive to many well-motivated moral, political, and metaphysical sensibilities. It evoked severe criticism from Islamists, too. It rubs against both the traditional notions of a transcendent soul and the contemporary notions of creative selfhood. It snacks of crude reductionism. It also criminally serves to protect those with the lowest moral and/or social ideals. It is thus unpalatable to those as well who vociferously uphold the freedom and dignity of the person. The ideology of biological determinism has helped ferment the anti-human notions of racism, fascism, and sexism. It discounts the importance of nurture in appreciation of nature assuming that social conditioning and/or individual creativity really does not transcend the forces of nature.

Very recently, however, there has been a stream of writings by naturalists emphasising that concepts of moral freedom and human empowerment are compatible with a thoroughgoing naturalism. They contest that the idea of 'brutish' nature is essentially a simple misrepresentation of the empirical fact. They stop short of conceding that the naturalistic reductions are correct but do attempt to show that whatever is feared does not necessarily follow even in the field of sociobiology.

The rise of biological determinism (for example, Spencer's *Social Statics*) that was primarily responsible for wild racist and imperialist theories, like social Darwinism, was founded on the perception that there is strong correlation between genotype (inherited chemistry) and observed behavioural phenotype (demonstrated behaviour and societal role) (Sahlins 1976, p.5). This theory was used as excuse for maintaining difference in the status quo between the strong and the weak, and between privileged and the under-privileged. Those favoured under this regime legitimated it all complacently and those not favoured accepted it all compulsively (Lewontin 1984, p.236). This is the position that has forced all naturalistic reductionists to retreat into unpopular position. There are metaphysical and epistemological arguments that are rooted in old-fashioned transcendentalism, phenomenology, or linguistic analysis for rejecting the naturalisation of the person.

It should be noted that contemporary sociobiology no longer professes this kind of one way one-to-one correspondence of genotype and phenotype that could lead to justification of racism, nationalism or fascism. It speaks not of genetic determinism but of genetic pre-dispositions, i.e., the ways people react with each other in various environments, and of the price that may be paid by social forms that choose to alter their normal phenotypic expression. Sociobiologists insist that although the human psyche is very flexible, it is not a perfectly plastic material, which can be shaped in any way a social reformer might deem it fit.

Sociobiology is not, altogether, a rationalisation of the status quo. Status quo often represents an imposition of unsuitable social arrangements onto a relatively unreceptive genetic material. The general idea of sociobiology is the idea that human beings are not malleable infinitely and cannot be shaped in accord with any ideologically or technologically motivated program. However, even this modest position was too much for humanists. Lewontin took the view that cultural possibilities are limited by genetic mechanisms.

Sociobiology, at a simpler level, aims at limiting the spectrum of combinations of human behaviour possible in a given social environment based on genetic conditions. Such claims can be easily subjected to empirical experimentation. An example of this might be the claim that a society cannot force slavery on one segment of its population and at the same time expect that segment of the population to work as efficiently, happily and responsibly as those who freely choose their work.

Still at a little higher level, sociobiology provides a descriptive framework to determine the incompatibility of certain behaviour patterns through genetically determined, behaviour-specific instincts or drives (Wilson 1978, p.38). What are instincts? Some **think** of it as a point of origin while for some they are nothing more than the behaviour they are urged to motivate. In any case, the mere assertion of their existence simply does not entail a one-to-one correspondence between genotype

and phenotype and hence defence of status quo. Instincts may be repressed and/or moulded in various ways and because of that fact sociobiology can lead to results quite critical of the status quo.

The field of sociobiology seeks to give biology a role in explaining human behaviour. In the opinion of neo-modern naturalists, this does not tantamount to denial of human flexibility or obfuscation of the possibility of social conditioning in view of the spirit of reductionism. In their view, neither the social context has absolute power over shaping human behaviour nor evolutionary forces have the sole power to infuse the instincts. There are limits on both sides indoctrinated by the balancing forces of nature. The real problem is to determine the precise limits and cost of violation from either side.

The current trend in this debate is marked by new awareness that naturalisation of human being is not threatening. Instead, it is the supposed human superiority to the natural that seems to be challenged. There are visible attempts to recast the role of human beings within the context of nature. In the aftermath of enlightenment dream, nature and its forces were thought to be dumb; to be subdued. Aided by technological prowess, scientific discovery, and creative talent, human beings unleashed designs for dominating. The nature was dominated. The reaction by nature within its own ecological language provoked popular revulsion against anti-naturalism in the form of environmentalist movements, bioorganic interest groups, and pro-life trends. To be sure, this line of thinking is different from those anti-scientific, romantic or primitive eastern or Greek philosophies.

Evolutionary pressures of the nature form a common reference to build a distinguished view about a healthy human personality and ascertain proper functioning of the various elements of personhood. The reality of nature, back into which humankind is to be positioned, can only be the nature as known by modern science. This also means a willingness to work out anthropology of human kind,

body, and behaviour within the naturalistic brackets. The body is healthy only because of certain 'as if' functions to whom it has been moulded by evolutionary pressure. Naturalists argue that without that pressure there would be no objective reference point from which to define the 'right function'. On similar grounds, psychic health needs to be conceptualised. There may be education; there may be adjustment; there may be spontaneity, happiness, flexibility, and control, and different people and different societies may value these personal differences differently.

### 4.5 Harmony and Natural Selection

Humanity is a purely natural element. It has no capability to transcend the natural character or escape its natural environment. It is bound in its purely natural context regardless of the possibility of transcendence and resurrection in ontological, phenomenological, or existential terms. One way to strictly adhere to these criteria is to apply naturalistic tradition of philosophy. The reconstruction within naturalistic brackets assumes that the same forces that control other living structures within the world of nature and living things control the dynamics of human behaviour. The dynamics include the unconscious operations and the mechanisms of defence that are the controlling forces in human behaviour (Weiner 1993). So to speak, anthropology within the naturalistic brackets will simply assume that human behaviour is governed by thought, thought by emotion, emotion by psychodynamics, psychodynamics by protoplasm, protoplasm by DNA, and DNA by natural selection. On these assumptions, it has been shown that the concept of harmony of the soul as expounded by the early philosophers is a very real thing. Based on same assumptions, it has also been shown that at least the supposition of a hidden and moral human nature is more reasonable than any alternative.

This is a tantalising demonstration. Hitherto, the moral consequence of adoption of natural selection model to human behaviour has been thought of as outrageous. It invokes sense of ruthless competition for scarce resources and upholds the idea of

survival of the fittest. It is believed to allow all sort of manipulation with nature keeping up with Machiavellian spirit. In such power play, there is no room for ethical rules. But in recent years, there has been a series of conceptual writings, which have given exposition to the natural selection model and brought it in tune with the moral conception of nature and humanhood. A new doctrine is in the process of making. (Weiner 1993)

One inadvertent effect, of Darwinism's popular usage of the theory of anthropomorphic frameworks such as theory of natural selection, is the bridge that establishes between human life to the rest of nature and human nature to the history of life. Series of writings by scholars such as Richard Young, Donnah and others reasoned on teleological and purposeful grounds within the most reductionist of the biological disciplines. They found anthropomorphism at the heart of the very human sciences, which were keen to be seen as respectable according to the model of the physical sciences. Some were finding science in Marxism and linguistics in the unconscious while others were finding humanism and values at the heart of the very sciences about which the formalists were appealing for legitimacy.

The pervasive role of ideology as a constitutive determinant is now established in all knowledge disciplines. This is as true of metaphysics or Darwinian biology, or the problem of the place of humanity in nature, or the psychoanalytic understanding of the unconscious. Ideology refers to legitimisation and to the intrusion of values into putative facts. It provides a worldview and a value system for developing acceptable criteria, and undertakes decisions. Ideology reflects social locations and serves established or aspiring powers.

The purpose of integrating naturalistic paradigm and ancient and modern streams of philosophy is not to prove or disprove either one of them with the help of the other.

The object is to work with the theories to develop a broad-based comprehensive model that can logically explain the assumptions, clarify confusions and open new

horizons. By employing variety of theoretical platforms, an explanation of the complex edifice of human behaviour with minimum gaps and blanks can be sought. For example, philosophy can point out that sociobiology is the logical development of naturalism and can help explain the nature of religious experience of humankind. Notwithstanding the intradisciplinary squabbles of psychology, philosophy can help to clarify the psychodynamic working idea of the unconscious and its relation to the philosophical notion of true desire. And philosophy can show how the predominance of unconscious motivation not only does not pose a threat to moral freedom and responsibility (as has been commonly thought), but in fact goes a long way toward understanding of how freedom can be achieved. It can also show how the moral interpretation of the unconscious can make good sense of certain other troublesome ethical.

It goes without saying that this attempt to work within the naturalistic brackets is not intended as a strict deductive proof of the harmony of self using the scientific theories as basic assumptions. The matter is far too complex for that. There are simply too many possibilities that cannot be decisively excluded; too many turns in the argument where choices have to be made without definitive evidence. The goal is, therefore, simply to rationally explain which while not really prove its own conclusion might still show the harmony of the soul to be a likely possibility. In this regard, the task is a bit like the one that Plato set for himself in the *Timaeus*. The concern is not the cosmos but the psyche. The substance of reasoning is empirical, not metaphysical. But the goal is to this extent the same—to show that a hidden harmony is a likely possibility. It might be difficult to demonstrate that it is the most likely of possibilities but this dissertation will show that it is more likely than traditionally thought of and rationally proven. The pursuit of harmony of desires can become a rational object of faith and practice.

## 4.6 Freudian Concepts

In the world of psychology, Freud talks about freedom and relates it to the process capturing the inner being, a dimension not brought to fore in psychological literature before him. He maintains a controversial paradox. On the one hand, he seems to be a typical nineteenth-century deterministic reductionist. On the other hand, Freud's entire focus is to make the unconscious conscious and with some reservations it can also be said that his psychology is a psychology of freedom. The entire approach of psychoanalysis is embedded in the formula 'where id was there shall ego be' (1933:22 p.80). The analysis enables the person to discern into the self and identify desires, instincts, and drives. It culminates into the *working through* through the manner in which in past they were repressed, compromised, and pursued. All in an effort to enable (free) the person toward making a more learned choice in future if not better (1923, p. 19, son.).

Freudian **thinking** gets is not without its own share of critique as well as appreciation. Therapy entails freedom from neurosis – a form of slavery, the operations of the unconscious. Neurosis influence decision making without the person knowing about them. Does it thereby relieve the humans from moral and legal responsibility of their neurotic behaviour? Specially, if the behaviour stems from vicious neurosis and demonic unconscious. Neurotic behaviour can be compared to the behaviour of a drunkard. Once drunk, the person is not consciously responsible for the unconsciously created disruptions. But the decision to choose to drink was a conscious decision. Hence cannot be absolved of the responsibility of all that ensues from unconscious behaviour. Therapy consists of learning just about this. It is only when the responsibility of the repression is accepted that the damages can be undone. It is making it known to and accepted by the person that he or she, who created self-deception, is also fully responsible, "That it is not anyone else but I who do things to me."

To willingly ignore what is known is a form of repression. Platonic myth of recollection and the Freudian theory of the unconscious are based on the willed ignorance, i.e., 'I know that which I do not know.' The result is that by denying the reality one deceives own self and in the process creates a pseudo-self. It is tempting to view people as a passive pawn of the pseudo-self. However, for the original deception, one can blame only own unwillingness to face the truth.

The effectiveness of therapeutic performance depends on two fold successes. Firstly, to help the person in forgiving self or herself and rendering blameless. Secondly, to encourage the person to accept full responsibility. In other words, to know the guilt, forgive the self, and then make the guilt productive for future. Although, this process is wrapped in scientific methodology, nevertheless, it is as serious an ethical business as anything could be.

The genuine notion of freedom can largely satisfy the need for ethical framework to govern the process. It is, however, clear that mere self-knowledge cannot be a substitute to the political freedom. Though it is also true, that unless people have self-knowledge there can not be a political freedom as well. Genuine freedom strengthens political freedom by providing it with the requisite ethical content while political freedom makes genuine freedom virtually effective. The genuine freedom is unique to humans, no other animal is capable of seeking it, given the present state of knowledge. The distinctively rational faculties aid humans in achieving the self-knowledge. The process of attaining and then constantly maintaining the freedom does require lot of sustained efforts backed up by resolution and commitment. The process works in tandem with the moral order and in coherence with the nature and satisfies the highest order of self-esteem and dignity.

This conception of freedom is also consistent with the view of human nature emphasised throughout this dissertation that nature alone can help humans to grow and satisfy ethical sensibilities. Versions of Kant's moral freedom and Sartre's

existential freedom are not compatible with genuine freedom. They are both transcendent forms *of* freedom because each *of* them presupposes a self that is capable *of* constituting itself independently *of* the constitution *of* nature. One can object that why can a human be considered as moral and free if constitution *of* desires is selected by nature and choice is imposed by external forces.

Hume pioneered this line *of* **thinking**. To him the notion *of* supra-causal spontaneity tempers with the requisite notion *of* freedom. If it does exist, then again the ground *of* moral responsibility is weakened. Freedom is incompatible with firmly fixed, regular, predictable, and entirely natural character. This type *of* idea is chimera and not required for the morally significant sense *of* the word freedom. Worse, Hume says, it is actually antithetical to the qualities *of* character that people find morally praiseworthy (1748:8; 1739, p. 2, 3, 1k2). Others who joined Hume include Berkeley with Hobart (1934), and going on through Smith (1948), Ayer (1954), Hampshire (1959). They all believed that spontaneous behaviour is simply erratic and closer to madness than to morality. They see desires as formed by the laws *of* nature and the self as determined by the nature.

To be free is first to know the desires and then act in accord with them. To be responsible is to choose the right desire and then do the deed in a manner consistent with the nature. This behaviour is also called morally praiseworthy. The failure to act is often a consequence *of* failure to secure self-knowledge. Again, this type of freedom has little to do with the transcendence of the laws of nature by spontaneity, rational or otherwise.

The kind of compatibility that is advocated here is illustrated in the Iliad in which favoured heroes achieve predetermined goals through supernatural aids. Heroes are then praised as the author of their successes. In reality, there is no record of real experience of people behaving in free of the laws of nature. Can it be possible at all? One can see concurrence in ancient as well as modern philosophical literature that

freedom never entailed spontaneity as independence from nature. Regardless of the say of external force, people have always been held responsible for their actions and character.

The switch from morality to virtue thus brings into consideration the self-knowledge as a mean to achieve genuine freedom. Rough virtue is shown to be an ingredient of freedom. This analysis integrates psychoanalysis with self-discovery as a path toward self-dignity. It certainly shuns all forms of nihilism.

As Philippa Foot (1978) puts it, "On the whole it is wise to be suspicious of expression such as 'determined by desire' unless they have been given a clear sense, and this is particularly true of the phrase 'determined by the agent's character.'"

Philosophers often talk about actions being determined by a man's character, but it is not certain that anybody else does, or that the words are given any definite sense.

One might suppose that an action was so determined if it was in character, for instance the generous act of a generous man; but if this is so we will not have the kind of determination traditionally supposed to raise difficulties for a doctrine of *free will*."

And Hampshire (1957) also adds this, "A man becomes more and more a free and responsible agent the more he at all times knows what he is doing, in every sense of this phrase, and the more he acts with a definite and clearly formed intention.... It is not by itself a threat to the reality of human freedom that some close observers are able to predict, accurately and with confidence, that what a man is going to do before he does it. The threat arises when his own evidently sincere declarations of intention turn out to be comparatively worthless as a basis for the prediction of his actions."

### 4.7 Psychology of Spirit

Psyche has been defined differently in different cultures and philosophies. Some scholars skewed towards the most limited and narrow-focused meanings while

others attributed to it the most deepest and perceptive meaning. In literature, the meanings that come closer to the Islamic concept are ones adopted by C.Q. Jung (1981). He conceived psyche in ways that can be modified and developed further to fit into the Islamic mould of human psyche. Jung lays the groundwork for psychology *of* spirit in the conception of nature and unique functioning *of* human psyche, along with its all manifestations and variations. In his thinking, one can trace affinities with the Platonic-Cartesian mode of thought. He sees psyche as more than a product of biochemical process in sharp contrast to the dominant reductionist views. He was of the opinion that increase in the scientific understanding and the resultant scienticism has led to dehumanisation of the natural and social worlds. To him, psyche is an independent and autonomous character totally different from the character of matter. It can help resolve the conflict between matter and spirit because all experiences are psychic. Psychic happenings have a role in configuring the human behaviour. Pains and pleasures have a bearing on the psyche and in turn on the behaviour. Jungian practice *of* psychotherapy that tries to bring about change in the human behaviour talks about psychic phenomena such as 'individuation', 'archetypes', 'persona', 'shadow', and 'transference'. He believes that patients would need to become aware of the process of individuation. It entails understanding of the need for the creation *of* a harmonious synthesis *of* the functions, whereby, the nature *of* the shadow and the power of the archetypes of the collective unconscious are reconciled with the demands *of* the conscious personality.

To him, even the knowledge is conditioned by the psyche, which alone is conditioned by the 'superlative real.' Human mind has been endowed with spiritual nature, which is an indispensable part of the human self. He did complain about the partial and fragmented knowledge *of* the spiritual nature. He assumed that unconscious and conscious interacts with each other in the innermost psychic milieu. The conscious is the perceiving agent for experiences while the unconscious is the ground of being. Absar (1992) notes that, "The metaphysical and spiritual content of

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Jung's conception of psyche in the form of the collective unconscious is so illunense that one can rightly view it *sub specie aeternitatis*: a divine element or component in man."

Jung was aware of spiritual but was not religious. He found religious beliefs difficult to refute or accept. Religions become popular because they provide a platform for interpretation of collective conscious. Spiritual vacuum in the wake of material affluence drew the attention of many scholars and people toward the ideas of Jung and thus the foundation of humanistic psychology movement was laid down.

Renowned psychologists such as Gordon Allport, Abraham Maslowe and Carl Rogers build upon the theme of humanistic tradition founded by Jung. Religious views concerning human psyche were given more consideration, as their **thinking** was less and less deterministic about human personality. The Freudian and behaviourist approaches, charges humanistic psychologists, underestimate and ignore the human potential for self-direction and actualisation. They lay great emphasis on the self as a unifying factor which accounts for the individual's subjective experiences, and which determines much of his observable behaviour. Human beings are not seen as a responsible and active participant having the freedom of choice and will to chalk out the destiny for own self and others.

The study of human beings shifted to the study of human behaviour and personality in the current century (Murray 1938). The field of personology focused on scientific study of the human self notwithstanding the semantic problems associated with personality (Bischof 1970). The lay connotation of the word personality entails a superficial image that an individual adopts in playing the life roles. Psychologically speaking, personality expresses itself in the shape of behaviour, which is inescapably cast in the mould of human nature. Human nature manifests itself through needs, abilities, and potentialities, while personality is the realised mix of those attributes or demonstration of the characteristics that needs and potentialities have taken.

Anatomical and psychological aspects play a significant role in the development of

personality. The full explanation of the genesis of personality requires consideration of the factors beyond heredity and environment. The task of understanding human nature is further complicated by the fact that a lot is **unknown** about human beings. The concept of personality as an aspect of human self was initiated by James (1890) and then forcefully represented by Carl Rogers (1961). James saw self as an emblem of spiritual, social, and material. Carl Rogers viewed personality in terms of organised, permanent, and subjectively perceived entity. Homey (1950) talked of self in terms of subjective awareness as distinct from other objects of observation. Watson (1924) reduced self and mind to behaviour, and behaviour to body. He believed that humans get body and its mechanics through heredity and acquire the personality and the rest later. Miller and Dollard (1950) presented the idea of personality as the learned behaviour.

Personality is the gestalt of internal and external factors and forces, sides and parts, aspects and perspectives. The concepts of soul, mind, spirit, psyche, and self or behaviour refer to the internal factors. A lot of research work is required to explore the nature of these forces. As Jung pointed out that though now infinitely more is fathomed yet a lot needs to be known to understand fully the dynamics of human beings.

The theory of personality in psychology is embedded in the definite posture towards metaphysics. All kinds of psychotherapies are based on conception of metaphysics. Formulating of metaphysical assumptions is important to avoid acute dispersion into multiplicity. The focus of psychology should be to discover psychophysical unity to enable people to reclaim the original state of wholeness and harmony.

### 4.8 Synthesis within Moral Psychology

The idea in the dissertation is to merge and synthesise scientific and value-oriented frameworks. On scholarly grounds, the prominent psychologists such as Jung (1981), Erich Fromm (1947, 1961), Karen Homey (1950), Carl Rogers (1961), Abraham

Maslow (1962), Scott Peck (1980, 1983) have formulated linkages between mental health and moral behaviour. They have boldly developed explicit thesis or implicit presupposition in psychotherapy. This effort did not progress because of any resistance. It came strongly from scholarly spheres because it blended scientific and moral languages. Traditional Freudians view morality with psychotherapeutic suspicion; behaviourists owing to their allegedly naturalistic reductionism totally negate the role of morality; and positivists purge the scientific-medical model from psychiatric theory and practice. According to them is/ought dichotomy is unbridgeable and science and values belong to different universes of discourse. Thus, positivism and existentialism remained the dominant philosophical currents of today.

Health is one of the few norms about human nature having a promise to hold universal germaneness and unanimous approval. Health and nature are much alike conceptually as well as practically. They are created, not by humans, but by a different external force. Both indicate the state of situation in relation to the advantages and benefits to the humans. Human endeavours to understand and subdue health and nature have faced similar kinds of problems. Good nature implies good health; bad health means bad nature. Health and nature can be defined in terms of uncontroversial and concrete dimensions in view of their physical as well as non-physical properties.

Seen from the nature's point of view, ethics is a kind of health of the soul and virtue the healthy condition of the human being. The primary beliefs governing the ancient moral and medical practices were based on the concept of health as embedded in goodness of behaviour. The scientific revolution severely undermined the predominance of this traditional view. Anthropological incursions made it all the more irrelevant by adding more substance to the crude scientific assertions. It did take a great deal of philosophical efforts to separate health and goodness and make the ancient medical model of soul a metaphorical idea.



The thoughts on this line are generally regarded as merely an extension of the scientific/medical study to behaviour/psychology. In the modern times, Freud and his humanistic followers took deep interest in the psychodynamic processes and inadvertently laid the foundation of the renewal of the most ancient formula of the union of health and virtue. To build a viable synthesis along the same lines, careful analysis is required to integrate medicine, psychology, ethics, and anthropology. The meaningful reunion of health and virtue depends on how the idea of a healthy soul can be established. To that end, firstly, the ambiguity and obscurity surrounding the notions of health, nature and goodness needs to be cleared. Once the meanings are ascertained, the question turns to determining the demands of ethics from human beings that aspire to embody the health, virtue, and goodness. The response to this question should come from empirical as well as philosophical grounds. The analysis in this dissertation will be lirnited to the philosophical grounds only. To conclude the empirical needs summarily, one can say that the findings from philosophical analysis are more likely to be true than the reverse.

In recent times, several platforms have developed to base the new synthesis. The functionalist rationalism of the theory of natural selection provides one framework that integrates nature and human self in totality. The new field of ecology as a sort of functionalist bio-cosmology is another framework, which attempts to link homosphere, biosphere and noosphere. Sociobiology has also made valuable contribution to determine the role of nature in the study of human behaviour.

Anthropology that has unearthed the primitive man's activities in the archaic nature is another field that can help in such synthesis. Freudianism has discovered the structure of hidden operation of mind. Humanists in psychology have illuminated the notion of harmony on that basis. Some of these theories are more controversial. Some qualify to be called 'scientific.' Some bear political connotations. Some are projected enthusiastically for to cash in on the popular crave for spirituality.

In order to develop proper synthesis, it is important to render due consideration to all of these perspectives. A multi-theoretical perspective would be better equipped to explain the complex processes of human nature and human interaction as it has evolved over a long time. Negating any one of these viewpoints would reduce the validity and the reliability of the framework. Understanding of human nature requires holistic concept given its own holistic functions. Thus, there is a need for a paradigm that can establish viable interface between human nature and nature and can signify the harmony of self after reconstructing the moral conception of nature. Such possibility can be realised by reviving the concept of virtue on a nonmetaphysical and natural teleology. Thus a new branch of moral psychology is a reconstitution of the harmony of the soul on the most modern of foundations. This thesis makes an attempt to unify that perspective with the Qur'anic perspective on common grounds.

## CHAPTER 5.0

### THEMES FROM ISLAM

This chapter is the last in continuation of the preceding two which brings into discourse the distinct perspective of Islam into the making of synthesis. The chapter begins with the discussion on influence of naturalist thinking on Islam. It selectively incorporates two responses from the Christian and the Islamic world to present the range of ideas stimulated by the infringing views of the proponents of naturalist stance. The concept of Ultimate Ego and oneness of God and relationship between human and nature is expounded to describe the Islamic concept of metaphysical issues. The chapter closes with the discussion on Qur'anic paradigm of human nature and the concept of personality and human self. The themes developed from philosophy, science, and Islam are seen in relation to each other for comparison and analysis.

## 5.1 Naturalist Thinking and Religious Response

### 5.1.1 Position of Naturalists

The struggle for the soul of humankind in this century would be, Wilson (1998, p. 267) ventures to predict, dominated by the choice between transcendentalism and empiricism. The key issue of moral reasoning will either get further entrenched within the idioms of religion and philosophy, or it will shift toward science-based natural sciences. The issue that has preoccupied philosophers and scientists is whether ethical precepts, such as human will, responsibility and justice, are independent of human experience or else they are human innovations.

Transcendentalists **think** that moral guidelines come from outside human mind while empiricists **think** that they come from human thinking. Ethics is defined by empiricists as conduct favoured consistently enough throughout a society to be expressed as a code of principles. As the leading advocate of the position of



naturalists-empiricists, Edward Wilson believes that the argument for the existence of a biological God Who directs organic evolution and intervenes in human affairs (as envisioned by theism) is increasingly now contravened by biology and brain sciences. Empiricists favour material origin of ethics, which while still imperfect, already cover the most facts known about moral behaviour with maximum accuracy and minimum assumptions. By exploring the biological roots of moral behaviour, and explaining their material origins and biases, more enduring ethical consensus can be formulated. According to him, "Ethical codes are precepts reached by consensus under the guidance of the innate rules of mental development. Religion is the ensemble of mythic narratives that explain the origin of a people, their destiny, and why they are obliged to subscribe to particular rituals and moral codes."

(Wilson, 1998, p.275)

Wilson views ethical beliefs as created from the bottom up. The direction of genesis is from people to their culture. They do not come from the top down or from God or any other 'nonmaterial' source to the people by way of culture. Reverence to mythology and religious dogmas, should not imply that human beings withdraw from freedom and will. There is not concept of intuition, revelation, or of God communicating to humanity in any form. The individual, in naturalists **thinking**, is seen as predisposed, biologically, to make certain choices. Even the role of culture is limited to the extent that it makes some of the choices hardened into precepts and subsequently into laws. A belief in the command of God or the natural order of the universe is only a consequence of strong predisposition or coercion, thereby, denying any role for objective deliberation, or inner vocation, or personal experience leading to faith in the Reality of God. "Human nature," Wilson (1998 p. 181) defines, "is composed of epigenetic rules, the hereditary regularities of mental development that bias cultural evolution in one direction as opposed to another, and thus connects the genes to culture." Though, it is, he believes, still an elusive concept because of rudimentary understanding of epigenetic rules.

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In contrast, transcendentalists argue that moral guidelines come outside the human brain, either natural law which comprises free standing principles of moral conduct immune to doubt and compromise. St Thomas Aquinas reasoned in *Summa Theologiae* that 'natural law is an expression of God's Will.' Human beings are obligated to discover the law through diligent reasoning and apply it into their lives. This transcendental type of belief is also shared by secular transcendentalists, such as Immanuel Kant, who posits that human beings are independent moral agents with a wholly free will capable of obeying or breaking moral law. Humankind is endowed with the power of self-determination, independent of any coercion through sensuous impulses. In a similar vein, John Rawls (1971) proposes that, "In a just society the liberties of equal citizenship are taken as settled; the rights secured by justice are not subject to political bargaining or the calculus."

Much of the contemporary intellectual debate is between scientific materialism and traditional religion. Considering religion as the chief competitor of the scientific naturalism Wilson (1978, p. 191) hopes that final decisive edge over religion can be achieved if natural selection can explain traditional religion as a wholly material phenomenon. Discounting religion is no answer, 'principle of natural selection acting on the genetically evolving material structure of the human brain' should be able to explain the origins of mythology. This is the most aggressive position taken against the religious **thinking** by a scholar from scientific tradition. In this ongoing battle, Wilson argues that final redoubt and recourse from which theology could not be driven out hitherto, is the role of God in the process of 'myth' of creation. That is God, as the One, Who caused the existence, and the One, Who generated all the energies and the natural laws. Science emphasises the 'belief' that every part of existence is obedient to physical laws requiring no external control. However, he acknowledges that these laws can never be definitely proven to form a cause-and-effect continuum from physics to the social sciences, from this world to the other worlds, and backward through time to the beginning of the universe (Wilson 1978, p.

191-193). There is "pervasive testimony to the existence of a genetically based human nature" (Wilson 1998;p. 181) strengthening evolutionary epic but "its most sweeping assertions can not be proven with finality" (Wilson 1978;p.101).

This dominant view of naturalists invoked responses from all religious traditions - especially, Christianity and Islam ranging from outright negation of any hereditary influence to partial or total acceptance. Two representative responses from

Christianity and Islam are briefly discussed here on the basis of their attempts to understand the logic of scientific naturalism, to make a critique of the paradigm itself, and to determine how it relates to the teachings of respective religions.

Religion as a deliberate enterprise to seize the ultimate principle of value and thereby to reintegrate the forces of one's own personality cannot be denied. Modern man has ceased to live soulfully from within. Absorbed in facts, the optically present source of sensation, he is entirely cut off from the unplumbed depths of his own being.

All religions combine two things. The first is the insistence on spiritually debilitating inheritance which states that none starts with a clean slate but with a set of circumstances and inner dispositions with which humans have to contend and for which they carry responsibility. The second is the belief that there are also spiritual opportunities for progress within humans by calling the transcendent sources of power to which access is provided by religions.

## 5.12 Penelhum's View

The cornerstone of the Christian view of human nature is that due to transgression of the first human being the nature is corrupted and is unable to resist temptations to more than a feeble extent. It is the sacrifice of Christ that has made it possible for humans to free themselves from crippling guilt and to open up to the prompting of the Spirit. The primary fruits of the work of the Spirit are strengthening of morality, capacity for love, and compassion.

In response to the scientific claims that humans are biological fellows of other species, Terrence Penelhum (1989; p.78), who tried to link the two diametrically opposite paradigms, opines, "What the evolutionary understanding of our origins makes clear is that the traditional doctrine of the Fall must go." Specifically, 'some parts of the view that is traceable to Paul, and based upon his interpretation of the story of Adam's disobedience in Genesis 3.' These relate to the facts that 'evil and death came into a world that was until then free of both, and that the deep influence of sin in the soul of each person is a consequence of that disobedience also.' He acknowledges that humans should see themselves as *ascended* (his italics) from an illal past. However, the admittance of biological roots should not in any way overshadow the special calling of human beings.

The Christian doctrine sees human beings as called to a mode of life for which their biological provenance does not entail a sufficient preparation. To be sure, this mode of life transcends anything that the natural selection can make it possible. The recognition of the biological roots should be seen in terms of its impact on what human beings have the capacity to be. To have this capacity, they require a higher intelligence and a measure of freedom. The doctrine of the *imago dei* demonstrates that human beings possess the necessary freedom within their finite world to choose what is good or what is evil. They are distinguished from other just biologically programmed species. They are also endowed with the power of moral discrimination: the power to know their own natures, and to choose good over evil in what they find within them. They also have the capacity to recognise and resort to the transcendent sources for strength and guidance. The Pauline account of how this gift came about is, in his view, is no longer acceptable due to scientific discoveries. An alternative account consistent with naturalists is required, which should also include description of the radical character of the evil.

Generally, it has been taken for granted as a straightjacket assumption that it is believe in God that spawns responsible moral behaviour. It is so clearly reflected in

John Locke (1823) when he refuses to trust atheists and advises not to expect any commitment to moral conduct from them. In contrast, Joseph Butler (1900) is of the view that human nature carry a moral structure governed by conscience. The role of conscience is to warn when humans are about to do something that they should not or to evade something that they should not. The power of making moral judgement is a natural endowment, just like ability to perceive objectives. Morality comes not only from following divine commands but also from innate inclinations.

Awareness to innate characteristics comes from self-knowledge, which leads to repentance (in case of bad deed) or reinforcement (in case of good deed). Philosophy from the date of Socrates and Aristotle also has sought self-knowledge. Butler emphasised the strength and authority of the conscience to recognise the power of motives and get free from adaptation to the evil choices. Each human being is in the position of making choices in which, often, they end up fulfilling desires that go against what they know to be the good or the right. Thus arises the question of temptation, inclination to go against the knowledge or predetermined preferences. Only those can sin, who have the moral reckoning as well as the capacity to yield to temptation. In this sense the Fall story must be historically accurate: that sinfulness could only affect human nature when they had become equipped to know good and evil.

On the one hand, he distances **himself** from, what he calls 'absurd thesis,' that humans are merely animals or that humanity does not have unique endowments. On the other hand, he insists on reinterpretation in a way that takes due note of the fact **that humankind** is a part of the natural order and are not aliens in it. To be 'properly-disposed' is the only ethically-defensible response to the understanding of the natural order. What it implies is that sinfulness of unregenerate natures is not a historical consequence of the transgression of the first human ancestors. Many of the components of human nature come down as genetic endowments from the long eras before fully human choice was possible. It is all a part of the creative process.

His position is akin to those who see the Christian view of human nature as essentially a forward-looking and take eschatological view of the subject. What Paul judges to be the result of the invasion of sin has come about from the time of the onset of understanding of morality and the capacity to judge good and evil. Humans have made the wrong responses to the chronic anxieties that these generate and it is these evil inclinations that the Christian proclamation and other religions call upon humanity to transcend.

Penelhum also substantiates the stance of pluralism as opposed to religious timidity by considering the view that the major traditions of the world are equally viable paths towards salvation. This amounts to saying that transformed person in every tradition is following a path that will lead to a destiny that articulates and unleashes a true being within.

### 5.1.3 Iqbal's View

Muhammad Iqbal confronts the idea of naturalistic paradigm from the perspective of Islamic philosophy. In principle, he says, that philosophy can discuss the issues related to religion. But should accept that religion is of such a nature that its discussion under philosophy can only take place on religion's own terms (p.2). Religion is expression of the whole man and thus can not be inferior to philosophy, which deals with human life in parts; in linear manner against physical dimensions of time and space through reason and intellect. The central position of religious experience needs to be recognised first. He states that thoughts and intuition are in need of each other for mutual rejuvenation and complement. Intuition is a higher type of intellect, as Bergson (1911) also points out. Intellect grasp reality in piecemeal within temporal aspects based on exclusive observations. Intuition is rooted in eternal and considers wholeness and sublime nature of things to capture dimensions of Reality for increasing intimacy. Reality stands for the Absolute independent of human consciousness. Former attempts to connect with the Reality through the

sense-perception, reflective observation, and experimentation while the later simply makes direct association with the Reality to truly fathom as it reveals itself within.

The primary role of religion is to conceptualise and regulate the relationship between the individual and the universe, individual and the society, and individual and God.

The scope of religion encompasses all that exists, seen or unseen, known and unknown, within and without the finite temporal bounds. Religion is essentially discernment. It is discernment of the God and the world, the real and the unreal, or the everlasting and the ephemeral. Religion establishes union with God, the Great Spirit. Everything in religion has its foundation in one of these two elements: in discernment and union. If humankind is intelligence and will then religion is discernment and concentration (Schuon 1983).

Iqbal asserts that if intellect is a product of evolution then whole mechanistic concept of the nature and origin of life becomes absurd. Intellect is a mode of apprehending reality. It cannot be an evolution of something that only exists as an abstraction of that mode of apprehending, which is again the intellect. Of more dire is the consequence of this belief in the domain of scientific investigation. As a product of the evolution it cannot be absolute; it has to be relative of life which has evolved it. This brings down the whole edifice of objective presentation as an absolute and total exclusion of subjective aspect of knowing.

Science cannot comprehend life, declares Iqbal (1989, p. 41). Science seeks to trace uniformity of experience but life with its intense character of spontaneity abhors deterministic expectations. It falls outside the domain of necessity. The phenomenon of creation is opposed to repetition which is a characteristic of mechanical action. The inadequacy of the naturalistic assumptions would become clear, if biologists, he suggests, could study their own. The universe is a free creative movement as explained by Qur'an.

Iqbal (1989, p.42) conceives creative evolution in a totally different mode. He points out that movement of life, as an organic growth, involves a progressive synthesis of its various stages. It is determined by end objectives and the very supposition of ends implies permeation by intelligence. Unconscious experience, life and thought permeate each other forming a unity by encompassing diversity and divisions. This is in contrast to Burgeson who views that the 'forward rush of the vital impulse in its creative freedom is subjugated or deflected the light of an immediate or a remote purpose.' For Burgeson, the creative thrust does not aim at a result or is directive or targeted. It is wholly arbitrary, undirected, and chaotic in behaviour. Iqbal maintains that life is only a series of acts of attention, and an act of attention is inexplicable without reference to a purpose be it conscious or unconscious. Reality, Iqbal says is not a blind vital impulse, its nature is through and through teleological. Envisioning the creative impulse, Burgeson is of the view that portals of the future must remain open to Reality.

Iqbal vehemently opposes the notion of continuous materialism because the idea of predetermined destiny or rigid determinism leaves no scope for human freedom or Divine action. To him, the world regarded as a process realising preordained goal is not a world of free, responsible moral agents. Beyond temporal reproduction of eternal schemes, mental life is essentially teleological in the sense that there is a progressive formation of fresh ends, purposes, and ideal scales of value as the process of life grows and expands. Life is a passage through a series of deaths for transmutations and transformation.

If history is regarded (p. 63) merely as a gradually revealed photo of a predetermined order of events, then there is no room in it for novelty and initiation. Consequently, there is no meaning to the word 'creation,' which does have a meaning in view of our capacity for action. Spontaneity of life is experienced fact and evolution denies that chance. Hence, naturalistic thinking entails compromise on the freedom of all-inclusive ego that cannot be conceded within the Islamic thinking.

## 5.2 The Ultimate Ego

Religious efficacy is contingent upon its ability to testify truth and invoke belief. Human being search for truth through religious mode of thinking. Thus, every religion qua religion has, ultimately, two cardinal elements that constitute its foundation. Firstly, a set of rules which can help in differentiating between the Absolute, the Absolutely Real, the Absolute Value and the opposite. Secondly a method of concentrating upon the Real, of attaching oneself to the Absolute, the Total Reality, the 'Wholly Other'.

These two elements, the doctrine and the method, the means of distinguishing between what is Real and what is apparently real, and attaching oneself to the Real, exist in every orthodox and integral religion and are in fact the essence of every religion. The doctrinal language, its import can differ from one tradition to another but all religions have explained it in one way or the other.

The creed of *ta'wheed*, in the eyes of Qur'an, implies that God has no partner and no associate in any way whatsoever. By His nature, He is the Absolute Being. He does not need help or assistance, since He is by nature omnipotent. He is the Prime, Mover, the Unmoved Mover. He is above every need and beyond any effect, since need presumes deficiency and effect assumes lack of omnipotence. He possesses no body in the concrete sense since body needs a space but all spaces are His and He is everywhere like a light. His movement or Self cannot be diminished or curtailed, harmed or compromised. He has no equal. He knows it All and All. His power of knowledge is beyond comprehension of the knowledge of human mind. The scope and limits of ongoing creation are manifestly apparent everywhere. It is He alone that cannot be defined in terms of time and space, because He is the Creator and not a prisoner of time and space. It is He alone Who enjoys these qualities and not any other being, on earth or in heaven.

The Qur'an lays great emphasis on the Divine Unity or Oneness: the creed contains a negation of false gods and the affirmation of the unity of the one true God. Qur'an says:

"Say (O Muhammad bpuh): He is God, (the) One. Allah-us-Samad (God-the Self-Sufficient Master, Whom all creatures need, (He neither eats nor drinks). He begets not, nor was He begotten. And there is none co-equal or comparable unto Him." (Qur'an 112:1-4)

The Attribute of God as the Creator further amplifies the doctrine of the Unity of the Godhead. The power of creation belongs exclusively to God since God Himself is uncreated. He has no beginning, hence no end. He lives from eternity to eternity. All other things in the world and in heaven are created, hence they have temporal or ephemeral subsistence. God is uncreated, hence His is eternity. He creates the entire creation by the imperative 'be' and it becomes.

God belongs to the supernatural realm. He is both transcendent and immanent. God has no body, hence, He cannot be subjected to any empirical or anatomical analysis.

The phenomenon of revelation is another evidence of the unity or oneness of the nature of the Godhead. He is the only One Who constitutes the basis of revelation culminating in religious experience and expression. Revelation is the form of communication from God to the humankind. Access to revelation is access to Truth and Guidance representing the knowledge. This knowledge forms the basis for the creative operation of intellect and intuition.

The concept of *ta'wiz id* in Islam is further amplified by the phenomenon of death which is part of the creative process. God is, by nature, immortal. It is He alone Who is immortal and incorruptible. Thus, it is He alone who gives and takes away life and thus God's ultimate sovereignty over the world and its history is affirmed and reaffirmed as soon as one is born and one dies. It is only He Who creates and Who can recreate. It is only He who makes that can unmake and re~~u~~nake.

....'

The stage of final resurrection and day of judgement after the death further amplifies the oneness or unity of the Godhead. There is no other being who can give perfect judgement. God, by nature, has no partiality in judgement. He is the just Judge, the righteous Judge who judges the world without fear and favour. The notion of *tawhid* involves absolute oneness or unity not a diffused or submerged. Throughout the Muslim history, the concept of the unity or Oneness of God has been upheld by all schools of thoughts.

Ibne-sina (980-1037) believes that God is the One, the 'necessarily existent' (*rvaj i- al-rvij ud*), from Whom emanates everything. Ibne-sina places the spiritual at a higher elevation above all that is material. From the conception of the Possible and the Necessary, the existence of a necessary Being plainly follows. According to Ibne-sina, humans should not seek to demonstrate the existence of the Creator from His works, but rather should deduce, from the possible character of all that is and all that is **think** able in the world, the existence of a First and Necessary Being, whose essence and existence are one.

The doctrine of the Unity or oneness of God is unique (*al-tawllid rvalid*). Islam seeks to affirm this in the world of multiplicity of religions, doctrines and beliefs by its uncompromising emphasis upon Divine Unity. It can be said that Islam has two dimensions, the 'horizontal' dimension of the will, and the 'vertical' dimension of the intelligence: the former maintains 'equilibrium' and the later seeks 'union'. The notion of equilibrium acts as the basis to establish order and justice while the roots of union can be traced back to the concept of Oneness of God or *tawhid*.

Implications of *tawllid* are not limited to God only. It also follows that life is an undivided whole. All possible facets and aspects enmesh into single dimension necessitating the required role of a Central Force. This Central Force unites and binds the life by virtue of the power of a single all-encompassing perspective. Thus, all divisions and compartments that characterise the human attempts to understand the

life may represent the structure and style of **thinking** but has no relation to the human life which is projected in the Qur'an as one unit. Qur'an does not believe in the dichotomy of material and spiritual world or of private and public life. Aspects of human relations, cultural ethos, and societal structure-all are considered to be relevant to the religious considerations. To achieve success, a believer has to perform and prove in the real world.

The Islamic concept is based on meaningful integration with and creative submission to God the Central Force and All-Sovereign in the universe and nature. The word used by Qur'an is *Din*, which stands for comprehensive way of life and complete domination. Islam as a *Din* claims to cover all aspects of life. It ties the question of transcendence towards eternal salvation and transfiguration towards spiritual elevation to the mechanics of individual performance and dynamics of relationship in this world. The scope of responsibility, extent of empowerment, range of relationships, and possibility of sharing in this earthly life is also provided within its framework. Thus, Islam establishes a harmony between all aspects of life at all levels. The key source of harmony rests within humans when they establish a constructive interaction within their organic and inner self. The word used by Qur'an is balance for harmony. There cannot be any balance without harmony. Qur'an says:

"And has not laid upon you in religion any hardship" (Qur'an 22:78)

"This day, I have perfected your religion for you, completed My Favour upon you, and have chosen for you Islam as your religion." (Qur'an 5:3)

In other words, Islam claims to contain necessary prerequisites for harmony. Therefore, it emphasised utter exclusivity of God and requires that there is no association or partnership or relation in His role and self. Hence, precondition to peace is submission at all levels and domination in all reaches. The partial link-up and tangential coupling has no meanings, and, in fact, may have adverse consequences.

Qur'an lays comprehensive divine framework for governance and rule, value and faith. It provides for flexibility, strategic as well as structural, to be able to adapt to the changes in human life, cater to the diversity, and align to the dynamic nature.

Qur'an talks about justice and balance as the premier quality of the nation it seeks to raise. The purpose of justice and balance is to manage equilibrium amid coordination and conflict, agency and principality, unity and diversity, universality and locality, individuality and collectivity, spirituality and materialism, objectivity and subjectivity, reality and idealism, culture and nature, transcendental and permanence, relativity and absolutism, and so on and so forth. The overarching dimension of Oneness of God unifies and dyes all diverse facets and human activities into one strand and shade. Islam thrives on its notions of holistic, integrative, and comprehensive governing system for humankind. The crises and vicissitudes in human thoughts, confrontations and tensions in societal structures, polarisation and anarchism in human affairs resulting from ontological controversies are theoretically resolved in Islam. It is a simple and straightforward way of life. The notion of harmony requires a central force to bind all, a meta-reality to refer to, and a powerful overarching mechanism at the level of function. That One Force, Meta-Reality, and Functional Authority is One God. The straight road leading to the Oneness of God has the potential to harmonise among all directions, sources, and variations in the context of human existence. Specifically, that harmony is a result of synthesis between human nature and nature of human leadership. If such a synthesis exists and it is materialised then it has the potential to change the course of history. Such tantalising consequence forced the attention toward honing of harmony through integration of Islamic concept of human nature by creating dialogue and negotiation for mustering possibility of substantiation from variety of other streams of thoughts.

The test of humans in this world critically depends on the power to see the unseen through the perception of what is seen. The fact is that meanings and interpretations are always found organised in the hierarchy of layers. What is apparent is not at all

enough to understand what it fully means. There are multitude layers in different directions, which need to be analysed to decipher the meanings of even the simple events.

Humankind faces the task of filling the blanks, guessing with raw information, assuming realities when not clear, and accepting or rejecting notions based on the previous right or wrong experiences. The increasing uncertainty, complexity, and equivocality have put greater pressure on the power of seeing the unforeseen. Research is undertaken to determine the risks against the benefits. What scenarios will emerge in future, distant or near, are sketched. Using sophisticated analytical tools and historic data, estimates for the future are established. Vision and analysis both are employed to fill the vacuum.

The unseen nature of God's existence is a focus of the test designed for humankind. Qur'an refuses to offer a logical or a clear appearance of God because it wants humankind to believe in God by understanding through reason. The belief in the existence of God should be originated from the reasons developed by **thinking** upon and through the hierarchy of realities and processes of unfolding the realities surrounding the life. The reality of the existence of God, Qur'an says, is so apparent and so evident that any reflective eye and perceptive mind can capture it. Qur'an aggressively invokes rational faculties of human beings more than any other religious orientation for support and attestation of its assertions. The beliefs are founded on rational approach. Qur'an strongly objects irrational approaches to faith or non-rational attitudes to defence against the claims of Qur'an. Building on sound logic, Qur'an repeatedly attempts to engage its addressees to a rational dialogue on important issues such as creations and decisions of God. The limitations of the perception of human mind are also extensively discussed in the Qur'an. The kinds of biases, prejudices, and shortcomings that impair the **thinking** process are highlighted so as to guide the **thinking** process.

Iqbal (1989) has used the term of 'The Ultimate Ego' to symbolise the concept of *tazvuzid* in the modern context. The Ultimate Ego exists in pure duration where in change ceases to be a succession of varying attitudes, and reveals its true character as continuous creation, untouched by weariness (50:38) and uninterrupted by slumber or sleep (2:255). The perfection of the 'Creative Self Change' in the Personhood of God does not mean imperfection. Iqbal says that it indicates the vast basis of His creative activity and the infinite scope of His creative vision. God does not pursue any objective or ideal, His life is a life of restrained self-revelation of infinite inner possibilities of His creative activity. This universe and the humankind is only partial expression.

The Qur'anic conception of God, from a purely intellectual point of view, includes Creativeness, Knowledge, Omnipotence, and Eternity. Iqbal shuns (p.52) the narrow vision of finite mind, which consider universe as a mechanical article which having no organic relation with the life of its maker. That kind of **thinking** means that universe is a mere accident in the life of God and might not have been created.

From the Ultimate Ego, egos proceed. The creative energy of Ultimate Ego functions as ego-unities. Every atom of Divine Energy, however low in the scale of existence, is an ego. The world, in all details, from the mechanical movement of what we call the atom of the matter to the free movement of what thought in the human ego is the self-revelation of the 'Great I am.' There are degrees in the expression of the ego-hood. Through out the entire galaxy of beings runs the gradually rising note of ego-hood until it reaches its perfection in human being. That is why Qur'an declares the Ultimate Ego to be nearer to humans than their own jugular-vein.

Conceptualising knowledge is a totally different task, in view of the limitations of language, given the context of the presence and potential of the Ultimate Ego. The discursive knowledge however infinite cannot be predicated of an Ego who knows, and at the same time forms the ground of the object known. Divine knowledge

should not be regarded as a kind of passive omniscience. It must be conceived as a living creative activity to which the objects, that appear to exist in their own right, are organically related. The metaphor of a reflective mirror is, perhaps, close to the state of knowledge but foreknowledge should be thought of at the expense of His creative freedom. His Knowledge is of the kind that is also creative of its object. Universe is not a closed entity where creativity has terminated. The creative potential of the future against the notion of a fixed futurity should be kept in consideration in line with the directions of God's creative activity..

Omnipotence is not merely a blind, capricious power without values. Divine Omnipotence is intimately related to Divine Wisdom. The infinite powers are exercised not in the arbitrary and the capricious but in the just and orderly manner in alignment with the constructive creative role of God. Qur'an also says that God is holding all goodness in His Hands (Qur'an 3:26;57:29). Nature is a cosmos of mutually related forces and God's omnipotence articulate and balance these forces. The force of evolution has generated universal suffering and wrongdoing. It is hoped that eventual victory of human beings over the forces of evil, as Iqbal predicts would result in reconciliation of the Goodness of God with evil in His creations.

### 5.3 Qur'anic Paradigm of Human Nature

Qur'an is a communication of God to humankind. It clarifies the key relationships between God, humans, and nature. By revealing the events of creation of the first human being and the universe, it resolves the basic questions such as context, framework, and purpose of humankind. Qur'an furnishes the broad principles, rules and norms for individual and collective life. Qur'an delves deeply into the psychology and behaviour of humans. The purpose of this section is to first discern the relationship that Qur'an seeks to establish between God, humans, and nature and then explore the Qur'anic view of human nature. This will set the perspective to determine response to the central question of this thesis concerning the creation of

harmony within the human beings, among human beings, between the humankind and nature, and between humankind and universe. The Qur'anic thinking is taken as the representative of Islam, to facilitate development of an integrated framework blending perspectives from philosophy, science, and Islam. Modern psychology has not been able to truly represent the inner richness and variety in the religious experience. Mere analytical criticism with some understanding of organic conditions of the imagery is not going to carry humans to the living roots of human personality.

Qur'an indicates that humankind has a special position in the universe. It is different in the universal scheme primarily because it has been originally intended to be different. This difference has been enunciated at a number of places in the Qur'an. A typical description would be what has been mentioned below:

"Behold! thy Lord said to the angels: I am about to create man, from sounding clay; from mud, moulded into shape; when I have fashioned him (in due proportion) and breathed into him of My spirit; fall you down in obeisance unto him." (Qur'an 15:28-29)

The process of creation as described in the Qur'an clearly indicates that the whole process of creation was deliberate (rather than accidental), and was, of course, a result of God's omnipotent will. There was a particular moment which was of special significance, a moment which came towards the end of this process. This was the stage at which a divine element was introduced by breathing into the first human being of *Al-Ruh* (Spirit) from God, which completed the process of man's creation.

The Qur'anic view of the world is essential to understand what Qur'an has to say about the nature of human beings. Humans are the focal point of all the injunctions of Qur'an. Qur'an lays great stress on the fact that God has not created universe and humans in vain (Qur'an 38:72) but with purpose and meanings (Qur'an 30:8).

Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) says:

"Every Child is born in a state of *Fitrah* (the original nature). Then his parents make him a Jew i.e. Christian or a Megrim, just as an animal is born in intent. Do you observe any among them that are maimed (at birth)?" (Masnad Ahmad Bin Hambal, Vol. 2, p.315-346)

Qur'an also presents Islam as a system of life, which is natural and aligned to the human nature.

"So set you (O Muhammad BPUH) your face towards the religion (of pure Islamic Monotheism) Hanif (worship none but God Alone). God's Fitrah (i.e. God's Islamic Monotheism) with which He has created mankind. No change let there be in Khalq-illah (i.e. the religion of God — Islamic Monotheism), that is the straight religion, but most of men know not." (Qur'an 30:30)

God has created everything and then nurtured and developed in it the requisite potentialities, capabilities, functionality, and behavioural moulds, given its purpose and placement. (Qur'an 87:2-3). He not only determines the nature or shapes the nature for one time in the beginning but takes the full responsibility to guide it along its process of development. All things created by God fulfil their purpose whether it is successive movement of day and night, decoration of skies with stars, erection of mountains, movement of winds and clouds, countless varieties of animals, fruits, flowers, trees, etc (Qur'an 2:164, 3:27, 3:190-191, 6:1, 10:6, 14:33, 35:27-28).

The ultimate purpose of religious experience is to make this evolution move in a direction crucial to the destiny of ego and the moral health of the social fabric, which forms the immediate environment. The basic perception from which religious life moves forward and take over all facets of the life is the inevitability of transition from this world, amenability to development, and the capacity for freedom and strength to create new situations in known and **unknown** environments.

The status and nature of humankind can be deduced from the manner in which the creation of first human being is described in Qur'an. An explanation of the story of



Adam the symbol of humankind in the Qur'an, makes clear what kind of creature a human being is going to be in God's vision and therefore in the framework of Islam. The story of Adam and his creation in the Qur'an is a most profound and advanced expression of the nature of humankind. In this story, Adam represents the whole community human species, not in the biological sense, but in philosophical, behavioral, and symbolic sense. God announces the make up of the human self as such:

"And (remember) when your Lord said to the angels: I am going to create a man (Adam) from dried (sounding) clay of altered mud. So, when I have fashioned him completely and breathed into him (Adam) the soul which I created for him, then fall (you) down prostrating yourselves unto him." (Qur'an 15:28-29)

The creation of human beings, that is, the essence, spiritual density and attributes of human race, as it appears in these two verses, may be reduced to the 'sounding clay' and the 'Spirit of God.' Thus humankind is a creature with a dual nature, as opposed to all other beings which are one-dimensional. One dimension inclines to clay and lowness, to stagnation, to inutility and absolute passivity. But the other dimension, that of the spirit of God, aspires to ascend and to mount up to the highest summit conceivable. It indicates an endless movement toward perfection and infinite exaltation. Humankind is composed of two contradictory elements, clay and the spirit of God, and his splendor and importance derive precisely from the fact that he is a two-dimensional creature. Qur'an says:

By Nafs (Adam or a person or a soul), and Him Who perfected him in proportion; Then He showed him what is wrong for him and what is right for him. Indeed he succeeds who purifies his ownself. And indeed he fails who corrupts his ownself. (Qur'an 91:7-10)

Qur'an says further:

"And shown him the two ways (good and evil)? (Qur'an 90:10)

In his, *An Introduction to History (El-Muqaddimali)*, Ibne Khaldun (1958) has emphasized this two-dimensional nature of man. He says, "It should be known that God put good and evil into the nature of Man. He has inspired the soul with wickedness as well as fear of God."

The two-dimensional potentiality of humankind opens up two different ideologies and avenues for the way of life. It is the human will and freedom that enables human to decide either to descend toward the pole of sedimentary clay that exists in own being, or to ascend toward the pole of exaltation, of God and the spirit of God. This constant striving and struggle takes place in humankind's inner being, until finally one of the poles as the determinant for destiny is confirmed as the final choice.

The free will of human beings gives them superiority over all other creatures in the **universe**. **Humankind** is the only being capable of acting in opposition to own instinctual nature. It is only human who can rebel against the way in which he or she is created, who can defy even spiritual or physiological needs, and act against the dictates of goodness and virtue. **Humankind** can act either in accordance with intelligence or superimposed ignorance or arrogance. A human is free to be good or to be evil, to resemble clay or to resemble God. This is the greatest property of human nature. It follows that human nature needs a dynamic model to reflect the freedom of choice and dualistic and contradictory nature. Humankind is always in striving mode and in flux within the continuum ranging from clay toward God or from God towards clay. A person is in constant struggle within the own self, striving to ascend from clay to God, so that he or she can take on the characteristics of God. Since humankind possesses a free will to choose either of the two opposing poles, he or she is responsible not only for own destiny but also for the fulfillment of God's Trust in the world as a viceregent of God. The purpose of religion is to guide the



humankind towards the pathway leading from clay to God and saving human beings from ignorance, punishment, stagnation, regression, and total loss in hereafter. The inculcation of the divine character is the essence of the religious teachings.

### 5.4 Relationship between Nature and Humankind

Qur'an in its discourse, repeatedly, invites the attention of readers to the features of cosmic system, global organism, and the human self. The purpose is to demonstrate the supremacy of God as the Lord of the Universe. Evidencing the layout, design, and operation of nature, Qur'an refers to it as an unequivocal source of guidance and knowledge of the truth. The nature of moral truth becomes grossly palpable if one casts a perceptive eye and reflects on the events and changes in the elements of the universe. The single most important moral truth, Qur'an claims, is that the universe is the creation of one Creator and is being governed by one Ruler. That Creator is neither dependent on nor affected by any of its creature in any way. All decisions are referred to him, and all creatures of all kinds are in total submission to him without any choice, except the human beings. The only exclusion of human beings has entitled them to freedom of choice and will leading towards empowerment. Qur'an integrates science and ideology, facts and values, knowledge and truth, morality and universe all in a single mould to corroborate the truth.

The naturalism of Qur'an, according to Iqbal (1989, p. 12) is recognition of the simple fact that human beings are related to nature, living in nature, and working with nature. This relation entails controlling of the forces and exploitation of its resources, perhaps, in the 'nobler interest of a free upward movement of spiritual life.' The nature also acts as sign of God, a source of constant reminder and invocation. Iqbal (1989) describes the universe as a process and structure of events possessing the character of a continuous creative flow. He specifically focuses on the quality of nature's passage in time as this is, in his view, the most significant aspect of

experience, which Qur'an especially emphasises. It also offers the best clue to the ultimate nature of reality. He criticises Einstein for converting time into distance rather something timeless or higher horizon.

Nature is not a chaotic mass of materials filling a void. It is a structure of events, a systematic mode of behaviour, and as such quite organic to the Ultimate Self. From Iqbal's point of view, nature is to the Divine Self as character is to the human self. It is the habit of God (Qur'an 42:11). It must be understood as a living, ever-growing organism whose growth has no final external limits. The knowledge of Nature is the knowledge of God's behaviour. The observation of nature is to seek a kind of virtual intimacy with the Absolute Ego. This Absolute Ego is Whole Reality. Thus conscious experience is that privileged case of existence in which human beings are in absolute contact with the Ultimate meaning of existence. One can say that someone else's perception is external but direct perception of nature is internally integral and profoundly intimate activity. The ontological problem of how to define the ultimate nature of existence is solved by the direct observation of nature.

Faruqi has noted two types of religious views in terms of their conception of the nature. One group of religions comprising Taoism, Mahayana Buddhism, Hinduism, Archaic religions regard nature as sacred. In contrast, Hinayana Buddhism, Judaism, Christianity and Islam see nature as profane. The first group called as naturalist believe that God and nature are distinguishable only in the mind. In reality, they are one and the same; nature is indeed God, or Ultimate Reality. Nature is considered as mysterious, i.e., mysterious, terrifying and fascinating. Mystery (hiddenness, incomprehensibility, impenetrability), almightiness (overwhelming power, absolute superiority, awesomeness), and sublimity (beauty, attractiveness and moving power). They are motivated by reverential fear or reverential love in their interaction with nature. .

Transcendentalist religions regard nature as profane, as an inexorable process of generation and decay, a clockwork whose power is inherent in itself. However, in no way, they treat nature as god or sacred or ultimate reality. Transcendentalist religions divide between theistic and non-theistic varieties, nature is regarded as eternal or ephemeral, as good or evil. For Judaism, Christianity and Islam, it is ephemeral. In itself, it is good; but with reference to what humankind makes of it, or how humans conduct themselves toward it.

The profanity of nature is complete and absolute in Islam. Nature is not parallel to God; it is creation of God. Qur'an condemns the predication of sacredness to nature (Qur'an 43:15) or to take the earth anything as divine (Qur'an 21:21). Islam also emphasises that reality is dual, one realm being occupied exclusively by God, the transcendent Creator, and the other includes all else. Heaven and earth and that is in them are creatures. They come into being and pass away under the relatives of space and time (Qur'an 11:7; 46:3).

Nature is distinguished for its utter orderliness. All events follow the same laws and nothing stands outside of them (Qur'an 24:2; 80:19). Indeed, for a creature to be at all, it is to be in nature, to fall under her inexorable laws. To be otherwise than nature or to stand outside of its laws, is to be God and Creator of nature (Qur'an 39:38-46, 65; 27:59-65). An event occurs as a result of its cause; in turn, its occurrence is a cause of another event. The same events point to the same causes, and the same causes point to the same consequences (Qur'an 65:3, 36:12, 36). Nature is thus a complete and integral system of causes and effects without how, without gap, perfectly patterned by its Creator. "It is God Who created ... Look into His creation for any discrepancy! And look again! Do you find any gap in its system? Look again! Your sight will return to you humbled having found none" (Qur'an, 67:3-4). The reason is that the patterns of God are irrunutable (Qur'an 48:23). He does not change His ways because He stands beyond change (Qur'an 10:64; 33:62; 35:43; 48:23).



Each and every item in nature exists for a purpose and a task assigned by God. All must fulfil this purpose and cannot deviate. Qur'an says that God created everything and assigned to it its measure, destiny, role and purpose (Qur'an 25:2; 87:3). Such purpose is built into the object as its nature, toward which it moves (Qur'an 80:19) with inexorable necessity (Qur'an 13:9). It may be obvious and well known or hidden and almost **unknowable**.

God affirms in the Qur'an:

"And we created not the heavens and the earth, and all that is between them, for mere play." (Qur'an 44:38)

"We created not the heavens and the earth and all that is between them for a (mere) play." (Qur'an 21:16)

As object in nature, humankind is equally purposive. The only difference is that humankind has the will to fulfil the purpose or not. Harmony is created when human actions are also aligned with the actions of nature. This can be realised by following the Divine Will.

Nature is independent entity, yet subservient to humankind. Heaven and Earth have been created so that human can do the good works (Qur'an, 11:7; 18:7; 67:2), The purpose to create is the moral works of man. To this end, God provided the necessary tools (Qur'an, 40:64; 64:3), and did so at creation (Qur'an, 95:4). He equipped humans with eyes and sight (Qur'an, 17:36), with hearing and language (Qur'an, 46:26; 16:78; 2:31; 9:90), and with reason and understanding (Qur'an, 22:46; 96:4) so that he or she would be able to discharge the obligations in the world.

Nature, therefore, is essentially good; and its goodness is its perfect amenability and willingness to lend itself for use by humans. Man is God's vicegerent on earth for the purpose of realising the moral values which are the higher part of God's will (Qur'an, 10:14; 27:62). The significance of hills is indeed cosmic, since the cosmos itself was

created for its sake. This is what the Qur'an has expressed by the idea of *taskhir*. Sun, stars and moon (Qur'an 13:2;29:61;31:29: etc.), heaven (Qur'an 31:20;45:12) and earth (Qur'an 22:65), animals, plants and things (Qur'an 22:36-37), clouds, air and all the elements (Qur'an 38:18, 36: 16:12, 14) are subservient to humankind. Evidently, nature has the means' value of being the necessary material for purposes which are the final ends of life, indeed of creation

### 5.4.1 Harmony through Submission

Qur'an also claims that everything in this universe thus obeys God, fulfils His designated role and does not deviate even in a small way. This universe is in a state of total surrender and is thus called *Muslim*, which means the one who surrenders and obeys willingly or unwillingly (Qur'an 3:83). God says that this universe worships, glorifies, praises, and prostrates just as humans are supposed to. Thus when humans' worship they create a harmony and integrity with the total universe. The voluntary worship by humans is in tandem with the mandatory worship by all non-humans.

Qur'an says that humans are unique in the universe in a sense that they have been allowed freedom to exercise own will and choice in surrendering to the command of God for worship. Thus, they have a choice, either to create harmony at own will or to create conflict. The position of humans in this Earth is totally different from other creatures. The divine orientation of his position as vicegerent of God requires integration of the role of humankind with God. Because He has made the whole creation subservient to humankind, thus a great trust has been bestowed upon the **humankind**. That is why humankind is made responsible for the consequences of this exercise of freedom. If it chooses to surrender then it will attain harmony here and happiness hereafter. If it chooses not to surrender then failure is the result. In order to aid the decision-making, God has endowed humankind with the faculty to differentiate between right and wrong, virtue and sin, good and bad.

Constant change is unthinkable without time. On the analogy of our inner experience, then conscious existence means life in time. A keener insight into the nature of conscious experience, however, reveals that the *seU* in its inner life moves from the center outwards. It has two sides: appreciative and efficient. On its efficient side it enters into relation with the world of space. This is a practical *seU* of daily life in its dealing with the external order of things which determine the passing state of consciousness and stamp on these states their own spatial feature of mutual isolation. The time in which efficient *seU* is hardly distinguishable from space.

From Iqbal's (Qur'an 1989, p. 39) point of view the appreciative *seU* is more or less corrective of the efficient *seU*, inasmuch as it synthesises all the 'heres' and 'nows'- the small changes of space and time, indispensable to the efficient *seU* into the coherent wholeness of personality. In our constant pursuit of external things, however, we veil the appreciative *seU* and it becomes alien to us. In the life process of this deeper ego, the states of consciousness melt into each other. The unity of the appreciative ego is like the unity of the germ in which the experiences of its individual ancestors exist, not as plurality, but as a unity in which every experience permeates the whole. It is time as felt not as measured.

#### 5.4.2 Moral Essence of Responsibility

The moral essence of the nature of humankind implies that it is voluntarily supposed to live within the precincts and purview of the moral charter designed for it by the creator. The accountability of humankind for its behaviour and actions provides a totally new paradigm. In Qur'an's view, deviation from this charter would be tantamount to unethical behaviour having grave adverse consequences. Human behaviour is being constantly recorded and is liable to be judged at the end. It is the unique privilege of humankind only, who has been inescapably rooted in responsibility and reward structure.

Qur'anic verses provide a distinctive view of humankind which is uncompromising. Humans are born neither good nor bad, but with the power and freedom to become either. If they develop such powers and employ them for their own moral and material enhancement, the conduct meets the expectation. On the other hand, if they fail to realise the tremendous resources or misuses them in ways harmful to humankind, the conduct fails his conduct is said to be bad. It is in this light that humankind's nature should be evaluated from the Islamic perspective. It also follows that humankind needs Divine Guidance to know the truth and the knowledge. Without knowledge from the Creator, it would not be possible to point out the way toward the harmony and happiness.

According to the Qur'an, by following the divine path, humankind will remain integrated with the nature even in its time of nurture. The teachings of Qur'an imply that a believer is a person who achieves total integration with the nature by virtue of his belief on creator of the nature and following the divine path. A believer resolves internal and external conflicts and establishes harmony with all interacting elements.

Qur'an views humankind as a moral kind capable of distinguishing between right and wrong and free to choose either. Sometimes, human beings pray for bad as they should pray for good (Qur'an 17:11). Qur'an talks about the impact of humankind's decision to judge between good and evil and distinguishing right from wrong in the following verse:

By Nafs (Adam or a person or a soul), and Him Who perfected him in proportion; Then He showed him what is wrong for him and what is right for him. Indeed he succeeds who purifies his own self. And indeed he fails who corrupts his own self. (Qur'an 91:7-10)

The reason why humankind has been put on test on this Earth for a limited period is to test whether freedom is voluntarily surrendered or not. The test is not just restricted to merely submission but the aim is to find out who amongst the human

beings is best in conduct (Qur'an 67:2). The quality, orientation, and direction of behaviour and conduct are the very purpose of human life. It is to challenge humankind with an opportunity to prove its allegiance and steadfastness to the original attestation of faith. The fairness of test de hands freedom to choose, freedom to will, and freedom to act. The acquittal depends upon as to whether an individual selects the right option, intends to act on it and then undertakes the action. Qur'an has no room for predeterminism and reductionism. Qur'an makes it explicitly clear that humankind is responsible for its wilful actions. The free will entrusted to **humankind** can be used for gains or losses, pleasures or pains, advantages or disadvantages.

*Sheikh Jaafar Idris* (1977) has aptly summarised the relationship between the will of God and human freedom. Humankind cannot do anything against the will of God, but God has willed to give him the freedom to choose and the power to realise some of his intentions even if they go against the guidance given by God.

Humankind is also given the task to change the external forces bent upon influencing **humankind** toward abusive exploitation of the freedom. People are advised to prevent the rule of evil forces, spread the divine message of worship to God, and share each other's problems in discharging the responsibilities. The responsibility to invite others toward the responsible way does not mean accountability on their part. Qur'an says:

"Say: Shall I seek a lord other than God, while He is the Lord of all things? No person earns any (sin) except against himself (only), and no bearer of burdens shall bear the burden of another. Then unto your Lord is your return, so He will tell you that wherein you have been differing."  
(Qur'an 6:164)

As vicegerent of the God, humankind has been given limited discretion in making laws for its society. In this respect, Islam differs sharply from the Western concept of

lawmaking powers of humankind. The primary responsibility of humankind is to administer the Divine law and to make laws to implement the Divine laws wherever needed. If in the nature of all elements in the universe there is a purpose, then there should also be a corresponding law to ensure the fulfilment of the purpose. Qur'an says:

And I (God) created not the **Jinn** and **mankind** except that they should worship Me (Alone). I seek not any provision from them (i.e. provision for themselves or for My creatures) nor do I ask that they should feed Me (i.e. feed themselves or My creatures). Verily, God is the All-Provider, Owner of Power, the Most Strong. (Qur'an 51:56-58)

Humankind is expected to maintain a very delicate relationship with the universe and the nature. Qur'an repeatedly invites the reflective and critical attention of human mind toward the making of all elements of the universe, the total universe itself as a schema, and the processes and systems governing the various parts of the universe (Qur'an 3:190; 67:3-57). It exhorts people of faith to reflect over the purposive action of the nature, rules governing the operations, and nature and behaviour of the elements. Qur'an draws lessons from the dynamic nature for the benefit of people of faith. God is unseen but can be understood clearly through His creations. One way to come closer to God, indeed, is through reflection over the nature.

Nature is largely at the disposal of **humankind**, the vicegerents. For humanity, it is a subject that they can command and it is an object, too, which they must regard. Right from the day one, human beings have taken up the challenge of exploring the universe, understanding how it works, and inferring how it can be intervened for purposes. Human civilisations have risen and declined depending upon their capacity to learn from nature and to adapt accordingly. The logical purpose of the field of science and technology is to work with the nature and the universe. The rate of progress of understanding the nature is accelerating with the passage of time.

Qur'an presents this world as seedbed for the world of the Hereafter. The people who believe in this life as a passing phase are those who fully recognise the quintessential meaning of the life and formulate a world view on the basis of the relationship between God and humans. Qur'an describes this group as those who say:

"And of them there are some who say: Our Lord! Give us in this world that which is good and in the Hereafter that which is good, and save us from the torment of the Fire!" (Qur'an 2:201)

On another occasion, in striking moderation, God reminds the Prophet (saw.):

"But seek, with that (wealth) which God has bestowed on you, the home of the Hereafter, and forgot not your portion of lawful enjoyment in this world." (Qur'an 28:77)

And finally, the Qur'an calls upon people to ponder and **think**:

"And the life of this world is nothing but play and amusement. But far better is the Hereafter for those who are Al-Muttaqun (the pious). Will you not then understand?" (Qur'an 6:32)

Prophet Muhammad (bpuh) advised one of his companions to live his life as if he were a stranger or a passer by (traveller). Living lightly and organically was also the way Prophet Muhammad (bpuh) and his companions championed in their own lives.

The relationship between hu**man** and nature is multi-fold. Access to this universe is a form of trust. There is freedom to utilise the nature and attempt to change it in whatever way possible. Nature is under the command of God to open itself and cooperate with the hu**man**. As such it let hu**man** make it subject or an object. However, nature functions under certain rules and hu**man** have to work with those rules to get its way. This implies that nature does not adapt to hu**man**'s actions, but hu**man** has to adapt to the nature's conditions. Nature

can be brought to be helpful if its way is followed. Any positive activity or interaction finds itself in total harmony with the nature. Destructive types of interactions bring alienation, conflicts, and sufferings at all levels. In order to figure out, what is supported by nature and what is abhorred by it, one needs to understand and think a lot deeper. Laws of nature are fixed. They do not distinguish between people.

Nature allows itself to be consumed and utilised but at a certain cost and though it is free but deriving a benefit from nature is not free. It generates, regenerates and degenerates itself. It organises and reorganises itself on a continual basis. It is organised in a seemingly chaotic, haphazard manner. The inescapable tyranny of the laws of nature forces the human minds to take nature as granted and invites them to develop harmony by looking at things from nature's aspects as well as human needs. God has made it subservient as a matter of trust. Naturalists agree that employment of the resources contained within nature in an irresponsible manner should not be allowed. Nature requires **thinking** and planning in view of the long-term impacts. There is total agreement between the viewpoint of environmentalists and the teachings of Qur'an.

### 5.5 The Beginning of Creative Evolution

**That humankind** has a special position in the universe has never been doubtful. How it is realised is indeed a source of much of the debate. The act of creation for humans was totally different. The difference in creation was indicative of difference in the expected role. This difference has been enunciated at a number of places in the Qur'an. A typical description would be what has been mentioned in the following verse:

"And (remember) when your Lord said to the angels: I am going to create a man (Adam) from dried (sounding) clay of altered mud. So, when I have fashioned him completely and breathed into him (Adam) the soul

which I created for him, then fall (you) down prostrating yourselves unto him." (Qur'an 15:28-29)

The process of creation as described in the Qur'an clearly indicates that the whole process of creation was deliberate (rather than accidental), and was, of course, a result *of* God's omnipotent will. There was a particular moment which was of special **significance**, a moment which came towards the end of this process. This was the stage at which a divine element was introduced by breathing into man of *ruhl* from God, which completed the process *of* man's creation.

### 5.5.1 Initiative to Lead

As vicegerent, humankind has been given the knowledge of truth, power to decide and authority to act. This position entails great responsibility and a huge trust. This responsibility was earlier offered to heavens, earth and mountains but they trembled and refused. Qur'an says:

"Truly, We did offer Al-Amanah (the trust or moral responsibility or honesty and all the duties which God has ordained) to the heavens and the earth, and the mountains, but they declined to bear it and were afraid of it (i.e. afraid of God's Torment). But man bore it. Verily, he was unjust (to himself) and ignorant (of its results)." (Qur'an 33:72)

The fact that humankind ventured to accept this is testimony to the suitability and harmony *of* its nature with the role *of* leadership. The human had accepted this trust because it found itself equipped to take up the challenge in return *of* the great rewards. This is wholly an act *of* leadership, above which no other act can be placed. Qur'an makes it clear that human had on its own accepted this trust, and took the responsibility which others refused. Others refused because they found themselves incapable and ill prepared. Human had seized this opportunity because it found the position matching to the potentialities and capabilities it has been already endowed with.

Qur'an uses the epithets of tyrant and fool for humans not to criticise the initiative taken by humankind. It is to prove that this is a risky assignment, that humankind has been given the freedom, and that it has the capacity to perform even in negation of the assignment that it has wilfully taken. Human behaviour originating from ignorance and wrongdoing is not the natural behaviour. It is the reverse side, the perverted side. If mountain erupts, air tornadoes the city, rainwater storms, or earthquakes then nobody would hold them responsible for these actions because they lack freedom. However, if a man kills another human then the responsibility will be squarely placed on the wrongdoer and the ignorant person who committed this act. The initiative of humankind to accept the challenging job is an act of leadership. It shows that humankind is a risk-taker, and is full of initiative. The initiative to accept the challenging test amply demonstrates the leadership potential with which **humankind feels it is endowed with.. Humankind** has the inborn tendency to accept daunting tasks and to set uphill goals. This is key demonstration of the leadership potential.

Qur'an (2:30-39; 7:11-27) narrates that when God announced the creation of humans as vicegerents on Earth to the company of angels, they apprehended that such an entity would shed blood and engage in corruption. They anticipated, not incorrectly, that agents with freedom and power would end up fighting each other. They would contest with each other for domination and bend towards working in mischief. This remark should not be taken as a sign of protest on appointment of humans or condemnation of powers to be vested on humans. It is to indicate the extent to which the freedom has been allowed and the potential that it carries with it.

The next event in the story of creation is about giving humankind the knowledge and power. God, Himself, taught Adam the names of things. Thus, God Who is the source of all knowledge transferred the required knowledge to Adam. Then He asked angels to name the things. They could not and did not. Adam did. The

purpose here is to bring to record the difference between humankind and angels. Knowledge can prevent blood shedding as well as corruption, the two dangers colling from the delegation of power. Angles did not possess that knowledge. They have neither the right nor the freedom to conunand themselves. Upon demonstration of the competence of Adam in terms of knowledge, God ordered angles to bow down before Adam. Bowing down of angels, in view of Qur'an, was symbolic of the highest position of humankind, above angels. It was also an indication of the fact that powers to explore the universe and run the affairs of the world have been given to humanity. Angels who are assigned by the God to run the system of the universe would comply with the commands of humans. The subordination of universe to the will of humankind is not an open-ended deal. It is constrained by factors of time and rules that govern the system.

The freedom to act and responsibility to choose is not delegated without knowledge and faith. Reason and intellect alone cannot compensate the lack of divine knowledge. Faith is not mentioned but Adam did witness angels and God in a manrer that was more clear and closer than as is the case in this world. Toward the end, the knowledge stays with Adam when he is sent down however the need of faith arises because of hidden aspects of key elements of the belief.

### 5.5.2 Primal Lessons

The third episode in the story reveals the rise of imminent threat to the humankind as vicegerent on its successful performance. At the time when angels were asked to bow down, a character called Satan or *Iblees* rose up and refused to obey. When asked for the reason, he contented that he has been created by Fire which is superior to soil, the matter used to create humans. Based on the notion of superiority owing to physical properties, Satan challenged the accent of humankind. His objection was overruled and he was degenerated from his erstwhile position of closeness to God. Satan then vowed to deviate humankind from the right path. He announced his

strategy by saying that he would use all directions, forward, backward, left and right. He reckoned that only very few would surrender the freedom and worship God. God said that except for those who would be committed and sincere would nevertheless succumb to Satan's influences and gave Satan a certain period to prove his claim. God also declared that severe punishment would await those who would yield to the Satanic inclinations.

It does not mean that Satan has been given the power to dominate or coerce the humankind to its way. The blame for any wrongdoing on the part of humankind would solely and squarely be fixed on the doer. Even Satan will shrug off and say on the day of judgement that he had no power and all he did was to invite people toward evil. The responsibility of the decision to accept the invitation would be taken over by the doers themselves (Qur'an, 14:22). Thus, Qur'an seeks to reinforce the idea of freedom for humanity that is so crucial for it to be judged, justly and fairly, in the hereafter. Satan can induce or seduce, influence or insinuate, tell or show, surround or invoke, but cannot really coerce or enforce his way on to the humankind. The responsibility centres on the obedience to God's ordinances, and the abstinence from His prohibitions. Humankind is endowed with a nature that has spiritual, moral, and intellectual components and roles built into it so as to create resistance to any Satanic invocation. This also confirms the true *raison d'être* concerning the responsibility of humankind. The notion of the fallen nature of man or the concept of original sin also thus stands refuted and from Qur'anic perspectives. Qur'an says that every human being is born totally innocent without sin. Accountability is pinned on what a person inscribes upon the unblemished *tabula arsa* of his nature. Sin has no hereditary origins (Qur'an 2:123, 6:164, 53:38-42).

Qur'an introduces Adam as the first human. His story of committing a sin in paradise is quite instructive as far as human nature is concerned. Human nature is exposed and a whole cycle of action and follow-up is narrated by Qur'an to outline the potential strength and weakness of humankind along with the transcendental

and moral dimension of existence of humankind is highlighted by Qur'an in the following verse by saying that:

"And We said: O Adam! Dwell you and your wife in the Paradise and eat both of you freely with pleasure and delight, of things therein as wherever you will, but come not near this tree or you both will be of the Zalimun (wrong-doers)." (Qur'an 2:35)

At that stage of existence, they possessed not only the spiritual dimension but also the rational dimension of personality. The spiritual dimension was there because of the very fact of the transcendental nature of their existence. Adam and Eve were kept in ideal conditions in paradise. It was a controlled experiment, in a way. There was no duty, no pain, no anxiety, no bad experience, no other people, no scarcity of resources, and no occasion for sacrifice. On the contrary, in paradise, everything that they could wish for was available for their enjoyment and pleasure. However, enjoying according to their wish was not the only will of God for them. There was a very simple test also awaiting them. While the whole of paradise was open for them, they were asked to refrain from but just one tree. God clearly commanded them not to go nearer to that tree. Adam did not go nearer to the tree on his own but soon started receiving invitation and prodding from Satan who wanted him to eat the fruits of the forbidden tree for very good reasons, namely everlasting life and permanent happiness. Adam, finally, succumbed to the temptations and yielded to the pressure of Satan.

As soon as they took a bite, their clothes vanished. The seen became unseen and the unseen the seen. A new world had started. A new timeline began. God commented in Qur'an that Adam lacked determination and he forgot. The two inherent weaknesses of Adam played their part in bringing him down. The innate sentiments of shyness drove Adam to cover the body from leaves. They immediately realised the fault and were shameful. They wanted to repent and God gave them the words. He reminded Adam that he was told before that Satan is his avowed enemy and he

ought not to listen to him. Adam uttered those words, and was immediately restored and appointed as prophet thereafter.

The qualities of human nature that Qur'an exposes are briefly summarised. First, Satan had to come in the shape of a friend and a sympathiser, one who posed as more knowledgeable. Thus, Satan had to alter his tactics to influence Adam. It is thus clear that Adam would not have accepted the suggestions had Satan not camouflaged the real intention, i.e., to disgrace Adam in the eyes of his Lord. The wrong had to appear in the shape of right to force Adam in doing it.

Second, Adam knew but became victim of deception. His consciousness could not remember and body could not repel. He was warned but his faith shortly weakened. Forgetting is an important human trait.

Third, Adam forgot the commands of God in a highly controlled situation. All was allowed, but one tree. The paradise was being enjoyed and seen. In this world, both parameters are further constrained severely. The forbidden in this world includes not just one tree but it has expanded to a varied constant struggle with the internal urges and external pressures. The chances of errors also thus commensurately increase. In this scenario, the opportunities for forgiveness should also be provided.

Fourth, Adam came down to Earth as vicegerent of God and he was forgiven for his fault. Once forgiven, his original status was restored. He came out clean of any blame or curse for all times. This was true for him, then how did others, his future generation would be expected to share the blame. Fifth, when a human being sought forgiveness, God duly provided it. Thus, humankind has an ongoing provision for self-revival through repentance. This necessary privilege is provided to the **humankind**. Sixth, **Humankind** has higher aims and higher goals and pursuit of those goals motivates humankind to act. The history of **humankind** progresses due to the potential to pursue higher goals. It was this potential that drove Adam to ignore the consequences of disobeying.

## CHAPTER 5: THEMES FROM ISLAM

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Seventh, emergence of the natural feeling of shame after having committed the wrong demonstrates that recognition of good and bad is ingrained within the human nature. That is why Satan had to present evil in the form of good.

Eighth, the story also demonstrates within humankind there is an urge to reverse what has happened and return to the previous conditions. Ninth, the wrongdoing done is conceived as something done to the own self, not to others. The victim, as Adam states, was not anybody other than the Adam · self. Whatever the reasons for commission of sin, whatever the circumstances that forced the deviation, Adam immediately realises that I have done a wrong to myself. He proactively owns the responsibility of the action and blames none but himself. Tenth, once he realises that he is · self responsible, he spontaneously communicates to God who actually taught him how to seek repentance. Eleventh, the purpose of God in creating Adam is definitely to test but not to punish. The punishment is contingent upon not just committing the sin but on not returning to His fold after committing the sin.

Twelfth, two reasons that God pointed out which were largely responsible for this event were Adam's forgetfulness and lack of determination. In the new scheme of test for the future generation of Adam, God arranged systems to overcome both weaknesses. He told Adam that He would be sending prophets and books as means of guidance to direct and keep the humanity towards the right path. He also laid down a system of rituals in the form of worship to ensure constant remembrance. Thus the obvious failings of human nature were complimented and otherwise strengthened by God to help the hu **mankind** fulfil the required given tasks. What

**makes humankind** different from machine is that human · d can forget and is capable of weakening the earlier resolve knowingly or · owingly. Both of these traits play si · icant role in the development of civilisation, management of self, and maintenance of social relations. The focus of the system of worship, series of prophets, revelation of books aims at not allowing these important qualities, i.e.,

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quality of forgetting and weakening resolve, to come into the way of relations with God.

Islam reunites the spiritual and temporal powers eternally through its comprehensive way of life. The thoughts of *Ghazali* and *Sayyid Qutub* are briefly described below to outline the Islamic viewpoint as these thoughts have been inferred and interpreted from its sources Qur'an and Traditions of Muhammad (pbuh).

### 5.6 Ghazali on Human Self

*Ghazali* (1088-1106) is one of the pioneering Muslim philosopher and psychologist who focused on human behaviour and psyche, social dynamics, and interaction of the self with the world. He builds upon the basic premise that visualises human self in terms of integration of spiritual and bodily forces. He delineates the causes of happiness and enjoyment, misery and troubles. He accounts for the complexity, multiplicity, diversity, and equivocality of the human behaviour. He identifies *Qalb*, which literally means heart as the essence of human self. It controls the physical as well as the behavioural self, according to the tradition of Muhammad (pbuh). *Qalb* is the substitute of psyche or symbol of spiritual entity reposed in the physical self, and coordinates and connects the organic and physical functions.

**Humankind** has an inborn desire and capability to know God, to relate to God. This relationship is the key to the identification of human self and all that it does. The conception of humankind in isolation of God, according to *Ghazali*, would lead to wrong conclusions. The attributes of world, life, divinity, society, people, work, relations, matter all depend upon the perceived nature of relations between God and humankind. Closeness to God leads to normality in human psyche and distance from God results into abnormality. *Ghazali* initiates the discussion on self from normality, in contrast to Western tradition of starting the discussion from abnormality because of the influence of the concept of sin. According to Qur'an, the

child is born in nature and is innocent at the time of birth. A child is in full harmony and is in a state of balance before the society and family begins to influence.

*Glaznli* conceptualises the human self as consisting of *Qalb* (heart), *Rult* (Spirit or soul), *Nafs* (Soul or desire-nature) and *Aql* (intellect or reason). These elements have distinguished spiritual significance. In his writings, however, he uses the symbolic word of *Qalb* to denote the inner self of human, just like Qur'an. To know the ultimate reality, one has to dive deep into the *Qalb*. That reflection through *Qalb* is required to know the self. It will come under discussion again in next chapters.

## 5.7 Shah Waliullah on Human Self

*Shah Waliullah* (1961) again viewed microcosm and macrocosm as one indivisible, organic, rational whole in which God is the source of creation as well as governance while individual is the focus and society or universe is the arena. A person acquires a concept of being and personifies it. The expression of the person in terms of statement or behaviour is a result of tailoring of the self. The process governing this sequence is a rational process but it requires divine knowledge to come close to the reality. He sees a vibrant link between psychic, physiological, and physical states. The self emerges out of interaction between these constituents of the self. He notes that in the state of equilibrium, the mind reconciles with the matter, the spiritual meshes with the physical, and multidimensional idealism is generated. Ultimately, the mental orientations and psychic dispositions influence the external forms of behaviour.

He believes in unlimited potential for the development of self. Life, to him, is a continuous process, creative as well as re-creative, and that it is capable of unlimited performance and infinite refinement. *Shah Waliullah* ascribes to religion the role of essential guidance and of maintaining peace and harmony for social and moral good.

*Sluzli Waliullalz* alludes to *Sufi* metaphysics, according to which hu **mankind has a** conceptual necessity built into itself as macrocosm is the universe and microcosm is the human being. The universe, the macrocosm, is a cognate of man, the microcosm (Iqbal, 1984).

To *Sluzlz Waliullalz*, the overflowing of divine power from the pure being to actuality, caused creation of the human being. The first thing which originated from the Divine Essence through the '*ibda*' was the '*Nafs al Kulliya*' ( Universal Self) or the '*Qalam*' (Pen). It is an abstract existence and represents His active knowledge (*Filiyy iun*). The pen, according to *Slzah Waliullalz*, could be identified with the foundation level of intellect of the rationalists. The *Klzalq* (creation) is a logical corollary of the *ibda*. *Klzalq* means creation of something from something else. The Universe (*Slzaklzs al-akbar*, macrocosm), its form (*Hiyula*), space (*Makan*) and time (*Zaman*) belong to the realm of creation. To *Slzalz* both time and space belong to the realm of *Jalvalzar* (self-sustained) and are not accidents. They are not two categories, indeed are inseparable and indivisible, and one cannot be conceived without the other.

In the *al-Klzaqr-al-Kabir* he says, "when intended to create the creation, He first caused something to flow from pure abstraction and pure absoluteness. By that 'something' is meant complete body which has limited all the directions (*Jilzat*) and is not capable of any rend and mend. This complete body is the Great Throne (Ars/I). Though it is material, it is spiritual in respect of the complete nearness (it enjoys with God) and in it being the source of the universal administration (*fadbir*). It has a complete, universal soul. Thus it, deserves to be said about it "God mounted it". Thereafter, He caused another body, incomplete and tilted by directions and capable of rend and mend, to flow. This body is *al-Ma* (water), which is pure material. It does not possess any soul. Qur'an confirms that there was water before the creation of heavens and Earth.

To begin with, Being in the sense of Reality (and not as a concept) It takes itself evident in three stages: (1) Pure essence stage, (2) Stage of Intellect, and (3) Stage of the Great Body. Qur'an identifies existence of a supra self, a self other than the self which will testify against the *Nafs* (75:14). This indicates the presence of an element detached from the operational self. It will be focus of investigation in the next chapter.

### 5.8 Nature of Human Leadership

The manner in which the constituent elements of the human self behave, also characterise the human nature and the way leadership should interact. Here are some implications:

1. Human is a very special creation. It cannot be and is not a result of chaotic chance or natural evolution. It is a perfectly thought out product with a specific design and a purpose. The understanding of the meanings of its creation and its role requires access to divine sources of knowledge. Its own learning abilities can be fully utilised only if the purpose and meanings are rightly deduced. The pureness of the natural state at the time of birth is an assurance and a challenge that a person would still come to recognise God and worship Him.
2. The supreme quality of human nature is manifested in its underlying openness. It is not a content of a box or a protected item in a closet. Human behaviour is all the time exposed to all possible directions in all possible ways. This entails flexibility and tremendous chances for development in view of the context.
3. Human nature is designed such that possibilities of outcomes are numerous every time a desire is aroused or a situation is faced. In short, human behaviour abhors predictability, directionality,

singularity, and unequivocality. It can take any direction and continue to change. Each occasion is a new occasion and each moment is an opportunity to start a fresh.

4. Human nature is a very complex issue due to variability and flux in its characteristics. Soul and mind interacts in a dynamic pattern that exacerbates complexity and intricacy. No simple framework can fully account for the complex nature.
5. Humankind has universal presence. The universality of nature is caused by its ability to absorb diversity and adapt to diverse conditions. Universality comes not from uniformity. It is a highly diverse and ever changing entity. However, there is no room for racism, or any other type of bias based on physical properties.
6. Nature is the context within which humankind has to work. The mind, heart, soul, and body are constantly influenced by the settings of the context. Work is and thus should be taken as a natural activity in human life. Good work is the one that does not oppose or desecrate the nature. Qur'an suggests living by working and working to live utilising whatever God has created. Good work is productive and bad work is unproductive. Good work is rewarded, while the bad work is a form of injustice.
7. Nature is accessible only at the cost accession. This requires a measure of self-control and sense of accountability. Benefits and advantages from the utilisation of nature may result into blind, unethical, irresponsible way of dealing. The self-control can be exercised through the interrelationship with other citizens. The spiritual consciousness and intellectual competence can help shape the behaviour, whims, and desires, according to the values of trust.

Proper direction and motivation in the course of discharge of responsibilities can be reinforced through self-disciplined awareness of God's presence at all times and everywhere.

8. **Humankind** is potentially capable of fulfilling the tasks assigned to him. The fact that Islam requires total submission does not mean that humankind is given a highly rigid and determined course of action. There is a wide range of area where humankind works by own decision and can exercise choices and alternatives. Qur'an allows people to carry out their work using their own standards, innovation, and discretion. The aim should be to organise and work in a way that could serve humanity, individually and collectively, in a fair and just manner. As an intelligent being, humankind is required to develop life on earth and making it more prosperous. However, the innovative abilities must function within the broad scope that Islam has outlined.

Qur'an calls for supervisory and administrative coherence among human beings to promote the good potential in human nature and suppress the possibility of bad because of paradox bad part. The administrative system is part of the check and balance policy. The supervisory chain begins from God who supervises all, then the head of the state, governor, superior officers, managers and family head. The purpose is to make disobedience difficult and obedience easier.



## CHAPTER 6.0

### THE MAKING OF HUMANKIND

The leadership theory of Islam that is presented here is embedded in the conception that human self consists of five distinctive elements: spirit (*Al-Ruiz*), heart (*Al-Qalb*), mind (*Al-Aql*), soul (*Al-Nafs*), and body (*Al-Jasd*). This Chapter presents a unique framework for the understanding of human self as the leading self, its nature as the leadership nature, its constituents as constituents of leadership. This framework is unique in the sense that such an integrated framework has not been presented elsewhere. The objective is to demonstrate the suitability of overall human make-up and its constitutional elements of nature in integrative and relational form to the role of leadership. It builds upon the previous

The Islamic concept of ultimate reality is inextricably linked to the concept of psyche. All reality and all being translate from God to matter in a hierarchical order. In case of humankind, Spirit pertains to God, Heart pertains to the inner self of humankind, Mind pertains to perception, Soul pertains to state of the Self, and Body pertains to matter. The heart or the centre of psyche acts like an intermediate plane and as the mediating medium between spirit and body. Spirit is the key to the being of humankind. Soul corresponds to the operation of mind and through heart humankind can achieve gnosis. Human self is contained in the body in its downward or corporeal tendency and to the spirit in its upward or spiritual tendency.

#### 6.1 Spirit (*Al-Ruh*)

A human life exists because of the existence of its 'spirit,' a word having many subtle affinities of meanings. The deep-structured meanings and ontological significance of spirit needs to be clarified for a better understanding of human nature. It is embodied in the corporeal body but is independent of the self for its survival. Rather, body is the consequence of the spirit. The earthly existence of every human being

consequences when the human spirit, whose original abode is the transcendental world is projected into spatio-temporal dimensions and is aligned with a particular body. Even the personalities of Adam and Eve were projected into the material world in the same manner.

Spirit, according to Qur'an is the word of God. It is the order of God that promulgates existence of a human being. It is the instruction, which creates a new life. Virtually speaking, it is the license that brings into reality a new vicegerent, a new person. Spirit is actually a symbol of a decision—a person specific decision. The One who decides everything undertakes these decisions. Once given existence, it remains forever under the commandment of God, the Supreme Sovereign of the universe.

Qur'an also points out the direction from where the spirit came. It belongs to none else but God Himself. The origin of the human spirit lies in the source of God. This is a unique position of humankind that no other creature has ever been endowed with. The God also claims that He had given a respected rank or position to the human beings. The Godly spirit within a human being is the very basis of the superiority of **humankind** over all other creatures.

### 6.1.2 Transcendence to Godly Attributes

The endowment of Spirit from God is a source of inculcation of Godly attributes and a leadership character that human beings possess in their own limited way.

Humankind can listen, see, **think**, talk, decide, manufacture, delineate, etc. Human character exhibits traits, in which, its Godly attributes are manifested, albeit, to the extent of merely a shadow only. The actions which presumably could only be actually undertaken by God can be taken by humans, with God's permission and will, in a tiny and constrained manner. The internal constraints come from grossly limited capabilities as well as restricted means. The external constraints come from the lack of control over all variables and deficient knowledge.

## CHAPTER 6: THE MAKING OF HUMANKIND

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Specifically speaking in Qur'anic terminology, the term *ruh* refers to numerous metaphysical verities like angels, revelation or divine inspiration, in addition to the inner divine human nature of metaphysical parlance. *Al-Zamaklisha ri* (1354), a famous Qur'anic exegetical scholar of the early period, interprets the word *ruh* as divine inspiration and points out that it gives life to hearts that were (as if) dead in their ignorance. It is, to use a *sufi* expression, a divine spark in human made of clay. This has been very explicitly stated at several places in the Qur'an. For example:

"And (remember) when your Lord said to the angels: I am going to create a man (Adam) from dried (sounding) clay of altered mud. So, when I have fashioned him completely and breathed into him (Adam) the soul which I created for him, then fall (you) down prostrating yourselves unto him." (Qur'an 15:28-29)

God's breathing of His spirit into human is obviously of immense metaphysical significance. The breathing of God's spirit may imply that human is equipped with the faculty of God-like knowledge and if rightly used, would give it superiority over other creatures. The angels, who carry forward the God's orders and are responsible to run the operations, were asked to bow down to cooperate with the human. This was a symbolic gesture on behalf of God that **humanity would be able to implement undertake its will as per the permission by God.**

**Qur'an** further explains this first and foremost constituent of human psyche in these words:

"And they ask you (O Muhammad) concerning the Ruh (the spirit). Say: the Ruh (the spirit) is one of the things, the knowledge of which is only with my Lord. And of knowledge, you (**mankind**) have been given only a little." (Qur'an 17:85)

Though a direct and detailed understanding of the nature of spirit is not accessible, little information can be employed to perceive its nature. *Ghazali* (1971) is of the view



that the question of comprehending the reality of soul should be left to the level of understanding that corresponds to the degree of psychic awareness or spiritual attainment.

### 6.1.3 Role of the Vicegerent

Humankind has been endowed with the spirit of God because they were created to represent God on this Earth. He designated human beings as His deputies on Earth. The noble charter given to humanity required an equally noble identity that could indicate the position and become proof of the authority vested in it. Spirit serves the need of establishing that identity. It connects humankind with this universe. It gives the power and authority to humankind necessary to command and discharge its responsibilities..

Spirit is the source as well as the destiny of humankind. A tradition of prophet mentions that the spirit returns to God after death. When a person engages himself or herself in tasks keeping in view the demands of his or her role as deputy to God then a unique harmony between God, herself, and the nature is achieved.

Resultantly, spirit is enriched and strengthened. Spirit is responsible to provide the metamotivation and supreme direction.

The most significant aspect of the spirit is that it is the only permanent element in the human existence. The temporal features of matter do not apply on spirit. Matter is subordinate to the spirit. The power of humankind begins and ends with the matter. Humankind has no control over the spirit. It cannot bequeath spirit nor dictate its movement, so far.

The spirit evolves the self towards permanence. It gives a lively character to **humankind** transcending the limits of time as it governs this world. Spirit thus governs the life from the stage of nullity to reality. Qur'an clearly mentions three stages of human life; before birth, life in the world until death, and life after death

(Qur'an 2:28). Life after death has two more stages: life in suspension before resurrection and life after resurrection. Spirit is the common element in all these three stages of life. Humankind owes its drive to achieve permanence, its craving for indefinite life, its craze for the everlasting, and its longing for never ending happiness, to the central and unique force of spirit.

Spirit makes it conducive for the humans to comprehend the unseen realities.

Human beings have also believed that there are things that cannot be seen but have serious bearing on their life. Spirit, itself an unseen but an intimate entity, is that medium which connects the humans to the metaphysical world. Spirit is the evidence of the things, forces, and the world that is not materially evident to human perception. The existence of God is the first and the foremost reality that is unseen yet truly fathomable. The world after death is the second most important reality that is yet not seen but has a tremendous bearing on the life of the humankind. These questions are not just important to a select few as a philosophical issue. They are important for determining the leadership and management paradigm that is in alignment with the overall context of the human world. Spirit determines the context within which the purpose and the objective of humanity can be rightly established.

The knowledge that comes from intuition is also a result of spirit. Intuition is a human faculty that provides insights, adds new dimensions, and enriches the perspectives. The capability to judge beyond what is apparent to reach the reality is depended upon intuition. Spirit provides the power to grapple with the realities beyond the scope of sense but within the imagination.

Spirit pushes the vicegerent's performance to realise the aspirations and desires to the higher and higher levels. The human world has the tendency to explore the unexplored, reach where none reached, discover what is locked and do what was not done before, due to the role of spirit. Excellence, its appreciation and its taste, and above all grasp of levels above excellence, comes from the spirit. The locution *ihsan*

(excellence), according to the Qur'an, is not to be attributed to man's animal and corporeal body, but to that divine spirit the presence of which makes man superior to angels. It is because of this spiritual psyche that God has called his creation 'best of moulds' or 'best conformation'. Qur'an says:

"Verily, We have created man in the best stature (mould)." (Qur'an 95:4)

### 6.1.4 Covenant in Consciousness

The spirit accords to humankind a substantive and independent status and a distinctive supra-physical nature. Consider the following verse:

"And (remember) when your Lord brought forth from the Children of Adam, from their loins, their seed (or from Adam's loins his offspring) and made them testify as to themselves (saying): Am I not your Lord? They said: Yes! We testify." (Qur'an 7:172)

This is the first event in which Qur'an gives a glimpse of the world of spirit. In this transcendental plane of existence, spirits have been gathered in one place. This place is beyond the limits of spatio-temporal world. The argument that existence of human being is contingent upon the bodily survival is not valid according to the Qur'anic theory. What also follows from the above event is that spirit has the capability to recognise clearly its link with its source just like a living entity. It distinctively indicates the possession of consciousness- self-consciousness as well as the consciousness of the Personality of God- and hence of full-fledged personality, which is based and built upon conscious. This spiritual entity or spirit, which has been projected into the biological existence of humankind in this physical world forms the distinctive basis of psychic life. This event also substantiates the point of view that the real (primordial!) and essential human personality is spiritual in nature. It also corroborates the existence of the spirits of all human beings- from the first to the last- at the dawn of creation.

The affirmation of the position of God as Lord by humankind, amounts to a covenant **between humankind** and the Lord, in the eyes of Qur'an. How this covenant impacts the life of humankind in this world and how it makes itself realised in practice has been discussed extensively by scholars. The point, however, is that the essential covenant of monotheism is inscribed on every human spirit. The ability to affirm the existence of the Supreme Power is inborn in the primordial human nature. The presence of this inner cognition, however, gets blurred subsequently due to worldly and societal exposition.

' This conception of primordial human psyche gives a highly elevated sense of human nature than compared to views of Freudian School that reduces human mind to a strange storehouse of repressed infantile wishes and desires. The Qur'an grants a pristine, clean, spiritually driven start to the humankind, in sharp contrast to the start conceived by naturalists. It is result of learning that a human being acquires things that bend the spiritual forces and contaminate the purity.

### 6.1.5 Infusion of Spirit and Matter

The process of creation and simultaneous infusion of spirit is detailed in the following verses:

"And indeed We created man (Adam) out of an extract of clay (water and earth). Thereafter We made him (the offspring of Adam) as a Nutfa in a safe lodging (womb of the women). Then We made the Nutfa into a clot, then we made the clot into a little lump of flesh, then we made out of that little lump of flesh bones, then we clothed the bones with flesh, and then we brought it forth as another creation. So Blessed is God, the Best of Creators." (Qur'an 23:12-14)

The Qur'anic references to the clay, or dust, or essence of clay, as the material for creation points out the fact that human body is composed of earth bound organic and inorganic substances. It also indicates the continuous transmutation of those

substances because of interaction with nature and intake of new stuff. How does an inorganic matter become a living matter? The answer is Spirit. The inorganic constituents *of* the earth are absorbed into living matter by way of food, and living matter reproduces itself by means of sperm. This is deposited in the womb. It fertilises the ovum, and rests for a time in security in the mother's womb. Then passing through various stages, it assumes shape in its growth as a foetus, and finally it develops bones, flesh and nervous system. So far, or rather more precisely, up to this stage, man's growth is like that of an animal.

Then an altogether new creative feat takes place. Starting from essence of earth up to the stage of a fully developed embryo, all the details have no doubt been given in order to stress humankind's humble origin. But what marks off a human infant from an animal infant is the last episode in which it undergoes, not only a totally new shaping but rather assumes an altogether different status as a spiritual being imbued with a spirit. Thus 'bringing into a new creation' clearly signifies the addition of a new ontological element – the spirit – into the animal infant making him *Imago Dei*: God's vicegerent on earth.

According to the tradition of the Prophet (pbuh), there are three stages in the development of foetus and each takes about 40 days and then an angel breathes spirit. The breathing of spirit is not merely bringing it into a new creation or a new mould. Qur'an does not allow the essence *of* the inner metaphysical core of **humankind** to be accounted merely as life or consciousness.

The Prophet is reported to have said, "The first thing that God created is the spirit". Spirit is supposed to have two aspects: created and uncreated. These two aspects of the spirit are evident in terms of the spirit's role as a mediating ground between the Divine Being and the universe. The uncreated aspect relates to the Divine Being whereas the created aspect reflects itself in the intellect. There also exists a universal psyche denoted as *al-nafs al-kulliyah*. The soul to spirit is as substance to essence, or

In material to formal. In *Sufi* doctrine, the term for universal substance is *al-lzaba*. This means 'fine dust' suspended in the air that becomes visible only by the rays of light it refracts. The symbolism of *al-lzaba* illustrates the double nature of the soul. The spirit illuminates *al-lzaba* and corresponds to the ray of light refracted by fine dust. Since the dust becomes visible only to the extent that it refracts light, only the ray shows as such on the screen of the dust. Burckhardt concludes that the undifferentiated light symbolises the uncreated Soul while the light determined as a ray on the other hand symbolises the created Soul (Burckhardt 1983:71).

### 6.1.6 Divine Light and Reason

*Ibn Arabi*, a famous Muslim Scholar, emphasises the oneness of Being (Sharif 1963; Nasr 1988). He believes that the uncreated aspect of *ruh* present in human beings is essentially in union with God. Hence, on the one hand, human is the perfect manifestation of divine attributes and names. The inherence of Divine qualities in a measured way constitutes the Divine Form. Prophet Muhammad (*pbuh*) is also reported to have said, "God created Adam in His form." (Masnad Ahmad Bin Hanbal, Vol. 2, p.244-519). This existence of Divine essence establishes a mutual relation between Divine and the human self, suggesting that human nature contains elements and shadow of Divine nature.

There is another school of thought known as illuminationists. It categorises bodies in respect to the degree to which they permit or reject the light to enter. *Ibn Sina* (Sharif 1963) designates Spirit and Soul as two different levels of a single entity. At the transcendental level, it is pure and at the phenomena level it enters the body and animates it. The study of the first level of a person belongs to metaphysics whereas the study of the latter belongs to the natural sciences. *Ibn Sina's* theory of being is emanationistic. He states that first intelligence or intellect, a synonym of intellect, flows from God, Who is primordial. The essence exists in human mind posterior to the individual existence. For him, the human spirit, although it is only potential

intellect at the beginning of its career, is nevertheless a non-material, spiritual substance capable of existing independently of the body.

*Glazzali* derives all his inferences from the Qur'an and Hadith. Like the *Isltraqi* school, one can again find here the symbolism of light or Light-being used in the context of *nllt*. In his exposition of the Light Verse of the Qur'an (24:35) *Glzazali* compares Pure Being to sun and the human spirit to the elemental light; Pure Being is related to *mlt* as sun is related to elemental light. This ray of the Divine sun proceeded from the command of God (Qur'an 17:85). He also speaks of *mlt* in the context of a life force, which imparts power to the body comparing it to the radiation of light from a lamp that illumines the body. Thus, it is a spiritual principle that vitalises the body and controls it. *Glazzali* grades human soul into four levels: (1) sensory soul, (2) imaginative soul, (3) rational soul, and (4) transcendental soul. Like most Sufi thinkers, *Glzazali* also mostly refers to *mh* in symbolic terms, and uses the analogy of life.

Spirit as a ray of divine intellect was also understood by *Shihab al-Din al-Suhrawardi* (Nasr 1988). Togetherness of being and knowledge is taken as the meaning of Spirit by many Muslim thinkers as well as in the Qur'anic doctrines. Spirit is intellect as well as being. In the level of reality, knowledge is attributed to mind and being to body. *Razi* believes that spirit is eternal and the intellect is made of Divine substance.

The Platonian understanding of spirit as motion is echoed in *Ibne Miskawayh's* ideas. The motion is of two kinds: one towards intellect and other towards matter. The first motion brings man nearer to the source of the intellect, which is illuminated and in turn illuminates the matter. This implies a transcendental aspect of the human self that is spirit and a sensible self that is soul.

*Sadr al-Din Shirazi* was influenced by *Ibne Arabi* as well as well by new-Platonism. He rejects *Ibne Sina's* view that the soul is a relational concept. He is of the view that physical forms inhere in their matters not to form a composite (*murakkab*) but are

actually fused together to form a complete unity (*ittihad*). *Sadrah* distinguishes between spirit and soul. He believes that soul operates through faculties and powers in the human self. Spirit manifests itself in the form of soul (*nafs*) at a lower and simpler level. At the highest level, spirit is pure and being emerges as a manifestation of Essence. Then it creates or rather permeates the soul or *nafs* and is manifested in lower levels of existence i.e. animal, vegetative, etc.

## 6.2 Heart (A/-Qa/b)

### 6.2.1 Divine Recipient

The most significant attribute of *qalb* is that it acts as a governor of the Self. It has the capacity to absorb the Divine Presence and attain Divine perfection. In hierarchy, heart comes next to the Spirit. It represents the spirit in both senses: knowledge as well as being. As an organ of intuition (*al-kashf*), it absorbs the divine guidance. It is also considered as the point of identification (*ruqjd*) with being (*al-ivujud*), an entity that can be in union with the Real Being. Renowned Poet, Iqbal said that the vastness of heavens and earth cannot contain God, but the enclosure of the heart of a believer can grasp the attributes, presence and love of the God. He is closer than the life vein (Iqbal 1989).

The heart appeals to the inner understanding and insight of the psyche to grasp the ultimate Divine Unity and provide purpose and values to the human behaviour. The primary purpose for creating the human being is the worship of God which is a consequence of realisation of God (*Ghazali* 1971). Heart has an inherent yearning as well as capability for knowing God, the Ultimate Reality (*Umaruddin* 1951). The whole personality revolves around the heart. Heart relates itself to God and, in turn, tunes the personality according to this relationship. The blockades to this active relationship are checked by the heart to ensure an unimpeded development of the possibilities of the personality to the fullest range.

The Qur'an says that it has been revealed directly to the heart of Prophet Muḥaḥunad (bpuh) (Qur'an 2:97). Thus, heart was the first recipient in this planet, of the verses of Qur'an colling directly from the Throne of God. This testifies to its front-end position in the revelation of the knowledge. The self has an inherent yealling for an ideal that it strives to realise. In the embodied conditions, the self has been endowed with qualities that make it possible to provide for the bodily needs as well as to qualify for the ideal.

### 6.2.2 Sublime and Supreme

The Qur'an considers heart as the prime originator of human behaviour, motivation, insight, reflection, and perception. Qur'an makes it responsible for comprehension of God's message and directing the behaviour in view of the guidance. Prophet Muhammad (bpuh) considered it to be like an organ, which if worked correctly could also bring the whole personality in order. In many other references, heart has been treated as the inner self-the other self, the interior of the behaviour, the real self. Some Muslim theologians interpret the term *qalb* to refer to a luminous spiritual substance which is functionally synonymous with the spirit, the spiritual self ( *Glzazali* 1971).

*Glzazali* says that relation between heart and body is same as that between God and Universe in the context of supremacy and subordination. The hu llan heart is considered the author and master of the body and its functions. All the organs of the body have been subordinated to the heart or *qalb* and they have been geared to follow it in totality. The behaviour actually reflects the state of the condition of heart.

According to Ghazali, the *qalb* is the essence of human beings. He uses it as a synonym for *ru/l* or Self at times. The spiritual entity lives in the physical body and controls its organic and physical functions. It is duly connected with the physical heart though the connection is essentially transcendental. That spiritual heart is the substance and the physical organ of the same name is only an accident of it. *Glzazali*

prefers to use the word *qalb* for the self in all his writings. The knowledge of this entity is essential to the knowledge of the ultimate Reality.

The attributes of God in the human self remain dormant, passive, or undeveloped. They are weakened by the passionate and sensuous indulgences of the self. They are strengthened by the sacrifices of the same. The purpose of infusing the self with the sensuous passions is to put it on test and to see its commitment to goals and ideals beyond sensuous passions (Qur'an 91:7-9).

### 6.2.3 Master of Action

'This dual potentiality, combined with freedom to will (Qur'an 10:99), makes it clear that *Qalb* has been given the independent ability to select destiny and work its way out toward its attainment. Either it can turn to the divine unity and order prevailing within the self and the universe at large or it can remain stuck up with the gross multiplicity of the apparently random stimuli around. If *Qalb* gets predominantly engrossed in these sensory stimuli, passions override the rational faculty of the self, and make human personality a slave of sensuous pleasures. If, on the other hand, the self concentrates on the manifestations of Divine unity, and realises the unseen divine system and order at work within the self and the universe, human self would spontaneously orient itself toward appropriate adjustments with this perpetual divine order.' This awakening to the inner meanings and unity would remove the illusion of multiplicity and strengthen the *Qalb* to overrule passions in favour of intellect and guidance. *Qalb* would then nudge the self towards total conformity with the Divine Reality. At that level, the innermost divine properties of the self start blossoming into behaviour.

### 6.2.4 Cognitive Role and Sense-Making

Qur'an invites the attention of people repeatedly to reflect upon the various forms of creation, to look into the working of own self, to see through the human history, to

discuss the all-pervasive signs of the Divine Unity. Qur'an emphasises the need to meditate and reflect as a mean to strengthen the faith, gain understanding of the functional rules of the universe, and come closer to God through its creations. This exercise of meditation is required to maintain the relationship with God, the Ultimate Object and meaning of life. Qur'an exhorts:

"Verily, in the creation of the heavens and the earth, and in the alternation of night and day, there are indeed signs for men of understanding. Those who remember God (always, and in prayers) standing, sitting, and lying down on their sides, and think deeply about the creation of the heavens and the earth, (saying): Our Lord! You have not created (all) this without purpose." (Qur'an 3:190-191)

Qur'an specifically locates *qalb* as the seat of wisdom and intellect. The following verse precisely indicates that:

"Have they not traveled through the land, and have they hearts wherewith to understand and ears wherewith to hear? Verily, it is not the eyes that grow blind, but it is the hearts which are in the breasts that grows blind." (Qur'an 22:46)

Wisdom and intellectual functions are related to the *qalb* and the *qalb* is said to be located within the breast. Thus, both the functions and locus of the *qalb* are mentioned in the Qur'an. Muslim scholars have interpreted this as a subtle spiritual light which, however, has its functional counterpart in the cone shaped lump of flesh known as *qalb* (Umamddin 1951). This physical *qalb* may be considered the point of interaction between the body and the spiritual *qalb*. Qur'an conceives sensory organs to be the external windows of this transcendental *qalb* which are open to the physical world. They feed the '*qalb*' with the sensory facts perceived through the physical light. The inner illumination of the *qalb* processes these data and reveals their interrelationships and meaning to the self. This meaning becomes the basis of judgement and decision. Decisions are made by the *qalb* and the brain while the

nervous system functions as an instrument to implement them through the faculties of the body.

Qur'an persistently attempts to set the *Qalb* right by prompting it to develop and purify. Ghazali has taken the following verse as the explanation of the functions of *qalb* in terms of Divine guidance. Qur'an says:

"God is the light of the heavens and earth. The parable of His Light is as (if there were) a niche and within it a lamp: the lamp is in a glass, the glass as it were a brilliant star, lit from a blessed tree, an olive, neither of the east nor of the west, whose oil would almost glow forth (of itself), though no fire touched it. Light upon light! God guides to His light whom He wills. And God sets forth parables for mankind, and God is All-Knower of every thing." (Qur'an 24:35)

According to *Ghazali*, there are five phases of the *qalb*'s faculty to illuminate, from the sensory at the bottom to the transcendental at the top, for perceiving different levels of reality. These five faculties have been symbolised as the Niche, Glass, Lamp, Tree and Oil in the above verse. The Niche is the sensuous faculty, whose light comes through the sense organs. The Glass, Lamp, Tree and Oil stand successively for imagination, intelligence, rationality, and transcendence. Sense data refined and processed through these five grades of light produce at the end the perception of the ultimate Transcendental Reality. Only when the self perceives the ultimate Transcendental Reality encompassing and governing the whole universe that personality can overcome and put off all the alien 'extra-self' influences except those of the Absolute Transcendental Being. Exposed to the direct radiation of the Absolute Being, personality absorbs God's Colour into the self and imitates the behaviour of God as His true Vicegerent. Qur'an exhorts believers to display fully the colour of God.

Thus an important characteristic of *qalb* is that it represents that faculty or capacity of human personality which enables the person to know and understand the reality of

things, make evaluative judgements, and sift the right from the wrong. The functions of the *qalb* are described quite frequently in the Qur'an along with the sensory capacities of human beings, indicating that what the *qalb* does is an extension and a superior function of what is being done at the lower level by the sensory organs like eyes and ears.

Iqbal (1989, p. 13) says that *qalb* is a kind of inner intuition or insight which, in the beautiful words of Rumi, feeds on the rays of the sun and brings us into contact with aspects of Reality other than those open to sense-perception. It is, according to Qur'an, something that sees, and it can be trusted for its opinions. It must not however be regarded as a mysterious special faculty; it is rather a mode of dealing with Reality in which sensation, in the physiological sense of the word, does not play any part. The experience is just like any other experience. Such kind of experience has been too enduring and dominant to be rejected as mere illusion. In the capacity of yielding knowledge it is just as good as any other faculty.

### 6.2.5 Conditioning of *Qalb*

*Qalb* is not inert to influences of the results of practices and performance of the person. It is again *qalb* that receives the ultimate feedback and also gets conditioned in the process. Qur'an informs that due to continuous neglect of the responsibilities to worship God or to accept the Truth or persistent attempts to hide the Truth, *Qalb* is gradually blackened and ultimately blocked or sealed. In this case, the perceptual processes of seeing and hearing are reduced to mere sensations without enabling the self to gain guidance or penetrate into the real meanings. They fail to decipher the real import of the data from sense-perceptions. The process has been described at several places in the Qur'an (2:6-7, 7:101, 4:155, 63:3, & 16:106-108). The sensory organs lose their utility. People in such a condition have "And they have eyes wherewith they see not, and they have ears wherewith they hear not (the truth)." (Qur'an 7:179)

According to the Qur'anic statements, the blocking of the cognitive processes takes place under special circumstances; when a person is faced with a situation *of* conflict and resorts to a special type *of* defence mechanism in which he or she rationalises actions that are emotionally driven or founded on irrationality. Such a person starts with a state of conflict between what his moral judgement demands, and what is his need for immediate, unlimited and unjustified gratification. His belief and his practice become completely at variance. Such people begin with a conflict between their conscience and their overt behaviour. However, behaviour is a public commitment, and soon they are taken over by the need to resolve this conflict, and to justify their behaviour. Their conscience is so weak that they cannot continue to keep to their belief, and have to resolve this situation by believing in what they are practising, rather than the other way round. This is a special situation when the belief is so subdued that it completely loses all practical meaning or relevance for life. The central role of *qalb* in this situation has been described in a *Haditli*, which says:

When a *mu'min* (believer) commits a sin, a dark spot appears on his heart. If he repents and seeks forgiveness (of God), his heart becomes spotless again. If he persists in sin, the dark spot increases.  
(Masnad Abd Bin Hambal Vol. 2, p. 297)

This is the spot that has been mentioned in the Qur'an:

"But on their hearts is the stain *of* (the ill) which they do." (Qur'an 83:14)

It may be noted that here the *Haditli* describes what happens when a person who believes commits a sin knowing full well that it is a sin. The Qur'an says:

"That is because they believed, and then disbelieved; therefore their hearts are sealed, so they understand not." (Qur'an 63:3)

At another place this issue has been taken up in detail:

"Whoever disbelieved in God after his belief, except him who is forced thereto and whose heart is at rest with Faith; but such as open their breast to disbelief, on them is wrath from God, and theirs will be a great torment. That is because they loved and preferred the life of this world over that of the Hereafter. And God guides not the people who disbelieve. They are those upon whose hearts, hearing (ears) and sight (eyes) God has set a seal. And they are the heedless!" (Qur'an 16:106-108)

The process of 'sealing of the heart' is not confined to the people who are believers in the formal sense. It also includes the people who rejected the truth from the very beginning, because of the emotional blocking.

Once *qalb* is blackened or blocked, it sows the seeds of disharmony, conflict, and disruption within the self, between the self and others, and between self and the nature. If a person is not at peace with own self than how can he be an agent of harmony in the outer world. The disharmony that prevails, the conflicts that rule, and the disruptions that are taking place at all levels are due to the basic disharmony inside the self. The peace and harmony, meditation and illumination at level of *qalb* are the seed for overall harmony.

The Qur'an repeatedly affirms that the essential human psyche or soul is not blind, and accordingly it lays great emphasis on *qalb* as a supersensory organ of cognising metaphysical truths - *tafaqquh* in the Qur'anic terminology. *Qalb*-the word for heart in Arabic - imports both the seat of intellectual faculties and understanding as well as the seat of affections and emotions. Qur'an says:

"They have hearts wherewith they understand not, and they have eyes wherewith they see not, and they have ears wherewith they hear not (the truth). They are like cattle, nay even more astray; those! They are the heedless ones." (Qur'an 7:179)

The cognitive role of the *qalb* is further affirmed in verse of the following:

"Have they not traveled through the land, and have they hearts wherewith to understand and ears wherewith to hear? Verily, it is not the eyes that grow blind, but it is the hearts which are in the breasts that grows blind." (Qur'an 22:46)

Those who reject God's message have their physical eyes and ears, but their *qalbs* are blind and deaf. If their faculties of understanding and true discernment were active, would they not see the signs of God's Providence and wrath in nature around them and in the dwellings and ruins. Though apparently they have all the faculties of reason and perception, they have so deadened them, those faculties do not work, and thus they are worse than cattle. The Qur'an tells that the *qalb* of a human being, as created by God, is pure and unsullied. Nevertheless, when someone commits a sin, it leaves a black stain on his *qalb*. On repentance and forgiveness, sin is washed off. However, if a person does not repent or pray for forgiveness, the stains deepen and spread increasingly, until the *qalb* is sealed and eventually the *Inan* dies a spiritual death. Two verses here are of utmost significance:

"Nay! But on their hearts is the Raan (covering of sins and evil deeds) which they use to earn." (Qur'an 83:14)

"God has set a seal on their hearts and on their hearings, (i.e. they are closed from accepting God's Guidance), and on their eyes there is a covering. Theirs will be a great torment." (Qur'an 2:7)

'Sealing of the heart' refers to a law instituted by God. As a person goes down the path of sin, his penalty gathers momentum, just as goodness brings its own capacity for greater goodness. In other words, when a person persistently adheres to false beliefs and refuses to listen to the voice of truth, he gradually loses the ability to perceive the truth, so that finally, as it were, a seal is set upon his heart. Surely, it is a consequence of man's free choice and not an act of 'predestination'. The Qur'an even goes so far as to declare such people dead and tells the Prophet (pbuh):



"So verily, you (O Muha llu llad bpuh) cannot make the dead to hear (i.e. the disbelievers), nor can you make the deaf to hear the call, when they show their backs and tum away." (Qur'an 30:52)

The organ in body, which is associated with intellect, is the heart. The Qur'an says:

"Verily, it is not the eyes that grow blind, but it is the hearts which are in the breasts that grow blind." (Qur'an 22:46)

By virtue of being the centre of the body, the *qalb* may be said to transcend the rest of the body. T. Burckhardt (1983) defines it as the organ of supra-ratioal intuition which corresponds to the *qalb* just as thought corresponds to the brain (see also Lings, 1983). Just as the mind transcends the brain, so the spiritual *qalb* transcends the physical *qalb*. Spirit is both knowledge and being. In man, these two aspects are in a way polarised as reason and *qalb*. The *qalb* marks what a person is in the light of eternity, while the reason marks what a person **thinks**.

### 6.3 Mind (*Al-Aql*)

In broad categorical term, Qur'an considers mind to be a part of the *qalb*. Qur'an attributes the functions of mind to the *qalb* and when it speaks of the *qalb*, it includes the functions of mind in the *qalb* as its constituents. However, it also speaks of mind as distinct from *qalb*. On its own, mind is the third most important part of the human self. If spirit represents the fuel, *qalb* the driver, then mind is the epitome of the system or the engine that runs the self. Technically speaking, even when *qalb* is attributed as the seat of the decision making and locus of intelligence, the reference is actually made to the mind. Mind stores memory and acts as information processor through its learning and sense-making mechanism. Mind ultimately relays the orders of the *qalb* and thus sits between *qalb* and behaviour. Mental characteristics, again thus, influence the actions of the body. Human behaviour reflects the state of the condition of *qalb* as well as mind. Mind is constrained by the structure of the language to convert the feelings, knowledge, perceptions, and the state of *qalb* into

expression. *Qalb* is not bound by the language because it receives feelings and inspirations, dreams and ideas in their actuality. Mind needs language as a medium of communication and order. Through mind, spirit is ultimately translated from *qalb* to the body into the language of mind.

### 6.3.1 Reason and Intellect

According to Ibn Khaldun, the ability to **think** has three degrees. The first degree is humankind's intellectual understanding of the things that exist in the outside world in a natural or arbitrary order, so that he or she may try to arrange them with the help of own power. This kind of thinking mostly consists of perceptions. It is the discerning intellect. The second degree is the ability to **communicate** which provides humankind with the ideas and behaviour needed in dealing with his fellow beings and in leading them. It mostly conveys appreciative notes, which are obtained one by one through experience, until they have become really useful. This is called the experimental intellect. The third degree is the ability to **know** which provides the knowledge or hypothetical knowledge, of an object beyond sense perception without any practical activity. This is the speculative intellect. It consists of both perceptions and apprehensions. They are arranged according to a special order, following special conditions, and thus provide some other knowledge of the same kind, that is, either perceptive or appreciative.

Martin Lings (1981) says that, *aql* means above all 'intellect', but the Greek intellect coincides only with the purely transcendental aspect of *aql*, whereas the Arabic word comprises in its meaning the whole range of the intelligence including even the reason. Reason is primordially taken as a conscious projection of the intellect. It provides logic and clears the way, and frames and answers the questions. *Rumi* has also emphasised the difference between reason and intellect by giving the example of a tree. Martin Lings (1988) has used another simile to explain the relationship between reason and intellect. According to the doctrine of

correspondence between the macrocosm and the microcosm, the holders of temporal power, that is, the king and his delegates, are the counterpart, in the macrocosm of the faculty of reason in the microcosm, whereas the representatives of spiritual authority correspond to the intellect. Below the reason and normally under its control are the faculties of imagination and emotion and the faculties of sense. In order to exercise its royal function, which comes to it from the intellect for it, depends on the intellect for knowledge of the higher principles upon which its government must be based. When direct contact with the intellect is broken, religion serves as the sanction giving authority and fulfils the function of the intellect. In such a case, the rites or rituals of religion are the movements to and from which keep the channels open for a free-flow of the intellect to reason. Reason is the faculty of discursive and analytical thought, whereas intellect is the faculty of intuition. In the attainment of self, the latter is the main source though reason, helped by intellect, can discern certain theoretical aspects of the truth. Hence, spiritual experiences are supra-rational, and should not be confused with irrational which is equivalent to the animal soul in humankind.

Some scholars believe that it may be legitimately inferred that the 'knowledge of all the names' taught to Adam after his creation actually signifies man's faculty of logical definition and, thus, of conceptual **thinking**. Mind is located at nexus of heart and soul. It is the driving seat and in effect drives the self. Heart leads while mind manages. Heart visualises while mind analyses. Heart grapples with the broad issues of destiny, orientation, values, and people. **While** mind sorts out logic, preferences, proportions and mechanics.

Researches on the working of mind show that there are three levels of operations in mind. The lower mind gets the information from the senses in the body. The five senses include seeing, listening, feeling, tasting, and smelling. Lower mind is the recipient of the sensory data. The data then processed by the lower mind is then interpreted by the middle mind. The lower mind acts as the dispatcher of sensory

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data to the middle mind and of motor data from middle mind to the body. The middle mind receives data from lower mind and screens the data for action into two groups. Data that requires new decision are referred to the top mind while the data that can be settled on the basis of previously programmed decisions is decided by the middle mind. These matters are referred to the subconscious by the middle mind. The data that requires ingenuity and does not have a parallel, or about which no previous decision rules exist, is then referred to the top mind. Top mind receives the information and engages itself into **thinking** and reflection. It tries to keep itself free from ordinary business to ensure its momentary attention to the extraordinary affairs. Matters arising out of accidents, i.e., suddenly unforeseen situations are given immediate attention by the top mind.

### 6.3.2 Learning System

Primarily, mind acts as the decisional and learning tool. It learns from the environment. It is structured to unlearn what was learned previously as it constantly engages itself in learning and relearning or master learner. Qur'an invokes the mind as a learning tool frequently in its texts. It seeks to establish a very active interface between mind and the environment of its perceptual capabilities symbolised by the nature and society. Qur'an affixes great trust that once a mind reflects over the nature and establishes an interface between the self and nature, it will be able to decipher guidance toward the way of Islam-the way of nature and the natural in this life. Nature is conceived as the tutor and mentor for cultivating the right mental attitude, developing the structure of **thinking**, and providing the overall paradigm. Nature challenges the human mind that its arguments are irrefutable and its style is not duplicable.

### 6.3.3 Ghazali's View of Senses

*Ghazzali* divides senses into two parts: external and internal. The external senses consist of sight, smell, hearing, taste and touch with their special sense organs. The

inner senses are designated as Common Sense (*Muslifarak*), Imagination (*TaklzaYYul*), Reflection (*Tafakkur*), Recollection (*Tadlzakkur*), and Memory (*Haftza*). *Glazali* treated the common sense as apart from power to deal about tangibles (*Qurrvatal Klzayal*) as he views another sense as the power to deal about intangibles (*Qurrvat-ul-Wa/1 Ill*). Its business is to apprehend in parts the intangible meanings of sensible object.

*TaklzaYYul* enables a being to retain the image of any perceivable object, once it has been experienced. To illustrate, the image of object seen remains in the mind after the eye has been closed. *Tafakkur* is the power that brings together relevant thoughts and associates with or disassociates from them, as it considers fit. It has no power to create anything new which is not already present in the mind. The impressions received through the senses are stored by memory (*Haftza*). Just as memory remembers to enter frames of objects, *Tafakkur* recollects the meaning, which is imperceptible. *Hiss-e-Muslifarak* is a special faculty, which synthesises the sensuous impressions carried to the brain, and gives meaning to them.

*Glazali*, similar to some modern psychologists, believes in the localisation of function. Every mental faculty has a corresponding seat in a region of the brain. For instance, he says, memory is located in the under-lobe of the brain, the power of imagination is located in the frontal lobe of the brain and the power of reflection is located in the middle folds of the brain. Like the five outer senses equip the organism to act in the present situation, the five inner senses help it to learn from past experiences and foresee future situations. All these powers control and regulate the body, and the *Qalb* controls and rules over them. Thus *Glazali* holds that mind has supremacy over matter and is the source of all activities. This dynamic force, that is mind, fashions matter according to its own needs. Even the growth of the bodily organs is due to the inward yearning of the soul.

### 6.3.4 Mind and Leadership

The significance of mind in the process of leadership and management has never been disputed. Mind, if fertile, can marshal reason to make qualitative decisions. For acceptance of an idea, the mind applies the battery of logic that it has so far amassed. It is geared to work with the tools of rationality. Nonetheless, it is now a fully recognised fact in the management literature, that rationality is a bounded function in qualitative as well as quantitative terms (Weick 1969). There is a limit to the depth and breadth of the information, and also to the currency of the information that a mind can handle without jeopardising its general rational protocols. For questions beyond that limit, it adopts ways and means that do not match the criteria of rationality. It then tries to rationalise the decision arrived at through not-so-rational modes.

Mind stands at the centre of communication. The power of communication is a testimony to the grand mercy of God. It reflects the autonomy and responsibility vested upon humankind. It has been endowed with the capacity to **think**, choose, will, and more importantly, also to express to others. External communication is the first basic requirement for the performance of humankind in the leadership capacity of vicegerent.

Mind expresses its thoughts using variety of ways. The first achievement of mind is to help human beings in developing variety of linguistic cultures, traditions, **thinking** structures, and ultimately languages. Without expression, mind cannot show its output. Communication reflects the output of mind and the language structures that output and carry the productivity of mind. Expression of mind takes place in two shapes: communication and behaviour. This is not a simple classification of saying and doing. The processes of communication and behaviour involve highly complex sub-processes at multiple levels. Spirit and soul converge in mind to articulate communication and shape up behaviour.

In psychological literature, mind has three sectors: conscious, subconscious, and unconscious. These domains interact with each other as well as with the incoming data and are linked in the form of loops. There is a role for each sector in furnishing right response to a fresh cue. Mind has the capacity to work in certainty as well as uncertainty, clarity as well as ambiguity, emotionally as well as rationally, generally as well as specifically. It is a highly fertile source as well as resource to make up all the shortcomings.

### 6.3.5 Shah Waliullah on Harmony and *Natiqah*

*Shah Waliullah* (1961) understands Essence as the source of all intellect. The emanation of intellect from pure Essence is a consequence of the decision by the Essence itself to create the universe, the macrocosm (*Shakhs-ul-Akbar*). The humankind is positioned as microcosm in this universe. *Nasmah* is the subtle vapour of inferior type, which is responsible for activities in life. It changes in terms of quality from the very birth until the death. In contrast to *Nasmah*, spirit or *ruh* does not change in any situation. The spirit is directly connected with *Nasmah* and through it with the rest of the body. *Nasmah* is extremely subtle and is in a state of equilibrium and as such, it is quite fit for relationship with it. At the time of death, it is the *Nasmah*, which separates from the body, and its separation becomes the cause of death. The connection of spirit with it, however, remains intact. *Nasmah* would be the body of the spirit and the vehicle for the spirit in the next world.

*Nafs-i-Natiqa* is related to the spirit though it is quite distinct from the body. In Qur'an it is mentioned as "the command of God" and no further elucidation has been made. According to Shah Waliullah the *Nafs-i-Natiqa* or the superior soul, is the universal soul in miniature located in the heart of man. It enters the body, as the *Nasmah* is strong enough to establish its link with body. It generally happens before the birth of a child.

*Nafs-i-Natiqa* has two aspects, one the devil self and the other the angelic self. It possesses the capacities to know and control both the spheres of nlatter and soul. These two aspects of *Nafs-i-Natiqa* have two propensities or forces, bestial and angelic, which either cooperate with one another or pull in different directions.

The happiness of humankind lies in strengthening the former. Humankind can attain perfection in the divine knowledge only through *Nafs-i-Natiqa*. It carries with it stimulating, perceptive and understanding powers. The purpose of *Nafs-i-Natiqa* is to control and coordinate all the three important centres of the *Nasmah*, i.e., heart, mind, and liver. Thus *Nafs-i-Natiqa*, is a special divine gift to hullan beings, which ensures equilibrium and union between the heart mind, and spirit. Psyche and soma are bound together.

### 6.4 Relationship between Mind and Body

The task of resolving the problem of the interdependence of mind and body presents a plethora of intriguing and intricate difficulties. In fact, Hume (1955:76-77) asserted that there is no principle in all nature more mysterious than the union of soul with body, by which a supposed spiritual substance acquires such an influence over a material one that the most refined thought is able to actuate the grossest matter.

#### 6.4.1 Philosophical Views

Plato's influential description of the body-soul relationship is detailed in his *Phaedo*, where he clearly indicated a separation of the body and soul, and a denigration of the kinds of knowledge available from the senses. In fact, Plato's attitude towards the body is quite negative, a position doubtless derived from his personal struggles with bodily passions coupled with his intense belief in the values of harllony, balance and moderation. In his *Phaedo*, Plato stated that, in every case, man pursues pure and absolute being, with his pure intellect alone. He will be set free as far as possible from the eye and the ear and, in short, from the whole body, because intercourse with the body troubles the soul and hinders her from gaining truth and wisdom. The soul, he says, is most like the divine, and the irrunortal,

and the intelligible, and the uniform, and the indissoluble, and the unchangeable; while the body is most like the human, and the mortal, and the unintelligible, and the multiform, and the dissoluble, and the changeable.

Descartes' position is similar to, but more extreme than, the influential description of the body-soul relationship detailed in Plato's *Phaedo*. In fact, Descartes extends the concept of the dualism of mind and body to the point where he states that, "We clearly perceive mind, that is, thinking substance, body without mind ..." (1641). The soul is entirely and truly distinct from one's body and it can exist without it. Following careful and extensive deliberations utilising among other procedures and techniques such as the process of 'radical doubt' and the doctrine of 'clear and distinct ideas,' Descartes concluded that humankind is composed of two distinct substances: body and mind (or soul, to utilise Descartes' terminology).

The body is viewed as an unthinking, extended, material substance; the mind is a thinking, unextended, immaterial substance, Descartes clearly states that, "the body is an unconscious machine, as mechanical as a watch, conforming to the unwavering and rigid laws of nature; the mind (the true "essence" of man) is a conscious and free substance possessing no qualities of extension and, therefore, not susceptible to, or dominated by, the mechanical laws of nature." (1649) The two substances are thus perceived to be totally distinct and independent.

A rather different approach to the nature of the relationship between the human body and the human mind has been advanced by phenomenologists. They have completely broken from the dualistic conception of Plato, the dualistic Cartesian thinking, and the dualism of Christian thought. Instead, phenomenologists have worked from the point of view that the body is not an instrument of the mind, nor is it connected to it; it is not a vehicle for directed sensation, nor is it a devilish antagonist to the spirit. Phenomenologists repeatedly assert that the human body is not a mere thing or object subject to the inclinations of the mind; rather, it is a subject in itself, deriving its subjectivity from itself. Merleau-Ponty argued that, "to say that the Soul acts on the body is wrongly to suppose a univocal notion of the body and to add to it a second force which accounts for the rational significance of certain conducts." From a phenomenological perspective, the body is you; you are your body. Your body is your mode of being-in-the-world. The body as object to be perceived, studied, analysed by self or other - is a different mode of being, called by Sartre 'being for others.' (1943)

### 6.4.2 Islamic Views

The exalted view of humankind in Islam is also seen in the way Islamic philosophy maintains a balance between humans' lives and their hereafter. Societies and civilisations have been oriented exclusively either to the hereafter and renunciation of this world, or to this materialistic world. In regard to the mind-body association, Islamic philosophy defines humankind as having two complementary natures, very intimately interrelated and continually interacting upon each other. These are the inner nature and the outer nature hardly separable from each other.

The internal nature of man refers to the soul and mind whereas the external nature refers mainly to the body. Islam emphasises that strength of the external nature is greatly dependent upon that of the internal and vice versa. In fact, it is only for the sake of clarification that Islam classifies man into internal and external natures. Any imbalance in the system of human nature may lead to destructive and fatal consequences. Both the internal and external natures act and interact responsively and Islam extends its divine touch to the internal as well as the external aspects of life. Islam views humans as a unitary subject, a unity (not union) of physical, biological and psychological events all participating in dialectical relationships. The motions and activities of the 'lived-body' are not distinct from consciousness; rather consciousness is deeply embodied in them. Shagrah (1985) has argued that physical, mental, psychological and spiritual dimensions must complement each other and focus on a channel to build the human personality and human society. Anything that provokes sound thinking or refreshes the mind and revitalises the body to keep man in healthy shape is encouraged and invited to by Islam so long as it does not anticipate or involve any sin, or cause any harm or delay and hamper the fulfilment of other obligations.

### 6.5 Comparison of Heart and Mind

What is clear from science and the Qur'anic insights on the nature of the heart and the mind is that they are two entities. However, Qur'an's view of the heart/mind link is quite different from that of modern science. While the former stresses communication, cooperation and a united front between the mind and the heart, the latter hardly admits any interaction between the two. Here the total monopoly of the

phenomena if the heart and the mind is located within the boundaries of the bio-chemico-neurological system of the human brain.' This is in contrast to the Qur'an's position. On the one hand, the heart (*al-qalb*) is the site of emotions, beliefs, and sentiments; on the other, it is also the source of much of so called insightful human **thinking**. As such, it takes away a lot from the human brain's resources and functions as described by the specialists of modern science. The Qur'anic view does not allow monopoly of the human brain over thinking and emotional capacities. Qur'an redistributes these distinct human potentialities between the heart and the mind and favours the heart, because of its capacity to function with the recombined rhythm of both feeling and reasoning at the same time. The heart could, thus, be called the balanced mind or composite mind over a compartmentalised mind. It is the legitimate arena par excellence for dialectical, dynamic and vibrant pursuits of life.

Al-Juzu'i deploys all his efforts to identify the obvious, the common and the subtle meanings of *al-aql* and *al-qalb*. He also makes a list of the other Arabic words which have corresponding meanings to the term 'mind' and 'heart.' On the one hand, the words *al-hijr*, *al-lub* and *al-nuha* have equivalent meanings in the Arabic language to the word 'mind.' On the other, the words *al-fu'ad*, *al-sadr* and *al-aql* have also corresponding meanings to the term 'the heart. Al Juzu' (1993) was able to identify eight major themes which are implied. Most importantly, the faculty of *al-aql* has been invoked to reflect upon nature, the Earth, the origins of humankind, establish logic, expose the contrary attitudes, and finality of *Sharia*.

In the Qur'anic text, the heart is represented as a complex universe, much beyond a biological tissue, which like *al-aql*, distinguishes humans from non-humans. It is equated with the mind, taken as the center of human responsibility of belief, repository of faith, recipient of Divine revelation, source of emotions, such as love, hate, tolerance, envy, peace, anxiety, security, fear, mercy and so on.

It would be wrong to presume, given the Qur'anic text, that heart is identical to mind. However, mind and the heart have in common the thought dimension. In addition to this, the heart is privileged with control of human emotions. This is against the scientific view that considers the heart's function limited to the blood circulation in the human body. It has no role in reasoning and thought. Human thought and emotions are considered to be under the total monopoly of the human brain. The position of modern science on the mind-heart link is clearly incompatible with the Qur'an. While the former sees divorce and separation between the two, the latter perceives unity and distinctiveness at the same time between them. As they stand, the two positions do not appear to be reconcilable. According to modern science, heart is bio-physiological while according to Qur'an, it is feeling and controlling authority with responsibility.

Within Qur'an, the meaning of *al-aql* is not identical to that of *al-qalb* as pointed out earlier. There is common ground and similarity between the two in the Qur'an, but they are not identical. This necessitates communication and cooperation between heart and mind. Modern physiology, biology and neurology could continue to hold that both the human emotional and rational dimensions are triggered and acted out within the boundaries of the human brain. However, modern sciences have to investigate the heart's input into the emotional and the thinking/ rational activities that go on within the human brain. What has to be sought is the degree of control the heart may have on what goes on in the supposed 'totalitarian' human brain. If contact, reciprocal exchange and cooperation between the heart and the human brain (the mind) could be scientifically established, then the two perspectives might be reconciled and be in a position to cooperate, enhancing our knowledge in this largely neglected field of research by modern science.

From Qur'anic perspective, the mind reflects on sense-perception and reaches out for belief and certainty. The heart does the same thing, but in a different style. It relies on its profound psychic power and keen insight. There is a role difference between the

two. The mind collects information, organises it and deduces from it what can help it in improving its knowledge.

The heart, in turn, recognises this information internally and emotionally. The mind can partially contribute to this process or be an integral part of the heart. The mind is under the heart's control and is disposed to serve it. Heart is concerned with feeling, certainty and deep understanding, i.e., beyond the functional scope of mind.

## 6.6 Soul (*Al-Nafs*)

Soul and spirit are often used interchangeably. In this thesis, they are used differently. They connote specific entities in view of the Qur'anic teachings. Spirit (*Ruh*), as explained above, is what was breathed into human and it caused the existence or initiation of life. Soul (*Nafs*), in Qur'anic terminology means, the self itself or various states of the self. These states are identified in terms of the roles as well as accomplishments. Qur'an talks about the *Nafs*, which means, in this dissertation, soul as distinct from *Ruh*, translated as spirit. Soul means the human self or person, specifically, the human soul and the human person. For example, Qur'an says:

"While the angels are stretching forth their hands (saying): deliver your souls! (Qur'an 6:93)

In almost all languages, a subtle element or force (designated as wind, air or breath) is seen as imparting life and power of motion to the body and thus forming the inner dimension of man's self. It was pointed out in the discussion on *ruh* or spirit that it performs this very function. It is the core of human being, yet it remains hidden. *Ruh* indicates the Divine presence in humankind. *Nafs* is the area where *ruh* comes into contact with the self and it connects the corporeal aspect of human self to the spiritual self. *Nafs* is a subtle element but contains forms (images, sensations, and ideas) whereas the *ruh* is formless. *Nafs* or soul works with body, heart and mind, through its faculties and organs. *Ghazali* (1981) has pointed out, similar to heart, *nafs*

or soul has two dimensions. The top edge connects it to the spirit whereas the low edge connects it to the body. All mental processes and faculties of hu **mankmd** such as will, imagination, feeling, sensation and **thinking** are related to either of these two aspects. Thus *nafs* is not merely an arena where desires and passions act as players from various dimensions but also contains subtle lnanifestaton of angelic characteristics.

Huston Smith (1981) says, "...there is a dimension of ourselves that exceeds even the stratosphere, an essence no universe, subtle or gross, can contain. The ancients called it soul (psyche, ani lna, sarira atman, nephesh, or nafs) and ...the soul is the final locus of individuality. Situated as it were behind the senses, it sees through the eyes without being seen, hears with the ears without itself being heard. Similarly, it lies deeper than mind. If lnind is equated with the stream of consciousness, then the soul is the source of this stream; it is also its witness while never itself appearing within the stream as a datum to be observed. It underlies, in fact, not only the flux of n lind but also all the changes through which an individual passes; it thereby provides the sense in which these changes can be considered to be his. No collection of the traits I possess - my age, my appearance, what have you - constitutes the essential 'me', for the traits change while I remain in some sense myself".

Soul is a dynamic and subjective characteristic of the human self. Qur'an conceives soul as having a multi-layer structure with diverse dimensions and implications. The characteristics of soul are independent and can exist at one ti r ne simultaneously. The three types of soul mentioned in Qur'an are now discussed below with special reference to human nature and leadership.

### 6.6.1 The Commanding Soul

The first and the foremost soul plays the colnmanding and initiating role in the human self. Qur'an denotes it as *Nafs al-amma rah*. It says:

"And I free not myself (from the blame). Verily, the (human) self is inclined to evil, except when my Lord bestows His Mercy (upon whom He wills). Verily, my Lord is Oft-Forgiving, Most Merciful." (Qur'an 12:53)

Many scholars have inclined towards characterising the commanding soul as necessarily commanding towards evil. This assumption does not fit with the total scheme of human nature as laid down by the Qur'an, which clearly mentions that the human nature is built into right mould from the beginning. It does have a chance to fall to low ebbs if the given freedom is abused. The meanings of commanding soul towards evil would consequently absolve humankind of responsibility for action. The case for its accountability could also not remain justified any more. The commanding soul urges towards work and moves the self for action. It may be translated as the 'ordering soul' which moves the person to become active. Some scholars also point out that main effect of *Nafs al-Ammarah* is to paralyse the cognitive processes. They cite the following verse, for instance:

"They have hearts wherewith they understand not, and they have eyes wherewith they see not, and they have ears wherewith they hear not (the truth). They are like cattle, nay even more astray; those! They are the heedless ones." (Qur'an 7:179)

These scholars are of the view that *Nafs al-Ammara* is diabolical or the instigating soul. The basic ingredient of this soul is the evil tendency that remains at its strongest and instigates the animal forces to revolt. If commanding soul comes under the influence of evil, then reason is subdued and conscious becomes ready to accept evil tendencies. The body and other faculties become subordinate to the evil.

Conversely, approach is right then the tendency towards virtue become stronger and body and its faculties cooperate to realise the intended good. The state of heedlessness is indication of blackening and resultant blocking of heart, not the doing of the commanding soul. Humankind is not born with state of heedlessness or ignorance.

Its innate nature basically consists of an urge to do something and a capacity to do right or wrong.

## 6.6.2 The Reproachful Soul

"And I swear by the self-reproaching person (a believer)." (Qur'an 75:2)

*Nafs al-Laiwama* is the reproachful soul, which admonishes, castigates, criticises, and blames the commanding soul. Its role is not to let the self blindly condescend. It brings new dimensions into consideration. It revolts against the status quo, seeks difference, contrast, alternate, new. The urge to improve for better and change for positive results is the consequence of the reproachful soul, which is by nature restless.

If commanding soul were oriented towards evil then reproachful soul would attempt to redirect the self towards virtue. However, if commanding soul is already oriented towards right then reproachful soul urges the self for still better options, further improvement and amelioration. The divine element takes the shape of reproachful soul and continually struggles for making progress toward positive and better side.

*Ghazali* has talked about achievement of the state of equilibrium between the commanding soul and the reproachful soul. The reproachful soul pushes the self toward ideal condition, the commanding soul toward the action. Action could lead toward or away from the ideal conditions. If reproachful soul is silenced, or is assumed non-existent, then progress toward the right direction would be impeded. The commanding soul in this case may easily lead the self toward the animal self. However, with the help of reproachful soul, the commanding soul would lead the self toward angelic purity and perfection. Knowledge, i.e., application of *Ilm* helps in maintaining the equilibrium and acts as a divide between the commanding self and abuse of the appetite and other human tendencies.

The reproachful soul, in other words, is the locus of moral conscience and the ego, which is developed in this dimension, is principally a rational ego. The human self is drawing benefit of critical judgement of the self from positive direction.

### 6.6.3 The Consummated Soul

The third aspect of the soul, in Qur'anic term, is known as *Nafs al-Mutmainnah*.

Qur'an says,

"(It will be said to the pious believers of Islamic Monotheism): O (you) the one in (complete) rest and satisfaction!" (Qur'an 89:27)

Generally, scholars have translated it as the pacified soul or the tranquil soul. It does not designate a mode whereby the turbulence of desires and passions is calmed down and the agitation of thought has been reduced to stillness. In this dissertation, this self is denoted as the consummated self, i.e., self that has attained completion as well as perfection. The meanings such as pacified and other do not reflect the sense of perfection attained on completion of the test after a struggle. The word *consummate* more appropriately contains the essential meanings of *Mutmainnah*.

In Sufi terminology, *qalb* has been taken as the meaning for *Mutmainnah*. At the threshold of the divine dimension of Being, according to Sufi theory, the *qalb* is a supersensory organ of cognition. It is essentially of a luminous nature. The world disclosed by the activity of the *qalb* constitutes ontologically the middle domain between the world of pure Light of God, and the world of material darkness under the dominion of Satan.

*Nafs al-Mutmainnah* according to *Ghazali* refers to the perfectly contented and satisfied soul, which comes to existence when harmony prevails. He perceives that the forces for construction and deconstruction are centred within the self. The self constantly urges to revolt against the luminous *Qalb* and the rational mind. The mind, which contains reason because of the divine elements in it, tries to take control

of the self and attempts to divert it toward the right channels. If mind succeeds then a harmony conducive to the realisation of the ideal is born. When mind gain supremacy over the . tendency, then the struggle ceases and the self is enabled to pursue its progress unimpeded toward actualisation.

### 6.6.4 Arena of Desires

If mind deals with the reason than soul deals with the desires. Mind learns through facts while soul generates values. Mind makes sense of events, soul sifts through the desires. Spirit initiates the life; soul keeps up the life. Spirit signifies destiny, soul points direction. Spirit is metaphysical, soul is the outer self of that metaphysical and the inner self of the physical body.

One important characteristic of soul is the paradoxical nature of the human desires. The paradox in terms of the following areas is worth considering: (1) virtue and vice, (2) passionate and egoistic, (3) status quo and change, (4) experience and experiment, (5) defensive and aggressive. The range of options thus selected configures the nature of the humankind. The implications of paradoxical nature are further discussed elsewhere in this dissertation.

### 6.6.5 Self-Directing and Self-Organising

The soul acts as a backbone of the self-organising system that has been laid down to govern the human life (Wheatley 1994). Desires of various kinds, at various levels, from various directions compete with each other in an ongoing contest to invoke reconciliation from the Heart and intentions of the mind. Mind applies reason and heart employs intuition to maximise fulfilment of the desires. The typical picture would resemble like that of a field worked up by forces from diverse directions at multiple levels.

One important characteristic attributed to soul is the ability to move itself on its own at will. Plato and Aristotle agree that what distinguishes being from matter is the

function of self-motion. The connection between soul and body is organic not mechanical. Aristotle treats it as first order perfection of a naturalised organised body. To soul, the second force, was attributed the ability to move itself. Self-motion is the very idea and essence of soul. Aristotle declared that anything, which has a soul, could move itself. In Greek mythology, the personification of human soul occurs in the realm of psyche. Aristotle defines the soul as "the first entelechy (or perfection) of a natural organised body, possessing the capacity of life".

Jung (1981) believed that the total psyche consists of a number of separate but interacting systems. He assumed that psyche encompasses the whole of existence and the total function of the self is governed through the psyche. He views the soul as the point of origin for all action and hence of everything that happens. He also pointed out that as the working of soul leads the self away from harmony, the mental disorders and heart imperfections increase.

### **6.6.6 Functional Potential**

The concept of leadership entails capacity to move at own will. The combination of various types of souls develops a system, which makes a perfect mould for human beings. Within humankind, the power to command and coupled with the power to reproach has been entrusted to lead it towards state of perfection and pacification. Human behaviour is outer expression of the soul's responses and decisions. It also indicates the functional potential of humankind. Desires are the basic content of the soul. The basic content of the soul works with desires that arouse within human beings because of the spirit and behavioural interaction. Since soul works with the desires, the human behaviour is a result of selection and intentionalization. It also follows that functional potential of human beings depends upon the soul. The extent and direction of desires determine the role of human beings in this world. Soul thus provides motivational energy to the mind and body. Without desires from the soul, there will be no decision to act by the mind.

Martin Lings (1988) is of the view that freedom to will, capacity to choose comes from the spirit, and it transcends the *Nafs*. The power to will can enable humankind to act contrary to desires or pleasures. It is because of this faculty that humankind would be held responsible for actions. Martin focuses on Will as a major instrument to maintain balance in the human behaviour.

*Glzazali* (1981) has pointed out that the essential output of the soul should be measured not in terms of perception or feeling, but will or intention, through which one comes to realise the spiritual possibilities. The fact that humankind can transform itself from the state of the passionate, egoistic soul (*al-nafs al-amma rali bi al-su'*) through intentionality and endeavour is a testimony to the power of will that has been granted.

### 6.6.7 Egoistic Conscious

It is evident from the construction of the *Nafs* that human nature is designed to maintain its autonomy, independence, and self-reliance. This leads to a degree of egoistic consciousness, if seen within a restricted context. Self-centred attitudes can potentially develop and dominate the self. Major philosophies of individualism, liberalism, secularism, and atheism, are born out of self-realisation where individual sees self as a completely independent entity, and opts for a narrow realm of consciousness. The concept of me as total reality gives rise to highly subjective and closed-ended view of the humankind. This is beginning of the deviation from the way of nature and an illusion of pseudo-supremacy, misconception about the real core of human being. There cannot be a greater mistake than this, in the eyes of Qur'an, if a human being starts believing in his own self in isolation of others and nature.

Descartes committed the same kind of error when he said '*Jepense done je suis*' ('I think, therefore, I am'). *Glzazali* believed that most of the spiritual diseases follow from this basic error. As T. Burekhardt (1983) has written; "in the mind 'to be'

becomes dissociated from 'to know' and in the process of man's degeneration it leads to all other ruptures and separations".

Qur'an lays great importance to controlling and balancing the egoistic tendencies within the human self. Qur'an wants to abolish it for that would mean effectively nullifying the human existence. Qur'an seeks to refrain it from loosening itself by ignoring the context of its origin, web of interdependent relations with which it must work, and its destination.

In *Sufi* teachings, this tendency is prevented and discouraged through gnosis, i.e., self-knowledge through self-transcendence. By opening the eye of the heart, they seek to put a human being in contact with the inner self and then through the inner self to the outer realities at metaphysical level. The attitude to deny the truth, however, can resist any guidance that may come from gnosis. *Sufi* teachings portray a spiritually regenerated soul as if it is a crystal. Even if it is solid, it has the potential to absorb as well as refract the light. A crystal retains its ego, its shape, but in a highly transparent way, maintaining continuous contacts from all sides to the outer world.

### 6.7 Body (A/-Jasd)

Body is that material which encapsulates the spirit, heart, mind, and soul. It establishes the physical identification of the human self. If heart integrates it all at the inner level, the body does the same at the outer level. It is also an equipment box because the tools for realisation of the desires and intentions form the parts of the body. Body is also a way to establish the relation of self with the time because it ages with time. As the exterior of the self, fully integrated with the soul and mind, it represents the self in interaction with the environment.

The order of nature is experienced and encountered by hu **mankin**d through physical body (*Nasr* 1996). It is at once an extension of nature and part of the human self.

Humans identify themselves with the body yet also distinguish themselves from it.

## CHAPTER 6: THE MAKING OF HUMANKIND

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The body is the self as well as part of the other self. It has a dual role but not of a dichotomous type. It has an external as well as internal role. It operates as co-rundered but then will act as the witness for or against the self on the day of judgement. Certainly, it will be resurrected in hereafter, a belief that is shared by Islam as well as Christianity.

While the heart provides motivational energy and the mind generates intellectual power, the body provides the operational power. Despite the fact that the body can survive within mean values but within a range it is highly resilient as well as flexible in even extreme situations. In a social setting, the body is instrumental in developing relations towards good or worse through its cultural artefacts. Overall, it is a very dynamic and organic entity.

The body determines the functional capability of the human self and that is a primary source of its significance in the context of leadership and management. The soul determines the functional potential while the body determines the functional capability. The corporeal body prescribes the internal limits to the performance. The interface of the self with the environment is also enacted at the level of the body. One importance of the body is that it is totally subservient to the human will unless it becomes dysfunctional or is rendered incapacitated. On the other hand, it is also highly influenced by the surroundings and the nature. It reacts to its surroundings and can also force the surroundings to react to it. Thus at no stage, it can be totally insulated from the permeable forces of nature. It is exposed to the laws of nature and has little room to manoeuvre within the framework of absolute laws. It would not be a totally misplaced assertion to say that the human body is just an extension of the nature when it comes to absolute laws of nature. The only difference being the fact that the human body can influence the nature at its will while nature has only limited influence over the human body.

Ibne Arabi (In Nasr 1996) states that once God created the vicegerent, He built for him a city to reside therein with workers, masters, and government, the totality of which He called the body. This city consists of four pillars corresponding to the four elements and that God chose its centre, the heart, as the residence *of* the vicegerent. The corporeal is itself the locus of that real heart to which the Qur'an refers in so many verses such as "He it is Who sent down as As-Sakinah (calmness and tranquility) into the hearts of the believers." (Qur'an 48:4)

Then, God created, in the highest point *of* the city which is the brain, and an abode from where the vicegerent rules over the entire city, which includes the organs *of* the body—the senses, and the imagination. In the middle of this elevated realm, He built a treasury, which is that of thought and at the end *of* it, the treasury of memory. He also made the brain the domicile of the vizier of vicegerent, which is none other than reason. Then he created the soul (*Nafs*), which derives from the pedestal (*Al-Kursi*) just as a spirit (*Al-Ru/1*) as its abode around the throne (*al-Arsli*).

The combined presence of the Throne and the Pedestal represents sharing *of* boundaries between the Divine and the Cosmic orders. In the similar vein, *Ibne Arabi* also identifies the relation between the spirit and the soul in humankind and its relation to the body. *Glazali* also believed that the body is born *of* the wedding of spirit and the soul. This relation is key to the understanding of the doctrine that body is an extension of the soul and the soul even has the potential to detach itself from the body.

The metaphor *of* city for a human body highlights the organised and complex working of the body and the self. Human body appears to be embedded in the human microcosm. It reveals the importance of interface between humans and their environments.

*Slzatz Waliulla/1* (1961) notes that body consists of three vital members making it possible for humankind to undertake all the acts and meet purposes which human

body requires. These elements are brain for perceptive faculty, heart for emotions, and liver for maintenance. *Sufi* teachings call the internal senses of the body as *La taif*. *Gluzzali* says that human self has at its disposal the motor (*Mulzarrika*) and sensory (*Mudrika*) motives to fulfil the bodily needs. The motor motive comprises of propensities and impulses. The two special types of propensities are appetite or wanting and anger or repulsion. The former urges the body to desire and obtain what is good for it while the later urges the body to avoid and repel what is bad for it. Appetite includes hunger, thirst, sex, etc., while anger takes various forms like rage, indignation, revenge, etc. The power of impulse works at the behest of propensities. It resides in the muscles and nerves and moves the organs to fulfil the needs.

The present body is provided to serve the purpose of human self in this world. Body represents the physical self that identifies human self. The spirit and soul are contained in the body. It is endowed with the power to accept what is good for it and reject what is harmful. The body, often becomes the primary cause of betrayal to spirit and deviation of the soul because its powers, which need to serve as a means actually become an end. The powers focus the attention towards the needs of the body and force the human self to dedicate all energies for fulfilment of the bodily needs. The dedication of the self to fulfil bodily needs results into excessive indulgence and involvement with the worldly things. The propensities like wants and anger dictate reason rather than be dictated by the reason. In the process, commanding soul is governed by the bodily urges, the reproachful soul silences and the consularlated soul steadily vanishes.

## CHAPTER 7.0

### PHYSICAL HEALTH AND PSYCHOLOGICAL HARMONY

What is the purpose of this universe? Why humankind was created? Scientists undertake objective studies to determine the purpose of the nature and its various elements. The functional role of all elements of nature should be aligned to the overall purpose of the nature. An integrated approach in a comprehensive context entails a better functional guide for all objects of nature. This is a kind of view that is projected by system theorists who analyse things as an open-ended system.

In the context of the model of human-self presented in the preceding chapter, the series of inquiry aiming at determination of synthesis, should start from the purpose and position of humankind in this universe. Subsequently, each part of the self should be assigned a purpose in a manner that they all combined to form a coherent and integrated self. Otherwise, a disjointed and disconcerted self would disrupt harmony. This would be tantamount to strife and conflict in the outer world.

There can be two different ways of finding out the purpose, the original and the real for the human self. One way is to start from the self and see, deductively, what kind of functional role is natural. Alternatively, religious teachings can be referred to for inductive reasoning to determine the purpose and the right function of the human self. Religious discussions on purposes and objectives, more than other subjects, also focus on this aspect.

The purpose of this universe should entail fitness of objects to functional goodness. A study of element of nature suggests that every object has a purpose that prescribes why the object exists at all. This view is repeatedly projected by Qur'an. One view is that the purpose of an element provides the right perspective on the objectivity of the reason determined natural and logical for the object.

## 7.1 Physical Health and Integrity

In a nutshell, health is an indicator of life. It is related, in many respects, to the human nature. A person living better and longer is believed to have been in possession of good health. Good health also indicates, indirectly, harmony between person and nature. Health, thus follows, is the best possible manifestation of the fulfilled natural purpose. Health is one of those few concepts about which there has never been any disagreement among human beings. Despite the element of relativity and uncertainty, within any practically useful time period the meaning of health is still something given, unalterable, more or less knowable, and pretty much the same for all. The various descriptions of health which govern the views are: 'the body's doing what it is supposed to do;' 'the harmonious interworking of the different bodily organs;' 'a body that can live and reproduce itself;' 'a good strong heart;' 'a body that fits into its overall ecological niche;' 'painlessness;' 'a vigorous constitution;' 'a body that can perform the tasks required of it by society;' 'a body in homeostasis;' 'a structural ideal;' 'a functional ideal;' etc. (Weiner, 1993).

Philosophy has been interested in human health right from the very beginning, especially, with reference to its teleological explanation. The philosophical debates pertain to the issues in determining the objectivity and functionality of human beings – the body in totality and the individual organs. What is the functional utility of the organs and the body as such? How to choose from diverse purposes and conflicting norms? What are the needs of the human body? What if functionality does not match the needs? What rules govern the working of body?

Human body consists of various organs. Organs are structured in the body and each organ is capable of performing certain functions. An organ can qualify to be called healthy as long as it functions the way it has been originally and genetically designed to do. Thus, health can best be defined in terms of the functional hermeneutic of the body as a whole made up of organs and as a unit in itself in the social whole.

Religion, cultural ethos, social ideology all play significant role in highlighting the potentiality and determining the specifications of the functions of the organs.

Functions can be classified into three types: primary, additional, and optional. For example, the purpose of feet is to help the body move as wheels do in locomotives. They carry the burden of the body. Additionally, feet can also be used for hitting, ~~running~~ running, grasping, swimming, jumping. Optionally, feet can be used to insult, injure or kill somebody. It is also true for hand or any other organ. Objectively speaking, hand is there to hold things and to do work. Additionally, it can be used to feel the texture, counting, or as part of the non-verbal language. Optionally, it can be used to waive to say goodbye or to slap someone. The question is how should people decide the right and wrong functions. What needs and values should govern the functions?

One way to go about understanding the functions is to evaluate what is the structure of the organ and what kind of function the structure entails in normal circumstances. This assumes that functions follow structures. Structures arise independently and remain. The normal structure stabilises itself upon continuation of normal function. A function that weakens or breaks the structure should not be considered a healthy function. The supreme functions are taken as the survival, development, and regeneration of human species. Normal structure is selected and maintained by virtue of its close causal connection to the supreme normal functioning.

All humans possess body and function by use of organs. Yet, the full grasp of functions of all organs is neither possible nor feasible for all. For humans are time and space bound. Some functions are known to all easily, some are confusing, and some may remain mysterious or hidden. For example, the functions of heart and mind have been understood differently at different places at different times. Similarly, functions of other organs have been explored with the aid of empirical studies in the light of prevailing ideologies. Mistakes, within the limits of empirical fallibility, have also been made. Nevertheless, the experience with the mistaken view



then led to further inquiry. The influx of ideologies and philosophies, customs and traditions, also causes changes in the functions of the organs.

### 7.1.1 Health as Indicator of Goodness

Physical health has a natural value and a natural character. It is partly given and partly acquired. The formula is, in general, the same for all people, but there are some differences between groups and some variations within groups. Individuals can conform to it or deviate from it. But none can make it what they wish it to be at all times. Thus, though it is not timeless, health has a given measure of absolute characteristics. It retains the given set of absolute characteristics in the face of evolution. The specific environment that does change over time and over distance stimulates evolution. The creatures in such a shifting environment are simply caught between adaptation and adjustment. In general, a relatively stable and munificent environmental domain is more conducive for good health. Different natural environments imply different meanings of physical health for different human groups. These differences are just as natural and just as independent of human will as any other assignment or function by natural selection. They are relative to the environment only and are very small compared to what is common.

In transitory periods it is impossible to tell a priori what course of action would be most conducive to health values. There are always two possibilities. The organism can alter itself in order to fit better into the new circumstances, or it can alter the circumstances so that doing the things it was 'designed' to do would continue to be functional.

Biology is the elementary discipline, i.e., concerned with the physical and the material objects, their relations, and growth. The discipline of biology has kept itself limited to the genesis, performance, and dynamism of body and its organs. The theory of natural selection saw survival in adapting to the changes in nature. Behaviourism attempted to explain the human behaviour in terms of seemingly

general questions about modifications in human behaviour. Skinner argued against useful functions of humans. Nagel accepted that there were natural functions in biological phenomena, but opined that they did not entail any special type of causality since they could be fully accounted for in nonteleological language.

Traditionalists such as Hans Jonas and Teilhard de Chardin defended biology as a special field of teleological explanation.

Health assumed increasing importance and was subjected to intense philosophical scrutiny when revolution in health care technology such as biomedicine, genetic engineering, and psychiatry unfolded new challenges, questioned old concepts and demanded justifications for new possibilities. The philosophical discipline of medical ethics highlighted new dimensions to add value to the meaning of health.

The new debate was focused on three questions. The first question seeks to define health in terms of the relation between biological function and the criteria of health—normal structure and painlessness or lack of discomfort. Not unsurprisingly, health is best understood by its absence or through the effect of illness and disease.

The second question attempted to ascertain whether health is a natural norm or a value created by human desire. The third question looks into the ethical justification for decisions on health. On the one hand, conservatives wanted to limit the encroachment of innovations into the traditional ways of family and life. Kass (1975) and Boorse (1975) took proper function of all organs as the implication of health and opined that the functions are defined by nature. By deduction and induction, they should be deciphered and distilled by human perception and intelligence. Kass **thinks** that health is a state of being, a natural norm.

The progressives and liberals argued for empowerment and individual autonomy in favour of exercise of choice and fulfilment of desire. Engelhard (1974, 1976) tried to loosen the connection between disease and function by claiming that "there is not

one single set of criteria for calling something an illness." Then, he attacked the naturalness of natural function, arguing that functions are environmentally relative.

Margolis (1966, 1976) granted that the diseased state is defective with respect to some state of healthy functioning. He is of the view that functioning of human animal is inseparable from the functioning of human person. If natural norms are not straightforwardly discovered then at least a different rationale for the ascription of functions is required. Medicine to him appears as 'the ideology restricted by minimal requirements of the functional integrity of the body and mind.'

The liberal point of view heralded all the arguments that have previously been used against objective values and truth. In the extremely anti-authoritarian-libertarian times of sixties, joining the forces with Margolis and Engelhard were Foucault to King and Szasz to Sedgewick.

### 7.1.2 Health and Naturalist Views

Human body is made up of a kind of organic clay. Naturally, argues proponents of naturalistic view, it should be governed by the laws of nature. The human body is as it is because it was required to contribute to sustenance and maintenance of life at this planet. The deterministic nature of evolution lends purpose and mind behind the operation of diffusion, mutation, variation, and selection. In contrast, the evolutionary perspective assumes that the body is entirely moulded by process of natural selection. It also believes that nature has no purpose, and operation of diffusion, mutation, variation, and selection has no mind. Whether nature works in deterministic or random fashion makes no difference.

Both views are oversimplification of the complex processes and realities. The fact remains that an organ may have more than one function (Wright 1973:141). Due to genetic drift even less functional or dysfunctional elements can become generalised within a limited sphere for a limited time (Simpson 1951:15; Lewontin 1984:263;

Gajdusek 1964:356). It remains unclear as to whose survival serves as the ultimate "as if" end because ascertaining the level of selection from DNA molecule, individual, family, or tribe is problematic (Lewontin 1970). When environment changes, the selection mechanism also changes.

Naturalists argue that the complicated scenario of application of the paradigm of natural selection should not invalidate the primacy of functions. The theory of natural selection protects the basic primacy of function despite the uncertainty and complexity in the evolutionary process. Naturalists profess that life is for the sake of nothing but reproduction, its continuation. Therefore, reproduction is the supreme function and all other functions, directly or indirectly, are reinforcing this supreme function. Play, for example, makes an indirect contribution to survival and reproduction. Similarly, art, religion, and politics, nevertheless, contribute to regeneration in their own ways. Naturalists point out that because of complex genetic linkages in an individual, and because of the division of labour (function) in social life, unequivocal, direct, and universal connection of every organ to reproduction may not be apparent to all, in all cases, at all times.

Given the criterion of natural selection, the structure of the organ represents the functional form. The function of hand, thus, will be governed by the structure of the hand. Which consists of multitude of muscles and bones all designed to enable fingers and wrist move in different ways. This structure does not entail any single specific support that could make the hand especially suitable for tying other people's hands or . . . g others. Of course, the hand can be used in that way, but there is nothing in the internal structure of the hand that makes it especially suitable for such purposes. Thus, even the criterion of natural selection entails that . . . g is an act of violence and an assault on the integrity of the functional unit regardless of moral pre-dispositions.



The theory of natural selection is the essential etiological presupposition for the assignment of functions. It is applied to specific organs through a physiological/functionalistic study of the relationship of parts to whole. For its proponents, functions are not socially constructed. Factually, the hand waves goodbye and communicates other signals. But the degree of adaptation of the parts to the socially constructed functions is very low compared to their adaptation to grasping and so all else being equal, that is conceived to be their natural function. In problem cases, the interpretation of the parts is constantly adjusted to the interpretation of the wholes, of the wholes to the parts, and of those wholes to still larger wholes. The ongoing goal being an explanation that harmonises everything with everything. By definition, that is how the truth in matters of this kind is sought, as it is an ideal, not an already existing fact. This is the hermeneutic of the body and the theory of natural selection claims to anchor the entire process. It is the guiding assumption that gives sense and direction to more concrete work.

### 7.1.3 Role of Milieu

Humans are social animals. Sociality is one of the major tools in the efforts to survive and grow. Without social life, there would be no communication, no society, no education, and no government. It is indeed the social character that makes humans dominant species. Otherwise, individually they are the weakest, lacking even the instinctive wisdom of animals. Health, then, is relative to those social structures that have been stable enough to allow natural selection to work in a single direction over a very long period of time. The demands of urban, industrial, capitalist, socialist, feudal or agrarian society put specific pressures on norms and values of health. The physical characteristics of people, not to mention the genetic, are also different. The critical point here is to understand that it *does* mean that humans do not always know what health is, and it *does* mean that their adaptation is partly relative to the social environment.

Health is a reality that is very well recognised by moral, political, and economic agendas of human society. What is good for health is ethically good for life. What is bad for health is ethically also bad for life. There has been consensus among all people that endangering health, own or others, is morally and ethically wrong. Health is a unique ground where logic and ethics converge to prescribe right and wrong actions.

### 7.1.4 Body and Nature

Religions have traditionally taken two opposing views of body. On the one hand, it has been considered as source of all evils resisting spiritual advancement of the self. On the other hand, it has been considered as a holy symbol having a sacred precinct. This is true of religions and schools of thoughts including primal religions such as Hinduism and Japanese **thinking** but also of Abrahamic ones. The Bible says, "Our bodies are the temple of the Holy Spirit which is in us" (1 Cor. 6: 19).

The movement to desecrate the sanctity of the body was led by Descartes and Julien de La Mettrie in the period of Renaissance. Since then, gradually body has been transformed from an inner space to the public space and from belonging to God to belonging to anybody. Commercialisation and technology soon accelerated the transformation. The idea of the body as a constant in making of culture, a concrete matter in scientific research, a dead mass came to dominate the **thinking** in modern era. Body became an object just like other objects in the science lab much reduced from a living psychobiological entity. The human body became a public and social entity parallel with the new definition of man as a social man and the body lost its sacred character given to by religions of the world.

In the middle, one can find scholars like Ashley who reasserted the doctrine of matter as the mirror reflecting God's creativity. He says:

"U<sup>n</sup>matter of the universe mirrors God and the human body sums up the universe in this mirroring of God, and if the human intelligence uses this body to know the universe in which it begins to see God, and in seeing its own body as part of the universe begins to know its inner self, then indeed in its inner self it finds the image of God."

The famous saying of *Sufiite Imams* that "our spirits are our bodies and our bodies are our spirits" points to the ultimate unity of the spirit, soul, and body in accordance with the unitary perspective of Islam. Similarly in Christianity, the body is considered as a temple of God not only in metaphorical sense but also in the symbolic sense. In the real sense, thus human body is the manifestation of the God's Wisdom, the microcosm presenting the cosmic significance and a reality having a spiritual realisation. There is a general tendency in the West to rediscover the body from religious, health, and other areas. Two opposing forces are at work. On the one hand, there is New Age movement emphasising on the non-material aspects of the body, integrating it with the nature, taking a holistic view. It emphasises mind-body unity and sees human self within the perspective of correspondence between microcosm and macrocosm. On the other hand, there is scientific penetration in the working of the human body as mentioned before. The crises reflect the diversity of views related to the understanding of as to what constitutes the human body.

The recent renaissance of religious interest in interaction of human body and nature is focusing attention on human body where the spiritual, psychic, and physical elements combine in a unity. The exclusive claim of the materialistic philosophy on understanding of the body is being challenged in the modern West. Even the dominance of medical sciences to the biological understanding of the human body is being seriously challenged.

### 7.1.5 Functional Integrity

Health can be defined as the right functioning of the bodily organs with all due allowance made for the possibility of group and individual variation and the disparity between the original and current social environment. The understanding gained through the application of theories of evolution and natural selection leads to the meaningful purpose of harmony of organic functions. This also brings into consideration the notion of functional integrity as a requirement of the maintenance of health. Religious and ethical philosophies illustrate the aspects of functional integrity within the human self. Rollo Klay (1944) pointed out that the fundamental truth is that religion with its faith and purpose furnished the indispensable understanding for health of the personality.

What is the functional integrity in terms of health? Health depends only in a pure environment. Else, when it adapts to the messy ways of the circumstances it tends to degenerate. It follows from the preceding discussions that primarily there are two aspects against which the integrity can be ascertained in the human body. Firstly, the integrity of the usage of body needs to be assessed according to the physical function and health of the body. The health of the body holds supreme because the operational capability of the self depends upon it. Naturalists say that life is for reproduction and maintenance. Life depends on body and as such the body is a focal point of trust, i.e., the person does not own the body. This presents a marked difference between Islamic and other doctrines. No one is allowed to consciously harm the body whether it is own or other's. Severe punishments are reserved for those causing it. Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) assigned the highest respect to the life of a human being even above the Holy Mosque.

Secondly, Islam and other religions fix moral and ethical boundaries for the organs of the body. This is source of fundamental contention between religious and liberal schools of thought. In liberalism, body is supposed to be owned and dictated by the desires of the person. Religions and value frames take a dormant seat and are

given only a limited room for interference in the person's usage of the body. For instance, a tongue can utter what a person likes. However, Abrahamic religions lay down ethical guidelines for its proper usage. Deviation from this charter is supported to adversely effect the health in the first place and then the survival in the hereafter, according to the Islamic teachings.

## 7.2 Psychic Health and Behaviour

The distinction between the physical self and the psychic self corresponds to the distinction between the two types of behaviour. A shift from the behaviour of a bodily organ or body parts to the behaviour of the human organism as a whole (Margolis 1966). Hands, for example, wave good-bye but it is not hand that harbours affection or respect. When hands meet, it is the persons meeting, and their behaviours collide. Whole persons do these things, and it is the entire complex of such generalised human behaviour that is dealt with by psychiatry. By 'persons,' in other words, what is meant is like 'creatures with minds,' so that the definition of 'mental' as 'the general behaviour of persons' probably begs the most important question. From Islamic point of view, it is the heart or the chest that represents the inner self of the person. Questions about the relation between the mental and the physical behaviour would also be discussed to see the working of interface between mind and body.

### 7.2.1 Behavioural Arenas

A particular set of behaviour (say eating) is known as an arena of behaviour for the entire organism. For example, coordination of eye, nose, hand, lip, tongue, jaw, tooth, throat, stomach, etc., in relation to food. Just as the activity of a particular bodily organ may or may not fulfil its 'as if' function, so it can be said that activity within a given arena may or may not fulfil the 'as if' function of that arena. Often it may not be clear as to what the functions of the arena are, but in the case of eating it seems clear enough that the primary 'as if' function is to get nutrition into the body. This is

for the simple reason that nutrition is necessary for life and there is no other way of achieving this in the original environment than by eating. The extinguishing, diminishing, or customarily compulsion of such behaviour would be an indication of illness. The clearer the relation between a given arena of behaviour and the 'as if' ends of evolution, the clearer the meaning of fitness for that arena. Arenas constituting the necessary, life-sustaining functions of the individual (like eating) are the clearest; arenas that are necessary for life but not absolutely required of every single individual (like work), are less clear.

The idea of human life as composed of various arenas of behaviour, leads to the idea of the psychological body, i.e., the collection of all the arenas of human behaviour conceived as analogous with the organs of the physical body. As the latter is a unity of organ functions harmoniously related to the ends of life and reproduction, so the psychological body is to be understood as an organic unity of behavioural arenas subordinated to the same ends. In the end, goodness of mind can be nothing but the right functioning of this psychological body. Its harmony is at least as tattered as the harmony of bodily functions. It is relative to the original environment and subject to individual and group variation, just as was the body's. It is also subject to the special problems that concern the nuances of motivation. Nevertheless, one way or another, the harmony of the psychological body-the balanced personality-must be the meaning of goodness of fitness between motivation and behaviour.

In this section, an attempt is made to develop a broad but logical list of the behavioural arenas that constitute health of mind and are important to figure out the goodness of fitness between motivation and mind. Such a list would bear gross similarities to that propounded by Malinowski (1944). Unfortunately, there exists no universally certified list of all the behaviours of human beings. It requires genuine empirical research across a very wide spectrum of the social sciences. In the absence of such a list, there also does not exist any study for casual enumeration of the specific meaning of goodness of fit between motivation and behaviour. That

empirical research could enrich understanding about the specific ways of engaging in these behavioural arenas, their relationships to different natural and social environments, and also about the possibilities for group and individual variations. Also, all that could be learned about those arenas of behaviour that merely enhance life and reproduction but are not strictly necessary for them would be needed.

Within naturalistic brackets, the guiding overall assumption is that human behaviour, like all organic characteristics, arises from an 'as if' teleology with reproduction and regeneration as its ultimate ends. The proper functioning of any arena of activity can be determined on the basis of its relationship with an overall behaviour of the organism, the fit with known behavioural facts, and a harmonious fit with other activities. With this data, the enormous task of working out a concrete and useful definition of psychic health can be achieved on sensible grounds.

### 7.2.2 Division of Arenas

The arenas of behaviour can be divided into three categories. In the first category are the behaviours that are critically necessary for reproduction and are simply must in any inventory of the psychic health. This concerns, at a minimum, heterosexual sex, love (of one sort or another) and marriage (of one sort or another); and family, nurturing, child rearing, education. In addition, all behaviours that simply must be performed to bring the next generation to adulthood. From nature's point of view, these are the essential human activities, whatever the subjective wishes or values might be, and to them everything else, including self-maintenance, is biologically subordinated.

The second most important are the behaviours that are required for self-maintenance. Indeed before one has to take care of the young, before one can reproduce at all, one has to be able to take care of one's self. All that relates to the care of one's self is called self-maintenance, which includes hunting, gathering,

building, exchanging, cooperating, sharing, and learning, not to mention such nearly automatic activities as eating, drinking, elimination, and sleeping.

In the third category are the behaviours that simply enhance the life and its goals. Involvement in play, art, music, religious activity, chatting, dancing, storytelling, belong to this type of arena. There can be no doubt that these behavioural arenas exist because of some contribution made to life and reproduction. However, the exact nature of healthy engagement in that behaviour may not be clear. Thus, the comprehensive theory would include the theory of aesthetics and religion too. These behaviours are necessary for both reproduction and self-maintenance. Among them one can count (for humans) speech (i.e., rationality, deliberation, and technical achievement) and sociality by which is meant the minimal behavioural conditions for the possibility of social life.

It must be noted that this is merely a list of activities that must somehow be performed by the social group if that group is to survive and reproduce. It is not, ipso facto, a list of activities that is required for the health of every member of the group, though some of them clearly are of this nature and others may be.

The table indicates that psychic health is determined by primary arenas of activity; each consisting of many sub-arenas. These sub-arenas can be further broken down into still more subordinate means. The possibility for individual variation becomes greater as the means become more specific. It is very difficult to develop a simple template against which the behavioural profile of all could be easily measured. The more specific behavioural arenas will constitute more or less rough generalisations about the nature of psychic health. Some of the deviations are form of illnesses, and others are simply the peculiar phenotypical configuration of a given person's tendencies.

### 7.2.3 Gender Specification

The division of behavioural arenas exhibits similarity to the Freudian definition of psychic health, i.e., ability to work and love. Work is about maintaining the self; love is about regeneration and caring. By the same token, what is called 'reproduction' includes most of what is meant by love, not only in the narrow sexual sense, but also in the broad sense of caring for others. This may include love between sexual partners for each other, without which there is no stable ground for the rearing of children and of the strong for those who are weak and of rich for poor. Just as work/self-maintenance is generally self-centred, so is love/reproduction generally other-centred, Freud defines mental health simply as a balance of self-interested and other-regarding activities.

Interestingly, this definition corresponds to the basic moral dichotomy that lies at the evolutionary heart of the human psyche. Accidentally, this same dichotomy corresponds to the traditional stereotypes of gender. The traditional feminine stereotype represents substantially the activities under the role of reproduction such as sex, children, family, love, self-sacrifice, nurturing. The traditional male stereotype represents what constitutes most of work such as strength, mastery, hunting, and self-assertion.

This type of division binds the opposite sexes in a biologically founded mutual need through the institution of the family. However, it certainly does not amount to degradation or disparagement of the female stereotype. From the perspective of nature, all functions of the life are dedicated to the urge to reproduce itself. Life is for the sake of regeneration, not vice versa. Thus, the function of work, which is a stereotypically male function, is but a means to the stereotypically female function of reproduction.

In the current literature, writers have tended to take male virtues as normative. The domination of male gives most rewards to the virtues required of stereotypically male

activities related to work. For some writers coming from the traditional, religious/moral point of view, the stereotype female activities are superior. The fact remains that higher premium has been set on male virtues because of failure to draw the values from within the naturalistic brackets. The radical feminists, of course, are the exception to this tendency.

It is important to note that stereotyping does not owe its roots to genetic determination. All it entails is that most people are generally predisposed towards the gender-associated roles. There are wide possibilities of individual variation as the stereotypes are mere generalisations, not universals.

As explained earlier, genotypes specify only a range of phenotypical behaviour. Natural and social environments influence the selection of choices within that range. It is possible, therefore, that change of environment can have some real effects on the gender associated roles. However, the middle road in ascribing the extent of influence of nature or nurture in shaping and configuring the human behaviour is the better solution.

### **7.2.4 Psychic Harmony and Self Goodness**

Drawing analogy from the description of physical health, the psychic health is defined as a tattered harmony of mental functions (Boorse 1976:63, Flew 1973). The question then reduces itself to the issue of what is meant by 'mental'. Mental-health therapy deals with human behaviour. The idea of psychic health as employed in therapeutic practice seems to be woven from two criteria: (1) the notion of general human behaviour as opposed to specific organ functions; (2) the notion of a motivational etiology rather than a physical one. Consequently, the subject matter of mental-health is scrutinised by behavioural as well as etiological criterion. The paradigm cases of mental illness occur when these two criteria overlap. The cases where both are absent (specialised behaviour and physical cause) are undisputed

examples of physical illness. The remaining cases are debatable. Of these two, the behavioural is the most tangible and in some respects the more important.

The process of discovering the meaning of health is embedded in the concept that each arena of behaviour is like a psychological organ. The totality of these organs is conceived as a delicately balanced, organic whole that encompasses all the life-sustaining behaviours of the individual (eating, sleeping, drinking, loving, obeying, collunanding, working, learning, talkin g, playing, laughing, fighting, etc.). These behavioural arenas are then explored to determine their relation to the general task of survival and reproduction of the species in the original environment and to assess the fitness of function within activities currently going on in the relevant arena. Then the whole scheme is worked out so that there is a minimum of mutual interference between the various functions. For here as with the body, the evolutionary pressures tend to weed out survival strategies that are in fundamental conflict with each other.

Behavioural arenas are assumed to be intricately interrelated, inextricably intertwined, and like the bodily organs, balanced against one another in relation to the overall organic functions. Such a balance is understood to be health. The keys to harmony of self are physical and psychic health. The key to psychic health is balance of behavioural arenas.

For the soul or heart as for the body, this harmony is not a gross empirical fact. It is a paradigm that gives meaning to the empirical data. The paradigm is not derived from simple observations, nor do they contradict it. It is, in a certain limited sense, a priori ideal or hermeneutic device, but it is an ideal that is demanded by the naturalistic brackets and the theory of evolution.

This is, of course, not the direction social science has taken. As an overreaction to the crudely judgmental social theories of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, and out of respect for the fact/value dichotomy, much recent social science has attempted to be entirely nonjudgmental. More recently still, value judgements have

been re-allowed, but no objective foundation has been supplied for them. Social science of both types has stressed the diversities of people rather than an underlying common human nature.

The request for a reconstruction of the psychological body obviously goes counter to this trend. In effect, it is a new way of asking for the redirection of attention toward a common human essence. It is understood that this essence is not to be found by a crude empirical cataloguing of the diversities of human behaviour, or by averaging them. This is not true of physical health, and it is not true of psychic health. Health is always a reconstruction of the empirical data guided by the tattered 'as if' teleology of the naturalistic brackets.

The remarkable progress that mankind has made has not been without negative affects on the overall psychic conditions of human beings. This can be observed in the form of personal distress, disabling behavioural tendencies, poor reality control and psychosomatic disorders. The psychic health of modern man is severely tattered and in order to recover and redress, he is anxiously looking for therapies and cures.

The state of psychic health is generally defined by psychologists through its negative aspect, that is, absence of pathological symptoms such as tension, anxiety, depression, emotional imbalance, anti-social habits, and drug addiction. A person who does not display these symptoms is regarded as mentally healthy.' This operational definition of psychic health seems to be quite adequate, since it is tied up with normality. It is assumed that a normal person is well adjusted so he must be mentally healthy. However, the term *normality* is culture bound. It is difficult to arrive at a universally accepted definition of psychic health.

Like the negative characteristics of psychic health, some psychologists have prepared a list of the positive qualities of psychic health. This method is not very reliable either. This is because one has to believe in what a person says about oneself e.g., a mentally healthy person has a healthy outlook towards life if he responds positively

to the inquiries. This is also true for all other positive qualities like sociability, emotional maturity, effectiveness of human relationships, etc.

In modern psychology, several more or less independent systems have emerged and each one seeks to explain human nature. Each system tries to solve problems arising out of the complexity of the human nature. The mechanical model considers human being as a reactive being whose behaviour can be controlled through conditioning and reinforcing. This approach employs reinforcements to assess the probability of behaviour and then generalises. Many of these studies are based upon laboratory animals, not on human beings. It does not provide any comprehensive solution to the psychic problems of humankind. The scientific nature of experiments nevertheless provided recognition to this model. The analytical model, too, assumes that in the subconscious of human kind lurk kind of urges and impulses of which he himself is ashamed. Humans repress such impulses for the sake of social and cultural adjustment. Such adjustments become possible only by resorting to a number of defence mechanisms. The secret of psychic health is not to repress the animal desires so that mental conflict is avoided. The humanistic model lays special emphasis on the natural tendencies toward self-direction and self-fulfilment. The interpretation of reality not the reality itself is more important. The reality is individually constructed and protected. Humanistic approach states that a person becomes maladjusted when he perceives himself at odds with his important experiences. Tension makes the situation even worse and consequently he loses his psychic health.

A careful examination of these would reveal that they are based on the assumption that humankind is, like all other animals, an animal in this universe. The state of development that human kind has achieved is through the evolutionary process. Otherwise, the basic urges of humankind are common among animals and human beings. These approaches give due attention to the problem of psychic health, but fail to give any effective solution to the problem of maintaining or regaining psychic

health. The inadequacy of these models is obviously due to the fact that they are not based on a true premise of human nature as presented in this dissertation.

### 7.2.5 Need of a New Paradigm

Weiner (1993) notes that "Perhaps some day there will be an all-encompassing theory of the psychological body within which even aesthetics and religion would have their places. That is something to be hoped for. It would amount to an entire philosophy of life based on the concept of health. Till then, slow, uncertain progress can be made about such matters by working about them in the right way. The empirical evidence gathered by the social sciences is, of course, critical. But the right conceptual scheme and the right paradigm is needed to digest the overwhelming plethora of information that has already been gathered."

The notion that psychic harmony lies in fitness between psychic health and behaviour is rooted in the discipline of psychiatry that traditionally meant healing of the soul. Notwithstanding its narrowly-focused meaning in medical currency. The generalised behaviour of persons is usually considered the subject matter of mental-health therapy and that the 'behaviour' of specific body parts is usually referred to as physical medicine. Nonetheless, the word is used here in its etymological sense, to be synonymous with 'clinical psychology' or 'mental-health therapy' in general.

To begin with, psychology was closely associated with philosophy, religion and morality. Right from the primitive beginnings, humans have gone through various stages of development. The civilisation, culture, and religion are some elements of the environments that have contributed in the development of human mind, its sensibilities and adjustments vis-a-vis society. Metaphysics has also played an important role in defining the roles and responsibilities. In the later period when it began to seek recognition from medical establishment, it disassociated itself from things that cannot hold themselves under empirical reductionism. In that age of positivism, the debate about the ends of psychiatry was a taboo since it was

considered to be dangerously tinged with traditional moral, religious and ideological concerns. The practitioners who wanted to shape up and popularise a new practice among public could ill-afford to participate in this debate. Thus psychiatry avoided philosophical issues related to its goals and its methodology was attuned to the scientific mould. The tendency was to say as little as possible about the overall aspects of health and to concentrate on specific illness, its definition and causes.

Psychology has extensively dealt with the health of mind. •

In the literature of psychiatry, a wide array of definitions of psychic health can be found; starting from merely as absence of pathological symptoms (Oshanna 1958: 10) to positivistic ideals. It has been described as 'staid adjustment' (Menninger 1947); 'normality or nondeviant behaviour' (Scheff 1966); the exuberance of 'spontaneity' and/or 'freedom' (Rogers 1951); 'rational living' and/or 'mastery of the environment'; the ability 'to love and work' (Oshoda 1950: 55 - 6); 'freedom from guilt' and/or 'the absence of intrapsychic conflict' and/or 'the replacement of id-functions by ego-functions' (Freud); 'integration of the parts of the self' (Oung); 'happiness' and/or 'satisfaction' (Boehm 1955); and/or 'the possession of a democratic character structure' (Adorno 1950); 'being one's true self' (Homey 1950); 'the realisation of one's full potential' (Maslow 1968); 'the possession of a productive character' (Fromm 1947); and many others. This richness of metaphors comes merely from the overemphasis of one aspect or another of a more or less common goal.

The way various mental illnesses are described and defined mirrors same type of broadness to the extent of vagueness and conceptual ambiguity. Almost invariably these definitions include undefined words such as 'unreasonable,' 'excessive,' and 'inappropriate'. Thus a symptom of the dependent personality disorder is said to be 'the inability to make everyday decisions without an excessive amount of advice or reassurance from others.' The obsessive-compulsive personality disorder is characterised by 'adherence to...overly strict and often unattainable standards', and the passive-aggressive type 'unreasonably criticises or scorns people in positions of

authority.' There are two problems in such definitions. Firstly, the state of illness depends on how 'excessive' and 'unreasonable' are defined. Secondly, there must be a vision of positive behavioural ideal against which decisions on health as well as sickness could be taken.

In recent years, there has been a revolution in therapy. Issues of character such as fastidiousness, promiscuity, gluttony, addiction, ambition, which were thought of having moral bearings are now also routinely treated as medical problems. The practice of medicine is slowly infringing into the sensitive concerns of morality in an attempt to redraw the normative lines. Fastidiousness, for example, is now treated as a mild form of compulsive behaviour, promiscuity is believed to be a symptom of low self-esteem, proper ambition is now a compulsion, and moral integrity is now viewed as a pathological judgement. However, these definitions were only meant to be principle guides to practice rather precise formulations substantiated by empirical studies.

The question here is by what standards does the therapist judge that so much attention to cleanliness is normal, and beyond that lies neurosis. How much ambition makes a workaholic? Where steadfastness would be called perseverance and where it would be called hardheadedness. The real working meaning of psychic health depends on a probe to the standards. To answer this, understanding of the discipline of mental-health that can broadly identify the kinds of things that are actually dealt with by psychiatry is needed.

## 7.2.6 Debate on Behavioural Standards

To begin with, the naturalist brackets assume that behaviours and their motives are predisposed or influenced by the evolutionary pressures and the forces of natural selection. The complete definition of health should entail not just the right behaviour but also the right motive. But the formation of motive is secondary because it is a means to the formation of behaviour. It is clear that hunger is a basic motivation for



eating. Nevertheless, it is clearer that unless one eats one shall die. Formation of behaviour by evolutionary forces is, hence more certain than the formation of motivation. Therefore, it is primarily on behaviour that motivational forces work. Moreover, to this very limited degree evolutionary pressures are indifferent to motivation.

It can be seen that biological foundation of human behaviour, in a secondary way also serves to revive the natural law theory of ethics. The stand of progressives and liberals on issues such as birth control, abortion, suicide, old age care met opposition from health-oriented writers inspired by ethical implications of natural selection. The ultra-right and neo-conservatives as well as religious schools of thought also get support from this trend of

In response, naturalists say that their theory is flexible and adaptable. For instance, suicide is generally considered as an unnatural act because it goes against the health, be it mental or physical. However, the judgement might be different in the case of an old person who decides to hasten the inevitable ending due to a terminal disease in the interest of own and others' lives. In the view of natural selection, the health values and common moral sentiments are in harmony here. Since the urge towards self-maintenance is natural but only for the sake of reproduction, it would not be unreasonable to say that in that case the meaning of suicide changes from a negation of life to its affirmation. Again, whatever can be concluded from the health and nature based decisions on suicide, birth control, and abortion, is that it would be wrong to fix solutions from the point of view of just personal choice or blatant condemnation.

Consequently, health values are radical on some issues and conservative on others. Presumably, the sociobiological approach to psychic health turns out to support the status quo on some and negate on others. On the gender issue, for example, where progressivism takes the view that gender stereotypes have no biological foundation,

the sociobiological approach appears to be relatively on the conservative side. From within the naturalistic brackets, it is not possible to subscribe that anything as ancient and universal as gender role differentiation could be a purely social construct.

Nonetheless, if the progressive view simply requires equal opportunity action, then there is no conflict at all. Similarly, the sociobiological approach comes out as the great support of the school of radical feminism arguing for restructuring of society so as to give appropriate recognition to women's values. Because they believe that, in general, genuine, natural, irremovable differences between men and women and that women virtues are equal if not superior to men's.

The potential for radicalism in sociobiological theory stems from the fact that its social frame of reference for all questions of health is the generalised hunter-gatherer band. From this stems the radically conservative, radically nostalgic orientation that will prevent the medical approach to human behaviour from ever being a mere apology for the status quo. If anything, the approach should be criticised for its peculiar kind of radicalism. Its danger is a romanticism of the primitive, not contentment with the status quo.

The naturalist bracket agrees that in certain conditions, health itself may require doing things humans are not naturally adapted to do. Contraception, for example, employs technological devices to which humans are not adapted and are certainly harmful to one degree or another. However, in specific conditions of health of the partners, contraception may allow life to be more natural than it would be without it. Once the primitive conditions have been left behind, further technical advancement may actually bring humans closer to the natural and the healthy. Thus, there is no Luddite, anti-technological compulsions. Everything depends on the specifics of the reconstruction of the psychological body and its relation to current conditions. These are empirical questions, only certain broad outlines, which can be discerned in advance of knowledge that is more complete.

### 7.3 Health and Morality

The 'spiritual medicine' of the Muslim physicians and moralists integrates philosophic-scientific assumption that there are mutually effective relations between the body, the mind and ethics with the general world view of Islam. Some orientalist have suggested that it has been influenced by Greek philosophy and derived from the Aristotelian and Neoplatonic doctrines. Muslim scholars well versed in the ethical thought of the Greeks, which could have influenced them in one way or another. But the inspiration came from other sources. The "spiritual medicine" of Muslims is original in its spirit in the sense that it suggested that the cause of physical illness and that a physical or mental illness can be cured by good moral conduct. The methods that the Muslims commonly suggested for the restoration and preservation of health can be enumerated as: self-restraint from excess in pleasures and nutriment, self-control of the passions, observance of Islamic ethical codes, imitation of the way of life of famous personalities, moderation in eating and in spending, making a distinction between natural things and unnatural things, making a distinction between what is and what isn't possible, self-projection on others, or projecting others on one's self, and self-conditioning.

Reason has also been treated as the criterion for a person's passions, pleasures and the acquisition or expenditure of wealth. If a person measures all those feelings and actions by reason, he or she cannot have any mental or physical disease. All moral precepts must be judged by reason so that human mind can fall neither into states of misery and worry which leads him to hallucinations, melancholy, and early withering, nor into excess and selfishness. For example, as Al-Razi says, copulation, when in excess, is bad for the body, it causes early senility, weakness and many other ills; cupidity is a very bad state which brings pain and harm, and drunkenness leads to calamities and ills of body and mind.

For Ibn Miskawayh (1247), as for Al-Kindi, since the soul and the body are mutually dependent, if there is illness in the mind, it affects the body too; and vice versa. Ibn

Miskawayh says: "Now, as the soul is a divine, incorporeal faculty, and as it is, at the same time, used for a particular constitution and tied to it physically and divinely in such a way that neither of them can be separated from the other... you must realize that each one of them is dependent upon the other, changing when it changes, becoming healthy when it is healthy, and ill when it is ill. This we can observe directly and clearly from their activities which appear to us, for just as we can see the man who is ill in his body - especially when the origin of his illness is in one of the two noble parts (of the body), namely, the brain or the heart under going a change of intellect, an illness of the soul whereby he repudiates his mind, thought, and imagination and other noble faculties of his soul (he himself being aware of all of this); so also we can observe the man who is ill in his soul, whether with anger, grief, passionate love, or agitated desires, under going a change in the form of his body whereby he shakes, trembles, turns pale or red, becomes emaciated or fat, and the form of his body is affected by the various (other) changes which can be perceived by the senses."

For Ibn Miskawayh there are various principles for the preservation of health, which can be enumerated as follows:

1. Association only with those of high moral conduct; this is very important, and this means that one should be careful to avoid association with acquaintances who indulge in debasing conversations and vulgar stories or poems.
2. All inclination to be covetous must also be suppressed by means of reason and one must keep oneself from the love of physical pleasures and bodily relaxation, which is inborn in man.
3. Mental disquietude and dissatisfaction can be overcome frequently by the persistent and diligent pursuit of knowledge, by keeping the mind hard at work.

4. Physical exercises in the preservation of the health of body and mind are also important.
5. Intellectual exercises, reflection and speculations are also advised, Ibne Miskawayh suggests dealing with the four sciences geometry, arithmetic, music and astronomy.
6. Moderation in possessing external goods.
7. Refraining from stirring up concupiscent and irascible faculties.

Ibne Sina's spiritual medicine, like those of earlier Muslims, e.g., Al-Kindi, Al-Razi, and Ibne Miskawayh (1247), is based on the body-mind-ethics relationship. Although Ibn Sina holds that the body and the mind are two categorically different substances, he stresses the intimate connection of mind and body via the relation of the practical faculty of the rational soul with the appetitive faculty of the animal soul; and he also accepts that such a connection exists between body and mind and ethical conduct via the relation on the practical faculty of the rational soul with the imaginative and estimative faculties of the animal soul.

For Ibne Sina, there is an influence of the mind on the body, especially that of emotion and of the will. Ibne Sina notes that an actually physically ill person, through sheer will power, can become well and, equally, a healthy man can become really ill under the influence of sickness-obsession. Similarly, Ibne Sina says that, if a plank of wood is put across a well-trodden path, one can walk on it quite well, but if it is put up as a bridge (and down below is a chasm) one can hardly creep over it without falling. This is because he pictures to himself a possible fall so vividly that the natural power of his limbs accords with it.

Ghazali's explanation of the causes and nature of the passions and of the vices is more or less similar to that of Ibne Miskawayh, Al-Kindi, and Ibne Sina. But he uses a more symbolic language, which of course facilitates understanding of his views. To



quote Donaldson, "From the ethical point of view a more surprising supplementary section in Al-Ghazali's classification of evil qualities is that in which he ascribes those evil qualities that come from unrestrained ambition to the divine element in the soul, when it transcends its bounds. The love of over-lordship (*Hubb al Istifa*), the love of supremacy (*Hubb al-Istafa*), the appropriation of special privileges {*Taklisis*} and the usurpation of absolute authority {*Istibdad*} are the qualities.

#### 7.4 Faith Based Psyche for Leadership

In literature throughout the ages, anxiety has been taken as the symptom of the mental diseases and faith has been understood as the cure of the disease. Whatever beliefs and values a person holds play important part in creating anxiety and depression. In Bible and Qur'an, there are many references to the various types of behaviour associated with mental illness. Generally, people have found religion and psychic health as associated concepts. That mental disorder is directly related to moral decay may not fully explain the reality. However, the fact that psychic health is a result of harmony of interdependent relation between social, biological, psychological, and chemical processes at individual level, is not far from truth.

Glock and Stark have identified five contributions of religions in the area of human behaviour: (1) experiential which includes feelings, sensations, and perceptions; (2) ideological aspect providing beliefs; (3) ritualistic which gives certain collective practices of worship and culture; (4) intellectual which talks about universe, God, and man, and (5) consequential contribution interpreting and deciphering the effects of events in personal, societal, and national arenas. Religions play vital role from these five aspects. Some of these may not easily lend themselves to analysis but a theoretical understanding is also important.

Religions emphasise the importance of personal responsibility. It seeks to furnish moral reasoning to the questions of why in human choices and actions, there is a human tendency to attribute successes and failures, fortunes and misfortunes to a

higher supra authority. Religions provide guidance concerning the limits to human responsibility and God's actions. However, Islam is totally against the view that points out sin and rebellion as the root cause for all-human illness and suffering.

Szasz (1960) have argued that behavioural disorders are manifestations of sin rather than of disease. They dismiss the concept of psychic health as myth of convenience and consider it as a heir to the myth of demonology to attribute otherwise unexplainable realities. They advised that medical science has failed to demonstrate competence in psychiatry (Szasz 1970). Problems in human relations can only be analysed, interpreted, and are meaningful only within given social and ethical contexts. The phenomena of psychic health should be forthrightly examined as problem of how human beings should live. In that regard, religions provide guidance and nurturing to thought. They seek to cultivate appropriate behaviour to avoid disorders within psyche.

Qur'an talks of disease of heart as blind pursuit of worldly desires, preference of now and here instead of better and then, disassociation, doubt, and envy. It results into, Qur'an says, the obstinate tendency to deceive others and God which is actually nothing but an attempt to deceive the own self. The only way to reform a trickster is to show him that he has been tricking himself. This self-deception expresses itself in ready and easy conformity with the dominant group but ridiculing the same group when in the company of other disassociated people.

The entire ritualistic and doctrinal system of Islam, is a regimen of the preparation and advancement of people toward perfection and health. By reinforcing the faith, the complete faith in the omnipotence and the omniscience of God, Islam develops the certainty in place of doubt and solace in place of fear. Qur'an seeks to change the **thinking** and pattern of life of the disturbed individual. The Muslim therapists as an essential consider faith pre-requisite for the treatment of disorder. All the Muslim

thinkers like Ibne Sina, Ibne Miskwayh Razi, Ghazali, Shah Waliullah, and Ashraf Ali Thanvi agree upon this therapeutic value of faith.

### 7.4.1 God Consciousness and Self Consciousness

Frankl forcefully presented the idea that spiritual death and disease is closely linked up with the concepts of existential vacuum and non-being. For him the main cause for the contemporary explosion of emotional disturbance is the frustration of modern man's will to meaning. Modern life has deprived man of the possibility of seeing a real meaning or cause for which to live. According to Qur'an, life without faith in, and love of, God is a state of spiritual non-being in which the atheist loses touch with his own true self. God is the only True Reality of which man is only a reflection. Hence to forget God is to alienate one's self from the very source of one's being. Thus, the Qur'an says:

"And be not like those who forgot God (i.e. became disobedient to God), and He caused them to forget their own selves (let them to forget to do righteous deeds)." (Qur'an 59:19)

Qur'an equates forgetting God with forgetting own selves and remembering God is remembering the selves. Islam considers the spiritual meaning derived from submission to God as the only true meaning for man in this life. Frankl and other existential analysts seem to endorse this Qur'anic insight in their claim that without religious orientation modern life with its material wealth may actually increase the chances of agony and existential anxiety for the modern man. According to Qur'anic psychology, God-consciousness and self-consciousness are interdependent and intertwined. A true knowledge of one's deeper self necessarily leads to awareness of the Ultimate Self or God and *vice versa*. There are also a good many sayings of the Prophet (peace be upon him) to this effect. That is the reason why the whole of the Qur'an aims at inducing in man an attitude based on God-consciousness and heightened self-awareness.

### 7.4.2 To Others for the Self

Qur'an enumerates that fundamental reason for ensembling and raising the nation is not for own selves but for others, the humanity at large. The focus is on others not on their own interests. The function is to enjoin others for good and prohibit what is bad. In another place, Qur'an recounts only two basic characteristics of the people going to paradise, i.e., those who feared God and those who gave. Thus giving instead of taking, sharing instead of depriving, and caring instead of ignoring are the basic character traits of the favoured people of Qur'an. The mindset that results from the attitude of focusing on others rather their own selves is free from almost psychic problems that accrue from focusing on own selves. Qur'anic teachings imply that a person can further own interests too only by serving the interests of the others. The kind of emotions, sentiments, feelings, and **thinking** that one could generate in heart would be totally different than the person **thinking** of only own self.

It is the obligation of every man to keep normal relations with other human beings, especially those who are closely related to him by relations of blood or neighbourhood. Severe punishments are reserved for those who break the basic blood relations. Even neighbours, friends, friends of forefathers are given rights.

The secret of psychic health lies in observing certain rights and obligations. These include rights of other people against him. A healthy person is one who fulfils his personal as well as social duties to the best of his ability. The following beautiful verse is his code of conduct:

"Verily, God enjoins Al-'Adi and Al-Ihsan, and giving (help) to kith and kin (i.e. all that God has ordered you to give them, e.g., wealth, visiting, looking after them, or any other kind of help), and forbids Al-Fahsha', and Al-Munkar, and Al-Baghy (i.e. all kinds of oppression). He admonishes you, that you may take heed." (Qur'an 16:90)



A person whose behaviour is motivated by these two goals, development *of* some positive acts and avoidance *of* certain deeds, remains free from worries and anxieties. Psychologists agree on the point that a well-adjusted person is one whose social life is well regulated.

### 7.4.3 Preference for the Middle Road

Achieving and maintaining a balance in the behaviour is one *of* the requirements *of* Islam. Human nature is capable of taking extreme turns and tines. Qur'an says that God has created humankind in the best of mould but it degenerated itself into the lowest of lowest. Thus, hu **mankm** has the capacity to move into extreme in either direction from extreme virtue to extreme evil. Within virtue, itself, there are ways to go into extreme. For instance, a person came to Prophet Muhammad (bpuh) saying "that he fasts all days continuously. Another came saying that he prays all night. Prophet Muhammad discouraged both of them and drew their attention to his example. Muhammad (bpuh) used to sleep and then wake up in the night for prayers and fast but only intermittently." (Masnad d Bin Hamdal, Vol.4, p.409).

In another tradition, he is reported to have said that the best alternative is the middle course, and that if you have two options then choose the easiest one. Thus, middle course is recommended not as a permission to arrive at a compromise between good and evil. The middle road is not about direction. It is about intensity, the vigour and the extent.

It is an attempt to discourage the attitude of taking extreme positions initially. It allows the possibility of opting for intermediate steps in a gradual fashion. Islam favours an evolutionary and gradual process of improvement for development of personality. The chance of reversal or about turn increases in case of big jumps without proper absorption and consolidation. Selection of the middle road all the time tends to have significant improvement over the long range towards the standards.

Indirectly, by asking people to take the middle road, Islam allows realism to play in responding to the question of intensity. The person in view of perception about situation and motivation can contextualise it. Thus each person can find a middle road in view of the particular situation facing the person at the given time and space.

### 7.4.4 Peace and Submission

Islam stands for peace and submission. Peace is possible through submission. It also means a way of life, i.e., living with the true nature of humankind. Qur'an clearly states:

"And unto God (Alone) falls in prostration whoever is in the heavens and the earth, willingly or unwillingly." (Qur'an 13:15)

Since all other creatures are following this path, deviation from this way of nature results in maladjustment. This also implies that even in the human world the laws of nature are quite manifest. All the organs anyway follow the course that has been ordained for them. However, humankind has also been given the freedom of choice and action. The key to psychic health is the responsible management of this nexus where submission and choice are aligned through faith and knowledge. If a person consciously decides to submit to the will of God, the chances for conflict are removed. Such a person belongs to a nation that is identified as the nation of balanced people. For them is prosperity and liberation from grief and fear.

"No doubt! Verily, the Auliya' of God, no fear shall come upon them nor shall they grieve." (Qur'an 10:62)

On the other hand, those who do not exercise their higher mental functions for recognising their Creator and misuse their freedom of choice by denying Him and not submitting to His Will are in a state of mental conflict. The inevitable consequence of this conflict is a failure in the ultimate ideals of life. Their personality becomes disintegrated and their psychic health is shattered.



### 7.4.5 Balance

Qur'an does not consider psychic health as merely the absence of pathology, but also emphasises the positive aspects by which psychic health can be maintained and improved. It does not recommend the suppression of human urges but insists on keeping a balance among them. This concept is best illustrated in the Qur'anic term *sarva 'al-sabil* by which is meant the path of *i'tidal* and *tarvas sut*. This means that no urge is given undue importance at the cost of other urges. This results in a fully functioning personality. Such a personality is able to deal with all personal and social problems adequately. Humankind is thus spared from many crisis-producing situations.

### 7.4.6 Free from Fear and Grief

One of the major precipitating causes of mental ill health is the feeling of frustration and despair due to feelings of envy and jealousy, deprivation and demeaning.

Qur'an repeatedly guarantees that those having faith would be free of fear and grief of any kind. They would know that if any loss has come than it is because God willed it. It is part of the test and trials and patience because of belief on God that would result into more increment in rewards in hereafter. The promises for people suffering from losses of possessions, physical injuries and diseases, etc., are more than the normal situations.

Due to difference in the opportunities, backgrounds, injustices, and other factors, some people might appear to be in possession of more than what a person feels he has of the things that he desires. Because of these negative emotions, life is shadowed by such unhealthy psychic states as anxiety and depression. Qur'an discourages comparisons:

"And wish not for the things in which God has made some of you to excel others. For men there is reward for what they have earned, (and likewise)



for women there is reward for what they have earned, and ask God of His Bounty." (Qur'an 4:32)

In order to attain such a state of mind, the values like patience and gratitude are inculcated. Again, Qur'an says:

"Verily, man is in loss, Except those who believe (in Islamic Monotheism) and do righteous good deeds, and recommend one another to the truth, and recommend one another to patience." (Qur'an 103:2-3)

On the occasions of grief and despair, Qur'an asks people to say, "To God we belong and to Him is our return."—This indicates hope for a better compensation and justice, prayer for comfort and replacement.

The emotion of guilt causes repression, a mechanism that is the root cause of many psychic problems. Qur'an has introduced the concept of repentance, to be discussed in detail later, which gives an opportunity to return and restart the life with a new determination. Any person can avail the chance to start anew at any time with deliberate intention. Qur'an says:

"Your Lord has written (prescribed) Mercy for Himself, so that any of you does evil in ignorance, and thereafter repents and does righteous good deeds (by obeying God), then surely, He is Oft-Forgiving, Most Merciful." (Qur'an 6:54)

And at another place the Holy Qur'an approvingly mentions the believers saying:

"And those who, when they have committed Fahishah (illegal sexual intercourse) or wronged themselves with evil, remember God and ask forgiveness for their sins; and none can forgive sins but God." (Qur'an 3:135)

### 7.4.7 Source of Reliance

People need recourse for help and guidance, assistance and assurance. Qur'an encourages traits such as total reliance on God for help, advocacy, return, decision, recompense, guidance, delivery, success, and prosperity. The importance of these values in promoting psychic health cannot be over-emphasised. Remembrance of God provides rest and peace to the heart. Qur'an says:

"Those who believed (in the Oneness of God – Islamic Monotheism), and whose hearts find rest in the remembrance of God verily, in the remembrance of God do hearts find rest." (Qur'an 13:28)

### 7.4.8 Emotional Intelligence

Emotional balance is the key to psychic order. Qur'an directs the rational self to control and manage the emotions. It illustrates the emotive behaviour of dogs to characterise the people who are swayed by the emotions only. Qur'an says:

"Those who repress anger, and who pardon men; verily, God loves Al-Muhsinun (the good – doers)." (Qur'an 3:134)

Tongue and sexual organs are the two main organs used to pursue the emotions and Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) repeatedly ensured paradise for those who could guarantee right use of tongue and sexual organs. (Sahih Bukhari, Kitab ul Razaq, Chapter 23).

CHAPTER 8.0

UNION OF SOUL AND VIRTUE

Ancient philosophy has always been intrigued by similarity as well as linkage between health and virtue on the one hand, and illness and vice, on the other. The belief that medical is imbued with moral held sway until the decline of teleological thinking. Diseases, it was thus thought, occur due to contamination, pollution or punishment. The tendency to think that illness is something to be ashamed of is continuing even today. In modern times, morality and medicine took separate pathways for development. It became extremely awkward to talk about the ideas such as health of soul and spiritual side of medicine. Much recently, as a result of movement for alternative and new age culture, there has been a surge in the interest of people in the ideas of spiritualising of health.

The view that the medical and the moral are inseparable establishes a totally new paradigm for understanding of moral life. Human decency is grounded in the original configuration of pleasure and behaviour. Deviations from it are quite likely to make humans less decent. Just as if deviations from any highly evolved structure are not likely to make the organism do better the very thing it is meant to do.

However, neither all deviations from common decency are matters of psychological illness nor all mental illness is immoral. Some anxiety-relief, because it is a distortion of a basically decent configuration of emotion and conduct, may be harmless eccentricity and some of it may actually conform to or mimic the behaviour that is associated with the highest moral standards. For example, ignorance and/or adaptation to hostile circumstances can also cause the behaviour that deviates from decency. Since mental illness is a distortion of that configuration, it must come close to being viced. This means that in the traditional language of morality, deviations from psychological health are generally vices. This, in turn, means that health encompasses forms of virtue. There appears to be not only a great commonality in

matters of health and decency, but also that the general structure of psychic health and illness conforms to the general structure of virtue and vice as understood by Aristotle confirmed by Qur'an and Bible, and now professed by naturalists.

It would be wrong to assume that the medical and the moral are identical because they overlap in many arenas of human behaviour. There are certain general structures that seem to be common to nearly all unhealthy behaviours. The 'pleasures' of anxiety-relief do not cause human beings to engage in totally new forms of behaviour. There are only some variations in behaviour to which human nature is already disposed and there also exists a description of normal behaviour for that.

The neurotic activity is generally a variation in healthy behaviour that is roughly characterised as being too much or too little of it. It is generally excess or deficiency when measured by the norm of health. Virtually all the definitions of mental illness are prefixed by the words such as excessive, deficient, or reasonable. Thus, neurotic deviations from health exhibit three characteristics. Firstly, it is likely to be a violation of common decency; secondly, it is characterised by excess and deficiency when compared to decency and/or health; and thirdly, it appears to be pleasant to the person who engages in it.

Qur'an lays great emphasis on common decency as a standard and a criterion. In all matters of promulgating laws, it refers to the common decency, i.e., the agreed and known good norms of behaviours, deals, and contracts. These types of behaviours are ingrained in the common conscious of people. They are not debated or questioned and they have evolved out of the persistent practice. Within the broad rules laid down by Qur'an, it leaves room for common decency to play an important role. In Qur'anic terminology, it is called *Ma'arof*. This is an important pillar of Qur'anic jurisprudence. The term *Ma'arof* can be translated as virtue, goodness, decency, and an agreed code of conduct.

## CHAPTER 8: UNION OF SOUL AND VIRTUE

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To better appreciate this point, it is important to remember that the idea of ethics as mere obedience to a set of morally authoritative rules is a relatively modern notion. In the Greek philosophy, virtue was manifested in a certain fullness of the person, an excellence in behaviour, and the testimony of a person living-up-to-one's-own-human-nature. It was also understood that the virtuous person actually enjoys his virtues.

The idea of virtue was deliberately ignored and de-emphasised by not one but all giants of the modern philosophy such as Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Kant, and Mill. They discussed morality as a matter of whether one's behaviour conforms to the appropriate rules. The inner pleasure that a person may take in engaging itself in such behaviour was of no importance to them. They focused their attention on material human being. Obviously, in this framework, morality remained disconnected with health. Inevitably, hostility filled the vacuum between Freud's mental-health therapy and much of modern moral thought (Forrest 1947, p. 18). This stream of **thinking** was rightly criticised by philosophers like MacIntyre, Veatch, and others.

Historically speaking, virtue was the ancient moral ideal and virtue and health have been intimately linked. Virtue does not concern itself with rules of behaviour but rather with the subtleties of character and hence the configuration of pleasures and pains. To possess the virtue of generosity is not merely an act of giving to others. It is to be a generous person, and that means being the sort of person who enjoys giving. Who takes pleasure in the pleasure of others. Giving is the fundamental trait of the ideal personality of Qur'an. The theory of virtue is thus inevitably a moral psychology. Virtue is understood as precisely that union of pleasure, spontaneity and decency that constitutes emotional health. If health and primitive virtue are one, then it can be argued that ethical **thinking** need no longer be stuck in the moral mode. The concept of virtue has the potential to act as the heart of ethics and as the highest ideal from both naturalist brackets as well as Qur'anic teachings.

In contrast, morality was conceived as a replacement of virtue after the decline of teleological influences as the name for the normative ideal. It focuses on propriety, on the rules to which behaviour must conform if it is to be judged acceptable. It has legalistic implications rather than psychological. It considers psychology as irrelevant. If it speaks of character then it tends to understand it as mere will power, the ability to force morally correct behaviour on emotions that would pull the self otherwise. Thus, it is very important in politics, business, group and community relations. These are the areas where great precision is required in enumerating of rights and duties. Morality can help in these areas to bring people up to a minimal level of socially acceptable behaviour.

### 8.1 Virtue and Happiness

Happiness, in the eyes of Aristotle, is a pleasant activity for a virtuous person. He described it as the union of spontaneity and basic decency, of pleasure and the goodness. Virtue is the human functioning within the realm of decency and goodness. To the extent that humans can achieve virtue, they can be at peace with themselves and the society.

The desires related to virtue can only be satisfied to the extent that their capability and circumstance would allow. A person fulfilling desires to achieve virtue is an ideal person in whom spontaneity and goodness formed a seamless whole in the shape of union of freedom and goodness. Anarchists, not all of them, dreamt of such a type of society. This is the state, which Qur'an seeks to develop among human beings.

The difficulties surmounting the efforts to achieve union of pleasure and goodness, freedom and responsibility, selfishness and friendship, are numerous and overwhelming. To be able to achieve it in totality and constantly is a testimony to saintly character. The resisting forces are externally rooted in cultural, political, and economic dimensions and internally rooted within the psychic of the person.

In contrast to Aristotelian vision of human nature, Freud and Hobbes that requirement of social life goes against the demands of human nature. Freud implied that social fabric is woven at the expense of feelings of self-condemnation, guilt, and repression owing from denial of desires. Life appears to him in the state of push and pull between consequences of collective behaviour and impulses of human nature. Pleasures compete and contest with each other and are secured only at the expense of each other. There is no integrated model of pleasure seeking behaviour to synchronise. Some are short-lived and some are long lasting. Some are qualitatively better than the rest.

According to Freud, all human beings engage in the desire to condemn the self followed by a conscious will to remain ignorant of it. It sometime surpasses the desire to be free of anxiety and the desire for real happiness. That is why in psychology the therapeutic treatments focus on to effect healing by bringing self-condemnation to the surface. However, it does not succeed anymore than does an effort to commit suicide by consciously resolving not to breathe.

The self-deception covering up the self-condemnation is unravelled rather involuntarily when a person faces events amounting to the sudden collapse of life. It is managed systematically during clinical therapy. It is part of many religious exercises. At these moments of truth, it becomes possible to reclaim part of the original self. Sometimes enormously painful losses and altogether dramatic surprising discovery of the new self accompany the self-discovery. Sometimes people experiencing such events consider it as a form of death and rebirth.

The moments, which enable a person to return to nature mostly, come by accident rather than design. In between, people are generally caught up in the mechanics of anxiety relief and become part of the problem. The suspension of the moral rules merely throws people more overtly into neurotic tendencies. Presumably, there might be therapeutic value in this, but for normal living, it is problematic.

The possibility of returning to the original nature, to the decency entails the possibility of real happiness. Healing secured by crushing the pretensions and deceptions of the self are undoubtedly rare, always partial. But it does happen, and when it does, it brings about a reunion of pleasure and function that is strictly analogous to the return of healthy functioning to a sick body. It is thus health, and it is thus virtue. It is also a very plausible way to                      of happiness.

The real implication of the harmony of self lies in the union of spontaneity and goodness as depicted in the Aristotelian conception that resembles to the Qur'anic conception to a great extent. The arguments in favour of harmony of self can be derived from Darwinian evolution, Freudian psychodynamics, the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle, and of course, common sense, in addition to Qur'anic teachings. The tradition of naturalistic bracket, too, requires such a harmony to be sought and achieved at the level of soul. If distortion takes place due to mental sickness than there is a psychodynamic explanation for it and a return to original nature is, at least partially, possible. To deny the whole process would be, in fact, excessively pessimistic and raises the fundamental question as to whether humans are emotionally inferior to other animals.

The notion of the harmony of self has been the focus of Western **thinking** on ethics even in the early Greek period. In that period, the ideal of virtue epitomised the ethical feelings and consciousness. When the classic idea of virtue was replaced by modern (post Enlightenment) usage of morality, the idea of harmony of self became a nontopic. Since then, the possibility of harmony of self has received very scarce attention both in the sciences and in philosophy. Hobbes, Rousseau, Freud, Nietzsche and Heidegger, all pioneers of modern philosophy, understand ethics through goodness alone. To them, pleasures have no relevance to social cohesion or ethical life. Society is built at the cost of fundamental repression. Virtue concerned with nuances of human character does not appear in the mainstream modern analysis.

Virtues are dispositions not only to act in particular ways, but also to feel in particular ways. To act virtuously is not, as Kant was later to think, to act against an inclination; it is to act from inclination formed by the cultivation of the virtues. Moral education is an 'education senti mentale'. Emphasising propriety, morality builds the attitude of self-righteousness and inflexibility.

### 8.2 Spontaneity

Spontaneity, an important element of the harmony of self has emerged in the contemporary literature on psychology. There are positive as well as negative connotations. On the negative side, spontaneous nature of humans suits the make-up of a consumer society. It has contempt for interpersonal standards and in the vacuity of the amiable nihilism that seems to have become dominant cultural coin. On the positive side, spontaneous nature has a lure of freedom and gratification. The key question, here, is whether one set of feelings (i.e., pleasures) might be more or less spontaneous or natural than another. Since it is taken for granted, the inclinations can be adjusted through social engineering or personal effort to whatever conception of virtue is adopted. Nevertheless, outside the existentialist adumbration of authenticity, there has not been much discussion of spontaneity in the contemporary philosophical literature of ethics. It is not discussed even in the recent literature on virtue ethics, which not inappropriately, redirects attention away from moral rules to questions of character, feeling, emotion, and pleasure.

In contemporary academic philosophy, the discussion on moral psychology is considered to be an intrusion of philosophy into the empirical side of psychology.

While in the empirical findings of psychology, moral considerations have been considered in a manner that is poisonously unscientific. Only recently has some scholars dared to suggest an overlap between moral values and psychological health in the literature of popular and humanistic psychology.

### 8.3 Aristotelian Version of Virtue

This section will focus on the Nicmachean Ethics in order to show that Aristotle's virtue clearly understands it as a union of spontaneity and goodness. It emerges as a harmony of affect and behaviour that elaborates primordial decency. This will prove that the harmony of the self is not an idea attractive only to dreamy romantics.

Ethics is about doing, praxis. Its business is to see how the job is done. It is not possible to learn ethics by intellectual effort only. Matters of praxis are learned in the realm of deeds. It might be easy to establish rough generalisations. But one cannot anticipate all exceptions and define new rules, so on, and so forth. For Aristotle, the rules of ethical life are no clearer and no more specific than the rules of any other kind of practical activity.

The available ethical rules have to be applied carefully and sensitively to particular cases. A couple of decades ago, the idea of situation ethics also carried some implications (Fletcher 1966). Ethical guidelines such as 'thou shalt not lie' is a fundamental ethical principle about which there can not be two opinions.

Nevertheless, it is a rough guide on many specific situations. More injunctions to resolve different cases would only add to more questions and more rules. In ethics as in any skill, the intellect operates syllogistically, subsuming particular cases under universal rules. The real problem is not to fit a rule on a problem but to fit a problem to the rule.

In complex life situations, humans judge without unambiguous guidance from rules. The knowledge of rules as well as ability to apply in varying situations are needed to resolve the human issues. The criteria for good performance and successful outcome are well recognised in skills but enormously complicated in ethics. There can be diverse opinions on successful performance from ethical point of view. One can learn skills by doing but cannot similarly learn ethics by practising how to tell truth and

lies. Humans need something to fill the gap between abstract rules and the particular circumstances of real-life situations to make concrete decision.

Aristotle in his writings appears to be very keen to explore the mediating cognitive mechanism between rules and situations. Wittgenstein in the modern times also discussed the same issue: how rules are to be applied when their key concepts signify only a net of family resemblance rather than a univocal idea. Aristotle speaks of rational cognitive faculty called 'practical wisdom', which guides about right and wrong in particular circumstances. It acts as a mediating medium involving the intersection between Plato's 'Being' (the force of fixed rules) and 'Becoming' (the flux of particular circumstances).

Aristotle identifies the need of a sort of perceptually sensitive intellect or an intellectual form of sense perception. He states that practical wisdom is more closely related to sense perception than to a stream of thought. Reasoning is a post decision activity to buttress the judgement coming out of the sense perception. To choose between the two options requires deliberation and deliberation about right and wrong is the outcome of practical wisdom. Aristotle **thinks** that there is a medium to act between intellect and sense perception to provide for practical syllogism (Timaeus 49a, 52b) once a choice has been made.

Though the presence of practical wisdom signifies the capacity to act rightly, it does ensure successful employment of practical reasoning so long as one has thought about the matter. The successful employment of practical reasoning requires appropriate desires. More clearly, the right affective structure of the soul in which the intellect is 'embodied'. Desires and intellect are so intertwined and enmeshed that it is difficult to figure out whether right choice is a result of reasoning influenced by moral desire or desire enlightened by reason. The question is that right actions are taken because of desiderative reason or ratiocinative desire. Here Aristotle tries to break down the sharp distinction between cognition and affect, as suggested by

Bumyeat (1980, p. 73) and Annas (1980). The power to make right choice by applying intellect depends on right desires and right character. Desires, thus, need to be in harmony with right action.

Aristotle was familiar with Socratic doctrine that virtue is knowledge that establishes only one-sided relationship between reason and reasoning (Bumyeat 1980, p. 70).

Inherent in the idea of virtue, emphasises Aristotle, is the need for harmony of self, because virtuous persons take pleasure in virtue and make it a habit. Through out his discussions on moral virtues, Aristotle makes it clear that actions and feelings (praxeis kai pathē) both are dispositions of virtues. To . . . virtue is knowledge as well as a feeling coming out of action. Feelings strengthen the actions and assure continuity to build habit and rule out deviations. Habits facilitate in fossilising the affects underlying formation of behaviour.

Virtue thus comes up as a blend of passion and reason, pleasures and pains, sense perception and actions. Moral education is required to cultivate the right passions and desires to realise harmony of self. The peculiar form of perception involved in practical reason could be nothing more than educated sentiment, the moral 'instincts' of a person. Aristotle was at least close to . . . g of cultivated affect as the thing that bridges the gap between general rules and concrete situations. Macintyre refers to the same as the 'education sentimentale.' Aristotle . . . that a good character, i.e., a virtuous configuration of pleasure and behaviour is a part of the moral reasoning from which ethical knowledge proceeds. The intellect alone is not sufficient for the achievement of virtue. One must be a virtuous person, i.e., have the right pleasures and pains and then one will know how to interpret the rules.

Aristotle is never bothered by the alleged 'vacuity' of his doctrine of the mean. For him all moral rules come down 'nothing in excess', or, in his own words, 'not too much and not too little.' He assures that whoever follows it will possess every virtue.

### 8.3.1 Habit and Nature

The harmony that Aristotle refers to does not exist by nature. It is an outcome of artistic endeavours of humans resulting from application of reason. This type of art cannot be branded as a creative force. Its purpose is to perfect the natural dispositions by imitating the nature. Morally speaking, basic human dispositions are indifferent. Reason imposes right rule on them. For example, architecturally speaking, wood is indifferent whether used in house or furniture. It is the carpenter's reason that imposes order. But one cannot say that wood is perfected by application of carpenter's reason. Neither it had an imperfect tendency to become a house nor it has some special fitness for it. The question in the case of human being is to find appropriate relation between nature and virtue.

Aristotle claims that virtue is fulfilment of human nature actually tries to strike a middle ground. In his view, the relationship between a human being and virtue is less natural than that between a seed and the mature plant, but closer than that between the wood and the house. This type of relationship is so commonsensical and subject to day to day verification. People become virtuous neither merely by being allowed to grow up nor by allowing others to impose rules.

A virtuous life should evolve out of ordering, conjoining, and perpetuation of the pleasures. Are pleasures naturally inclined towards virtue? If yes, then the pleasures can be naturally adapted to virtue and could be perfected by adaptation. There should also be some strong force facilitating and causing habituation for full realisation of the natural tendency towards virtue adaptation. Indeed, the more powerful an inclination is natural the less there will be the need for habituation.

The paucity of the Aristotelian model of human nature is nowhere more acute than at this conjecture. He does not answer these questions. He knew that despite adaptation to virtue, vice cannot be eliminated. He diverted his attention to animals to learn about their ways of learning and adaptation to the nature. The issues of

anxiety, transformation of pleasure, and unconscious roots of behaviour do not figure in his dialogue.

Due to teleological orientation, both Plato and Aristotle believed that happiness and pleasure must coincide with virtue. They also, thus, had a priori reason for believing in an original harmony of pleasure and function. Interestingly, both were somewhat little perplexed by the presence of indubitable empirical facts that virtue is often painful and vice pleasant. Although they could not formulate a response to this puzzle, it never caused them to lose faith in the basic harmony of the human psyche.

Plato does not drive a very strong wedge between pleasure and happiness to avoid giving pleasure a hedonistic tinge and happiness an unworldly touch. Taking the middle ground, Plato distinguished between true and false pleasures and identified happiness with only the true ones (583bff). Consequently, if the pleasures of vice can be shown false (584c) and the pleasures of virtue to be true, then the basic harmony of the soul could be established. The original harmony of the soul would then consist of a harmony of only the true pleasures with virtuous behaviour. False pleasures would only motivate vice and show that the vicious people could also be happy. The concatenation from virtue to true pleasure to true happiness can then be projected.

How did Plato explain this riddle? His worldview rests on the assumption that cosmos is created of goodness, ordered by good, and destined for goodness. He shows that just man in the Republic is happy. And so should be the virtuous man. These assumptions form the basis of complex metaphysical, epistemological, political and psychological structures of the dialogue in Book II of Socrates. Plato also distinguished between simple and pain-relieving pleasures. The simple pleasures were to be the true ones and the pain-relieving ones were called 'false,' or 'illusory.' He was convinced that pain-relieving pleasures are linked to the pleasures of body and vice while intellectual/aesthetic pleasures correspond to pure pleasure

and to virtue. To him, as if, art or philosophy could not serve the end of pain relief, and as if smelling a flower (his own example of a pure pleasure) were not a bodily pleasure.

He asked the right question but was misled in formulating an appropriate response to these. In general, there is no simple correspondence between pain relief and any specific behavioural arena. Certainly any life activity can be used to relieve pain, and in all probability there are pure (or nearly pure) pleasures connected with them all. In any case, even if eating and drinking were mere pain relief, they are certainly not vice since they are unquestionably a part of biological functioning – a part known as animal virtue which must be helpful in completing the total portrayal of human nature.

The weak logic by Plato relegated the subject of true and false pleasures into the backyard of philosophy. This did not, however, prevent Aristotle from adopting it wholesale. He too wonders why vice is pleasant and uses the notion of illness to explain it. The sick pleasures also called as disgraceful and unnatural, form at least a large part of the pleasures of vice. These pleasures interfere with the human inheritance of virtue and prevent it from reaching fruition on its own.

### 8.3.2 Theory of Mean

Aristotle has advanced Plato's psychology only by tacking onto it his theory of the mean. Excessive pleasure is rooted in excessive pain, which is seen as the cause of all vices. He speaks of pleasures of vice in terms of pain relief. Vice, for Aristotle, is some kind of pain relief. Where there is no pain relief, then, there is no excess, and where there is no excess, there is only moderation. In the discussions by Aristotle, it is clear that he did **think** of a basic set of pleasures that constitute virtue, the ones that are pleasant by nature. These are the pure pleasures, and they exist 'first.' A pain of some sort supervenes upon them, and the pleasure that comes from the relief of that pain causes an immoderate, excessive pleasure which distorts the original harmony

and so gives rise to the different sorts of vice. Vices then are distortions of the personality that push one into (or pull one away from) an arena of behaviour more than would otherwise have been the case. All excess and deficiency (and hence all vice) is thus a modification of the original or natural harmony of pleasure and virtue.

### 8.3.3 The Unconscious Origins

For Aristotle, wisdom in human affairs involves, at least in part, the ability to read the complexities of human motivation beneath the apparent simplicities of human behaviour. To an insensitive observer, the qualitative motivational difference between pain relief and simple pleasure (and hence between the psychodynamics of vice and virtue) appears as a merely quantitative behavioural difference between too much or too little. The critical difference is hidden, invisible to those who cannot read motives from actions.

Aristotle may even have been able to countenance the thought that the pain-relieving quality of vice is invisible to the person who feels it. At least he points out that people generally judge their own behaviour moderate and judge excess and defect in others on the basis of that assumption. Confined to the conscious nature, nobody would admit that his or her behaviour originates from the relief of pain that initially did not exist. This conundrum now leads to the unconscious origins of behaviour.

Aristotle, alas, left it for Freud to pursue it. Aristotle dreamt of a coincidence of spontaneous pleasure and virtuous behaviour and projected existence of the primitive harmony of pleasure and virtue. The configuration corresponds precisely to his realm of 'natural' pleasures and onwards to the original or pure pleasures of the Republic and Philebus.

Here one can not let go the astonishing congruence between the contemporary practice of psychic health and the classical idea of virtue. However, difficult to digest it may seem but the goal of therapy is nothing but rediscovery of the classical ethical ideals. Therapists busy themselves with the patients in an attempt to discover the

true-sell, surface the unconscious, make clients more acceptable socially and worthwhile productively. Thus, health and virtue are about the same thing. For both, there is an original harmony of pleasure and function, and for both of them a pain, the relief of which produces a distorting pleasure, disrupts this harmony. Aristotle was prejudiced against body and biased for reasons. In contrast, psychotherapists are prejudiced against values and biased for scientific determinism. Ancients had no clue to unconscious and anxiety while psychotherapists have no appreciation for soul. Approaches of cross-fertilisation would ostensibly enrich the both. A holistic view is in the best advantage of human nature. This should be acknowledged. Sometimes pushing forward brings the past into clearer focus, while at the same time ancient insight can help to broaden the tunnel vision of the moment.

### 8.4 Virtue Links Human Nature and Leadership

Qur'an uses several words to denote virtuosity. The first and the most frequently used word is *Taqwa* which means God consciousness and God fearing. It mentions this as the most important and the chief characteristic of the people who would be able to derive guidance from Qur'an, and who would be rewarded with paradise in the hereafter. *Taqwa* resides in the heart, the operational centre of the human personality. The working definition of *Taqwa* entails that the psyche of a believer would have *Taqwa* as the most powerful force active at the motivational nexus between cognitive and emotional channels. *Taqwa* acts as a screen from which only the virtue will come out as a motivation for the behaviour and the vice will be screened out. *Taqwa* is sheer pursuit of goodness, morality, uprightness, righteousness and alienation from evil, immorality, base, waywardness and corruption. At deeper level, *Taqwa* is a matter of wisdom and intellect, which cautions and warns when something against the wish of God is proposed by cognition or affection.

Qur'an has called *Taqwa* the best dress. A dress is not purely a part of the body but without which no one could live. It is necessary extension of the body. Dress gives protection to the body, becomes identity of the self, hides the body parts, marks out areas of privacy, increases beauty, reflects inner values and choices, shows the **thinking** and intention, helps in the job, provides comfort, and without which no one would consider a human being complete.

*Taqwa* has also been symbolised as the provision. Having God-consciousness as provision means that it is a necessary good that one has to take forward in the journey. Without provision, the journey cannot be completed. It is to be constantly used during the journey of the life. Qur'an also mentions that God does not accept the blood and flesh of the **Is** that people sacrifice, but instead assesses the degree of *Taqwani*, which governs the act of sacrifice.

Thus *Taqwa* emerges as containing almost all the essential concepts of virtue as mentioned by Aristotle and discussed before. People with *Taqwa* are self-controlled individuals who let the law of God rule them. *Taqwa* is dependent on and is the result of faith in God and adoration of Him (2:21). Qur'an says that it has been revealed to produce the attitude of *Taqwa* or moral righteousness (20:113). The discipline of prayers (2:238), fasting (2:183; 2:187), *zakat* (98:5) and *liqj* (2:197), have been prescribed, apart from other benefits, in order to promote and reinforce *Taqwa*.

Qur'an describes the characteristics of people as those who believe in God, the Last Day, the angels, the Books and the Messengers; who spend out of earnings in love for God, on kins, the orphans, the needy, the wayfarer and those who ransom the slaves; who are steadfast in prayers, pay the **alms**, fulfil contracts, firm and patient in pain and adversity and in periods of danger (2:177). Qur'an also says that it is the people of *Taqwani* are compassionate and loving to one another (48:29), they walk on earth in humility (25:63), and hold to forgiveness (7:199). Qur'an further says that to turn continually to God in repentance is the sign of a true believer (9:112), and that this

attitude of *nūn* is strengthened by remembrance of God for it keeps humankind firm and steadfast in the most difficult and odd circumstances (8:45).

The presence of *Taqwa* in people saves them from destruction (27:53;41:18), helps them maintain God's command in conjugal life (4:129), in social life (2:177), and assists them in faithfully fulfilling social obligations (25:63;25:74). The motive of people with *Taq'walz* is not self-interest, but seeking of good for its own sake (2:272), for which they may even sacrifice their lives (2:207). The aim of such people is mainly a desire for increase in self-purification without any idea of winning favour from any one or expecting any reward whatsoever (92:18;92:21). When in power they enjoin the right and forbid the wrong (22:41). Qur'an further says that people of *Taq'wall* stand firmly for justice even if it goes against themselves, their parents, their kith and kin; that they perform that duty without any distinction of rich and poor (4:135).

Another characteristic of the righteous is their search for knowledge. They not only celebrate the praise of God, standing, sitting, and lying down on their sides, but also contemplate and ponder over the phenomena of nature (3:191).

Qur'an notes three degrees of *Taq'wah*. *Ilzsan* is the highest degree of *Taq'wali*.

According to the Qur'an, performance of righteous actions accompanied by a true faith is only a stage in the moral life of *Inan* which, after several stages, gradually matures into *Ihsan* (5:96). *Ihsan* signifies performance of moral action in conformity with the moral ideal with the added sense of deep loyalty to the cause of God, done in the most graceful way that is motivated by a profound love for God. Thus, individuals characterised by *Ilzsan* perform moral action with an attitude of deep loyalty tinged with an emotional response of love towards God. These people submit their whole self to the will of God and, moreover, do it gracefully and with a spirit of dedication. Qur'an says that the sincerely devoted people are those who willingly suffer thirst, fatigue, or hunger in the cause of God (29:69), or tread paths which may raise the ire of the unbelievers, or receive injury from an enemy (9:120); who do not

conduct themselves in life so as to cause mischief on the earth but call on Him with fear and longing (7:56).

The Qur'an further describes the characteristic by pointing out that they spend of their substance in the cause of God, refrain from evil, and are engaged in doing truly good deeds (2:195); who spend freely in the way of God both in prosperity and in adversity; who restrain anger and pardon all men (11:115; 12:90); and exercise restraint (16:128); who establish regular prayer and pay the alms and have in their hearts the assurance of the Hereafter (31:4); and who are always ready to forgive people and overlook their misdeeds (5:14). Another characteristic is that they are not only on the right path themselves (6:84), but also by their good example and magnetic personality lead others to the way of righteousness and help in establishing a social order based on peace, harmony and security (2:193; 3:104; 3:110).

## 8.5 Ghazali on Virtues and Vices

Ghazali has made various divisions of virtues and vices. They seem to rest on two basis. Firstly, virtues and vices relating to actions and classified not on a religious but on a psychological basis. Secondly, virtues and vices relating to the heart and determined by the attitude of the soul towards God. According to Ghazali, the love of this world and of the self and absence of love and fear of God are the roots of all the vices of the heart. Similarly, love or fear of God and absence of the love of self or of this world is the source of all virtues.

The love of this world is the root of all vices. Qur'an also notes that moral decay and corruption prevails upon people when they prefer this world to the next world.

Ghazali classifies vices into four kinds. First, the vices related to the physical organs of the body. Second, vices related to the attitude and character like anger, malice, and envy. Third, vices that are perceived by man deliberately like pride, vanity, love for wealth and love for position. Finally, there are vices which are consciously committed but, at times, the individual is unaware of it, like hypocrisy, vanity, etc.

From the point *of* view *of* functions, virtues are also classified into four groups: (1) virtues connected with worldly things, such as repentance, poverty, patience; (2) virtues related to the present state *of* the heart; (3) virtues connected with singleness *of* purpose e.g., intention, sincerity and truthfulness; (4) virtues concerning the relations between human being and God.

Ghazali believed that fundamental elements in the inner constitution *of* man are reason or wisdom, self-assertion, and appetite. In a good character, he believes, these elements must work together in harmony. Justice directs these elements to observe the golden mean in which each is blended in the correct proportion. When self-assertion and appetite develop in excess and get out *of* control, they easily exploit knowledge. The best course for self-assertion and appetite is to remain in subservience to wisdom and reason. Their right development produces qualities that are conducive to the spiritual progress *of* the self while their excess or deficiency produces traits, which hinder and frustrate its growth. It is knowledge, which makes possible the right use *of* all qualities in a human being. Ignorance is sickness. Knowledge is cure, Knowledge serves a twofold purpose. It is, firstly, an apprehension *of* objects and their significance, and secondly, a guide to conduct.

Ghazali classified diseases into two categories: organic and functional. Organic diseases are physical and can be treated moderately. Functional disorders are caused due to ignorance and lead to deviation from God. These are, more harmful than the organic diseases. Ghazali enumerates various modes *of* spiritual diseases and their methods *of* treatment. Some *of* these are:

1. **Being Caught in Own Desires:** A human being becomes his own measure and sets aside all norms to achieve self-centred goals. He distorts reality and ignores the others.

2. Malice: A person considers that he would live forever. Therefore, he is addicted to wealth, status and fame. This brings him into clash with the world.
3. Ignorance: When ignorance darkens the self, the person's progress toward perfection is thwarted. This disease is the enemy of reason and opposite of knowledge and is very fatal.
4. Cowardice: This also a spiritual disease. This ignorance is inward while cowardice is outward reflection.
5. Cruelty: A Person in ignorance becomes usurper of the rights of others.
6. Lust: His desires become his god and he cuts himself off from the light of virtue. He is led astray by his desires and deviates from the path of rightness because he is opposed to guidance (instruction). The patient in this situation sees that *Qalb* is screened from virtue it loses its potential, becomes atrophied, and complacently adheres to his own judgement
7. Melancholia: This disease is caused in the *Qalb* from doubt about the path of righteousness. Evil and false suspicions support it. This disease causes chaotic misgivings in the *Qalb*, such as, infection of mind with melancholia. Often this misgiving affects the *Qalb* from outside also and sometimes they arise from within the *Qalb*. This results in the domination of the evil spirit and the patient loses his insight and is lost in the chaos (bizarre) of his desires.
8. Malevolence :denying the blessings of God, lack of abstinence and domination of ignorance causes this disease. In this disease the *Qalb* develops propensities to excesses and loses the sense of balance. Excess is as much a hindrance to any activity as flow or deficiency. Due to excess man is lost in absurdities. Its cure will be to inculcate habit of balanced g.

9. Calumny: This disease infects both the precepts and the acts. Its root is in the desire for the unhealthy and depends upon one's own judgement. Such a man becomes aggressive which ultimately destroys him and blocks his progress to the right path.
10. Envy: This is a fatal disease. It destroys the jealous person himself. It eats into the *Qalb* as injury does into the body. It spreads like leprosy. It defies all cures and its root is ignorance in which the patient is seized by the object of his jealousy that lives in comfort and blessings. The jealous person feels very uneasy and gets highly irritated. He enjoys neither food nor drink, is ever tortured by jealousy, and is often consumed by it. Its cure is possible only through total submission to the will of God and acceptance of the destiny.
11. Deceit: This is a serious spiritual disease. Its inherent cause is jealousy when the heart is infected with the love of worldly glamour. The patient becomes jealous of other's prosperity and happiness. Ignorance and lack of insight cause this irritating disease and its cure is to rest in providence and to submit to destiny.
12. Avarice: It is a miserable spiritual disease. Greed obliterates faith from the *Qalb*. Greed spoils mutual relationship and the greedy covets the things of his friends. The real root of greed is ignorance and stupidity. Its cure is contentment and avoidance of the objects of greed. Worldly comforts should not be overemphasised and the attitude of indulgence renounced. Its remedy is not to cover what belongs to others. Appetite, anger and intellect are basic to all other powers of the self. These basic powers have their origin in certain principles in the nature of the self. Appetite is derived from the beastly (*al-bahimiyyah*), anger from the ferocious (*al-sabliyah*) and intellect from the divine (*al-rabbaniyyah*).

There are six powers included in the self of man, *viz.*, appetite, anger, impulse, apprehension, intellect and will. Appetite, anger and intellect are basic to all other powers of the self on which depends the occurrence of impulse, apprehension and will.

These basic powers have their origin in certain principles of the nature of man. Intellect, being the fundamental rational faculty in man, enables him to generalize and form concepts. Appetite is derived from the beastly (*al-baliimiyya*), anger from the ferocity (*as-saliyya*) and intellect forms the basis of *Aql*. Compared to these six powers of man, animals have only three powers: appetite, anger and apprehension. It is the presence of intellect and will in man that differentiate man from animals. The last mentioned power is distinguished from that which rebels against the intellect, i.e., the satanic (*ash-shaytaniyya*). Thus there are, according to Ghazali, four elements in the nature of man: The sage, the pig, the dog, and the devil. The sage in him is the *Aql*, the pig is *ash-shaha* (or his lust and gluttony) the dog is *al-gliadab* (or anger and ferocity), and devil is the brute which incites these two animals to rebel against *Aql*. Individuals possess these powers in different proportions.

### 8.6 Implications of Moral Conceptions

The moral conception of human nature reigned supreme one way or the other till the dawn of enlightenment period. The emergence of scientific tradition initiated a new school of thought based on therapeutic inquiry. The conflict became intense in post-Freudian period, especially in the areas of sexual freedom, abortion and divorce, responsibility and conscience. Scientific reductionism drifted the mind away from the moral conception of human as free and responsible agent. Freud replaced traditional notion of conscience into the internalised voice of semi-tyrannical paternal authority.

Another blow faced by traditional knowledge was redefinition by science of what is knowledge and what it is not. Highly selected view of science require that concepts

and constructs resulting from strictly defined methodology could be authenticated as knowledge. Thus, traditional moral knowledge was simply ruled out of the realm of knowledge, as it was too vague. Given the vacuum, first scientific morality ushered mainly based on Kantian and utilitarian views. Now lately, due to failure and imitations of these schools, philosophies based on relativism and/or nihilism have gained considerable ground. The recent surge in the interest in new age sciences has turned the attention again toward reunion of health and virtue toward achievement of happiness.

There are many implications of the surge of interest. Firstly, reunion is embedded in the notion of freedom versus determinism. Secondly, it gives rise to a very traditional notion of conscience. Thirdly, it also shows why ethical knowledge that is verifiable at interpersonal level does not lend itself to be disproved or proved by an impersonal or scientific methodology. One can also find from it a clear and cogent explanation of why, as the tradition knew but could not explain, practically useful ethical knowledge cannot be rendered demonstrable by any impersonal methodology. An explanation that at the same time explains why this fact ought not to be taken to disprove the genuinely interpersonal validity of ethical truths.

As a consequence, of discussion on these issues, the historical hostility between psychotherapy and ethics will be mitigated. Psychoanalytic theory can be gainfully employed to explain realities, which were unintelligible for Plato and Aristotle. It is necessary to reaffirm values and resurrect virtues during the process of self-development otherwise, it will be reduced to an immoral technology. Similarly, the ancient theories are neither effective nor complete. The psychodynamic deepening of harmony, democratisation of virtue, and de-technologisation of therapy are the great benefits that follow from the reunion. There is a potential of building a new framework of life if somehow psychology could be made to accept values and ethics, the transformation of virtue into morality by the reunion of health and virtue.

A review and contrast of Aristotelian and Qur'anic view of virtue shows great similarity in this basic ideal of human character. More cross-fertilisation along the same lines may reveal further correlations. Thus, a new paradigm needs to be revived under the title of science of virtue, which can potentially resolve the unsolved problems facing philosophy and psychology.

### 8.7 Union of Spirit and God

Qur'an suggests that the normal behaviour for humankind is closeness to God through integration with the creation of God whether human or non-human.

Normality and abnormality or health and disease, pleasures and pains are not seen as dichotomy. Each individual possesses a mix of these and at various states having various shades of blend.

It is clear from preceding discussion on spirit that it has come from God, and God gave it. Within humans, it is a sign of God. God is the Sovereign Power, the Supreme Ruler, and the Lord. As such, the spirit makes humankind too, a symbol of power and rule within its own jurisdiction. The natural course of harmony would require it to be rooted in total union with God. Spirit in union with God implies that the human self is founded in the place where its origins belong. Any attempt to separate the human spirit from union with God generates spurious identification, dichotomies, and psychological conflicts.

Qur'an insists on union of God and human in several ways. It says that God is closer to human than their jugular vein. God tells Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) if His servants inquire about Him then Muhammad (pbuh) should tell them that God is very close and that He listens and accepts whatever the servants say in prayers. God also orders that prostrate to get closer to Him. He says that He is so aware that He knows what is in the heart and hears all the whispers.

The *Sufi* doctrine enunciates that real knowledge is not information or a set of hypotheses but a knowledge in which the knowledge seekers and the object of knowledge are united. Knowledge and being are one. The relationship between human beings and between human beings and nature is harmonious to the extent that union between human spirit and God is achieved.

The basic norm of psychic health, too, therefore, depends upon closeness to God. Faith in the oneness of God symbolises not only unity of personality but also communion with nature. This is not simply a notion limited to the realm of inner feeling accruing from meditation. The real impact of this *taqwa* can be seen in the approach to scientific research and explorations taken under secular conditions in contrast to those taken under God-conscious conditions. In the first case, nature becomes enemy to be conquered and alien people become object to be colonised and bonded. In the second situation, attempt is made to derive maximum benefits for humanity, resources are utilised efficiently, and human civilisation reaps positive rewards (Ajmal 1968).

### 8.7.1 States and Sources

Ghazali mentions that union between God and human can be achieved and maintained through knowledge and will. Knowledge is acquired through followership, contemplation, reasoning, and intuition. The yearning for knowledge is not a superimposed task on the self, but it originates in humans and enables them to partake in Divine relations.

The eternal knowledge is about the truth (HAQ). Perfect knowledge (*ilm-e-kamil*) is possessed only by God. Thus the more one's knowledge is true and perfect the closer one gets to God. The knowledge about qualities and actions of God provides not only orientation for the role of vicegerent but also balances the mental frame of mind. It lends motivational energies to the heart and builds the personality of vicegerent in the right mould.

Ghazali believes that happiness, too, is an outcome of this knowledge. The ultimate form of happiness that a person can achieve is only if the person makes God happier by his deeds. The happiness that comes to the individual who has made God happy cannot be estimated. This acts as the most powerful motivational force for the vicegerent. Put simply, what could be more motivating and stimulating for a vicegerent than the fact that the God Who has appointed the person as vicegerent is happy. The source of happiness is the Personhood of God. Those making Him happy would definitely be in turn made happier by God. Qur'an asserts that believers do good for the sake of the face of God. The face of a person radiates the real impressions and inner sentiments. The eternal happiness of vicegerents is contingent upon their working for the real pleasure, i.e., pleasure of God.

The notion of consummate soul is also related to the union of God. A soul who is consummate, has actually earned the best of the pleasures of God.

The union with God can be classified into one of the three states. The first state is deliberate state in which conscious intentions are needed at every moment to turn the self towards God. The second state is spontaneous state in which a person maintains union subconsciously and is able to relate the self continuously with God. The third state is that of union in which a person totally aligns self in the image of the attributes of God. In this state, love of God becomes supreme and independent for a person and the person is extreme in his love for God. These states represent various degrees to which a person realises the unity of God in his consciousness. These states are transcendental and can only be achieved through acquisition of right knowledge and proper exercise of will.

Ghazali points out that union between God and human begins and flourishes on the grounds of gratitude. The creation of the self, accent to the position of vicegerent, blessings and bounties showered by Him, opportunities to achieve excellence and success are all signs of the immense Mercy of God. The emotion of gratitude and

thankfulness invoke deep passions and love for God. It inspires the heart and mind, soul and body. The first consequence of gratitude is that all things given by him should be used according to His pleasure for continuation and increment as well as for realisation of the highest state of nearness to God.

Qur'an states that sole aim of humankind is to intensify the love for God. Love is the paramount emotion governing the conduct and deeds. Qur'an seeks to restrict the love for God alone and the love of humanity and possessions to come within that umbrella. The dedication of this paramount emotion within human nature to God signifies achievement of the union.

### 8.7.2 Prayer as Enabler

Prayers call for formal attendance in the presence of God. It establishes highly personal communication with God and is perhaps the only way in which humankind can relate itself to God. Worship, according to Qur'an is remembrance and prayers to God.

Given the extent of freedom of will to humankind, prayers play an important role in keeping the exercise of the freedom within limits. Prayer is a symbolic gesture of remembering the relationship with God and strengthening it further. It indicates the voluntary will to surrender the freedom back to God's will. In view of the incident of Adam, it was important to require humankind to adopt a system of not merely a few rituals but also which could provide frequent interjections of freshness and remembrance for continuity of faith and assurance of right conduct.

Prayers have significant affects on spirit, heart, mind, soul, and body of the person. It involves the total self and enriches all elements of the self. The harmony of human nature depends upon the communion between all parts of the self. Prayers are the only way in which humankind activates communion among all parts at the same time that relationship with God is established.

Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) considered prayers (*salat*) like a climax or zenith for a believer. Spirit is the highest and noblest of all elements in the human self. Prayers provide that spirit an opportunity to once again relate itself to the One who originally breathed it. For mind, it is a dialogue and an attempt at remembrance. For heart, prayer is a spiritual therapy. It purifies the heart, washes the black spots emerging due to the sin, opens its ways toward Divine guidance, and make it evermore mindful of God. Prayers directly contribute toward enabling the commanding soul to command good, the reproachful soul to strengthen its criticism of bad, and give rise to the consubstantial soul. Thanvi recommends prayers as a form of spiritual therapy. A persistent attempt should result into spiritual transformation (Ajmal 77). Counting events, he holds that formal prayer is of profound psychological value for mental patients. As a universal phenomenon in Christian as well as Islamic faith, people realise certain psychological benefits from prayers. Prayers relieve depression, increase happiness, provide solace in grief, and support in crises. This is the effect of getting closer to the most Powerful, All Merciful, Most Compassionate, All Hearing, and All-Seeing Entity, Who is also the Creator and to Whom humanans have to return. By the feeling of relationship with God, the mental sufferings are suspended. Disadvantages become advantages. This produces relaxation, which is necessary for the cure of the mentally ill.

Qur'an points out that praying is a natural and instinctive response of hu **mankind** in times of need. Qur'an draws the attention toward peak experiences such as when a boat in the middle of seas is stuck in storm or when life is threatened. Qur'an asks who do people pray at those times. It also mentions that people turn to God in times of needs and danger, and they turn back when they are relieved.

The defensive mechanism of prayers is only a by product of the activity. The real benefit lies in liberation of the human spirit. By putting all hopes into One, trusting on His judgement, seeking His help, hu **mankind** can expand horizons, feel independent, and gather tremendous motivational energies. Prayer cures human

frailties and is a backup to human weaknesses. It unlocks the human potential, elevates it toward excellence, and helps it in attaining commitment and concentration. It disciplines the human nature.

Thanvi further notes that prayer is the most profound activity possible for the individual, since it reaches the depth of personality and organizes its motives, urges, needs, and pursuits. Maudoodi states that praying potentiates the power of human beings, causes enforcement of group integration and team work, results in facilitating the role of adjustment of the super-ego in dealing with reality and binds the person with community. It is an avenue to get a more intimate knowledge of the ultimate truth and association with the object of pursuit. Human beings become merged with the infinite reality, the Ultimate ego and personally experience closeness with God. The means through which this association is achieved is the act of worship or prayer ending in spiritual illumination.

## CHAPTER 9.0

### HARMONY DRIVEN MOTIVATION

Motivation is generally assumed to consist of two elements: affect and cognition.

Affective or emotional elements provide the psychic energy to act as the motive force while cognition helps in knowing how to aim itself.

Freud championed the affective element of the motivation. He pointed out that the problem of motivated ignorance (i.e., the unconscious) indicates that the locus of the problem is not in any kind of simple miscognition or lack of skill, but in the affect, that wills it. The Szasz viewed mental-health problems as translation problems and the therapist as a kind of language instructor, this way of viewing the matter essentially turns illness into simple ignorance and therapy into straightforward cognitive development and education. Socrates insisted that all behavioural error is really ignorance, and therapy may really boil down to some form of intellectual quest. There is good reason, therefore, to limit the definition of motivation to precisely this area of intersection between affect and cognition.

It is difficult to untangle the ultimate relations of affect and cognition in any concrete motivation. It seems always possible to hypothesise affect behind (mis)cognition and (mis)cognition behind affect until ultimately one reaches the Socratic view that since everyone desires his own happiness, all self-defeating behaviour must be some sort of miscognition. If a person forgets his duty, it at first appears a simple error of memory, a kind of miscognition. But dissatisfaction with the job could well lie beneath the forgetting, which is a matter of the affect. Moreover, the fact that the dissatisfaction remains unacknowledged (or unconscious) again makes the problem one of cognition. This specific miscognition represents the failure to acknowledge one's own emotions, and miscognition or blocked cognition of this kind are generally understood to be governed by a fear of facing the presumed truth, which reinstates

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the primacy of emotion. But then this fear seems to be rooted in the belief that a person will be better off not knowing the truth about himself or herself which is again a matter of cognition. And so on so forth.

The theoretical framework of motivation would focus on the general behaviour of the person insofar as that behaviour is understood to have its origins in motivations that arise from the area of intersection between cognition and affect. Whether cognition or affect or a blend of both is the ultimate cause is a question that can be left open here, just as the question of the ultimate relation of mind and body.

### 9.1 Pleasures and Pains

The inner person consists of pleasure, pain, feeling, desire, enjoyment, emotion, drive, instinct, libido all that moves humans while the outer self consists of actions and behaviour. What is assumed in a healthy self is that pleasures and pains in the inner self are adapted to the behaviour. In discussion on healthy body, it was concluded that the healthy functioning of organs is more enjoyable than the alternative. Similarly, healthy behaviour is more enjoyable than its dysfunctional counterpart. What also follows is that a life rich in positive pleasures and a healthy functional life are very much the same.

The naturalistic bracket assumes that the entire physical and psychological body conforms to the health requirements. Just as the behaviour is adapted to reproduction, the motivation (which also gives rise to the behaviour) is also adapted to behaviour. The inner and the outer selves are governed by the consequences of nature. The adaptability to the nature is more important than mere conformity to the right way the healthy way.

Abraham Maslow and others who **think** that behaviour adapts to the motivation seriously question the naturalistic **thinking**. That is outer self is an outgrowth of the



inner self. The power of self-determination is not subdued to the nature or evolutionary pressures.

One thing that is common between naturalistic assumptions and Islam is that in the arena of motivation too that harmony should be taken as a priori. It must exist. However, in practical life, it is often seen that the functional behaviour (work or love) is painful and dysfunctional behaviour is more enjoyable. It might be easy to digest the primordial harmony between pleasure and function at some times or most times but a permanent harmony is difficult to achieve. It very well seems to be negated by realistic assessment of human existence, too (Sidgwick 1874, p. 191). The task, therefore, is to explain the disparity between theoretical construction and observed fact. The notion of mental illness in the realm of psychology can help explain how it is possible for functional behaviour to be painful and dysfunctional to be pleasurable.

### 9.1.1 Pleasures

The word pleasure is used to represent the positive feelings of the inner self. These feelings incline humans to engage in behaviour rather than avoid it. It is very difficult to describe and discriminate the subtle and highly nuanced terms such as emotions, urges, instincts, and feelings. What is common between all of these is rather easy to agree upon (Brandt 1959, p. 305; Edwards 1975, p. 273). Pleasure is more known for sensual, localisable, positive feelings and is generally assumed to be different from satisfaction which conveys such positive feelings as self-righteousness, self-respect, and aesthetic delight, etc., (Nowell-Smith 1984, p. 138-9). The word enjoyment and satisfaction is subject to much less misunderstanding but are avoided. One problem with pleasure is that it lacks of hedonism, the psychological counterpart of materialism, if interpreted in narrowest and sensual sense. Naturalist tradition considers these pleasures as the motives for the basic behaviour that is required by life and reproduction. The theory of psychic health rests on harmony of pleasure and pain with behavioural function.

A preference for chocolate is quite unlike a preference taste for the sweetness of revenge. Though it may be a metaphorical extension of the term 'taste,' it is sort of a category mistake to view all pleasures in this way. To prefer sweetness of revenge or forgiveness describes a lot about the moral essence of human behaviour. Even aesthetic pleasures such as a preference for marbles over sandstone or white over red are also matters of character. Aristotle knew well that the moral constitution of a person is shown precisely by the constitution of his or her pleasures.

It is simply inaccurate to view such judgements as though they were mere matters of personal orientations. If it is difficult to appropriately differentiate between pleasures of child abuse and the pleasures of love, and between pleasure of work and the pleasure to sit idle, then it will be impossible to understand what is good or bad in human life, and more so, to figure out what is health and what is illness.

Despite the absolute centrality of pleasure in humankind and its significance in shaping the human behaviour, the vocabulary for its description remains feeble and the empirical studies confused. The simple word of pleasure encompasses all kinds of pleasures from that of intellect and art to sex and food, from wildest lust to the mildest flicker of arousal and from ulterior to altruist actions. There is no generally accepted scheme of classification in literature.

The word pleasure badly suffers from paradigmatic fixation to the sensual pleasure. The pleasure of generosity versus the pleasure of miserliness is at par with the pleasure of chocolate ice cream, versus the pleasure of vanilla. All pleasures understood as matters of taste led to a very popular, very tolerant, and very superficial brand of moral relativism. Even Kantians tend to take this view of pleasure, but only because they wish to put morality on a non-psychological foundation. More importantly, the absence of qualitative distinctions between pleasures helped in making psychology quite irrelevant to the moral feeling. Few in philosophy today take the matter of pleasure seriously despite the general agreement

on an enormous phenomenal qualitative difference between the sweetness of ice cream and the sweetness of revenge.

Only the philosophical hedonism took pleasure seriously and tried to relate pleasure with real life. Thus Mill (1863, ch. ii) classified pleasures into two types: lower and higher. The former associated with the body and the latter with the mind. The distinction does not quite hold itself because of its semantic inadequacy as well as due to the fact that under the utilitarian principle, one pleasure is to be preferred to another only because of its quantitative superiority (Sidgwick 1874, p. 94; Moore 1903, p. 50; Quinton 1973, p. 42). Francis Hutcheson (1755) offered a subtle frame for discriminating among pleasures. This also gives a basis to account for varying degree of morality underlying the different planes of pleasures. He distinguished between (1) pleasures of the external senses; (2) the pleasures of the imagination... and of beauty and harmony and knowledge, i.e., Mill's higher pleasures; (3) the pleasures of sympathy, i.e., pleasure in another's pleasure; and (4) pleasures that arise from the consciousness of good affections and actions, i.e., respect and/or admiration. The higher pleasures are said to be both quantitatively and qualitatively superior. The judgement of qualitative superiority is supposed to be made by a knowledgeable person who has personally experienced the relevant pleasures (Strasser 1987). However, no method offering ways to discriminate types of pleasures became popular. The utilitarians have settled for the merely quantitative distinctions envisioned by Bentham—the better pleasure being quite simply the greater, all things considered, and however exactly greatness is to be measured. Currently the task of making qualitative distinctions between pleasures is not being given any attention. One reason being that differences in pleasure were generally treated as differences in taste.

Beyond the intersection of cognition and affection, the motivational mechanisms take one of the two shapes: the pursuit of pleasure and the relief of pain. The overall condition of harmony of self encompasses the harmony between motivation and

behaviour. That primordial harmony does exist at least for the most basic behavioural arenas-for eating, drinking, sleeping, sex, speech, and play, has been appropriately substantiated by empirical evidence (Weiner 1994). In other complicated arenas of behaviour, the empirical evidence is less clear. For many people, productive labour is a source of deep satisfaction. So is the case of all kinds of altruistic acts, which are most pleasing to many of those who are involved in them.

### 9.12 Pains

The presupposition of the harmony of spirit, soul, mind, and body, whether recognised or unrecognised, exist wherever ordinary tasks of living are taken for granted as pleasant, satisfying, and enjoyable. This does also include the possibility that pain coming from disciplining the behaviour will be accepted in return of anticipation of higher pleasures. From the point of view of adaptive capability, the motivation by relief of pain is more critical than the motivation by pursuit of pleasure. Therefore, the harmony between pleasure and behavioural function is focused.

The motivational power of pain relief, often times, influences more urgently and overwhelmingly than that of pursuit of pleasure (Sidgwick 1874, p.46). This becomes clear when people snatch their hands from the fire or when loneliness forces people into social life. The same is true for having a mild desire for a glass of water in contrast to the true thirst; the simple pleasure of drinking versus the painful need for it after long jogging under sun.

The pursuit of pleasure motivates people toward healthy activity. When it fails, the relief of pain takes over if the matter is urgent to accomplish its 'as if' goal. Not unsurprisingly, it has been found that motivation for relief of pain can also induce people to sacrifice simple pleasures. In pain people feel a condition of unrelenting insistence that is void in the pursuit of pleasure.

The motivation of pain relief, the sacrifice of pleasure for pain relief, the simultaneous motives of pleasure and pain relief, the pain increases as consequence of pursuit of pleasure, all of these utterly complicate the concept of harmony of the soul. People invest in education to prepare for work. Work brings more pains, decreases some pains, takes some pleasure, and adds some other pleasures. Thus, work becomes a mixture of plight and delight. Same can be said about marriage, social relations, and so on. Such is the fact that all perfectly functional behaviours are consequence of mutually contradictory sources of motivation. The notion of unidirectional motivational force such as harmony of pleasure and function does not appear to be able to hold itself in practical life.

### 9.1.3 Shifting Configuration

The complex configuration of behaviour and motivation arises out of the relatively simple notion of harmony between motivation and function. What follows is that a dynamic theory of management of pleasures is needed to govern the changing and complex configuration of motivational factors. Also needed is a theory of transformation and change and a basis for categorisation of factors into pain and pleasures.

Thus, pleasures can be categorised qualitatively into two broad kinds, the simple or pure pleasures and those coming from the relief of pain. Plato and Aristotle noted that, quantitatively, greatest pleasures would probably be the simple, pain-relieving sort. Contrary to the tradition, however, the pure pleasures are not necessarily the same as the so-called higher pleasures.

The transformation occurs when a sufficiently intense pain appears on the scene, behaviour that relieves it will be experienced as pleasure even if that behaviour requires the suppression of behaviour that would otherwise be experienced as pleasant. This can be taken as the basic psychodynamic mechanism through which to

understand how the original harmony of the self gives rise to the discordance that characterise most unharmonious lives.

The action by a sailor who throws his treasures in the ship into the sea to lighten the ship facing storm may be called as sign of illness (dyspropertia or frenzied asceticism or Inasochism) by those not understanding the situation. But the fear of sinking and death alters the normal configuration of pleasures and pains. What could be painful becomes pleasure because it relieves pain, a different form of pleasure. We already noted that the relief of a sufficiently intense pain takes priority over the pursuit of simple pleasure. Also that the relief of pain is experienced as pleasure.

However, as apparent in the case of sailor, the alterations are necessitated by changes in environment, not in the person. The natural environment could change in ways more permanent than the onset of a storm at sea. Perhaps the ultimate contribution of the ecology movement will come not in merely cleaning up the environment, but in revealing how and at what cost to the original configuration of pleasures the humankind has come to live in environments other than those to which it has adapted. The sickness here, however, is not so much in the individual as in his or her relation to the environment and can be cured only by a return to the original environment or a full adaptation to the new one. The return is often impossible, and true adaptation requires the passing of many generations, so that a truly satisfactory solution is usually impossible. Since true health is impossible in such circumstances, medical practice must concentrate instead on working out the least debilitating compromise.

Essentially, the same thing can happen when the social environment changes. Moral, penal, economic, or technological changes can make painful the very behaviour that constitutes natural functions. New and unusual behaviour can then arise to relieve these pains, and with it come new and unusual pleasures. This can be unintended, as when, no doubt, the invention of agriculture and real estate dislocated the original

configuration of pleasure, work, cooperation, possession and land. It can also be deliberate, as when the threat of punishment (i.e., pain) is used to make unpleasant any more or less natural activity – singing and dancing, for example, or various forms of sexuality, or the eating of meat. More subtly, overpopulation and the change in the status of children from economic assets to liabilities have done this, to some extent, for the basic human urge to procreate. Progressives urge to adapt to new circumstances and tend to minimize the psychological cost. Conservatives fear the cost and urge to cling to the old adaptations.

The decision as to how such matters are best handled requires true political wisdom, and no blanket rule is possible. Given that present day environment is so far removed from the original conditions of human existence, further technical or social innovations may actually move humankind farther from natural functioning.

Everything depends on the hard-to-discern specifics of each and every case.

Nevertheless, if there is a sickness here, it is again not the individual who is sick, it is the society as a whole. The individual merely does his best to cope with a social environment for which he or she was not made.

### 9.1.4 Motivational Problems

The naturalist bracket presupposes original natural environment and basic structure of hunter-gatherer social forms. The original harmony of pleasure and behavioural function is then assumed to have been set by natural selection for human beings. The problems occur when the activities cease to be pleasant or when they become painful.

All of those theories of mental illness that have sought to take the onus off the individual and place it on society instead (Laing 1967, and the entire systems theory approach to mental illness) take off from this particular predicament. There is nothing wrong with this so long as the very possibility of individualised illness is not precluded. There most certainly are distortions of the harmony of the soul that are

properly considered social, and much that has been called 'alienation' is of this sort. However, recognition of this fact does not rule out the possibility that there are also illnesses whose locus is more truly in the individual.

What then makes the behaviour dysfunctional or motivation sick? Usage of the word sick to mean that the thing designated 'sick' is the thing that ought to change in order to bring about a return to health. In this regard, the locus of the originating cause is less important than the locus of therapy. In the cases already considered, only an alteration of the environment can restore real health. Therefore, the individual should be considered essentially healthy as long as he or she would be able to return to normal functioning if returned to the original environment. If, however, a person is so much altered that even after the restoration of the original environment, the dysfunctional condition continues, then the person should be called ill and must go through some kind of therapy.

How can it happen that the individual comes to carry the cause of the transformation within himself, as part of himself, even if the first cause of the whole problem was in the environment? In essence, that is the question which, Freud tried to answer, and it is the question answered by all the in-depth psychology that is based on his general psychodynamic conceptions. This is presumably not the only possible answer. Still, it is the one that has become so typical, has assumed a lot of importance, and is somewhat fruitful for understanding the subtleties of human motivation.

### 9.15 Faith as Motivational Force

Basic to the nature of man in Islam is the intention (*niyyah*) as critical to the performance not only of rituals but also of other overt and covert activities. The sincerity of motive in every type of action has a high premium in Islamic thought and action. The Qur'an stresses this in many references, two of which are:

"And they were commanded not, but they should worship God, and worship none but Him Alone, and perform As-Salat and give Zakat, and that is the right religion." (Qur'an 98:5)

"Say (O Muhammad bpuh): weather you hide what is in your breasts or reveal it, God knows it." (Qur'an 3:29)

In sum, these factors contribute to the reality that underlay humankind's creative ability. Qutb (1973, p. 25 - 7) states, "It is freedom which is coupled with responsibility; a power that is combined with a task; a gift that is paired with a sense of duty, that enables man to make choice, decision, and innovation." This leads to the last assumption in this series. Finally, humankind has great intellectual potentialities that can be utilised by different means. Motivation is one mean that can serve this purpose. Islamic texts and literature contain many examples of proper motivation at all organisational levels. The difference between the Islamic methods of motivation and those of the modern theories is that Islam uses, besides monetary and material incentives, a spiritual incentive. This spiritual incentive, as can be seen from historical studies, proved its effectiveness in motivating the people. Its effectiveness is, by and large, greater than any material rewards. The reason for this is that Islam attempts to reach the heart to motivate it. The spiritual type of motivation is more effective than other types that primarily emphasise material or social rewards. This is not to underestimate the value of material or monetary incentives in human motivation. The process of motivation should be measured in terms of the effect upon the individual and the group in their total human activities.

For example, the following Qur'anic verses motivate the people to perform up to the best of their abilities in all of their activities:

"Whoever works righteousness whether male or female while he (or she) is a true believer (of Islamic Monotheism) verily, to him We will give a good life, and We shall pay them certainly a reward in proportion to the

best of what they used to do (i.e., Paradise in the Hereafter)." (Qur'an 16:97)

"Verily, this Qur'an guides to that which is most just and right and gives glad tidings to the believers, who work deeds of righteousness, that they shall have a great reward." (Qur'an 17:9)

"God has promised those among you who believe and do righteous good deeds, that He will certainly grant them succession to (the present rulers) in the land, as He granted it to those before them, and that He will grant them the authority to practice their religion which He has chosen for them and He will surely, give them in exchange a safe security after their fear (provided) they (believers) worship Me and do not associate anything (in worship) with Me. But whoever is believed after this, they are the Fasiqun." (Qur'an 24:55)

Here life is purposive, striving for happiness. Happiness is achieved by the full employment of the total self. Happiness or *Sa'ada* is neither wholly physical nor wholly mental since human being is an organic whole. The only prevalence of the mind and mental over physical and impulsive is to keep it in control, for the purpose of coordinated and harmonious behaviour. (Iqbal 1984).

Shah Waliullah believes that the voluntary and deliberate acts have a lasting effect on the mind and the mental bent, disposition or nature is formed in this manner. The relation of motive and action is two-fold: the motive initiates action, action on the other hand strengthens the motive for further actions. Repetition and practice establishes and strengthens the mind and form the basis of its motive forces.

The state of happiness (Saada) faced by the harmonious functioning of the two aspects is an ideal state, leading toward perfection. Shah Waliullah emphasised the importance of motivation. He said:

"External behaviour by itself can neither be virtuous nor vicious, unless its source lies in the psychic disposition and springs from it. Two similar forms of behaviour could be different from each other, one being vicious and the other virtuous, owing to their corresponding psychic sources." (Shah Waliullah 1970)

## 9.2 Freudian View of self-consciousness

A sailor who is not ill when faces the threat of sinking may decide to throw away treasures to seek relief from the pain of fear of sinking. The pain relief yields 'pleasure,' and such 'pleasure' may disrupt the normal harmony of pleasure and function. In normal circumstances, the sailor would not throw away treasures.

Sometimes, there is invisible and intractable pain, deeply internalised. It operates in almost all circumstances regardless of its origin. Such a pain would well deserve consideration as the cause of an individualised sort of emotional illness. Freud's theory of the unconscious makes possible the existence of precisely such a pain. The two general words commonly used to describe quality of such a pain are 'worry' and 'anxiety.' The understanding of these terms is critical in the theory of mental illness.

### 9.2.1 Anxiety

Life is uncertain. All actions involve some kind of risks. Hence the need to worry. Worry is the concern about adverse possibilities in matters of uncertainty and risk. It is a very rational and functional emotion. It does create some tensions and requires sacrifice of immediacy. Those who cannot do this are bound to head toward destruction. Anxiety, on the other hand is an irrational worry that does no good. The resources thus wasted because of excessive worry itself sometimes do more harm than what might reasonably come from the presumed risks. Anxiety is merely one character trait among many, and not the one emotion that lies at the root of all neurotic behaviours (Fingarette 1963, p. 72). Or as Freud puts it as the "nodal point

linking up all kinds of most important questions; a riddle, of which the solution must cast a flood of light upon our whole mental life."

There is another kind of worry called 'angst.' Kierkegaard thought of it and it also became so important for the existentialism of Heidegger and Sartre. They thought of it as an inescapable emotion definitive of the human condition deep, omnipresent and independent of one's character or circumstances.

Freud's own use of the term seems to blend this anxiety with angst. He spoke of 'free-floating' anxiety (1920, p. 405), by which he meant an objectless fear. A fear that might sometimes seem to attach itself to a particular object (say, business failure or rejection in love), but is actually quite independent of it and is not put to rest when the alleged object is satisfactorily dealt with by objective success.

Within naturalist bracket, the word anxiety is used to mean generalised acute discomfort in which it is not clear what is feared and which is not relieved by success against risks. True anxiety does not fear anything in particular. That in the face of which one is anxious is completely indefinite.

According to the existentialists, the matter is ontological and lies in the fear of its own nothingness by a being that is not a thing at all. That is a no-thing, a free thing. However, this no-thing wants desperately to be a some-thing. For Freud, on the other hand, the matter is moral, resting in the conflict between instinct (id) and morality (super-ego), i.e., in guilt.

### 9.2.2 The Self versus Itself

There are two explanations of anxiety, that at first seem quite distinct, but they both have one thing in common—the turning of the self against itself. In one case, the self condemns its libidinous energy; in the other it judges its own mode of being as unacceptable. In both cases, there is a primordial division of the self against itself, an original 'intra-psychic conflict' to use the psychodynamic jargon. The thing feared by

anxiety is nothing but the one's own self. It is the fear that at bottom things are not very good.

The anxiety discussed here belongs to a level of selfhood that is prior to most specific activities; it belongs very nearly to an individual's most basic self-consciousness, and to what may be very nearly the basic self-consciousness of the species.

Evidently, self would judge itself against a scale of values and under certain assumptions about the scenario. The decision on self-deficiency will then be taken on ontological, moral, or aesthetic grounds. It could very well be different for different people and people of different societies.

Anxiety results out of the process of self-appraisal. It leads to the conclusion of self-deficiency or self-condemnation. It can be alleviated, however, by practice, diligence, competence, confession, restitution, or by securing for oneself a 'supportive' environment.

Anxiety should not be confused with the anxiety of pop-psychology. In fact, it is more like the Christian doctrine of original sin, and more like the thing meant by the anti-Christian Nietzsche when he defined man as 'the red-faced animal'. Neibuhr (1941, p. 182) very poignantly presents the Christian version as, "In short, man, being both free and bound, both limited and limitless, is anxious. Anxiety is the inevitable concomitant of the paradox of freedom and finiteness in which man is involved. The same thought is echoed by Nietzsche, 'the enlightened man calls himself: the animal with red cheeks. How did this happen to man? Is it not because he has had to be ashamed too often'? Oh my friends! Thus speaks the enlightened man: 'Shame, shame, shame - that is the history of man.' (Nietzsche 1883, p. 112)

Both Nietzsche and the theological tradition he rebelled against realised that anyone who escaped the sense of shame would no longer be quite human - he or she would either be an angel (i.e. saved) or a super-man (saviour) - but in either case so radically

different that from the normal human condition that he would appear to be another species.

Does such intense self-condemnation really exist? One could point to the universality of clothing, the fig leaf, and the nominal loincloth or penis sheath worn by even the most natural peoples. We could ask why among the animals this one alone feels a need to hide or alter its body? One could point to the restless human spirit, its infinite capacity for discontent, and ask why it is so impossible for this creature to be at peace with itself. One could point to its ancient hunger for eternity, from which springs all religion and all science (Eliade 1949), as well as to its modern need to alter its conditions, to have a history, to make progress, to improve. Humankind has always been the restless creature. How could this be unless humankind has judged itself and found itself deficient?

### **Self-Respect**

Self-condemnation is the negative correlate of self-respect. Its painfulness is presumably then in direct proportion to the need for self-respect. There are people, who will sacrifice wealth, position, or friendship if so required by their sense of duty. They could also be called like the natural Kantians, and if self-righteousness is their greatest vice, a lonely self-respect is their greatest consolation. However, there are other types of people who are less principled and more willing to work out an accommodation between principle and practice, implying perhaps sacrifice of some principles and hence some self-respect for other kinds of gains.

Humans have a strong need for self-justification. The accommodating persons are not self-conscious or deliberate hypocrites. Seldom in reality, do exist people, who have clear knowledge of absolute principles of morality, politics, or aesthetics. Sometimes people are not aware of violation before or during action. That is, the chances of doing something, while not knowing all about it, are great. Those believing in moderation also point out that it is unreasonable or fanatical to be

required by morality to sacrifice so much. People like to compare them with conventional standards as well as standards of real life. In this context of moral/intellectual opportunism, standards of real life take precedence over the conventional standards. Absence of guilt is there even if they realise something wrong. Many a times, attempts are made to readily compromise principles to the conduct. In the concentration camps, the principled ones died first. The rest were seldom self-conscious hypocrites. They merely adopted an ethic of survival.

Generally, people believe in their belief in the rightness of their conduct. True cold-blooded hypocrisy is as difficult as it is rare. It should even be counted a left-handed sort of virtue because it requires one to maintain the integrity of one's moral cognition in the face of one's own moral corruption. Thus, hypocrisy has been called 'the homage that vice pays to virtue.' But, the fact is that most people cannot easily indulge in it.

What follows is that self-respect is of greater worth than even the greater good. So much so that whenever there is contradiction that diminishes self-respect, people simply adjust scale of values. By and large, when the ambition of businesspersons, politicians, scholars, artists or criminals bring them into conflict with ordinary morality, all of them do essentially the same thing. For everyone, the need to justify seems paramount. The fact is that people are ready to engage in intellectual opportunism to make an attempt at self-deception. This may not be praiseworthy but certainly a testimony to the need for self-respect. True loss of self-regard means collapse of life and perhaps little is more feared than an honest confrontation with one's own self-condemnation. That is why anxiety seems to be the greatest of pains.

### 9.2.3 Unconscious and Conscious

For the physical body, tolerance is the first threshold for pain. If pain is greater than the limits of tolerance than it seeks refuge in a self-imposed anaesthesia. It becomes

unconscious by itself. Next is the threshold of survival. If pain crosses that, then body simply fails to survive, either partly or totally.

Freud's psychoanalytic theory of motivation suggests that the pain of 'guilt' (the foundation of anxiety) is for some reason and for at least some people is too great to bear. Repression pushes the pain into the unconscious. From there, the painful thought continues to influence behaviour through the mechanisms of projection, symbolisation, denial, dissociation, defensiveness, etc. The behaviour motivated by such pain manifests the symptoms of mental illness.

The notion of unconscious needs to go through purgation, simplification and resurrection, like anxiety. In popular psychology, unconscious was once fashionably overworked and a much abused term. It is now somewhat shunned with the fading of Freud's deification and abuse. Put simply, some of the complexities of human character cannot be fathomed and be grappled without it. This, however, should not mean that Freud is being given acceptance here.

Anxious state, if understood as a form of self-condemnation, is almost always unconscious in contrast to other types of pains. It is characterised by acute discomfort, which comes from objectless state. Such fear of the loss of self-respect is the prime motivator of unconscious beliefs. Some people repress the anxiety. While some end up with intellectual acknowledgement of self-condemnation. The entire dynamic complex of belief enactment, idea building and emotion building requires to be seen from this perspective.

The metaphor of unconscious as adopted here is different from that of Freud who presented the unconscious as a separate person or agency within humans. He meant two different things from unconscious. First, as a mere repository for knowledge, and secondly, as a demon-like, alien power that resides within a person. The first definition is very simple and agreeable. In this case, unconscious is either forgotten knowledge or inarticulate thoughts. From Plato to Leihnitz and Collingwood this

idea has had a respected place in the philosophical tradition. The second meaning is however conceptually quite problematic and needs to be intellectually dealt with.

Freud's theory implies that unconscious mind is able to manipulate the conscious mind thereby rendering it the passive puppet of invisible machinations. This assertion can be strongly refuted if the unconscious is taken as a source of agency and the agent is understood as a person other than the conscious mind itself. There is no empirical verification of it and it results in a falsification of the genuine experience that might be reasonably described, on some other interpretation, as experience of unconscious motivation.

Worst of all, this sort of **thinking** has undermined the legitimate sense of moral responsibility for one's actions. The demonic unconscious is a psychological echo of the reductionism and deterministic swagger of nineteenth-century scientific materialism. Freud's understanding of his own discovery was biased by this sort of reductionism. However, the unconscious is also characterised as phenomenological. Wide ranges of commonplace experiences are attributed to it and it is now assumed by all as a commonplace phenomenon. The genesis of the familiar and puzzling state of 'self-deception' is also attributed to unconscious.

Conceptually speaking, the tendency of mind to maintain deliberately two opposing views of what is happening on a consistent basis is questionable. The problem of dual nature was resolved by sacrificing the unity of self and recasting it as consisting of two or more parts: reason and desire in Plato, spirit and flesh in Christianity. Freud adopted this traditional solution. He spoke of relations between them as if they were relations between two different people who happen to inhabit the same person. He also suggested that deceptions of repression or projection were performed by the unconscious (conceived as agent) upon the conscious mind, thereby making the conscious mind passive and not-so-responsible for any actions that might result from the deception.

The whole metaphor of the division of self has not gone without criticism in the realm of philosophy. What is ignored is that the parts of the self are precisely parts of a single, identical self and that whatever is 'done' by any of them is done by that unitary self. If desire 'wants' something but reason does not, it is not someone other than himself who wants it. Even if it is also true that it is he who knows that it is a bad thing to do. It is plausible to accept that in some situations, a person may be at variance with himself. But, it is rather preposterous to say that it is someone else inside him, who wants it, while he, understood as reason, does not. Thus, the unconscious is not something inside a person other than himself. It is his unconscious, after all, and what it does, is done, by none other than him.

### 9.2.4 Repression and Deception

In Freudian methodology, the act of repression is caused by the unconscious to the conscious mind. The unconscious is conceived as an agent that hides from the conscious mind information or knowledge that might be troublesome to the conscious mind (presumably not so distressing to the unconscious mind). The unconscious does not deceive itself. It deceives only the conscious mind, operating rather like an overprotective parent.

All of this is very convenient for the conscious mind. It gets all the benefits of self-willed and self-serving ignorance, while remaining entirely innocent of the slightest intent to deceive. Its ignorance is utterly sincere, and yet it never has to face its own deep fears. It is as if whenever someone very much wished for but would not perform a certain species of inunoral action, someone else were to (1) read the mind, (2) perform the deed, (3) do it without giving the slightest knowledge to the conscious mind that the deed had been done, (4) without conscious mind knowing that unconscious had the power to read the mind, or indeed (5) without conscious knowing that unconscious exists. And what is more, (6) he does the wicked thing not out of any desire of his own to do it, but simply to spare conscious the pain.

A far more simple and satisfactory explanation of the above notion is that it is no one other than the person himself who deceives himself about alleged truths that he does not wish to acknowledge. In short, it is he who lies to himself by rendering some of his knowledge unconscious, and that he is, therefore, responsible for it.

The above analysis lends a new meaning closely related to self-deception to the notion of unconscious agency. Ordinary lives are full of examples of self-deception (Fingaratte 1969). For example, when a person would not like to be reminded of the work undone, he will try to forget it. He will also consciously manage to blind eyes and deflect attention away from the work and the cues such as a file, which reminds about the work. This way people try to spare themselves of the unpleasant feeling accruing from the sight of undone work. In nutshell, people attempt to refrain from acknowledging what they know about something disturbing. This tendency is called self-deception.

It is difficult to bring such unconscious thoughts aiming at self-deception to full consciousness. If conscious mind is ever forced to acknowledge, then it is with wry and sheepish embarrassment, and with corresponding degree of remorse. This empirically proves that the conscious mind accepts responsibility for its own deception. The phenomenon of self-deception argues against the idea that it is something done to an individual by the unconscious conceived as a totally alien source of agency.

The notion of the division of self, one of whom is able to fool the other, cannot explain the question as to how and why the unconscious mind can or should take over the control of the conscious mind without the conscious mind's knowing anything about it. The Freudian terminology of repression can be understood to mean self-deception.

This is not at all meant to deny (or to affirm) the possibility of another kind of unconscious mental life, especially if the unconscious is understood only as a

repository for certain kinds of very deep and rather unusual kinds of knowledge. It is meant only to show that in order to understand the need to involve in it in most basic examples of mental illness.

### 9.2.5 Object Relations Theory

Freud (1905) thought of the inner world in terms of the broad notion of sexuality and spelled out a series of developmental stages which provided the leitmotif for passing through the stages on life's way. The theoretical as well as practical focus of psychoanalytic theory and treatment centred on these early phases. It is possible to interpret the libido theory narrowly or broadly, somatically or symbolically.

Technically speaking, its roots lay in a theory of instincts and it drives with aims and objects. The objective was to meet the instinctual needs. In orthodox Freudianism the object is merely the vehicle for the instinct on its way to discharge. For Klein, drives are directed inherently and inseparably toward objects. For Fairbairn, libido is not pleasure-seeking but object-seeking motive. Humans are motivated to seek objects.

They are full of impulses seeking discharge and objects to get off. Hence the need to relate to other both internally and externally. He put this succinctly when he said, "..."it is not the libidinal attitude which determines the object relationship, but the object-relationship which determines the libidinal attitude" (Fairbairn 1941, p. 34).

The object relation theory has a potential to rescue human nature from the bleak fragmentation of postmodern deconstruction. This theory in a way contradicts the determinations that are believed to contribute to causality of human nature. Object relations theory can somewhat bind all the fragmentation and fabricate a coherent idea of human self. A theory of human nature can be determined which bears out the disintegrative forces in human cultures as well as simultaneously improvises for reconstruction.

To be human is to have perpetually ongoing object relations and to have object relations is to permit shared human nature. Humans engage themselves in

interpersonal relationships that are not reducible to purely animal set of interactions. Nature takes into account the biological origins and the social, political and economic determinations at work.

If a detached view is taken, the human self can also be envisaged as being the observer of its own self. This provides human beings a capacity for seeing themselves in interaction with others whilst retaining their own, for reflecting on the own self whilst being themselves' (Britton 1989, p. 87). It provides the psychoanalytic key to notions of self-knowledge, altruism, fairness and generosity, all precious attributes that are in danger of being abrogated by those reductionists and relativists. This version of development reorients human nature the aspects, which the scientific world view and the postmodern temptation to give way to fragmentation cannot sustain. The object relation theory also has the potential to be grounded in an essentially moral vision of human nature.

The psychological and moral unity of a credible concept of human nature, which has been subverted by scientism (Freud's and more recent versions) as well as by deconstructionism, is gaining a new lease on life. Human nature grounded in object relations is also a way of conceptualising humanity which would at least retain its nature against the onslaught of secularism, scientism or pessimism.

### 9.3 Effects on Motivation of Leadership

What is the effect of anxiety on the constitution of pleasures and motivation of behaviour?

Anxiety or self-condemnation exists at unconscious level. It is the greatest of pains. Unconscious self-condemnation, like any other pain, motivates for pursuit of relief. And just as all pain relief is experienced as 'pleasure,' so is the relief of unconscious self-condemnation. Freudian theory also postulates that a repressed desire remains a source of motivation even if it does not do so by becoming a demonic agent. This

happens through the mechanisms of pleasure transformation. But there is a great difference.

With unconscious pain, it is different. The relief of unconscious pain is not recognised as such, and so its 'pleasure' seems to be a simple pleasure. If the unconscious pain is self-condemnation, a very great pain, then the 'pleasure' of its relief will be correspondingly greater. Thus, the 'pleasures' associated with the relief of unconscious self-condemnation will appear to be relatively simple pleasures and also pleasures of the greatest importance. The idea of being 'cured' of them will seem absurd. In fact, one's entire self-esteem will be bound up with them, and so one will fight desperately to maintain them despite the fact that they are not really wanted.

The pleasures of anxiety-relief are not ordinary pleasures. Since the pain relieved is self-loathing, the pleasures of anxiety-relief are the pleasures derived from doing well and thereby demonstrating one's excellence. This presupposes a scale of values of some sort and a certain amount of proficiency as measured by that scale. Given that proficiency, there comes the 'pleasure' that relieves the self-condemnation - the peculiar type of reassurance that comes from doing well of oneself, or from being successful. Such self-respect is not a relaxed assurance of one's worth, but rather a more or less nervous reassurance gained from the successful effort to measure up. It is a very problematic kind of self-respect. When a moral scale of values is chosen it is called 'self-righteousness'; and when it is aesthetic, it is a large part of what is called 'snobbery.' But whatever the scale of values, 'pride' is the common name for the pleasures to which it gives rise (Homey 1950).

It would not seem to matter much what values are selected so far as the relief of anxiety is achieved. One could pick the Christian values of love and self-sacrifice, or one could play the cruel warrior for essentially the same reasons. One could take pride in business prowess, or be an artist, a **thinker**, a revolutionary. One can be traditional or individualistic, aggressive or meek, creative or conformist. There is

presumably infinite variety in the behaviour from which the 'pleasure' of reassurance can be gained. But when motivated in **this** way, all such behaviour involves the unconscious pain of an original self-condemnation and the creation thereby of another self that is manifested in the 'pleasure' of what has been called 'neurotic pride' (Homey 1950).

As the 'pleasure' of anxious pain relief overrides simple pleasure, so a new one replaces the self that was constituted by the original harmony of pleasure and function. The transformation of the harmony of the soul is also a transformation of self and, literally speaking, a distortion of it. The new self relates to the old self as the new 'pleasure' relates to the old. Its falseness is indexed by the quotation marks around 'pleasure.' And, of course, it is not known whether the transformation has occurred. In fact, it is forced that the new self is the true one because it was to convince of this untruth that the new self arose to begin with. Were this point to be contradicted, the entire point of the self-deception would be undone and the tears would have to be faced. Hence, the Freudian concept of resistance. Self-condemnation thus not only dooms humankind to live in ignorance of who they are and what they really want. It supplies them with a false self to believe in and a motive for clinging to it with utter desperation.

Because self-condemnation is individualised, unconscious, and intense, it creates a variety of eccentric pleasures that override ordinary pleasure and can cause an entire personality to shift to what it would never have been, had the self-condemnation not been operative. The original self performed in a more or less pleasant way the natural functions to which humankind is naturally adapted. The process of self-condemnation will tend to (but need not always) take humankind away from those common healthy functions into others that are dysfunctional and more highly individualised. It is a virus carried about within the psychological body and wedded to it by the bond of pride. It disrupts the original harmony of the desires by creating the eccentric pleasures of pain relief and doing so in a way that systematically blinds

to the entire process. This is a type of mental illness. Behavioural types motivated by the relief of self-condemnation are called as 'neurotic'. So deep is this self-condemnation, however, that it is nearly true to call hu **mankind** the neurotic animal. The neurosis arise, says Freud, when "the ego... enters into opposition with itself... Such a dissociation, perhaps, exists only in man, so that, all in all, his superiority over the other animals may come down to his capacity for neurosis."

## CHAPTER 10.0

### HUMAN NATURE AND PARADOXES

The nostalgic pursuit for attaining original harmony of the soul remains a perennial facet of human history. The journey into the self to find the real self has been a preoccupation of political, religious, psychological, and anthropological research. The longings for primitive and untouched conditions is also a consequence of the feeling that shun the present shape of human self as the unreal, contaminated, not different from the original self. Scores of ideologies and philosophies proliferated and competed with each other to win the minds and hearts of people. From communist ideals to capitalist constructs, and from revolt of 1960s to the explosion of new age ideas in 1990s, from empowerment of people to the weakening of the states, all point toward the attempts to discover and trust the human nature.

Is there a deeper self? Is the deeper self same for all species of humankind? What is the original configuration of pleasures? What is the original configuration of human psychology? How good or bad is the original configuration? How the new configuration takes place? In order to respond to these questions, modern anthropology refers to data from pre-social human being.

Early philosophy focused on pre-social man as the ideal to explore the human nature. While there are grounds, to reasonably assume, the existence of a primordial decency in the basic harmony of the soul, the exact contents of this primitive virtue will probably never be known through the human sources of knowledge. In some cases, empirical research combined with philosophical, psychological, and ethical sophistication may yield real answers. But for most cases it is difficult to have clear knowledge about either the essence of human nature or its application to circumstances for which it was not intended.

' This does not show, however, that primitive decency is unimportant. It does show that it is significantly incomplete when viewed from the standpoint of contemporary moral problems and that it cannot simply replace what is now called morality. It **remains** true, however, that the most fundamental tenets of morality merely duplicate in verbal formulae the emotional configuration of primitive decency. To a considerable extent, morality merely converts emotions into rules that may then be forced on a psychology that has, for one reason or another become reluctant (Wilson 1975b).

What is fixed within human nature? A cursory glance would note that even the crude body is not fixed in terms of functions. Physically, it first grows and then decays with the passage of time. Technically, it acquires habits and develops functions over a period of time. It learns and adapts to the context. But body is mostly a common element across different cultures, locations, and generations though it does change its looks and artefacts. The question is, if the stability of body is rooted in the laws of genetics and evolution, as theorised by the naturalists, then does the notion of the harmony of the soul and spirit can also be treated as stable as the body itself? The configuration of pleasures resulting into harmony of self is indeed also related to body.

Naturalists argue that the harmony of the soul is part of the fixed human nature. They also argue that it is predetermined by nature. Human mind is constituted by it and, therefore, is passive and somewhat 'thing-like.' This has been largely the conclusion of anthropologists who have sought to figure out the original essence and the natural self of all mankind.

From the evolutionary perspective, human mind has a fixed nature and distinctive configuration of the harmony of self coupled with equally distinctive tendency to transcend or negate that harmony. The question is whether the original harmony of self or its negation and variation is natural. The answer as proposed by naturalists, is

that human nature is radically equivocal and can be considered as devices that were expertly designed over a long period of time to do quite well in an original environment. By virtue of design, humankind is also given anxiety, which enables humans to survive in a variety of environments. It however, does also involve condemnation of already developed human nature and results into partial distortion of the original self. A word that has two distinct sets of criteria sufficient to identify its proper usage is an equivocal term, and so the term *nature* in the phrase 'human nature' is equivocal. It can mean a relatively simple instinctual life, which would include a measure of uncomplicated rationality, or a neurotically complicated life, may be properly called 'natural.'

The advent of anxiety did not create a new species, but it did make the human self less vulnerable and more versatile by altering the original truly human nature. Since anxiety contributes to the survival and deterioration of anyone that did not negate herself and resided simply in the original harmony would not be fully human. So there is then a straightforward evolutionary reason for self-condemnation.

Hence, there are two meanings of nature. First concerns the instinctive life. Second concerns the life of high achievement and sophistication that rests on a neurotic distortion or intellectual perfection of the original selfhood. Human nature is neither utterly flexible, nor totally rigid. There is elasticity to which original harmony can be changed and there is firmness to which anxiety can be effective. Human beings are composed of two things, instinct and self-condemnation or animality plus rationality. The human life at both ends of spectrum i.e., instinctual life and the negation and neurotic transformation of those instincts through the operations of anxiety, is part of the nature.

In this chapter, two different types of typologies are discussed. Shah Waliullah developed the typology from the Islamic perspectives. The next is developed in the

Western literature. One is vertical and the other is horizontal. Combination of both present a very good understanding of the human nature.

### 10.1 Vertical Typology of Potentiality

Qur'an says that human is endowed with equal potential for good and evil, guidance and heedlessness, right and wrong. According to Ali Shariati (1979, p. 7):

"Man is a mixed phenomenon, made of mud and the Spirit of God. He has the freedom to choose either pole. Having willpower makes him free but responsible. So, from an Islamic point of view, man is the only creature responsible for his fate. He is to carry the mission of God in this world and be his trustee on earth."

Qur'an emphasises that evil nature is acquired by human beings, it is not inscribed.

What is inscribed is the permission to do evil. Qur'an views human being as good and pure. Qur'an seeks to place a high premium on the development of the personality in a manner that will prepare him for his rights and obligations.

Regarding the development of human self, Qur'an states:

"By Nafs (Adam or a person or a soul), and Him Who perfected him in proportion; Then He showed him what is wrong for him and what is right for him. Indeed he succeeds who purifies his own self. And indeed he fails who corrupts his own self." (Qur'an 91:7-10)

Muhanunad Asad Leopold (1961, p. 23 - 4), remarks about the essence of human nature:

"Man is originally good and pure; and furthermore, that disbelief in God and lack of good action may destroy his perfection. On the other hand, man may retain, or regain, that original individual perfection if he consciously realises God's Oneness and submits to His laws. Thus, according to Islam, evil is never essential or even original; it is an acquisition in man's later life, and is

due to a misuse of the innate, positive qualities with which God has endowed every human being."

Iqbal notes that, "man is a spiritual reality in his ultimate essence. We have the explanation of his reality in the Divine Creative Power, in the Divine Conscious and Purposive Will and in the Divine Grace. God created the world and man out of the sheer affluence of His perfection. He created man out of a sheer possibility in His own Being and invests him with almost all the potentialities of attaining to the Perfection of the Divine."

Qur'an rejects the view that human nature has a predetermined fixed pattern of behaviour. God reminds that man has been created by Him according to the same divine law of creation as other things in the universe (Qur'an 30:30). Man is said to be 'created weak' (Qur'an 4:28); 'created of haste', 'being hasty' (Qur'an 17:11); 'ungrateful or thankless' (Qur'an 17:67); 'covetous or grudging' (Qur'an 17:100); 'impatient or anxious' (Qur'an 70:19); 'a caviller or contentious' (Qur'an 18:55); and 'a tyrant and a fool' (Qur'an 33:72).

Parwez (1968:111) concludes that:

"The truth is that there is no such thing as 'man's nature' in the sense in which the word is usually used. For by nature, we understand the properties which constitute the very being of a thing and hence characterise its existence in a way peculiar to itself. It is its nature that determines its behaviour. There can be no question, therefore, of its going against its nature."

### 10.1.1 Shah Waliullah Typology

The Greeks started the Science of Typology when they developed a scheme for classification of individuals into types. One of the higher types of the spiritual and worldly knowledge is the knowledge of the various types of human faculties, their spiritual aspects and the scope of their capacity to develop to the perfection mark.



The utility of this knowledge is that an intelligent person determines the scope and extent of application of his merit and adopts the direction of his actions accordingly and constantly keeps in view avoiding any departure. If such a person is not able to achieve this through his own efforts, his spiritual affectionate leader, through his own knowledge and information, should delineate the natural merit of his client and should show to him the right path.

Before offering the description of the natural faculties of human race, it is necessary to acquire the knowledge of certain relevant fundamentals forming the bases of this knowledge. Shah Waliullah developed a very interesting typology, which is based on the assumption that human nature is unchangeable. Hadith has also endorsed the unchangeable nature of the faculties. The Prophet (*bpulz*) says "that if you hear that a mountain has moved from its place, accept it as a truth; on the other hand if you are told that a person has changed his nature do not believe it. It is not possible for the simple reason that nobody can act or move contrary to the direction of his natural faculty" (Masnad Ahmad Bin Hambal, Vol. 6, p.443)

Shah Waliullah believed that human beings have been created to possess different faculties. And every individual can act and attain perfection only by moving in the direction of his natural faculty. There is none who can achieve more than his merit or capacity. For example, a person possessing a specific faculty is bound to move in a particular direction by adopting specific attitude. Suppose he abandons the natural course and starts moving in a different direction, he will never succeed in achieving his goal no matter how hard he worked. Similarly, consider another person who intends to achieve perfection by acting contrary to his natural faculty and merit. He will never succeed and his efforts shall go waste.

Shah pointed out two different types of faculties within humans: angelic and beastly. According to him, human kind possesses 'pseudo-soul', which is formed by the actions and reactions and for that reason keep on undergoing changes. In addition to,

there is a rational soul, which controls and conducts the pseudo-soul. When the rational soul acts upon the pseudo-soul it produces two types of inclinations. One directs humankind toward fulfilling the biological demands of hunger, thirst, fame, anger, envy and happiness and following it, a human being maintains the level of just an animal being. The second inclination of rational soul lifts humankind to the heights of Angels and make him altogether forget all about the animal needs.

Consequently, human being enjoys pleasures of the highest order, i.e., above the material region. He begins to receive kind of revelation which may contain secret truths of nature or which may mean to commence a new order among humans.

When a person is overpowered by inferior aptitude, he becomes an embodiment of animalism and inferiority and no sign of superiority and Angelic qualities is left in him. On the other hand when superior aptitude overpowers he becomes a perfect angel and no sign of cruelty and harshness is left in him. Typically, a person combines in him these two faculties. He is an angel as well as an animal. He possesses angel-like aptitudes and also lusts of animals. In order to develop the qualities of angels he has been ordered to lead a pious life and in order to suppress his animal lust he has been ordered to avoid bad deeds. Qur'an has mentioned this very secret of human nature. In certain persons, the inferior quality is, in quantity, more than the superior one and in certain other persons, the superior power is more than the inferior one. These two superior and inferior faculties are further split up into several grades. The proportionate ratio of these two qualities and the grades in which they are found determine the quality of faculty. It is due to this proportionate ratio that different persons possess different faculties. Shah Waliullah further divides Angels into two types (1) Angels of the superior region, and (2) Angels of the inferior region.

Angels of superior region are dedicated to the spiritual learning pertaining to the names of God. These angels have learned the principles and fundamentals of the mystery of creation of the whole universe, from the Absolute Being. Angels of the

inferior region are meant to obey the orders, which they receive from above. They implement them and apply them to the worldly affairs. These angels of the inferior region, of course, do not possess any knowledge of the expediencies of these orders.

Like the angel, the beasts are also of two types: (1) those who possess great beastly power (2) those with weak beastly power.

A person with strong beastly powers would be unshakeable in his determination and resolution. He would be so much energetic so as to keep on working hard constantly. In the second mode of expression, a person will be polite and amiably perfect in his habits and attitudes.

The presence of inferior and superior qualities opens two possibilities. Either these two faculties will contest with each other. 'his type of nature is called by *Tajazub*. It means that the beastly as well as angelic keep on struggling for its specific expression. There is no compromise between these two and they keep on moving in their respective directions. However, when the superior and inferior faculties are found in a balanced form and there is no race for victory going on between them, this mental condition is known as *lstilah*, which means that the superior power should descend down a little from its exalted position. The inferior power should also suppress some of its improper drives and move a little toward the superior power. Thus these two make a compromise, and both are interconnected, and a person has both of them.

Human being can be divided into various categories according to the proportion and ratio in which these two faculties are present. For the sake of convenience, all these categories can be grouped into eight major groups. Of these, four groups belong to the *Tajazub* and four to the *lstilali* categories.

Four groups of *lstilali* are as follows:

1. Both the superior and inferior powers are strong and well balanced.

2. Superior faculty is stronger than inferior one.
3. Superior faculty is weaker than the inferior one.
4. Both the superior and inferior faculties are weak but they are well balanced.

Similarly, the *Taj azub* group can be divided into four categories:

1. Both the superior and inferior faculties are strong but they are constantly in conflict with each other.
2. Both the superior and inferior faculties are weak but they are in conflict.
3. Superior faculty is weak and the inferior is strong but they are in conflict.
4. Superior faculty is strong and the inferior is weak but they are always in conflict.

### 10.1.2 Profile of Istilah

General behaviour of a person belonging to the *Istilali* group is that he is extremely diffident in the use of his organs and limbs. He possesses love for truth and justice and has the ability to understand the worldly and religious affairs. Generally, such people do not experience a state of perturbation and collusion.

In the whole world people of the *Istilali* group are the best followers of the divine code of life. Those among them who possess strong angelic power know the confines prescribed by God and they are also capable of doing research in laws and philosophy. However, those with weak angelic power, at the utmost, can be the followers of the orders of such persons. Their only duty is to act upon the visible

deeds. Indirectly they can also enjoy the pleasure of this very spirit of the divine code.

*U Jstilalt* group succeeds in breaking the chains of beastly power and they also possess strong angelic power, they may develop the capacity to understand the mystery of mortality and continuity, attributes and the names of God.

If their angelic power is weak then they do not know anything but few exercises and functions of the religious code of life in order to lessen the force of the sexual power. Their only achievement, which may amount to the height of happiness, is to see the light of angels shining upon them. They also foresee events, which are going to take place in this world. They also achieve perfection in getting their prayers accepted by God and their attention has great influence.

If he possesses strong superior and weak inferior faculties he is confronted with a strange phenomenon that his heart becomes absolutely cold or free of worldly desires and he is overpowered by God's love. This person is so much influenced by the phenomenon that his heart totally turns toward God. People, in general, consider this change in him as an event contrary to nature or a miracle. But the man with strong angelic power and weak beastly power feels as if he is a born saint and this virtue is part and parcel of his whole being. Nevertheless, as he gradually moves toward youth and gains power, he exhibits more miracles.

Those among the *Istilah* group who possess weak angelic power as well as weak beastly power are mentally confined to only in understanding the intrinsic manifestations, truths and fancies. In these pursuits something descends upon them but it is not of much significance. They are about equal to nothing. From among the persons, those possessing strong angelic power have the capacity to learn all that, which was known to prophets. They also know the intricacies of the politics of the nations and regions. They also know the basic morals underlying the management of towns and cities. Of course, there is no doubt that they do experience, prayers and

hymns. People of this category are the strict followers of the religious code of life. They get satisfaction out of it and feel contented and happy.

Those who have strong beastly power become leaders of the people. They have many followers, but those with weak beastly power are re-known to the world and are less popular.

The reality is that people with strong angelic power are rare and those with weak angelic power are in large number. Similarly those with strong beastly power are also very few and the majority comprises those with weak beastly power.

Those who possess strong angelic and beastly powers are like a mirror, which in spite of being hard, possesses the property of reflection. Those who have strong angelic power and weak beastly power are just like a pad of cotton soaked in water, through which the drops of water keep on trickling.

Now remain those who have weak angelic power and strong beastly power. They resemble the mirror with a canker in it. *U* it is polished then this mirror shines a little and starts reflecting the faces. But, if their beastly power is also weak they are like the child who, in spite of the best education, will not remember or grasp anything. This child, therefore, will take long to preserve the outlines of symbols and figures in his imaginative power. However, those who possess weak angelic power cannot see the form and shape of anything of the world of solitude.

### **10.1.3 Profile of Tajazub**

One belonging to the *Tajazub* group has great desire to retire and keep aloof from the worldly affairs. His greatest desire is to break off from the material world. He, thus, resembles a bird in a cage. *U* a person belonging to this category has weak beastly power and desires to get something, shall lack force and energy. A person from this group, possessing strong sexual vigour, aims at doing big things. If he possesses strong angelic power too, he is sure to attain high position like the prophets by

following and acting upon the prescribed rules and formulae. If this person possesses any acute sexual power and his angelic power is weak, he will exhibit extraordinary values during war particularly in the matters of indignation. A person belonging to *Tajazub* group does not show any inclination to take part in the big tasks, if his beastly power is weak. However, if his angelic power is very strong he will like to discard the world in order to win the favour of God. If in spite of the weakness of his faculties he succeeds in getting perfection according to his capacity, the utmost he can do is to sacrifice the worldly desires for the sake of a better life after death. If his circumstances are not favourable and he is not able to reach perfection in spite of the best use of his ability then he renounces. This renunciation is due to his inaction, powerlessness and infirmity.

Persons of the *Tajazub* group, with weak angelic power but strong beastly power need to undertake religious exercises. Then they start seeing the angelic lights shining before their very eyes in both sleep and awakening. They put up great courage and it is with determination and sincerity that they bear all the strain. If people in general come to know of such persons, they become very much devoted to them.

### **10.2 Horizontal Typology of Paradoxes**

The views that have emerged so far can be classified into two broad categories. In their polar aspects, attitudes about human nature range from pessimism to optimism. From assumptions that evilness, predatory competition, and aggression on the one hand, to goodness, cooperation, and virtue on the other, core of human predisposition is constituted. The traditional view entails that people generally dislike work and inherently lack the capacity for self-direction and personal responsibility. In contrast, the modern view projects that people do have the inherent capacity to become psychologically involved in cooperative activity and, under certain conditions, to be virtually self-motivated and self-controlled.

Douglas McGregor (1960), who among others has noted the significance of implicit assumptions about human nature, classified the two types of assumptions in Theory X and Theory Y. The former assumes that humankind is innately lazy and unreliable, and leads to organisation and control based on external or imposed authority. The latter assumes that humankind can be self-directed and creative at work if properly motivated.

The examples used are not intended to be other than illustrative and straddling such divergent systems of human thought as political government, psychoanalysis, sociology, and business organisation.

### 10.2.1 Rebellious or Submissive

Machiavelli in the *Prince* (1515) urged that, because of humankind's rebellious and non-cooperative behaviour, he must be strictly and ruthlessly controlled by anyone who aspires to gain or maintain a position of power. A ruler, in his view, must put aside any question of morality and must achieve control at any price and by whatever means he can find. The purpose of this theory was to benefit the ruler as well as people. Only the rulers are competent to decide what the ends are and how they should be achieved. Thus humans and groups of humans compete and contest for power, resources, and prestige to be able to secure the privilege of decision making as well as the right to force others to remain loyal to them in their pursuits.

Hobbes in the *Leviathan* (1651) opined that humans live at perpetual fear from their neighbours because of threats accruing from the rebellious nature. In order to circumvent the threat, humans enter into a social contract whereby they give up to a central authority a portion of their rights. The central authority or Leviathan creates and enforces the law to safeguard loss of life and property. The irrevocable powers given to the Leviathan by the commonwealth is governed by the sovereign and individuals are bound to abide by its despotic orders. What is seen is that the same

humans who have a tendency to rebel become utterly submissive to the state in order to ensure safety from rebellious nature of others.

Both Machiavelli and Hobbes viewed human nature primarily as a product of experience. They perceived in man a predominance of aggressive and selfish motives because of socialisation rather than biological inheritance, and they designed political organising systems in order to constrain and control human behaviour and thus create order in society.

### 10.2.2 Strong or Weak

Charles Darwin recognised orderliness in the whole system of nature. Through his research into the causes of variations in species and the contribution of these variations to the survival of species in nature, he became convinced that survival was assured through a process of natural selection. He thought that survival was guaranteed only to those who were the best representatives of the species and best adapted to the conditions of the environment. The survivors were those who through physical prowess and mental agility were able to win in the competition for food and mate. The theory of Darwin is embedded in the idea that nature is a never-ending struggle—a competition—and that a permanent state of war exists among and between all species and the natural environment.

The interpreters of Darwin such as Herbert Spencer, argued that among humans only the fittest are entitled to survive. The process of natural selection in man's world favours the aggressive and the strong. Humans in this scheme are seen like a predatory creature. Spencer's interpretations of Darwinian theory underlie much of the creed of many nineteenth century U.S. industrialists and their philosophy of the 'stewardship' of the rich and the 'gospel of wealth.'

### 10.2.3 Individual or Invisible

Adam Smith championed the idea that by pursuing the self-interest, each individual can not only further his own fortune but also that of a society as a whole. The idea of self-interest as a prime mover forwarded by Adam Smith was largely construed as portrayal of selfish nature of humans rather than a virtuous nature. Under this notion, the just allocation of nation's scarce resources takes place through the price mechanism that reflects supply and demand conditions of the market.

In the realm of philosophy, Adam Smith's doctrine came to occupy special meanings as the doctrine of laissez-faire. This implies noninterference in the private venture, personal indulgences, and freedom of choice and decision making. The role of government is to trust the self-seeking nature of human behaviour and to protect this freedom. Consequently, humans may have no restriction to employ predatory mechanisms to serve own interest at the expense of others that happen to be weak. The stronger is favoured, though weaker has limited opportunities to become stronger.

However, Smith, who occupied professorial chair in moral philosophy made it clear in *The Theory of Moral Sentiments* (1759) that he relied on natural morality which prescribed three cardinal principles: justice, prudence, and benevolence. He believed that morality and government must govern the actions of humans. Adam Smith assumed the aphorism that private vices become public virtues as a reflection of a natural state of equality. Humans in pursuit of enlightened self-interest are characterised by adherence to justice. He was not oblivious to the welfare of the ordinary people. By acting based on self-interests, individuals create an invisible hand that gives a fair deal to all.

### 10.2.4 Aggressive or Passive

Freud (1930) studied the unconscious mind and postulated that innate instincts and drives, which are antithetical to the societal norms, motivate humans. Humans

become civilised if society succeeds in curbing these animal forces and attune them to socially acceptable goals. The hostile feelings between humans ignited by destructive impulses of individuals periodically explode into open aggression. Society brings the aggression under control through cultural superego, which defines the norms of behaviour and thus creates perpetual feelings of guilt. The anxieties created by feelings of guilt resulting from tensions between human's basic nature and societal demands ultimately lead to mental illness as discussed above.

### 1025 Warrior or Peace Maker

There are strong evidences to suggest that humans have been a warrior and an aggressor since the beginning of existence. The earliest remnants of human ancestors have yielded proofs of warrior behaviour. Weapons have been the most important tools of humans. The cause of defence and protection of self and family, land and possessions, as well as acquisition of food and other supplies required weapons. The warring engagements have had a permanent effect on the hereditary structure of **humans**, (Bergson 1935). The urge to aggression translates into the desire to dominate others. Bergson is of the view that humans are not capable of avoiding conflict through reason and self-control because of the presence of innate predatory and selfish instincts.

### 1026 Personal or Impersonal

The prevailing ideas about human nature, which have been presented at various times, were adopted in various shapes in the writings about structures of human organisations. Incorporating setting, the interaction between managers and subordinates and between leaders and followers has been focus of attention from variety of angles. The founders of scientific management emphasised the need for management to exert close monitoring and control over the workforce to ensure their performance according to the organisational plans. The proponents of control and plans made six basic assumptions about human nature:

1. Humans have a fixed nature and can be considered as a constant just like machine.
2. Humans have inclinations to inefficiency and waste unless properly programmed.
3. Humans are lazy and need proper climate backed up by work plans. Managers honour the 'hard work' creed of the Protestant Ethic.
4. The main concern of humans' lies in self-interest measured in economic values.
5. Humans try to maximise the economic interests and are willing to undergo fierce competition.
6. Control is needed to overcome the desire to avoid work and motivation is needed to make him realise that gains are worth the efforts required.

In accordance with these assumptions, Taylor thought that management must assume the responsibility for specifying in detail the method to be followed by the employee in order to gain an approximation of his full output potential. In addition, a piece-rate plan would have to be included as a financial incentive to ensure maximum performance.

At about the same time, Max Weber (1962), a German sociologist, developed a similar pattern of thought concerning the relationship between manager and subordinates. He elaborated the ideal characteristics of bureaucracy viewing the organisation from the top downward. The Weberian image of human nature is no different from Taylor. The characteristics of specialisation of personnel, hierarchy of authority, entry and advancement by competitive examinations, written policies-all resulted into depersonalising the human interaction. The individual is largely an irrelevant entity, mostly dependent on the function of a complex cobweb, and a tiny part of the overall machine. To circumvent the hazards of human behaviour, the whole process of interaction is impersonalised.

The industrial organisations as well as governmental structures adhere to these Taylor-Weber assumptions about human nature and human interaction. The

persuasiveness of the model, which emphasises administrative control, minimising employee resistance, is evident in the large number of organisations.

### 10.2.7 Instinctual or Reasonable

Locke's concept of the social contract envisaged reason and goodness as the fundamental and natural potential among humans. Thus, inherently humans are disposed toward the medium of support and cooperation rather than war and aggression. Locke argued in *Two Treatises of Government*, that agreement emerges among free humans to entrust to the representatives of the society the authority to manage the collective affairs and common welfare. He identified democratic means as the most efficacious and convenient way to charge the custodianship to the right group. The sovereign power is conceived to decide what people want it to decide and rule them how people want it to rule over them.

Another interesting feature of Locke's philosophy is that he lays great emphasis to the role of social experience and learning. In contrast to Freudian assumptions, Locke believes that at birth the mind of human is *tabula rasa*, a blank sheet of paper. The mind learns through reason based on exposures and efforts. The function of government, therefore, is not to create its own laws as a controlling force but to discover what natural forces bring man to a state of reason in which he can control himself.

Some sixteen centuries ago, same ideas originated in the thesis of Marcus Tullius Cicero. He argued that men by nature believe in goodness and well doing, and abhor savagery and baseness. He further pointed out in his book titled *On the Commonwealth* (51 B.C.) that on the assumption of mutual advantage, humans come together in obedience to social instincts. They form a democratic association or commonwealth for the benefit of all, and within such bond emerges a kind of leader allegiance rather than through regulation based on force.

### 10.2.8 Cooperative or Competitive

Within the field of science, Allee (1951) and Montagu (1962) presented ideas that supported the position of Cicero and Locke. On the basis of empirical findings, they argued that nature, from the biological and anthropological point of view, supports the concept of survival through cooperation rather than competition. They pointed out that the probability of survival for any single individual, as well as for a species as a whole, increases when relationships are forged and cooperative arrangements are enacted. Humans must rely on others for the satisfaction of their needs, and therefore affinity for interdependence is a fundamental reaction of the social state. However, they identified the possibility of employing force or demonstrating power to establish hierarchy of dominance and subordination within the cooperative arrangement. The need for hierarchy within cooperative arrangement arises to clarify role expectation, to identify goals and objectives, and to maintain loyalty.

Allee and Montagu also pointed out that individuals thrive better where hierarchy is firmly rooted, and suffer when constant shuffling is taking place. However, at any time an individual can choose to renege or take initiative to change the hierarchy. The warfare is considered by Montagu, as it was by Allee, as a human invention derived from economic or materialistic, rather than biological, considerations.

### 10.2.9 Driven or Developed

Much of the modern view abhors Cartesian view that humans are born with innate ideas and a more or less fixed nature. The behavioural school of thought considers the constructive process of learning as the basis of human relationships and takes optimistic view of the human nature. They believe that humans bring a blank page. Human nature is neither predetermined nor fixed by the genes. It learns through experiences of the cycle of work and rewards. The set of attitude and behaviour that humans adopt are actually acquired in the life that undergoes continuous changes. Neo-Freudians such as Sullivan, Erich Fromm (1941), and Karen Homey departed

from classic Freudian **thinking** and posited that external societal forces and events play a greater role than innate desires and instincts in shaping up the human behaviour. Neo-Freudians do not see any dichotomy between humans and society as perceived by Freud and Hobbes which implies that a set of drives representing evil within human nature remain in conflict with the set of rules in human culture. Brown says that difference in Freudian and neo-Freudian is that people are pushed from behind or drawn from front. The school of psychological determinism focuses on drives, instincts, conditioned reflex as a source of behaviour while subjective theories focus on psychic energy created by perception of reality and personal goals. Human life starts with potentials and is absorbed in pursuits of goals. The manner in which potentials are realised and goals are achieved depend on the pattern of interpersonal relations. The form and content of human personality is an outgrowth of specific cultural forces. For example, individuals seek security in a social situation and avoid anxiety caused by feelings of disapproval or inadequacy. At the state of infancy, humans are, in Rousseau's terms, in a state of oneness and harmony with nature. Exposure to the human relationships alters this profound sense of well being into a state of tension. Sullivan describes "euphoria" as a tensionless state similar to that experienced by an infant or a person who is unaware of the threats or has a feeling of total satisfaction. Education and learning foster the self-making system, which moulds the personality. Sullivan sees two different types of systems self-system and true self. Self-system is the realised potential while true self is the unrealised potential. Because of interpersonal experiences in contemporary culture, most people remain 'inferior caricatures of what they might have been.'

In a similar vein, Fromm (1941) strongly rejects the idea that instincts are the primary source of human behaviour. He does admit that humans are born with a set of drives and instincts. He also agrees with Sullivan that human culture shapes the particular patterns of development of individuals. But he builds further the same theme by considering that human potentialities depend to a very large extent on the will to

productiveness which society succeeds in bringing to human. The environment in which the individual exists, therefore, becomes a primary factor in the way he responds to life and work. Fromm says that animals achieve close ties with nature by adapting to the nature through their instinctual equipment. Similarly, humans with the same desire to be part of nature are alienated through self-awareness and reason. The process of alienation is not limited to interaction between human and nature but also between him and himself, between him and other and between him and his work. In this process of removing the alienation by humans attempt to work in accordance with their own potential.

Karen Horney, in tandem with Sullivan and Fromm, was one of the first analysts to emphasise role of interpersonal relations in behaviour development. How a person reacts to other is influenced by the way he is treated by others. She disagrees with Freudian emphasis on giving an excessive role to biological factors in character formation. All individuals, she says, seek sentiments of approval from others. When such support does not materialise, individuals have a choice to either move further toward people (feeling inadequate, they become attached and dependent), or move against people (feeling rejected, they become aggressive), or move away from people (feeling alone, they become secluded).

Neurotic behaviour occurs when there is conflict over which response pattern to adopt in a given situation. Assuming that humans are not doomed by a set of parentally determined instincts or early life experiences, Horney tended to look toward present interpersonal involvement for the understanding of clues and triggers to the neurotic problems. Human nature is not eternally fixed by inescapable genetic dispositions. Humans develop significantly in cooperation and interaction with others. According to Horney, what is needed is a strategy to tap human's potential for joining in productive relationships with others.

### 10.2.10 Responsive or Fixed

In the realm of industrial organisations, Elton Mayo (1960) found that the logical study of comprehension of psychology of workers should not be just limited to individuals. The analysis for issues such as non-cooperative and unproductive relations between employers and employees should also bring into consideration leadership, work environments, group context, and other situational factors. He also pointed out inadequacy of the concept that life on earth is an atonement for original transgressions of God's laws, and that man is cursed with a set of evil instincts which must be curbed by society for understanding of human nature. Scientific studies, thus, contradicted the Hobbesian theory by demonstrating that humans were more victims than antagonist in his environment.

### 10.2.11 Creative or Adaptive

Mayo's work added normative perspectives to the nature of human relations. Later on, he was joined by Argyris, (1962) McGregor, (1960) Likert and A. H. Maslow's (1954) to determine aspects of training and education, leadership behaviour, contextual factors, and motivational factors. The study of human adopted the shape of study of motivation in organisational setting. The unsatisfied needs of hunger, safety, social affection, esteem, and self-actualisation-all in an extended sense- are supposed to motivate human behaviour. Implicit in this type of paradigm is the idea that essence of human nature is defined by the spectrum of needs, capacities, and tendencies. These needs, as expressed by Maslow, 'are on their face good or neutral rather than evil.' The challenge for managers and leaders is to maximize the opportunities for growth in a conducive workplace. In an ideal situation, while working humans continually mature into a yet better human being while serving organisational goals through own goals.

In a continuing reflection of the neo-Freudian view of man, McGregor characterises employees as lazy, indifferent, unwilling to take responsibility, intransigent,

uncreative, and uncooperative. While Argyris suggests values such as mutual understanding, trust, self-esteem, openness, internal commitment to develop fully functioning human beings aspiring to achieve excellence. Behavioural scientists think that given the opportunity humans will participate creatively in furthering the objectives of the organisation. In contrast, if frustrated, human behaviour will be totally alienated from an orientation toward work as a central life interest. Under the influence of assumption about human nature as a creative being oriented toward constructive activities, the extensive programs of education and skill development among all employees were initiated.

### 10.2.12 Ambivalence or Discreet

Bergson said that war in a materialistic society is natural, but he noted that collective ownership leads to cooperation within groups to protect members from outsiders. Even Freud, who comes closest to a concept of innately evil humans straining against societal constraints to satisfy their needs, conceded that human may become 'good' because of his dependency on others. He will, in short, cooperate when he finds helping behaviour in other men. Similarly, Locke argued that reason evoked cooperation among men. However, he implied that the 'social contract' exists between ruler and the ruled to control man's acquired competitive, aggressive nature. The neo-Freudians believed that man's goodness or evilness was a product of experience, i.e., competitive (hating) experiences lead to malfunctioning by societal standards, but cooperative (loving) experiences lead to satisfaction and to development.

The psychoanalytic assumptions and clinical findings of the neo-Freudians to the effect that man has basic worth and is capable of constructive psychic responses in an environment of understanding and encouragement have received scientific support among modern experimenters. Behavioural Science Man, whether the setting has been in the laboratory or in the field-in a business, education, or government

organisation-is a 'good' man whose potential for productive growth and self-actualisation has too often been stunted by his superiors' outmoded assumptions that he is 'bad.' Therefore, for their purposes, he must be manipulated like a puppet on a string.

### 10.3 Primary Tendency

It would be too simplistic to assume that human nature can be classified into two opposite dimensions of character such as love and hate or warrior or peacemaker. Any human being is a mixture of the opposite traits blending in various proportions for various objects at a time, given the learning and experience. Similarly, all the possible social processes are located along a continuum whose polar extremities are mutual cooperation and predatory competition. As opposite ends of a spectrum, cooperation and competition are closely related to friendship and enmity, harmony and discord, and collaboration and opposition. They may therefore be used to describe a person's basic or characteristic propensity toward his fellowmen. In terms of interpersonal attitudes, every person will find himself at some point on this spectrum depending on the particular situation in which he is involved.

Nonetheless, human character generally exhibits a central quality of being or a **primary** tendency something toward which it is drawn by the force of his own history and experience. Evident in all personalities there is a core pattern to which people adhere to so much that it becomes synonymous to their character identity. Consequently, a degree of ambivalence is found in both perspectives, i.e., those who **think** that humans are good as well as those who think that humans are evil.

## CHAPTER 11.0

### DYNAMICS OF HARMONY

Humanity is the only being, says Heidegger (1927, p. 32, 67), who has to settle the issue of 'being,' as a consequence of, its being. It implies that the identity of human being is to be discerned not only by what human beings are, or what they were, but what they could be and what they ought to be. The fundamental modality of being needs to continuously resolved in view of external and internal changes. The philosophy of existentialism (Sartre 1946) projects that for humanity existence precedes essence which means that the only given human nature is the task to create a self, an identity, and interpret meanings all in a transitional mode.

Now how the 'doubleness' should be accounted for in this maze of human nature? How nature itself could produce a creature whose nature, in part, lies in the negation of a part of its own nature? Why in the case of humanity alone the nature should produce this chameleon of a species. Biologically speaking, why humanity has a remarkable tendency to adapt.

All philosophers from early to modern times have broadly agreed that anxiety and conflicts at internal and external levels introduce complexity, uncertainty, ambiguity, and equivocality in human behaviour. Notwithstanding the unrealistic character of the view about human nature that it consisted of an equivocal set of perfectly harmonious disposition, it is interesting to note that the most traditional philosophical anthropology always showed deep appreciation for it. Aristotle posited that it is the peculiar nature of human being to negate that fixed nature. Therefore, in a sense, humanity becomes itself only in the paradoxical attempt to negate itself. Traditionally, the fixed side of human nature is represented by the rational animal paradigm. Since happiness is the fulfilment of essential nature, human happiness is supposed to lie in a judicious blending of an ideal or earth bound

elements with the divine spark, which for Aristotle is reason. The **thinking** of Ghazali and Shah Waliullah has already been discussed before. Aristotle does grant to this 'mixed life' a certain second-class happiness (*N.F.*, X, I 178a8 - 23).

Aristotle thinks that human nature attempts to negate itself in order to become that which it most truly is. He believes in paradoxical anthropology in which the truest fulfilment of human nature comes not from the fulfilment of what is merely human, but from the attempt to negate the essential humanness-to be like God. Here again the views of Islamic scholars converge with Aristotle.

Aristotle's thought are echoed elsewhere in other philosophers' writings as well. He drew from the Platonic anthropology of the *Symposium*, wherein (203-4) the human essence is understood to be consisting of Eros. Eros is the desire for that which is deficient in the human form of being. If ever completely fulfilled, it would drive the human (lower) form of being into a state of contentment that is appropriate only to God. Human way of existence, for Plato, is that of paucity or deficiency, weakness or vacuum combined with knowledge and skills, resources and methods. Thus Eros is the life of the continual effort to achieve self-transcendence through the achievement of a godlike satiety. The teaching concerning self-revival from Islamic point of view also agree on the same.

The moral sensibility of the Iliad also suggests the same notion of self-transcendence towards the gods. The status of heroes is achieved by people who struggle to be godlike and immortal. Presumably, it also appears to be the reason of the fall of Adam when Eve was tempted by the promise that if she eats the forbidden fruit she will become like God.

The paradoxical multiplicity of human nature is a thoroughly recognised fact, in contemporary literature, and Qur'an, too. In fact, one can be overwhelmed with the current obsession with plurality, diversity, and relativity of thoughts that are hostile to any semblance of fixed design of human nature. Today, the focus of empirical

anthropology is on cataloguing the variety of difference in human culture rather than continuing the historical debate on a restrictive subject such as the human nature.

The paradoxical nature helps humans to sustain themselves and dominate other species. The domination of humans is disrooted in its adaptability, imagination, self-negation, and self-recreation. As a restless creature, humans have the incentive to seek out new circumstances and invent the future. All other creatures and all elements of nature are content and bound within their own nature and function in an entirely fixed environment.

Humans are an anxious animal having paradoxical nature with capability to transcend by rejecting or reaffirming the desires and behaviours. Nietzsche thought of human nature as a self-propelled wheel. The restlessness is there to relieve the sense of weakness, to achieve domination, to attain novelty, and to recreate the self. Traditionally, human kind has been seen as composed of two different things: nature and the spark of God, good or evil, or more popularly today known as flesh and spirit or mind and body. Ghazali divides humans into four classes in view of their state of negation of the self and adherence to the original self:

In the first category are persons who do not have a moral character. Due to weakness in self-consciousness, they cannot distinguish between good and evil, between right and wrong. Though they have yet not wholly become slaves to the pleasures of the senses. The character of such persons can be improved by providing guidance and helping them to become strong in determination.

In the second category are people who in spite of being addicted to the indulgence of the lower appetites, are nevertheless alive to their evil effects. They can discriminate between good and evil. Their consciousness is fully developed and they realise that the rational self is the only true self. Yet they succumb to the demands of their lower selves because they are not practised in subjecting their actions to the power of their will. They can be reformed, firstly, by abandoning their habits, and secondly by

cultivating virtuous habits. They are amenable to good influence if they have the will to improve their character.

In the third category are the people who are not only addicted to evil ways but also believe that those ways are good and to follow them is necessary. With regard to such people it can be said that the real nature of things has become obscured in their minds. Consequently, the gratification of the lower self appears to them as the sole end of human life. They are brought up in ignorance. Their animal self has grown at the expense of their rational self. To reform them is relatively difficult.

In the fourth category are the people who are actually proud of doing evil and of leading others astray. The improvement of such people is the most difficult. Only a conversion through Divine power can bring about a radical change in their case.

### 11.1 Preference for Original Harmony

There is no question that in one sense or another of the word *nature*, both the harmony of the self and its neurotic transformation are natural. There is harmony-nature and then there is anxiety-nature. Which is preferable? Which is the most excellent condition? There are four reasons that favour original harmony over the anxiety-harmony.

Firstly, the psychodynamics of desire make the harmony of the self more persistent than any and all of its transformations. Anxiety effects only a relatively superficial alteration of pleasures through the mechanism of unconscious pain relief. But the moment the pain ceases, the original constellation of pleasures returns, just as the sailor rediscovers the pleasure of his possessions and the pain of their loss the moment the storm is over. The original self is not so much destroyed in the process of transformation, as it is buried, and it remains there, as it were, awaiting the circumstance in which it can reappear. The total regimen of worship, remembrance, and repentance is geared to revive the original self.

Secondly, both Aristotle and Plato claim that only the pleasures of the harmonious soul can be called 'true pleasures.' This can be empirically confirmed when the sailor says of his eccentric pleasures that he 'never really enjoyed them,' anyway. To the extent, that only the desires of the harmonious soul are 'true' desires, so the harmonious nature is the true nature. This illuminates the priority of the harmonious nature from yet another angle. See also Veatch's excellent (1992) on the good as constitutive of desire in the teleological account of psychology.

Thirdly, it is important to notice that the logical and dynamic priority of the harmonious nature is the reflection of a straightforward temporal priority that is very nearly decisive on its own account. The harmony of the self contains all that ties human beings to the rest of animal nature. It is thus far older than anxiety and presumably contains the totality of instinctive life except for the anxiety-motivation itself. Age, it must be remembered, is a very important criterion for the establishment of legitimacy from an evolutionary point of view. What is called 'nature' is conservative and tradition-loving. Pollution, i.e., the destruction of the natural environment and its replacement by an artificial one, is a time-bound concept. Given enough time, the natural order would adjust to the pollutants of industry. Artifice is eventually incorporated into a remade nature and a system of new natures is created, as happened after the advent of oxygen. In the short run, however, these pollutants wreck havoc on what is then commonly and properly called the 'natural environment,' i.e., the environment into which the dynamic and structural features of the organism have evolved with great intricacy and internal harmony over an unimaginably long sequence of biological ages.

Fourthly, there is the matter of sheer quantity. It has already been noted that the harmony of the self contains all the instinctual elements of most ancient past and almost all of the uniquely human motivations of more recent past. Over and against all this, the neurotic self has single motivation. The capacity for anxiety, although it gives rise to a quite marvelous variety, is itself still but a single source of motivation.

## 11.2 Conscience as Change Agent

In the chapter on leadership mould of nature, there was a discussion on the reproaching self. According to Qur'an, this represents the conscience in the human self. In this section, a review of traditional and modern **thinking** is undertaken to conclude that the idea of conscience as an essential constituent of the self has also been present in the Western philosophy.

Conscience is generally considered as the final moral authority at the individual's level (Garnett 1969). For St. Paul, conscience is said to be the effect of the moral law's being written 'in the hearts' of the gentiles, not in their minds (Romans 2: 14 - 16). In literature, one can identify two different perspectives on conscience. The traditional view is closer to the concept of harmony, virtue, and health presented here. The modern view leads to the different direction of relativism and paradox. First, a summary of both perspectives will be reviewed and then the Islamic perspectives will be compared and contrasted. The analysis will be focused on what is the role of conscience? How conscience can influence behaviour? What is the link between conscience, freedom, virtue, health? How it can be used for leadership and management? And lastly, why it is difficult to listen to the voice of conscience?

### 11.2.1 The Traditional View of Conscience

The traditional view of conscience is easily misunderstood and sometimes it is known for what it is not and sometimes it is not known for what it is. The early discussions on the subject can be traced in Plato's theories of Eros and recollection, in St. Paul, Plotinus, Augustine, Aquinas, Shaftesbury, Hutcheson and Butler (1726).

Butler has added another dimension to this view by calling it as a source of infallible knowledge (Anscombe 1958, p. 2; Fuss 1964, p. 112). This was not part of the traditional notion of conscience and would seem to fit better with the modern one.

In traditional view, conscience is configured as an innate, still, small voice that urges **humankind** to particular ways of action and conduct. It is constituted by or

constitutes beliefs about right and wrong. The source of these beliefs lies within the more authentic deeper human self but may not be acknowledged in the ordinary course. Thus this voice is deeper than the voice with which the beliefs are spoken. This voice is also assumed to urge everybody towards the same way of conduct. It is also attributed to the sense of guilt that it creates if it is not heeded. The traditional view also presupposes that the best opinion on moral beliefs may or may not be correct.

The question whether attempts of different people to consult conscience yield different or same results needs resolution. The contents of conscience can be thought the same for all if the attempt to consult it is fallible. The fallibility of conscience is also a necessary condition for the possibility of its interpersonal validity in various contexts over a period of time. In contrast, the infallibility of conscience, based perhaps on a Cartesian notion of a person's privileged access to the contents of his own moral consciousness is a guarantee of its relativity. For it is a foregone conclusion that the attempts of different people to consult it will sometimes yield different results.

### 11.2.2 The Modern View of Conscience

The most important characteristic of modern view is that it projects the possibility of variety in the conscientious behaviour of people in terms of direction as well as magnitude. If conscience is to be treated as the final moral authority then it leads to relativism and a paradoxical nature of virtue and ethics. At interpersonal level, it leads to a complex situation. For example, person A desires to do things that person B considers immoral (Nowell-Smith 1954, p.247; Bennet 1974). Now if person B grant the moral authority of person A's conscience, then person B is forced to admit that person A ought to do something that person B he ought not do.

The modern notion of conscience is associated with Freudian psychology. The deepest layer of the self in Freud, the id, is frequently assumed to be a reservoir of (at

best) amoral urges. Thus the Freudian superego seems to be precisely what is called the 'modern' notion of conscience.

### 11.2.3 Comparison and Analysis

There are two basic differences between traditional and modern views. Firstly, the modern view leads to the relativistic and paradoxical conclusion. Secondly, the conscience is not considered as the univocal and authentic voice of morality. In the modern sense, in some circumstances people ought not to act in accord with conscience (Nowell-Smith (1958, p. 248). But it does not make sense to say that people ought not to obey their most legitimate mode of access to moral truth (Garnett 1969, p. 83; Szabados 1976, p. 467).

However, there is a certain sense in which even the traditionalist must agree that one ought not to do something that he believes is wrong. It goes without saying that one ought to do the best one can to determine the right course of action and act on that determination. To determine the moral truth is each person's final obligation and a person is expected to be as best as one can. Nonetheless, even after doing the best one can, one can fail to determine the truth correctly. Thus if one means by 'conscience' merely 'doing the best one can to determine the moral truth,' then indeed the final authority of conscience also seems to entail the original paradox.

The traditional notion does not lead to relativistic conclusion not because inherently not relativistic or because one can not be successful in an attempt to derive the best one can.

This is common for understanding of any other discipline. It applies to the entire concept of doing the best one can in any area of knowledge or in any endeavour at all. Presumably one must always do 'the best one can,' and for it one deserves a certain kind of praise. It is still unfortunately true that in a wide variety of ways the

best one can do may not be good enough. The precisely correct expression of the equivocation is not a problem that concerns the specifics of conscientious behaviour. But if thought more deeply, the notion of doing one's best will lead to the real heart of the problem of conscience and to the intimate connection that exists between it and genuine freedom. This connection can be construed using the sincerity of the purpose and self-deception. Butler posits that self-deception is the great corrupter of conscientious knowledge (Szabados 1976). No one believes that insincere conscience exists which can yield different opinions to different people on a similar actions. If one is sincere then conscience would do its best to show the best way. If a person from Serbian army argues that it was his sad duty to exterminate Muslims and he had to do it against the temptations of pity. It is possible to claim that he was sincere, it is hard to prove that he was not. The self-knowledge would entail a consciousness divided against itself, a consciousness that does not that it is lying, but which also has motives for lying and which also knows well that it is lying. 'his kind of conscientiousness rests on the capacity to render one's self ignorant of own tyrannical desires, sense of justice, feeling of humiliation that may have given rise to his surface personality. If sincerity means saying what one really believes, and if a person can deceive herself about what she believes, then his protestations are insincere and are not the manifestations of any form of conscientiousness at all. Sincerity implies absence of self-deception. Certainly not of one that would be acknowledged to have final authority. Even if one means by 'conscience' no more than 'doing the best one can to ascertain the moral truth,' it is not at all clear that person has done this, even though he seems to he has.

The intrusion of sincerity and self-deception in the working of conscience makes it clear that the idea of the unconscious bears critically on the notion of conscientiousness. Just as the notion of knowing one's own desires turns out to constitute a large part of the meaning of freedom, so does it constitute a large part of conscientiousness. At least if conscientiousness must be sincere and if sincerity

implies the absence of self-deception. The very personal qualities that make genuine freedom possible are also the conditions for conscientious living. Conscience is rooted in self-knowledge and is restrained in those who are self-deceived. Seen from the perspective of the synthesis of health and virtue, the concept of conscience adopted in this paper is akin to the traditional sense.

The bare existence of the Freudian superego should not preclude the existence of other kinds of guilt that might resemble more like the traditional notion of conscience. The assumption of reification of the superego as the locus of that particular species of guilt is not contradictory to the traditional theory. However, the assumption of the amorality of the instincts is not acceptable in the traditional notion. The instinct in the traditional voice of conscience does contain the moral content. It is also characterised by ambivalence and vagueness, which can explain its obscurity, quietness, and weakness. The working of self-deception imprisons the conscience within the depths of unconscious. When they call from the depths, they frequently face repression, and thus often become inaudible to the consciousness. They also exert themselves in a variety of disguises to find a way out. Under these disguises, the evil in the human nature made attempts to influence the consciousness and tempts to indulge in neurotic pride. As a result, the consciousness often misidentifies its welfare and selfhood through neurotic pride. The goodness in human nature seeks satisfaction and compete with the influence of the bad.

Erich Fromm in 1947 reinterpreted Freud by distinguishing between the authoritarian and humanistic conscience. He called the Freudian superego as the 'internalised voice of authority' (1947, p. 148). The latter he described as the voice of the true selves which desires to see humans to develop fully and harmoniously and to live productively and to become what they potentially are. He is also of the view that humanistic conscience is the expression of their true selves; it contains moral experience of the life (1947, p. 163). This type of conscience can also be called genuine

conscience. Its role is consistent with the notions of psychic health that includes true self, work, love, harmony, and, most importantly, innate liking for virtue.

One of the critical point levelled by the scientific school of thought is that conscience conceived as such de-emphasises rather degrades the role of intellect. The kind of confused intellectual apprehension of moral truth complemented by the emphasis on desires, instincts, urges, as well as deception and repression sound too reductionist. But the intellectual perspectives of conscience is not subdued in the traditional notion. Within the spirit of Plato, myth of recollection serves as a sort of semi-mystical intellectual support for the notion of conscience. The theory of Eros serves as a kind of blind emotional attachment to ethical truth (the beautiful) and supplies to this known-but-forgotten knowledge its affective force. Plato **thinks** that the object of desire is known but forgotten (i.e., unconsciously known) while Freud is of the view that they are repressed (conveniently forgotten). The doctrines of both are thus inaccord at the working of conscience.

#### 11.2.4 To begin With

Human beings find themselves in some form of fixed being to begin with. Then deviations occur due to deliberate struggles and external pressures. At the end, some philosophers postulate, human being may return to that fixed being. The nature of the human nature, thus, must include within its folds, self-negating and divergent aspect as well as the fixed and rational aspects. A plausible theory of anthropology should explain the human being as negation of itself, i.e., a fluid and dynamic character and who is always struggling against itself to be the that best that is ill possible for it to be. In either case, there must be something to be negated.

In general, pain is a form of illness or a functional disadvantage. But humans can choose to bear pain or increase pain if that delivers other higher goals in terms of happiness or unhappiness. Apparently, self-condemnation is such type of pain. It is a kind of pain or ill-feel that has the potential to reconfigure the halpny of the

original pleasures in a variety of ways. This kind of transformation unfolds new opportunities under changing environments which otherwise would have not been possible. This also serves a great advantage to the survival and domination of human species. In the process of self-negation, governing role is assumed by the set of values adopted to dominate. During the early history of western civilisation, the values chosen enhanced domination of the environment in quite obvious ways. ~~What~~ the neurotic self at first claims contempt for the pragmatic or reproductive end that constitute the original harmony of the soul, in fact, the values through which it defines itself could not have been better chosen for those most mundane goals.

In human beings, there is a strange tendency to reject original pleasures of domesticity, peace, and long life. Instead, they choose competition and warfare, to turn the dreams into reality, to test the strengths, and to succeed in domination. Sometimes, they are forced to choose pain to fend off the threats to peace and long life. The pride coming from greater achievements and winning under more stiff competition provides higher status of pleasures. From a strictly evolutionary perspective, these competitive-warrior values confer an obvious reproductive advantage provided these values does not completely rend the social fabric that makes them possible.

A study of history of philosophy demonstrates that the values chosen by even the early civilisations are the one that condemn the earthly, biological, and metaphysical aspects of hu ~~mankind~~. They prepare the hu ~~mankind~~ to become the dominant species on earth. Thus human beings dominate the Earth not because they are rational or because of other skills. They dominate because of the values that drive the ends. The ends represent the discontentment with the self and domination is a mean to mitigate the discontentment.

The harmonious self is thus the ever-persisting source from which the neurotic self emerges. It is more correct to say that it is cloaked or distorted rather than destroyed

by its neurotic transformation. The harmonious self reemerges as soon as the disturbing force relents; it is much older than the neurotic self and it is immeasurably bigger. Nothing can deny the neurotic self's claim to be natural in its own carefully limited sense of the word nature but these broader considerations amount to a set of very pressing reasons for granting that to be a very initial sense of the word.

### 11.25 Self-Discovery

Finally, there is a possibility of negating the self-negating nature. There can be attempts to turn self-negation on itself and thereby try self-consciously to return to as much as possible to the original selfhood. This could be the most nature-fulfilling activity that it is possible for a human being to engage in. This type of reflexive self-negation is a very real, very sophisticated, and very important human activity.

Insofar as self-negation is always artifice vis-a-vis the original self, the negation of self-negation may also be said to belong to the realm of artifice and therapy. It is, however, art in the service of nature, the art that, in Aristotle's words, perfects nature.

In reflexive self-negation, the urge to dominate others is replaced by the urge to dominate oneself (one's neurotic self). The skills to control others is converted into skills to control the self. This kind of self-control opens path towards the discovery of the nonneurotic self or the dawn of a truly moral consciousness.

Naturalists reasonably claim that negation of self-negation is the most human nature of all. It moderates and fulfills both harmonious and self-negating natures. In the unlikely or impossible case of its perfect completion, there would, of course, be a kind of return to the original harmony in which would remain only the barest vestige of the self-negating self. But this would be a return that was at the same time an unquestionable advance, or, to use Hegelian language, it would be an absorption of the original thesis into a higher synthesis – the innocence of the saint rather than the innocence of naivete. But the task, of course, is never complete. The return is always

a process of partial re-appropriation and not the kind of wholesale appropriation of the past that is associated with romanticism.

The fullest and truest human nature does not reside solely in the evolutionary past. The truest human nature, the human nature that encompasses both senses of the word 'nature,' resides in the partial and ongoing negation of self-negation, i.e., in the continual process of self-discovery. It is, in part, a rational, sophisticated, and artful projection of the past into a future. A projection that seeks to determine a present that negates the self as a dead fact that has simply taken place (the neurotic self) – and attempts to recreate it by a process of discovering what it is that one has always really been. It is both nature as the primitive past and nature as the highest attainable perfection. The Naturalist **thinking** on self-discovery will now be merged with the Islamic **thinking** in the next section.

### 11.3 In Social Shell

Social life is the human shell. Society is the necessary condition for biological survival. Philosophers and scientists concur that human beings can adapt well to the social life. They possess inherent capability for social adjustments. It is argued from evolutionary perspectives that notion of harmony of pleasures should also account for social needs. The original harmony of self must incline humans to adopt behaviours that help in relating with others and socialising. As with any other common human behaviour, there can also be exceptions to this presupposition. However, the social nature of humans is now overwhelmingly taken for granted because of increasing empirical evidences in favour of the virtues to which nature incline people.

The simple fact that social man is a natural man, though clearly recognised by the tradition from Plato to Thomas Aquinas, was denied by a great deal of early modern philosophy. It was believed, more so by existentialists, that stripping away of the artificiality of social life is important to expose the pristine human nature. It is now

generally agreed that this was conceptually a misguided approach. Recent traditions of analytic philosophy and the currently popular branch of cognitive sciences exhibit little interest in human nature. Marxism found solace in the traditional point of view but as a mean to its political objectives. In recent times, those writing critiques of capitalist theory have also questioned the underlying assumptions regarding the human nature.

Is the natural human being then good or bad? Neither, given all that is meant by these terms, but human beings are naturally decent. Whatever this decency lacks in scope and refinement is compensated for by the spontaneity that motivates it.

The relatively new field of anthropology focuses on nonjudgmental elaboration of human differences rather than human essence. It takes into consideration the attributes of hostility, cruelty, depression, or humility in people. The way anthropology studies human beings, it obscures understanding of commonality among humans from various places and times. It is too obsessed with differences and diversities to allow consideration of the fact that a normative paradigm of understanding of human nature can help figure out the remarkable commonality within rich diversity. The very first sentence of Ruth Benedict's *Patterns of Culture* (1934:1) amply substantiates this point of view. "Anthropology," he says, "is the science of human beings as creatures of society. It fastens its attention upon those physical characteristics and industrial techniques, those conventions and values, which distinguish one community from all others that belong to a different tradition."

It implies provision of certain degree of variation for adaptation in the human law to the circumstances of time and place. The fixed side of human nature, thus, might be conceived as the lowest common denominator of conduct or some minimal residue of behaviour that can be found in all societies. Though it cannot show itself unequivocally in any society-not even in the most primitive.

### 11.3.1 Human Nature and Culture

The influence of culture on development of personality and shaping the human self is empirically recorded and discussed in detail in behavioural literature. Yankelovich (1973, p. 424) summarised the relation between human nature and culture by saying that nature and culture are constitutive not exclusive of one another. To him human nature needs to be conceived within human culture. This is, of course, the essential premise of the sociology of knowledge, i.e., that knowledge has a sociology and thereby gets constituted by particular interests and power relations (Mannheim 1929: 31).

Later, attempts have been made to draw a line between human nature and culture to grapple with the complexities involved in ascertaining the real nature of the interaction between nature and culture at multiple representations and at various levels. Originally, it was thought there is culture and human organisms, the two separate entities. Now cultural penetration is increasing because of technological prowess. Humans develop a second nature within social shell as a result of the influence of culture. The second nature is mediated by thought, and all thoughts occur inside culture. The most obvious way to approach a definition of second nature is development of forces, inflected through individual consciousness and the unconscious: inflected through, not inscribed upon.

Second nature acts very much like common sense. It is an intuitive response in a spontaneous manner. It so natural a part of the human self that no reflection, or intention or praxis is necessary. It becomes known to others in the course of time and they anticipate how the person is likely behave because of second nature. Ideology play a key role in the developing the second nature (Young 1986).

Young defines human nature as an ensemble of social relations, neither biologically given nor instinctual. He says that "...in deep and fundamental respects, we learn to be human not human in the abstract but human inside history, inside a given

culture and sub-culture, and family his father's son, her mother's daughter, daddy's girl, flawed, Jewish, working class, poised, a trier...but we too easily use the ideas of learning and of socialisation and acculturation non-specifically."

The conception of human nature as ensemble of social relations also implies that history and anthropology are also directly related. Anthropology discusses across the cultures and history discusses across the time and geography. Archaeology, a branch of history brings the analysis back to the phylogenetic scale. Human development presupposes and is in part constituted and constrained by the biological, historical and cultural sedimentation in genes, in a place and a community.

Jean-Paul Sartre also took up the concept and wrote about 'the inertia of infrastructures, the resistance of economic and even natural conditions, the binding of personal relations in things'. All of this is what Sartre called the 'practico-inert', the sedimentation of human actions into social structures that lost their human quality and resisted the freedom of individuals and groups (Poster 1975, p.177-8). What in reality is the socially mediated sedimentation of second nature is therefore presented as nature as such, and in psychology is seen as primal, instinctual nature (Schneider 1975, p.52, 59-60).

Within Hegelian-Marxist and Freudo-Marxist traditions, there has been attempts to invoke the concept of second nature which is neither as general as the epistemological consequences of the sociology of knowledge, nor as the corruption sense notion as conveyed by 'it's second nature' (Adorno 1973; Lukacs 1923; Marcuse 1969: p11n; Jacoby 1981, pp. 118-20; Schneider 1975). In this line of thought, a balance view has been taken between the extreme form of theories of nature and human nature which says that truth and human nature are made and not found (Rorty 1989), on the one hand, and utterly fatalistic and pessimistic views, whether socially fatalistic or biologically so, on the other.

Freud sees life in the society as a compromise between desire and control. He treated it civilisation as an imposed compromise between human self and society as such it is to be regarded as insoluble predicament (Gay 1988, p.547). Freud wrote, 'I recognise ever more clearly that the events of human history, the interactions between human nature, cultural development, and the precipitants of primeval experiences (as whose representative religion pushes to the fore) are only the reflection of the dynamic conflicts among the id, ego, and superego, which psychoanalysis studies in the individual the same events repeated on a wider stage. (quoted in Gay 1988, p.547)' Peter Gay comments: 'He could not have stated the essential unity of his thought any more forcefully' (ibid.).

### 11.4 Learning Harmony

Qur'an presents on going processes to develop and strengthen harmony for effective leadership role. The threefold purposes are to restore, maintain, and develop normal and desirable pattern of behaviour. In an Islamic society, the task of developing harmony assumes the significance of a cultural institution deriving its roots from its sociocultural context and also projecting new values and norms among the individuals. It is synthesis as well as thesis, evolutionary as well as revolutionary.

Qur'an assigns the task of developing harmony on every individual. It becomes the prime thrust of society and individuals. Individuals become an agent of change when they discharge the obligations to enjoin other what is good and prohibit what is bad. Such collaborations often times gallops into a long interactive and evolutionary process in an attempt to balance, modify, or alter the human behaviour and to root out the sources of psychic sickness.

Essentially, there cannot be any universal standard theory and practice of human development. As an investigative and therapeutic tool, the types of practices vary in terms of the nature of the targeted goals, etc. The purpose of developmental efforts is exploration and resolution of problems.

Islam has developed its own ways of human development and psychotherapy by projecting transcendental concept of human being. The philosophical roots of the culture impinge upon the ways and means of psychotherapy. The holistic and comprehensive approach of Muslim psychotherapy is highly dynamic. This tradition is neither derivative of other cultures nor just a discursive series of effects generated by alien influence. The traditional doctrines have been continuously reformulated and renewed on the basis of the given constants in relation to changing human circumstances (Burchardt 1983).

Islamic thinking has been able to remain intact since its beginnings because of the relatively dynamic character it possesses in a collective form and its emphasis on intellectual contemplation, which transcends the affective currents of the human soul. For instance, Sufism is a tradition that deals with transmission of wisdom divine in origin. It focuses on perpetuation in time and a continual renewal by contact. During the dark ages, while demonology and magic persisted in the West, many Muslim scholars put forward radical humanistic approach towards mentally disturbed individuals and suggested scientific ways and means for their recovery.

The process of development revolves around three primary factors. Firstly, assessment of the disorder; secondly, exploration of the causes; application of techniques. In practice, it is not the actualities but the potentialities of human nature that provide a standard (Allport 1960). The popular behaviourist approach associates psychic health with the absence of mental illness. Value oriented questions are ignored because of problematic measurement. The infinite spiritual qualities and the moral dimensions are discounted and the psychological person is devoid of soul, absolved of faith, and his wellbeing is disintegrated (Hamid 1974).

### 11.4.1 Reactive Learning

As explained earlier, Qur'an has provided the chance to repent and return from any state of diversion or deviation. Tawbah is the way back to the original state of nature.

Qur'anic concept of learning does require humankind to resort to Freudian means of repression and deception. Tawbah is not the negation of past, it is a contract for future in return for eradication of past evil. It is the result of a person's understanding of the wrongness of an act and his determination not to repeat the act. Qur'an provides the stamp of divinity and hence authenticity to this act of confession as a therapeutic measure. The story of Adam narrated in the beginning of Qur'an sends this powerful message to all humanity.

People become overpowered by a stern sense of guilt and the realisation that there is no way that they can absolve them of what they have done. Afflicted by sense of guilt and immersed in the state of wickedness, they would find in Tawbah a way to get rid of the sense of guilt and remission of their sins. Their mind would become free of damnation and the expectation of further damnation. It would ultimately relieve the depression and people could start a new life in righteousness.

Qur'an projects repentance not as a source of disqualification but of qualification and a necessary tribute of the successful people. Qur'an gives great value to the confession and maintains a predominantly healthy attitude towards sin by providing a disciplinary remedy against it. Ghazali says, "Narrating the moral conflicts to another person is often sufficient to prevent the conflicts from becoming the source of morbid obsessions." Even today, in the melancholic asylum it is a common obsession of patients that they have committed an unpardonable sin and are, therefore, forever cut off from the hope of God's forgiveness. The act of confession deals both with social, psychic and personal welfare of the people. Otherwise, the suffering may continue to afflict him, even though the legal arm of society may never be able to punish him. Through Tawbah, the social status of the person is also reset. The original self-image is restored.

Tawbah opens door for reconciliation of the person to the world and to God.

Afterwards the person can again enter into relationship with God instead of being relegated to hopeless state of depression, alienation, and ultimately suicide. Tawbah launches the person into the road of self-development and self-revival through effective learning of the self by the self. The process is driven by the Reproachment self and constantly reinforced by the Consummate Self. It is embedded in the deep realisation of the wrong that the person has committed. It is negation of the self-negation as discussed in the preceding discussion.

As a result of Tawbah, the hardness of the heart is replaced by openness and softness. The act of Tawbah is complete when heart is changed and the source of motivation is set in a righteous and the original mode. Confession saves the person from becoming a hypocrite or adapting to dualistic personality. It reunifies the personality into one organic whole. In many ways the dynamics of confession are similar to the process in psychotherapy known as 'catharsis'. Catharsis, (literally, cleansing) likewise involves the expression of negative feelings and past mistakes, but for which a sense of blame may or may not be present. In fact, in some modern forms of group therapy, violent verbal blasts and expressions of hostility are encouraged and approved. The mere uninhibited release of libidinal energy is assumed to be of therapeutic consequence. Tawbah strengthens the sense of responsibility as the confessor accepts the guilt as a reality instead of shrugging it. This implies restoration to God within the eternal perspective. It is a cosmic healing that is much more than getting rid of bothersome symptoms that go beyond a mere time-and-space-solution.

*Tawbah* implies a change in the old patterns of life. The whole of human personality is involved in it. This fact has been established in the modern times too. Robert H. Thouless says:

"Private confession is helpful in many instances. My experience indicates that confession is therapeutically helpful, as well as theologically and sacramentally. I have counselled successfully as a priest, when trained psychologists have failed. It is amazing how some patients respond to the therapy of grace, which is provided when other methods fail. The fact of divine aid has tremendous psychological effect. The removal of guilt is in fact efficacious, where there is real sorrow, because of a supernatural motive and a sincere intention of amendment."

Tawbah is the eradication of all wrongdoing done to the self. Humankind surrenders once again to the will of God. God commits in Qur'an, "He pardons, him unto who turns to Him with a pertinent heart".

#### 11.42 Proactive Learning

While Tawbah represents the process of reactive learning, Tazkiya symbolises the process of proactive learning. Tawbah is an opportunity of revival for the self while Tazkiya is an ongoing, incessant, relentless struggle to perfect the angelic aspect of the self within human nature. It is an initiative to purge the evils from the self to attain Angelic purification by uprooting the animal constituents of desire. Qur'an relate self-purification as the primary characteristic of the people to enter the paradise.

Another word that is used in Islam is *Hdlzb* which means cut off, lopped, pruned, cleansed, reformed, polished, trained, and educated. Qur'an is a book of human development at individual as well as collective levels. The building of character and morals are issues of prime concern in the eyes of Qur'an. Tazkya, according to Muhatrunad Qutb (1977) reflects "development of the good side of human and its promotion, to the end of making him fulfil God's description of his creation in the best forms. Islamic development, or growth, is equally fulfilled by the disciplining of the self (nafs) which is capable of evil, by enabling it to master its affections and passions."

Carl Rogers characterises this inner growth as 'becoming of a person,' while Abraham Maslow (1908 - 1970) describes it as 'Self-actualisation.' There is agreement among Islamic psychologists and self-theorists in the Western tradition that self-development involves freeing one's self from egocentric defensive counter-productive attitude and behaviour. Yet the Islamic concept of self-development differs in that it emphasises the importance of inculcating noble and spiritually dynamic qualities in the self to please Allah.

### 11.4.3 The Perfect Being: Way to Perfection

The human soul, is capable of attaining perfection, but to attain it, has to work through the three parallel processes of development. These stages, as mentioned earlier, can also be conceptualised as the self-organising system to govern the process of development while retaining the freedom and responsibility of the individual. Tazkiya is not a matter of choice or discretion. Every individual, in the eyes of Qur'an, should undertake the full responsibility of self-development. When a person is not developed, the self would be under the control of passions. It would be guided by the sensuous, momentary and extraneous pluralistic appearance of reality. The self, at this stage, remains fully engrossed with the gratification of the immediate sense-perceived pleasures. The light of reason or cognition, then develops and starts challenging the overpowering affections. In the contest between reason and passion, either reason may be able to suppress passion by pre-occupation with various intellectual pursuits and by leading a virtuous life. But since reason heavily leans on analytical processes, the self at this stage cannot have the fully integrated perception of reality as the all-pervasive Unity. Consequently the self stops short of developing into a fully integrated personality. However, reason often becomes strong enough to persuade the self into refraining from the predominantly ego-centred pursuits. It also makes the self become aware of and sensitive to the prevailing sociocultural values and norms, so that the personality begins to absorb and reflect the current social ideals and norms. From the ego-centred self, the personality transforms into a

conventional social self. But the intellectual light, with its characteristic discursive nature, fails to pierce through the veils of the dominant sociocultural values into an abiding perception of Reality. Whatever momentary glimpses of the dim shrouded Reality may be achieved at this stage, always gets tarnished by the mediation of conventional ideals and values. Thus though *al-nafs al-lawrvamali* subordinates *al-nafs al-ammara li bi al-su'* by replacing the exclusive guidance of gross sensory light with the finer and superior light of 'reason', it cannot achieve a fully integrated state of personality.

The final stage of development, *al-nafs al-mutma'innah*, is attained when the personality gets rid of the conventional self through the direct perception of *tawhīd* – the ultimate Unity and Reality – by the innermost transcendental light of the heart. Such an unaided perception of *tawhīd* with the light of the heart's own eyes, frees the self from the bondage of the passions within and the socio-physical forces without, since no other forces except those of God, the Unity, exist in the perceptual field of the self at this stage. As a psychological consequence, the self in this phase totally identifies itself with God. As a result, the self-centred ego is completely liquidated and the conventional social self crumbles and disappears to make room for the ascension of inner transcendental self for holding the reins of personality. This ultimately leads to the resolution of all inner conflicts and the attainment of abiding peace in perpetual harmony and unity with God. With all its outer crusts removed, personality is now exposed to the direct radiation of the Divine Reality to become fully dyed with His universal Colour. Coming in contact with the ultimate Transcendental Being, the built-in divine nature of the real human self starts unfolding to the fullest measure. Free from the impact of all conventionalities of the prevalent cultures, the personality transforms itself into a cosmic self, reflecting the impact of all conventionalities of the prevalent cultures, the personality transforms itself into a cosmic self, reflecting in his behaviour the universal character of the Absolute Transcendental Being, the Ultimate Unity and Reality (Haq 1984).

The spirit in humankind is a guarantee that humankind can become a perfect being by ascending to higher states *of* being. The concept *of* a perfect human being has been laid down by Qur'an repeatedly. Qur'an also draws comparisons between people of different types. The perfect human being model *of* Prophet Muhammad and Abraham is also presented in Qur'an to act as benchmark for character building.

### 11.4.4 Perfect Harmony

To form a beautiful personality, reason or wisdom, self-assertion and appetite must work together. Lack *of* these elements leads to mental disorders in man. The progress in the development *of* character depends upon inherent tendencies and the voluntary efforts *of* the will. It is the effort *of* the will that determines the moral worth *of* one's actions. In the beginning such efforts would involve great will power, determination and work and will be accompanied by pain but eventually it may become a habit and then one would begin to find pleasure in it.

To Ghazali, all bodily organs and mental faculties have been created to help man realise the ideal, but it is knowledge, the right use *of* which makes possible the realisation *of* these qualities in him. Ignorance is sickness and knowledge is cure, deviation from faith is abnormality. When knowledge *of* the true nature *of* things is absent man must be suffering from some disease.

Ghazali's most favourite therapy is based on integration *of* action and g.

Human nature strives towards constant struggle and conflict between opposite and potentialities. According to this therapy much emphasis is laid on imagination. The action and thinking will go side by side making the personality balanced.

In order to develop a beautiful character reason or (Aql) and self assertion (*Glzodab*) and appetite (*Shahwa*) should work together in harmony. Their proper development produces qualities that help in the spiritual progress of the self. If there is an excess or deficiency in any *of* these elements it may produce vices and virtues. If

knowledge, appetite and self-assertion are in right proportion only then perfect and complete character is possible. God's immediate aim in sending Prophets was to make the character of their followers perfect by leading them to the knowledge of God.

### 11.5 Virtue and Harmony


The difference between virtue and morality needs to be clarified again in view of the harmony of pleasures. The original harmony of pleasure and decency is also called as innate virtue. Owing to this, human behaviour is spontaneous and decent requiring minimal guidance from rules. Morality represents, in part, an effort to intellectualise this innate virtue. It is partly the attempt to make virtue more precise so that everyone, regardless of emotions, can know exactly what is expected of him and exactly what to expect from others. It attempts to extend the basic outlines of the virtuous psychology into important spheres of action that it does not specify. But whatever the goal, morality involves a translation of living virtue into clear rules; of the spirit of the law into form of letter, to use the Christian phraseology; or, of matters of character into matters of law.

Once the need for this intellectualisation of virtue is accepted, the task can become so engrossing that the fact of translation gets forgotten. There are good chances to be caught up in the logical niceties of one way of stating the rule versus another; in the precise relation of the rules to each other; and in the question of whether there might be higher order rules (laws) from which the lower order rules should be deduced.

Indeed, the greatest moral question is should not there be one supreme moral law from which all the subordinate rules follow. And what should be the epistemic justification of such a law. At that point, the original notion of virtue is lost, and philosophers become comfortable with morality as a discipline very much akin to the mathematics on the one hand, and law on the other. Ever greater precision and systematisation can be demanded. Soon one wants a science of ethics, empirical

(Mill) or a priori (Kant), and when these fail us, the nihilistic or relativistic conclusion begins to seem inevitable (Nietzsche, Ayer). In all this, it is forgotten that virtue was grounded in psychology and anthropology (i.e., moral psychology) not logic.

If one were to desire the virtues of both, then logically, the solution would prescribe to seek a moral order that springs from the purest spontaneity. This optimistic possibility rests on an empirical question - whether there exists in the human psyche a basic harmony of pleasure and (at a minimum) primordial decency.



## CHAPTER 12.0

### CONCLUSION

The business of philosophy is to, says Hampshire (1965, p. 232), "search for a definition of man and to interpret the great philosophers of the past as each providing a different account of the powers essential to man." Early thought that concept of humankind is definitively ascertainable, but it is no longer possible. The contemporary researcher has to settle for a reasoned framework that emanates from cross-fertilisation of variety of disciplines, not the solitude tunnel of a field. Precisely, the work of this thesis has been undertaken in the similar vein and for same pursuit.

The objective of thesis was to refer to the divergent trends of thoughts for analysis to develop understanding about human nature. The basic premise that motivated the inquiry was Qur'anic assertion that human beings have been created in the best of moulds to act as vicegerent of God on this earth. One may, then, justifiably expect that nature of humans should be the nature of leadership. In it should be reflected all core values and qualities of leadership. Since each and every member of the humankind is meant to lead, the nature should be shaped to inculcate the necessary qualities to make it possible.

#### 12.1 Summary of Discourses

It is difficult to conclude the arguments leading to synthesis from diverse streams of **thinking** and subscribing to wide spectrum of themes. This section is intended to summarise the arguments and take a process view of what has been accomplished in the thesis.

Human reasons appear to have the power of elevating itself at times beyond the immediate limitations of its time and place. Some philosophers, the early history of

philosophy, supposedly seen it in the spark of the divine. Then, gradual rise in distrust in the ability of reason to chalk out the destiny made room for all kinds of unconscious forces, both social and psychological, historical and contemporary, to become the real masters. The self, what makes the person a person, has progressively vanished under the onslaught from every direction. Human beings considered to be immortal with an eternal destiny, capable of grasping the true nature of things became doubtful of their capability to understand even their own nature. Pursuit of truth became impossible as pathways were reduced to illusion under increasing criticism.

Thinking in individual disciplines of social sciences proceed with some view about human nature. For instance, Marx, a political economist, and Freud, a psychologist, had to search for the roots of human existence, society and behaviour. Throughout the course of enquiry, the largest assumption has been that there is such a thing called 'human nature.' The search for similarities on the basis of membership of single biological community and dissimilarities with other species is still on as there is neither agreement nor satisfaction with what has been achieved.

The idea that it is possible to select representative thinkers, from a period of nearly two and a half millennia and from a wide variety of countries and to consider that they are all talking about the humanity, is itself a proof of the fact that there is a human nature. It is in the conviction that, human life has remained the same in its essentials through recorded history, that forms the basis for such analysis. What Plato and Aristotle have said is no less likely to be relevant to present concerns than something more recent. This view of human history is not without substantiation from Qur'an. The search for commonality and universality in the thesis is conducted within a framework that builds and connects several scholarly inputs from variety of disciplines.

The first chapter introduces the theme of harmony of leadership and human nature. It lays down the premises upon which the inquiry for the thesis has been initiated. The importance of the concept of human nature in the making of history of ideologies and civilisation is demonstrated on the basis of interpretative research done by leading scholars. The second chapter delves into the methodological issues in their historical context. The phenomenon of evolution of different bases of inquiry over the last hundred years has been traced. The purpose is two-fold. Firstly, to explain the methodological framework of this thesis and cogently substantiate the selected methodology. This chapter is also a study of the human attempts to collect and examine information about their own beings, nature, and society. Chapter three, four and five penetrate into the disciplines of philosophy, science, and Islam to extract themes that point towards synthesis within their own disciplines. In a bold attempt, the statements of facts and values are compared, evaluated, and enriched. The purpose of multidisciplinary investigation is to enrich the understanding of a complex and archaic issue. Many sensitive issues pertaining to the validity of scientific inquiry, philosophical relevance, and Islamic thinking are debated to determine how a view on harmony can be formulated on the basis of the strengths of these perspectives. These chapters largely consist of literature survey, textual relationships, and interdisciplinary dialogue. The fifth chapter refers to the Qur'anic story of the day one of the creation of the first man. The events following the creation are discerned to see primordial events. The context and terms and conditions of the advent of humankind on this planet have been analysed. In sixth chapter, a new model of the human self is presented. Perhaps, this is the first time that a comprehensive model of human self has been conceptualised that consists of spirit, heart, mind, soul, and body. Nowhere else such a model is developed on these lines. Though this chapter primarily draws from the Islamic teachings, it provides a basis for integration of mind-body and heart-mind relationships. It is a unique model and as such raises new questions and provides new orientations. In the seventh chapter, development of physical and psychic health is discussed to see how the notion of

health can help in maintaining the harmony within the human self. This chapter draws extensively from the field of psychology. In the eighth chapter, the innermost self is more extensively focused to see how aligned between soul and virtue as well as union between God and spirit assure and ensure harmony and peace overall. This section draws from all three perspectives and brings into light the inner edges and the outer reaches of human nature.

The ninth chapter is on motivation, which sets the context for behaviour. Here, the object is to find out the human capacity to ascertain meanings on its own. This section throws light on the internal psychic processes concerning pleasures and pains on which a theory of human nature can be founded. The tenth chapter takes the analysis of the human self to the demonstrated facets of human behaviour in the society. The paradoxical nature of human is seen in terms of the continuum where a range of possibilities exists. The vertical typology is based on the thoughts of Shah Waliullah and Ghazali and it classifies behaviour as based on vices and virtues or angelic and beastly qualities. The horizontal typology is based on the alternative modes of behaviour as they are reported in Western literature. This is also relevant to the profile of leadership. In the eleventh and the final chapter, the processes of change and dynamics of human nature are explored. The role of conscience, reactive learning, and proactive learning in achieving and enhancing the harmony is described.

It is difficult to do justice to all the paradigms in a narrow-scoped dissertation. The purpose is neither to credit or discredit any perspective. It is to demonstrate the veracity of multidisciplinary synthesis with special reference to leadership. The utility of such a framework in the field of administrative and management sciences would enhance personal effectiveness.

## 12.2 Evaluation of Discourses

Broadly speaking, there are two ways to reasonably judge whether a particular concept is preferable to or better than another (Barry, 1986). The first criterion should ask the question, is a theory internally consistent? Sociobiologists and other scientific accounts are seen weak on this score. They have, as Oakeshott (1975, p. 15) points out, nothing more to say than that it is all done by genes and this theorem is also in itself is being done by genes. By indulging in theorising they are negating the biologically programmed nature of the audience and their own self.

The second criterion by which to assess a theory of human nature is whether it adequately accommodates the 'facts.' The pursuit of comprehensiveness while also maintaining the inner coherence is the test of versatile theory. The theorists can be seen as buying consistency at the too great a cost of sacrificing plausibility.

The work contained in the preceding chapters result into a unifying theme of a natural model of human nature based on harmony and synthesis. It is internally consistent as well as capable absorbing the facts reported in the text.

There are two other sets of criteria for the work done in the mode of constructivism as reported in the literature. First is *trustworthiness* criteria of credibility (paralleling internal validity), transferability (paralleling external validity), dependability (paralleling reliability), and confirmability (paralleling objectivity) (Guba, 1981; Lincoln and Guba 1985). Second set of criteria is *authenticity* criteria of fairness, ontological authenticity (enlarges personal constructions), educative authenticity (leads to improved understanding of constructions of others), catalytic authenticity (stimulates to action), and tactical authenticity (empowers action) (Guba & Lincoln, 1989). According to Guba and Lincoln (1998, p. 214) the former criteria focuses on issue of quality but come too close to the positivism. The later overlaps to some extent to critical theory. It is hoped that this dissertation satisfactorily meets the second set of criteria. The discourses have been authentic as they are based on

exhaustive analysis of methodology and the themes employed have been taken from the recognised and representative sources of literature. Biographical sketch of the leading scholars and bibliography is provided at the end. There is no doubt that inasmuch as this exercise is unique in approach and confirming to the principled tenets of the emerging paradigm in this direction the exercise can be ranked moderately high in terms of educative value. So much has been related elsewhere concerning the practical relevance of the notion of human nature, in historical context, that catalytic as well as tactical authenticity-not required for dissertation purpose is still viably present as a measure of effectiveness of the discourse.

One of the reasons for the selection of constructivist methodology is that it gives prime consideration to values and ethics. No discussion on human nature can achieve much without according due role to values as ineluctable in shaping inquiry outcome. The constructivist paradigm is also conducive to the interjection of ethical intents of the narratives. The hermeneutic/dialectic methodology itself provides a strong basis for safeguard against deception. The inquirer's ethical considerations and aims, if remain hidden, resist improvement of construction. They need to be clearly spelled out and integrated in the mainstream discourse.

What then is right? This might be a fair question after surveying so many conflicting views. All cannot be true at the same time. But different features of the dominant constructs can find relevance in different situations. The contingency theory can help sanctify parts of the paradigms. Still, one cannot escape having to choose between the different positions, and the fact that it is possible, indicate the freedom-an essential element of human nature.

Truth is at issue. Yet there is no sign of general agreement about the subject.

However, since there is no agreement does not mean that there is no truth. The very existence of philosophical arguments rests on the assumptions that one can be right or wrong even about the most important matters confronting humanity. The exercise

of reasons presupposes the possibility of arriving at truth. That is the supreme characteristic of humanity. Philosophers have been found wrong more often than they are right. The basic flaws of character and **thinking** underlie all efforts. Because of fallible nature, consensus is difficult to achieve. The preference of rigour over speculation and certainties of logic over vagaries of experience have not entailed anything better now than it has before. Must then any theory of human nature be religious? Iqbal **thinks** so and argues a case for that. James, Wittgenstein and many others have documented sufficient experiments in this direction. If not religious, then should it be political? Within the precincts of politics, the assumptions about human nature have played a great role.

### 12.3 Act of Leading

Leadership as an activity is inseparable from values and vision. The means in a typical human situation can never be entirely divorced from questions of 'ends' related to human purposes and leadership vision. Hence, terms like power, responsibility, freedom, justice, truth are ineluctable as far as the act of leadership is concerned. The question that how, if at all, does human nature fit into this picture can be resolved here. Debate on straightforward leadership issues is pushed back into competing views of human nature (MacGregor Burns, 1978; 143-145).

The concept of human nature, it has been proved, is both indispensable and contentious, to imply the arguments for human nature in the field of politics as discussed by Barry (1986). Leadership is about human relationship and organisation of human effort, and honing of human resources. Human nature acts as a presupposition that counts as a premise to a decision taken by leadership. It also has a demarcational role in defining the program and alternatives for leadership. Hobbes (1914, p.64) argued that each and every human being wants to be 'chief' and simultaneously wants everybody else to be 'indians.' Thus ensues the root of conflict. Articulation of a theory of human nature will, like Hobbes's State of Nature -

always be a contentious matter. It develops in a way that a theory of human nature stakes out a space within which leadership defines its role. To invoke human nature is to claim superiority of one form of life over the other.

It also appears that human nature is not completely indeterminate. If the concept is indispensable then a view of the good life is inescapable. It need not be logically compelling or scientifically proven. It should be working and boast functional utility. That is why it is always possible to deny the prescriptive import of any particular descriptive depiction of the features of human nature.

The ideological roots of the theories have been a source of much of the debates. On the one hand, scholars (Talman, 1970) imply that the belief that real interests can be imputed to human nature without specific human individuals necessarily being aware of these interests underlines a free society and underpins a dictatorship in the name of the people. On the left side (Young, 1973) argue that the claim that some institutions reflect permanent realities of human nature is an obstructive and obfuscatory myth and as such a hindrance to social change.

To summarise one of the key salient aspects of this work, the argument of Hampshire (1965, p. 231-237) can be employed. He says that the grounds by which leadership can be distinguished from other human activities are usually disputable, and central to that theme is the notion of the concept of human nature. He claims that there exist a number of 'permanent and distinctive' conditions that must characterise human life and which are 'the necessary basis of the comparison between men of different periods and cultures.'

What is valuable and how far it is valuable invokes human interests that become part of the concepts to which the 'evaluative epithets' are attached (Hampshire, 1965; p. 258). The difference in opinions is corrigible and thus there is always need to give supporting reasons for the positions taken up and a commitment to reconsider the position if the reasons are shown to be cracking. As such, there is nothing self-

evident about human nature and judgements about nature are concept-dependent. This requires adjudication between diverse positions or recourse to a transcendental mode of information such as Bible or Qur'an.

The gist of conclusive remarks, once again, lies in the assertion that through the integration of philosophical, scientific, and Islamic **thinking**, it can be demonstrated that it is in the nature of **humankind** to act in the capacity of a vicegerent to the supreme Sovereign Authority of the universe, i.e., God. This is the highest possible attainable position. The ultimate about this relationship is narrated by Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) in the following tradition. According to him:

God says that, "Nothing is more pleasing to Me as a means for My slave to draw near unto Me than worship which I have made binding upon . . . and My slave ceaseth not to draw near unto Me with added devotions of his free will until I love him; and when I love him I am the Hearing wherewith he heareth and the Sight wherewith he seeth and the Hand whereby he graspeth and the Foot whereon he walketh."

This Holy Tradition forms not only the philosophical and operational kernel of Sufism as claimed by Martin Lings (1975) but also the core of the synthesis of harmony presented here. By virtue of this Tradition, God grants to the human personality the grandest status. In effect, this tradition identifies a state where a human being has perfected own person to an extent where God recognises and rewards it as best and as high as a vicegerent could possibly attain. God finds it appropriate to honour the person by delegating His powers. This is point of zenith where the powers of vicegerent establish a direct relation with the powers of the Supreme Sovereign. At this level, leadership and human nature combine because finite approaches the Infinite, the transitory reaches the Ultimate, the permanence envelops the immanence, and the servant is set to play Master by his Master.

## CHAPTER 12: CONCLUSION

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Has anyone achieved this so far? Yes, within the folds of Abrahamic religions, there have been numerous people who reached that status, even excluding saints and prophets. Qur'an repeatedly mirrors the events from Prophets Abraham (pbuh) and Muhammad (pbuh) as those who reached the pinnacle of leadership, perfected their nature, and became a model. After the death of Muhammad (pbuh) when his favourite wife *Aishah* was asked what he was like. She replied: "His nature was like the Qur'an (the word of his Master)." He was incarnation of Qur'an. The most striking aspect of the parallelism between the Qur'an and Muhammad (pbuh), or theory and practice, is no doubt to be seen in the far reaching juxtaposition of theory and practice. Just as the Qur'an embraces every aspect of human life, so it was the charter assigned to Muhammad (pbuh) to become a model with exceptional versatility in the domain of human experience. The earthly plenitude of the Prophet is combined with an extreme sensitivity to the magnetism of the Hereafter. The most important resistance to harmony is faced due to the conflict between requirements of this world and that world. How this was resolved by Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) can be vividly discerned from the following Tradition:

"Do for this world as if you were to live a thousand years and for the next as if you were to die tomorrow."

In a similar vein, Jesus is also reported to have said that person who seeks life will lose it and the person who risks losing it will find it. Thus, the readiness to leave is realised in the form of risks to suffer and incur losses. Halalony Overall requires readiness to sacrifice this life for the next. There cannot be a better formula for successful leadership as well as for harnessing the human potential.

On the one hand, it challenges human beings toward attaining perfection and excellence to meet the consequences of incumbency as a representative of God on earth. On the other hand, it demands that human beings should be ready to leave this world at a moment's notice. The return symbolises the continuation of the flow of



the wave at the very point from which the ebb begins. The ideal characteristic can only be achieved through combination of earthly plenitude with readiness to leave, synergy between energies and spirits, poise between flow and ebb. Human harmony lies in its perfection of Majesty and Beauty, the two Divine Qualities. The whole purpose of self-discovery, and learning tools such as *Tazkya* and *Tarvbali* is to strengthen these divine qualities.

### **12.4 Leadership and Spirituality in Human Nature**

In the earthly plenitude, leadership, work, and spirituality are an unlikely trinity. In stereotype discussion, life of leadership and spirituality are considered as the two opposing forces. The act of leadership is treated as an outward, activity-oriented force, and result-driven position. This thesis focuses on the magnitude of the inner challenge that leader must face. It highlights the fallacy to understand leadership exclusively as the ability to manipulate the external world. Vaclav Havel (playwright, prisoner, and then president of Czechoslovakia) addressed the USA Congress in 1990 and said:

"Consciousness precedes being, and not the other way around, as the Marxist claim. For this reason, the salvation *of* this human world lies nowhere else than in the human heart, in the human power to reflect, in human meekness and in human responsibility. Without a global revolution in the sphere of human consciousness, nothing will change for the better in the sphere of our beings as humans, and the catastrophe toward which the world is headed – be it ecological, social, demographic or a general breakdown of civilisation will be unavoidable." (Havel, 1990).

Two things are worth noting in this text. One that conscious precedes being, other that the salvation *of* the world lies in the human heart. He directs attention toward the heart *of* the matter – the formation of the human heart, the reformation of the human heart, and the rescuing of the human heart from all its deformation.

According to him, human awareness and consciousness not the material forces are

the fundamental factors in the movement of history, a position also taken by the Qur'an. Those are the deep sources of freedom and power, with which oppressed people historically have been able to overcome immense resistance. Leaders have created new societies by moving and transforming the hearts of people. But, Havel is too polite. Capitalism is more responsible for giving sanctity to the belief that economics is more fundamental than spirit. Realities of the external world carry more weight than the sense perception of the inner world.

Parker Palmer (1994) says that humankind shares responsibility for creating the external world by projecting either a spirit of light or a spirit of shadow on that which is not part leadership. He says, "We project either a spirit of hope or a spirit of despair, either an inner confidence in wholeness and integration or an inner terror about life being diseased and ultimately terror." A leader is a person who has a tremendous power to project his light into others. The ultimate that a leader can deliver is a happy life here and hereafter. There cannot be another gift more valuable than this. It sums up all. Warner (1987:145) asks the question that what it is to lead a happy life. He responds by saying, "My claim is central component of happy life is a special kind of enjoyment intimately connected with exercising one's ability to act freely." His definition broadly confirms Aristotle's (Nicomachean Ethics, 1099a13-22) who says that "actions which conform to virtue are naturally pleasant, and as a result, such actions are not only pleasant for those who love the noble but also pleasant in themselves." The ability to act freely, according to Warner, is acting self-consciously on a desire to continue to realise a self-concept for its own sake. He also suggested (p, 158) that one is leading a happy life only if one enjoys the realisation of the self-concepts to which one is committed.

### **12.5 Axis of Harmony and Age of Synthesis**

The discourses planned in this thesis are framed in the spirit of consilience (Wilson, 1998;p.6-47). Wilson believes that Enlightenment thinkers of the seventeenth and

eighteenth centuries got it mostly right the first time. The propositions of the original Enlightenment are increasingly based upon objective evidence, intrinsic unity of knowledge and the potential of indefinite human progress. He thinks that ongoing fragmentation is artefact of scholarship rather than reflection of the real world. To him (p. 6), "consilience", means, "literally a 'jumping together' of knowledge by the linking of facts and fact based theory across disciplines to create a common groundwork of explanation." In the intellectual world now, the momentum is overwhelming toward conceptual unity. Disciplinary boundaries are disappearing to be replaced by 'shifting hybrid domains' in which consilience plays the key role. He (a strong naturalist) argues that philosophy plays a vital role in intellectual synthesis in the approaching age of synthesis. A balanced perspective is required to comprehensively contemplate the emergent issues.

What makes harmony a viable bridging pin between philosophical, scientific, and religious paradigms is the common emphasis on self-concept and commitment. That is essence of human nature and of leadership, too. Human beings are influenced, thus, by meanings of self-concept that is wholly and uniquely their own. They experience a deeper knowledge of the purpose that structure their activities, many times invisibly and without awareness. These meanings can be sought as a retrospective attempt to make sense of what has gone or as the pre-existent attempt to make sense of the life. Nothing else has the power to harmonise and cohere the entire human activity. Faith provides the dimension and strength to the meanings. A self-organising system has the freedom to grow and evolve, guided only by one rule: It must remain consistent with itself and its faith. The presence of faith allows for both creativity and boundaries, for evolution and coherence, for determinism and free will. The leader's task is to communicate them, to keep them ever-present and clear, and then allow individuals in the system their random meandering.

God, the Infinite and the Incomprehensible, creates human beings so that He can provide them an opportunity to draw upon the His Self for their full actualisation.

God, then generously and mercifully, invites human to follow Him in the divine project to establish Justice and Peace, Harmony and Balance. God gives Himself away into two ways: by entrusting the outer world of nature and by responding to the calls of inner world and by beings so closed to the human self. That establishing justice and keeping balance is the supreme source of high degree pleasure is agreed by all paradigms discussed here.

One of the guiding principles of scientific inquiry is that at all levels, human nature and nature seems to resemble each other. *U* nature uses certain principles to create and manages itself, it is highly probable that those principles apply to human nature as well. If human nature is ever to be simplified into one unifying principle, then it will be found in self-reference. In nature, it can be seen that order is maintained in the midst of change because autonomy exists at all levels.

What emerges from this constant flux is that wonderful state of equilibrium. Nature creates ebbs and flows of movement in all directions. These movements merge into a whole that can resist most of the demands for change. The continuity of human self is kept in harmony by a force that is just beginning to be considered important: the capacity of self-reference. There is, even among simple cells, an erring recognition for the intent of the system, a deep relationship between individual activity and the whole. The operation of self-reference separates living organisms from machine. There is process of mirroring within self and between conscious and sub-conscious, self-concept and self-realisation.

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Not too much should be expected of any research on human nature. Whatever the concept, it can be used to see what makes a leadership theory 'tick' but articulating a theory which can solve all problems or dissolve all issues was not the target and is not the result. That is too much to expect because theory itself is part of the problem and constitutive of the issue.

Leadership is always dependent on the context and has to prove leadership within a situation. Nonetheless, one's own self and relationship with the context and environmental forces constitute the very essence of leadership. No situation can be influenced without taking into consideration the complex network of people who contribute. Understanding of human nature is thus key to the success of leadership.

To invoke human nature was not to end discourse, it was to start a new one!

### GLOSSARY

For the convenience of the reader I have prepared the following glossary of some of the terms used in this book that may be un-familiar because they are technical or that, because of their importance deserve a more than usually precise definition.

#### A

*Abdullah*: Literally A slave of God, the title of a Muslim, as well as a popular name.

*Abu /al-zl*: He was a member of the Quraish, and a staunch opponent of Prophet Muhammad (bpuh) and his message.

*Adam (adam)*: The first human being, or simply, "the human being." God molded his body out of clay, blew his own spirit into him, taught him all the names, and appointed him vicegerent in the earth.

*Adaptation*: In biology, a particular anatomical structure, physiological process, or behavior that improves an organism's fitness to survive and reproduce. Also, the evolutionary process that leads to the acquisition of such a trait.

*Ad-din al-hani*: the religion of tawhid.

*Ad-din*: the perfect religion which God has ordained for humanity, including faith, ethics, law and devotions.

*Aesthetics*: Pertaining to the science of taste or beauty.

*Aggression*: Any physical act or threat of action by one individual that reduces the freedom or genetic fitness of another.

*Ahl-Al-Kitaab*: Literally - The people of the Book, a title given to the Jews and Christians, who received previous revelations of God through their Prophets.

*Aliliyya t al-wujub*: receptive legal capacity to receive but not incur obligations.

*Al-Akbar*: Literally - The Greatest, this is an attribute of God (SWT).

*Al-Aleem*: The All-knowing, an attribute of God.

*Al-anir wal-nahy*: commands and prohibitions.

*Al-Arsl i*: The great throne.

*Al-Ba hiniyyal i*: Desire to kill and injure.

*Al-Fu*: Heart.

*Al- Gliadab*: Anger and hate.

## GLOSSARY

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*Al-Haq*: The Truth. God alone is the Truth.

*Al-Hijr*: to depart.

*Al-int, pl. Ulama*: lit. "learned," scholar.

*Al-illan al-kamil*: the universal man, the perfect man.

*Al-Istilah*: When the superior and inferior faculties are found in a man in a balanced form and going on between them, this mental condition is known as Istilah, which means that the superior power should descend down a little from its exalted position.

*Al-Itdal wal Tawassut*: The middle course, balance and just view and action.

*Al-Kasf*. An organ of intuition.

*Al-Kursi*: Pedestal.

*Al-lah*: The Arabic word for God.

*Al-La wwantah*: the reproachful self.

*Al-l int. Al-k alant*: Dialectical theology.

*Al-Lu b*: Heart.

*Al-ma la al-a'la*: the Supernal Plenum.

*Al-Nafs al Kulliya*: Universal self.

*Al-Nafs-al-Lawwaniah*: Self-reproaching soul.

*Al-Nafs-al-Mutmainnah*: Soul, in complete rest and satisfaction.

*Al-N ulia*: Heart.

*Al-Qalant*: The pen.

*Al-Quran*: The final revelation of God to the Prophet Muhammad (bpuh), conveyed in Arabic and memorized by his companions.

*Al-Qur'a'll*: the final revelation of God to the Prophet Muhammad (SAAS), conveyed in Arabic and memorized by his companions.

*Al-Rabbaniyya h*: Desire to be pure.

*Al-Ru bubiyali*: The Belief that God is the Only Creator.

*Al-Sadr*: Heart.

*Al-Shaha*: Lust for gluttony.

*Al-Tajazub*: Energies keep on struggling for specific expression.

## GLOSSARY

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*Altrusini*. Self-destructive behavior performed for the benefit of others. Altruism may be entirely rational, or automatic and unconscious, or conscious but guided by innate emotional responses.

*Al-Uluhiyyah*: The belief that God alone deserves to be worshipped.

*Al-utma'inliah*: the tranquil self.

*Al-Walaa Wal Baraa*: To Love and Hate for the Sake of God.

*Al-Wujud*: Necessarily existent.

*Alliana (amana)*: Trust. The special responsibility that God offered to the heavens, the earth, and the mountains, but they all refused. Then human beings agreed to carry it. The Trust is often identified with the vicegerency or with love.

*Ananke*: The concepts of ineluctable factual necessity mixes logical and/or causal necessity with the force of what is normally due.

*An-nqfs al-ammarah*: the commanding self.

*Aqeedah*: The Creed of a Muslim. The Principles and details of belief.

*Aql*: Reason, intellect, faculty of rational and intuitive perception.

*Arsh*: The Great Throne.

*Asabiyah*: Tribalism / Nationalism.

*Aya (aya)*: Sign. The Koran employs the term to refer to anything in the universe that gives news of God, including all natural, human, and social phenomena; scriptures; the extraordinary acts and miracles of the prophets, and its own verses. *Aya* is thus the standard term that is employed to refer to the subunits of the *sllms*, or the chapters of the Koran.

*Ayat*: The Plural of Ayah.

## B

*Balid*: The term often applied to groups of hunter-gatherers.

*Baqafil-fal ia*: Survival in annihilation.

*Baqa*: Survival.

*Behavioral biology*: The scientific study of all aspects of behavior, including neurophysiology (study of the nervous system), ethology (study of whole patterns of behavior), and sociobiology (study of the biological basis of social behavior and organization).

*Boum*: The notion of the creation of the world by a benevolent God, called boum (Goodness) by Planto.

## GLOSSARY

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*Bricoleur*: A researcher who develops expertise to simultaneously draw upon different streams and paradigm.

## C

*Chodynamism*: The knowledge of ethical truth cannot transcend the psychology of its embodiment.

*Chromosome*: A complex, often spherical or rod-shaped structure, found in the nucleus of cells and bearing part of the genetic information (genes) of the organism.

*Companions (sahaba)*: Those who met the Prophet and accepted his message. Often contrasted with "followers," those who met any of the companions.

*Constructionism*: The type that combines selected variables in order to focus attention upon common elements in diverse concrete situation or to provide an heuristic device for examining relationships among the selected variables.

*Cortex*: In human anatomy, the outer layer of nervous tissue of the brain, the "gray matter" that contains the centers of consciousness and rational thought.

## D

*Darwinism*: The theory of evolution by natural selection as argued by Charles Darwin (especially, in *The Origin of Species*, 1859). It holds that the genetic compositions of populations change through time -and thus evolve- first because individual members of the population vary among themselves in their hereditary material, and second because those endowed with the properties best fitting them for survival and reproduction will be disproportionately represented in later generations. This mode of evolution is viewed by modern biologists as the only one that operates beyond and above the mere statistical fluctuation of genetic types within populations.

*Demography*: The rate of growth and the age structure of populations, and the processes that determine these properties; also the scientific study of the properties.

*Determinism*: Loosely employed to designate any form of constraint on the development of an anatomical organ, physiological process, or behavior. Genetic determinism means some degree of constraint that is based on the possession of a particular set of genes.

*Developmental landscape*: A metaphor used to resolve the nature-nurture controversy. The development of a trait is compared to the passage of a ball rolling down a genetically fixed landscape, in which it comes periodically to divided channels and rolls into one or the other branches according to its momentum and the relative accessibility of the branches.

*Dhikr*: To mention, to remind, to remember. Reminding people of God is the primary function of the prophets and the scriptures. The human response is also called *dhikr*, that is, remembering God and one's responsibilities toward him. More specifically, a special

form of prayer is also called *dhikr*. This usually entails the repetition of certain names of God or certain formulae containing God's name, such as the first Shahadah.

*Dlilyyat al-ada*:: active legal capacity which can incur rights as well as obligations.

*Din Al-Islam*: the religion of Islam.

*Din*: A way of life. Islam is a Din, because it incorporates both spiritual and material instructions in life.

*Di ll Al-Fitrah*: the religion of human nature.

*DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid)*: The fundamental hereditary material of all organisms. The genes are composed of the functional segments of DNA molecules.

*Dominance system*: In sociobiology, the set of relationships within a group of animals or men, often established and maintained by some form of aggression or coercion, in which one individual has precedence over all others in eating, mating, etc., a second individual has precedence over the remaining members of the group, and so on down a dominance hierarchy or "pecking order." Dominance orders are simple and strict in chickens but complex and subtle in human beings.

*Du'a*: The Supplication of Muslims, when they ask God (SWf) to forgive them, or to ask for His (SWf) bounties.

## E

*Environmentalism*: In the study of behavior, the belief that experience with the environment mostly or entirely determines the development of behavioral patterns.

*Epiphenomenalist*: Epiphenomenalism asserts that physical events cause mental events, and vice versa.

*Epistemology*: The theory of the method or ground of knowledge.

*Erklaren*: Focused on causality, that is found in the natural sciences. The attempt to match the methods to the context evolved into clear distinction of qualitative and quantitative methods.

*Eros*: He is described as unconquerable, destructive, roaring over the sea and among the dwellers of the wilderness.

*Ethics*: The science which treats of the nature and grounds of moral obligation; moral philosophy.

*Ethology*: The study of whole patterns of animal behavior in natural environments, with emphasis on analyzing adaptation and evolution of the patterns.

*Evolution*: Any gradual change. Organic evolution, often referred to as evolution for short, is any genetic change in a population of organisms from generation to generation.

*Evolutionary biology*: All of the branches of biology, including ecology, taxonomy, population biology, ethology, and sociobiology, that study the evolutionary process and the characteristics of whole populations and communities of organisms.

### F

*Fal-ak*: "Annihilation-in-survival."

*Fala*: Annihilation.

*Fitness*: See genetic fitness.

*Fitra (fitra)*: The original human nature as created by God. Its fundamental attribute is the understanding of *tawhid*. A pure and upright nature in which God has created all human beings.

### G

*Gene*: A basic unit of heredity, a portion of the giant DNA molecule that affects the development of any trait at the most elementary biochemical level. The term gene is often applied more precisely to the cistron, the section of DNA that carries the code for the formation of a particular portion of a protein molecule.

*Genetic fitness*: The contribution to the next generation of one genetically distinct kind of organism relative to the contributions of other genetically different kinds belonging to the same population. By definition, those kinds with higher genetic fitness eventually come to prevail in the population; the process is called evolution by natural selection.

*Genetic*: Hereditary; refers to variation in traits that is based at least in part on differences in genes.

*Genus*: A group of similar, related species.

*Ghafla*: Heedlessness. The basic human shortcoming; contrasted with *dlz ikr*.

*Ghairah*: Jealousy.

*Ghayb*: Absent, unseen, invisible. This is an attribute of God, the angels, and the jinn. *Glzayb* and *slzahcida* (the witnessed, the visible) make up the two main worlds of the cosmos.

*Giyds*: Analogical reasoning.

*Group selection*: Any process, such as competition, the effects of disease, or the ability to reproduce, that results in one group of individuals leaving more descendants than another group. The "group" is loosely defined in theory: it can be a set of kin (usually more extended than merely parents and offspring; see kin selection), or part or all of a tribe or larger social group. Contrast with individual selection.

### H

*Haakimiyyah*: The Belief that God is the Only Law Giver.

*Haba*: Universal substance.

*Hadith*: The sayings of the Prophet himself or of his companions concerning his activities. Hadith is contrasted with Koran, which is the word of God. A hadith is one of the sayings found in the Hadith. The Hadith are gathered together in a number of collections. In Sunni Islam, the six collections considered the most reliable are called the "sound" collections; they are typically cited by the names of their authors, such as Bukhari, Muslim, Tirmidhi, Abu Dawud, etc.

*Hadith qudsi (qudsi)*: Holy saying, A hadith of the Prophet in which God's word are quoted directly. For example, "The Prophet said that God has inscribed on His Throne, 'My mercy takes precedence over My wrath.'" Like other hadiths, these are clearly distinguished from the Koran.

*Hafiza*: Memory.

*Hajj (hajj)*: The pilgrimage to Mecca that is incumbent on all Muslims at least once in their lifetime if they have the means to go; one of Islam's Five Pillars.

*Hawa*: passion, caprice.

*Hazirat al-quds*: The Holy Precinct or enclosure.

*Henneneutic*: The set of theories and rules governing the explanation and interpretation of the Biblical Scriptures has come to be known as hermeneutic.

*Hiyala*: The form of Universe.

*Human nature*: In the broader sense, the full set of innate behavioral predispositions that characterize the human species; and in the narrower sense, those predispositions that affect social behavior.

*Humankind*: The nature of man with more especial reference to his personality and or character as acquired in the course of socialization and often with further reference to aspects of human potential and power of development.

*Hypothesis*: A proposition that can be tested and is subject to possible disproof by further observation and experimentation. By the usual canons of scientific evidence, it is difficult if not impossible to prove a hypothesis with finality, but one can be tested so thoroughly and rigorously as to be transformed eventually into accepted fact-but never dogma. See theory.

### I

*'Ibada ('abide)*: To worship, to serve, to be a servant. This is the basic duty of human beings, failing which they cannot achieve vicegerency.

*Iblis iblis, akin to Latin diabolus*): The proper name of Satan. Like the other jinn, he was created of fire. Through pious devotions he was brought into nearness with God along with the angels, but he refused to prostrate himself before Adam when God commanded him to do so, and as a result he was sent down out of God's presence in disgrace.

*Ihsan (ihsan)*: Doing what is beautiful, the third dimension of Islam. The perfect fulfillment of the commands of God; the state of the person whose deeds achieve such fulfillment.

*Iktilaf*: Dispute.

*Ilmi al-kliilaf*: Science of legal disagreement.

*Imam (imam)*: Leader; the person who leads the *salat* when Muslims pray together; the prayer-leader in a mosque. In Shi'ite Islam, the Imams are certain descendants of the Prophet who are looked upon as the legitimate leaders of the Islamic community.

*Iman (iman)*: Faith, the second dimension of Islam. Its objects are God, the angels, the scriptures, the prophets, the Last Day, and the measuring out. Typically, these are discussed in terms of the three principles. Faith, affirmation, conviction or certainty that God is the one and only God and that Muhammad (SAAS) is His last Prophet, and that the angels, revealed books, the prophets, the Last Day, and the decree of good and evil are all true.

*Individual selection*: Natural selection favoring the individual and its direct descendants. Contrast with group selection and kin selection.

*Innate*: Same as genetic: referring to variation based at least in part on differences in genes.

*Instinct*: Behavior that is relatively stereotyped, more complex than simple reflexes such as salivation and eye blinking, and usually directed at particular objects in the environment. Learning may or may not be involved in the development of instinctive behavior; the important point is that the behavior develop toward a comparatively narrow, predictable end product. Because of its vagueness the term "instinct" is seldom used in technical scientific literature anymore, but it is so thoroughly entrenched in the English language and useful as an occasional shorthand expression - that attempts at a precise definition are justified.

*Interpretivism*: Interpretivism is largely an uncritical form of study. It involves textual analysis to derive meanings originally intended by the author or deductible from the text in expulse of author's intention.

*Iradah*: will, free-will.

*Jrja*: Postponement; suspension of judgement; predestination; political quietism

*Jrtif aq,p.: irtifaqat*: development.

*Islami (Islam)*: Submission to God. The word has four basic meanings. In the broadest sense, it refers to the fact that every created thing submits to God by being God's handiwork. In this sense, no choice is involved, but in the next three senses, people can choose whether or not to accept *islam*. Second, *islam* means submission to God's guidance as brought by the prophets. In the third meaning, for which we use the word Islam as a proper noun it means submission to the guidance of God as brought in the Koran. In the fourth and

narrowest sense, *islam* means observing the Five Pillars in general and the Shariah in particular.

*Islani*: submission and surrender to the will of God; from a root denoting peace.

*Ittihad*: Unity

## J

*Jama'at al muslimin*: The community of Muslims.

*Jawahar*: Self-sustained.

*Jihad (jihad)*: Struggle in the path of God. In the most general sense of the term, jihad is the personal struggle against one's own shortcomings that is required of all Muslims so that they can perfect their submission. In a more specific sense, it is battle against the enemies of Islam as regulated by the Shariah, as in defensive warfare. In its most common usage, it simply means a war that is perceived by those who participate in it as just; this perception is totally separate from the question of whether or not the Shariah would in fact sanction such a war.

*Jihat*: Direction.

*Jinn*: Creatures of an ambiguous and somewhat mysterious nature who were created out of fire, which combines the qualities of light and clay. Their luminosity makes the jinn somewhat similar to angels, but their darkness makes them similar to bodily things. The most famous of the jinn is Iblis, also known as Satan. Like human beings, the jinn are divided into two main groups—the followers of Truth (the truth-concealers) and the followers of the prophets (the faithful).

*Jisni*: Body. Anything that can be perceived by the five senses. In a general sense, the body is that which God pairs with the spirit in order to bring a creature into existence. Thus, angels have bodies of light, jinn have bodies of fire, and human beings and other animals have bodies of clay. In the case of human beings, the body's attributes are understood as opposite to those of the spirit. Hence, the spirit is high, the body low; the spirit is luminous, the body dark, and so on. The soul (*nafs*) is situated half-way between the body and the spirit.

## K

*Kalāni*: Dogmatic theology. One of the three intellectual schools that investigate the meaning of the objects of faith. Kalam takes a defensive stance toward the Koran and is generally polemical. Its major tool is reason or rational investigation.

*Kalīl*: complete.

*Khaleefah*: The Arabic word Khaleefah means one appointed to establish God's governance on earth. Vicegerent or representative of God. Adam was created to be God's vicegerent, and hence vicegerency is a privilege and responsibility given exclusively to human

beings. Becoming a vice-gerent depends upon being a proper servant (*see 'abet*). In Islamic political thought, the *khalifas* are the vicegerents or successors of the Prophet. Thus the Umayyad and Abbasid rulers were known as *khalifas* or, in English, "caliphs."

*Kliilafiyat*: Science of legal difference.

*Kiblah*: The direction of Mecca. Muslims face toward the kiblah when they perform the *salat*.

*Koran (qur'aa)*: The scripture of Islam, the word of God revealed to the Prophet Muhammad by means of the angel Gabriel.

*Kullya h*: Universal.

## L

*La tif*. Soft, light.

*Leadership*: The occupancy of status and active performance of a role that mobilizes more or less organized collective and voluntary effort toward the attainment of shared goals and objectives.

*Learning rule*: A predisposition to learn one alternative behavior as opposed to another, even when both are taught with equal intensity. An example of a learning rule is the development of handedness: persons who are genetically right-handed can be trained to be left-handed only with difficulty, whereas the reverse is true of genetically left-handed persons.

*Logical positivism*: The art or practice of reasoning. The science of the operations of the understanding subservient to the estimation of evidence.

## M

*Ma*: Water.

*Ma'arof*. A practice or view that is widely accepted to be good for all and regarded as suitable to further the common cause.

*Ma'ad (ma'ad)*: The return to God, the third principle of *iman*. The word is often translated as "eschatology."

*Madhbab*: A school of jurisprudence. In Sunni Islam, there are four: Hanafi, Hanbali, Maliki, and Shafi'i. The vast majority of Shi'ites follow a fifth school, called Ja'fari.

*Makan*: Space.

*Malak (pi. mala'ika)*: Angel; literally, "messenger." A kind of creature typically contrasted with human beings and animals, and often with jinn as well. Angels were created with bodies made out of light. They never disobey God, in contrast to both human beings and jinn. Animals are similar to angels in that they never disobey God.

## GLOSSARY

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*Maninial*: Any animal of the class Mammalia (including man), characterized by the production of milk by the female mammary glands and the possession of hair for body covering.

*Maturation*: The automatic development of a pattern of behavior which becomes increasingly complex or precise as the animal matures. Unlike learning, the development does not require experience to occur.

*Metaphysics*: The science of natural bodies and the science of mind or intelligence which seeks to trace the branches of human knowledge to their first principles in the constitution of our nature.

*Methodology*: The science of methods, rules, procedures, etc, as it is applied by a science or art.

*Methods*: A way or mode by which we proceed to the attainment of some aim; mode or manner of procedure; logical or scientific argument or mode of acting; systematic or orderly procedure.

*Mudrika*: Sensory.

*Mumin*: Believer.

*Murakkab*: Composite.

*Murjia nu]irji" a*: One who postpones ethical judgment.

*Mushfak*: Common sense.

*Muslimi*: One who has the attribute of *islam*. The word has four basic meanings in keeping with the four levels of *islam* (see *islam*). In the third sense of the term, we render it as "Muslim," meaning a follower of the religion of Islam.

*Mutation*: In the broad sense, any discontinuous change in the genetic constitution of an organism. A mutation can consist of a change in the chemical structure of a gene (segment of DNA) or in the structure or number of entire chromosomes.

*Mutmainliah*: Total satisfaction.

*Muwahhid*: Monotheist

## N

*Nabi (nabi)*: Prophet. A human being who brings guidance from God to other human beings. God is usually said to have sent 124,000 prophets from Adam down to Muhammad. *Nabi* is often used synonymously with *rasul* (messenger), but when the two are contrasted, the *rasul* is understood to have a higher rank with God.

*Nafs*: Soul, self. This word is used in various ways by different Muslim thinkers. In general, it refers to the human self as a whole. Frequently, its qualities are described as standing half-way between those of spirit and body (see *ism* and *ruh*).

## GLOSSARY

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*Nafs-i-Natiqa*: The superior soul.

*Naqis*: Deficient.

*Nasmali*: Nasmah is extremely subtle and is in a state of equilibrium.

*Nass, pl: nusus*: Clear text, designation.

*Natural law*: Natural law refers to a body of principles and rules believed to be uniquely fitting for and binding upon a community of rational beings.

*Natural selection*: The differential contribution of offspring to the next generation by various genetic types belonging to the same population. This mechanism of evolution was suggested by Charles Darwin and is thus also called Darwinism. It has been supported and greatly strengthened by the findings of modern genetics.

*Naturalistic Ductionists*: To retreat into unpopular position.

*Neurobiology*: The scientific study of the anatomy (neuroanatomy) and physiology (neurophysiology) of the nervous system.

*Neuroli*: A nerve cell; the basic unit of the nervous system.

*Neurophysiology*: See neurobiology.

*Nirvana*: Buddhism the final beatitude attained through the extinguishing of desire and human consciousness; a state of oblivion to human reality, as pain, concern etc.

*Nornzalists*: Those who favour reduction to a standard or type.

*Nucleus*: The central body of the cell, containing the hereditary material of the organism. (Genes are carried on structures within the nucleus called chromosomes.)

## O

*Objectivists*: The objectivism is to study the facts that regularly characterize particular **types** of beings and constant relationship that can be shown to obtain among various phenomena.

*Ontogeny*: The development of a single organism throughout its lifetime (contrast with phylogeny).

*Ontology*: The doctrine of being: that part of metaphysics which investigates and explains the nature of all things or existences.

## P

*Paradigm*: Paradigm; suited for being an example.

## GLOSSARY

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*Phenomenology*: That system of philosophy which inquires only into the causes of existing phenomena.

*Physiology*: The scientific study of the functions of living organisms and the individual organs, tissues, and cells of which they are composed.

*Pillars (arfean), Five*: The five basic activities that are made incumbent upon Muslims by the Koran and the Hadith: Shahadah, *salat*, the fast of Ramadan, *zakat*, and hajj.

*Polygamy*: The possession of multiple mates by an individual, either multiple females by a male (polygyny) or multiple males by a female (polyandry).

*Polygyny*: The possession of two or more mates by a male.

*Population*: Any group of organisms capable of interbreeding for the most part and coexisting at the same time and in the same place.

*Positivism*: The positivist perspective builds upon intellectual thrust of the Enlightenment, which attempts to assure unambiguous and accurate knowledge based on reason.

*Postmodern*: Postmodernism is a process entailing unification as well as diversification.

*Prepared learning*: An innate predisposition to learn one thing as opposed to another, even when the intensity of training is made equal for both. For example, a person who is genetically right-handed is prepared to learn use of the right hand and deterred from learning to use the left hand, or can be induced only by special effort to do so.

*Primate*. A member of the order Primates, such as a lemur, monkey, ape, or man.

*Principles (asl)*, three: The fundamental ideas that undergird Islam- is thinking and form the basis of Islamic faith: *tawhid*, *nubuwwa*, and *ma'ad*.

## Q

*Qadar*: Free will.

*Qadar*: Measuring out. One of the objects of *iman*.

*Qadariyya*: Doctrine of free will.

*Qalb*: heart, the organ of intuitive perception.

*Qat*: Certainty; apodictic.

*Qatiyya*: Decisive, certain.

*Quwwatal Khayal*: The power of imagination.

### R

*Rasul (rasul)*: Messenger, a specific kind of prophet (see *nabi*). Typically, the messengers are said to number 313. They establish religions, whereas prophets who are not messengers modify or reform already established religions.

*Realists*: One who maintains that things, and not words, are the objects of dialects, apposed to nominalist; fine arts and literature.

*Reciprocal altruism*: The trading of altruistic acts by individuals at different times. For example, one person saves a drowning person in exchange for the promise (or at least the reasonable expectation) that the altruistic act will be repaid if circumstances are ever reversed.

*Ruh (ruh)*: Spirit. The divine breath that God blew into Adam's clay, Angels are said to be spirits, or spirits blown into bodies of light. All visible things have invisible spirits. When spirit is differentiated from soul, it is typically understood as lying on a higher level and partaking of all the attributes of God in a direct manner.

### S

*Sabliyah*: Anger from the ferocious.

*Sahaabi*: A Muslim who met the Prophet (pbuh).

*Sahih*: Legitimate, sound.

*Salaf*: Early fathers of the religion.

*Salat (salat)*: A form of Islamic prayer. The five daily *salats* are one of the Five Pillars.

*Scientific materialism*: The view that all phenomena in the universe, including the human mind, have a material basis, are subject to the same physical laws, and can be most deeply understood by scientific analysis.

*Selection*: Seenatural selection.

*Shahadah (shahada)*: The "witnessing." The testimony of faith, which consists of the pronouncement in Arabic of two formulas, "There is no god but God," and "Muhammad is the messenger of God." Pronouncing the Shahadah is the first pillar of Islam, while the first formula of the Shahadah is the basic definition of *tawhid* and hence the foundation of faith, Islam's second dimension. *Shahada* also means the visible world, as contrasted with the invisible world (*ghayb*).

*Shahwah*: appetite, passion, desire, combination of sexual and aggressive instincts.

*Shaitaan*: The Satan.

*Shakhs akbar*: The universe: lit, the greatest person.

## GLOSSARY

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*Shar*: Revelation.

*Sharia, pl. shara I*: Revealed law.

*Shari'ah (shari'a)*: Literally, the "road leading to water"; the revealed Law, which establishes the commands and prohibitions of the religion. It provides detailed explanations of Islam's first dimension. It is based on the Koran and the Sunna of the Prophet, to which other sources such as consensus and argument by analogy are added.

*Shi'isni*: One of the two major branches of Islam, making up about fifteen percent of Muslims. Generally speaking, Shi'ites are distinguished from Sunnis both by the *Madzhab* they follow and by certain objects of faith, in particular the Imamate, or the belief that certain descendants of the Prophet called Imams play an intermediary role between human beings and God.

*Shiite Imams*: Shia is a sect among Muslim. Imams are persons, who have religious authority and act as leader of the Shia community.

*Shirk*: Association of other beings with God; the opposite of *tawhid*.

*Sigti*: See *aya*.

*Sin al-taniyiz*: the age of discretion.

*Social insect*: One of the kinds of insect that form colonies with reproductive castes and worker castes; in particular, the termites, ants, social bees, and social wasps.

*Sociality*: The combined properties and processes of social existence.

*Society*: A group of individuals belonging to the same species and organized in a cooperative manner. The principal criterion for applying the term "society" is the existence of reciprocal communication of a cooperative nature that extends beyond mere sexual activity.

*Sociobiology*: The scientific study of the biological basis of all forms of social behavior in all kinds of organisms, including man.

*Species*: A population or set of populations of closely related and similar organisms, which ordinarily breed freely among themselves and not with members of other populations.

*Sufi*: The spiritual saint.

*Sunna, pl. sunan*: Custom, practice.

*Sunna*: The way of living and acting set down by the Prophet; hence, the model that Muslims follow in order to lead a life that is pleasing to God. The basic source for the Sunna is the Hadith. A tradition of the Holy Prophet (pbuh) which is recommended.

*Sura*: Chapter of the Koran, of which there are 114. Literally, the word means fence or enclosure.

### T

*Ta wil*: Interpretation.

*Tad bir*: The universal Administration.

*Tadhakkur*: Recollection.

*Tafakkur*: Contemplation, meditation, recollects the meaning.

*Tafaquh*: Supersensory organ of cog lizing metaphysical struts.

*Ta/seer*: An explanation of the Holy Quran.

*Ta/sir*: Qurani exegesis.

*Tajalli, pl. tajalliyat*: Self manifestatin.

*Takhayyu l*: Imagination, ability to creative thinking.

*Taklif*: liability, obligation.

*Tanzih (taiizih)*: God's incomparability with his creatures; his transcendence. The complement of *tashbih*.

*Taqwa (taqwa)*: God-wariness, one of the most highly praised human qualities in the Koran. Closely connected to *ihsan*.

*Tariqah (<fariqa)*: Literally, "the path." The path that leads to the encounter with God here and now. The *tariqah* is looked upon as a narrow path that is followed by a relatively small number of people. It is contrasted with the Shariah, which is a broad path followed by all Muslims, including those who follow the *tariqali*. The Sufi orders refer to themselves as *tariqahs*, because they attempt to put into practice all three dimensions of Islam, not simply the Shariah.

*Tasawwuf*: Mysticism.

*Tashbih (tashbib)*: The similitude of God with his creatures; his immanence within creation. The complement of *tanzili*.

*Tawbah*: turning from one's *kufir* and from one's wrong actions to God while committed never to return to *kufir* or to repeat the wrong action.

*Tawheed (tawliid)*: Literally, "asserting unity." The affirmation of God's oneness, which is the first principle of faith and the ruling idea in Islam. It is given its most succinct verbal expression in the first formula of the Shahadah, Perfect *tawliid* involves simultaneous affirmation of both *tanzih* and *tashbih*.

*Taxonomy*: The science and art of the classification of organisms.

*Territory*: A fixed area from which an organism or group of organisms excludes other members of the same species by aggressive behavior or display.

## GLOSSARY

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*Theoretical Perspective:* A philosophical explanation of Phenomena; a connect arrangement of facts according to their bearing on some real or hypothetical law or laws.

*Theory:* A set of broad propositions about some process in nature, such as the mode of evolution or the history of the earth's continents, that lead to the creation of conjectures - "hypotheses" - about specific phenomena that can be tested. A theory is regarded as truthful if it stimulates the invention of new hypotheses, if the hypotheses stand up under testing, and if as a result the explanations made possible by the theory are more effective and satisfying in explaining some part of reality than the explanations pressed by rival theories.

*Tiymose:* The Greeks held the mosaic conception of mind and believed that the mental life was organized around a series of independent centers within the self: the psyche.

## U

*Ulania ('ulama', plural of 'alim):* The learned, those who have knowledge. This is the most general term used for all those Muslims who devote their lives to learning about their religion. Most typically, the word refers to the jurists, those who are experts in the Shariah. Typically, the ulama undertake public religious duties such as leading prayers in mosques, performing marriage ceremonies, or interpreting the Shariah. Often, they have formed a class of professional religious functionaries. Strictly speaking, all those who become learned in any of the Islamic sciences - such as Koran commentary, Hadith, Kalam, philosophy, and Sufism - are ulama. In some languages, the ulama are often called mullahs.

*Ummah:* The Muslim Nation.

*Uniunkhalqih:* Universal creative will.

*Umur kulliyah:* Universal principles.

*Usul al-din:* Principles of faith.

## V

*Verstehen:* It locates the study of society in the context of human beings acting and interacting.

*Vicegerency (khalifa):* The attribute of the *khalifa*.

## W

*Wahdat-al-wujud:* Unity of being.

*Wahn:* Lit. means weakness. (Love of Dunya and Hatred of death).

## GLOSSARY

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*Wahy*: Revelation; intuitive knowledge.

*Wajd*: A state in which the mind is carried away as it were from the body; a state in which the functions of the senses are suspended by the contemplation of some extraordinary or supernatural object; kind of trance.

*Wajib*: Incumbent according to the Shariah, as, for example, the daily *salat*. One of the five categories into which acts are placed.

## Z

*Zakat (zakat)*: Alms-tax, one of the Five Pillars.

*Zoology*: The scientific study of animals.

### BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES

#### **Socrates**

He was born in Athens in 329 B.C and was executed in 399 B.C, at the age of seventy. He was certainly a well known figure in Athens. He was a great philosopher and his teaching/concepts were new to the people of Athens. The close connection between virtue and knowledge is characteristic of Socrates and Plato. It seems fairly certain that the preoccupations of Socrates were ethical rather than scientific. He never compromised on his ideas and eventually executed by the rulers of Athens.

#### **Plato**

Plato was born in 429 B.C. in the early years of the Peloponnesian war. He died in 347 B.C. Plato followed the example of pre-Socratic philosophers in looking for stability and performance, but he knew that he could never find it in the constantly changing world of material objects. He was a well do aristocrat, related to various people who were concerned in the rule of the Thirty Tyrants. Plato and Aristotle were the most influential of all philosophers, ancient, medieval, or modern. It was Plato who had the greater effect upon subsequent ages. Plato, in addition to being a philosopher, is an illluginative writer of great genius and charm.

#### **Aristotle**

Aristotle was born in 384 B.C. at stagira in Thrace and died in 322 B.C. His father had inherited the position of family physician to the Kind of Macedonia. At about the age of eighteen Aristotle came to Athens and became a pupil of Plato. He remained in the Academy for nearly twenty years until the death of Plato. Later, he became tutor to Alexander, the great. He has authored many books and was great philosopher of his ti 11e. He gave many new concepts on metaphysics, ethics. politics and logic. The world of Plato was also that of Aristotle. Aristotle's approach was more down to earth and less mystical than Plato's. Mind and purpose were very illportant to him.

#### **Thomas Hobbes**

Hobbes was born in 1588 and died in 1679. He was a philosopher. He was an empiricist and was admirer of mathematical method, not only in pure mathematics, but in its application. His general outlook was inspired by Galileo. As against Plato, Hobbes holds that reason is not innate. But is developed by industry. Life he says, is nothing but a motion of limbs, and therefore automa have an artificial life. The con11lonwealth, which he calls Leviathan, is a creation of art, and is in fact an artificial man. Hobbes, as might be expected, is an out-and-out nominalist. There is he says, nothing universal but names, and without words we could not conceive any general ideas. Without language, there would be no truth of falsehood, for 'true' and 'false' are attributes of speech.

#### **Charles Darwin**

He was born in 1809 in Shrewsbury, UK and died in 1882. His idea was that individual face a struggle for existence and must compete with each other for li 11lted resources. He prepared to make a distinction between the evolutionary developments of the human body through natural selection, and the intellectual and moral facilities, which, he maintains, could not have

been so developed. As a result of this dualism he was able to hold that there was a side to human nature which could not have been derived from animal ancestors.

### **Karl Marx**

Marx was born in 1818 in Trier and died in 1883. Marx differed from Darwin in paying attention to the social, rather than the biological, context for human life. Marx believed that we cannot change people without changing their circumstances. The history of Marxism itself appears to demonstrate the great power of beliefs to influence human behaviours. Marx was thirsted for change, and wanted to create a better kind of society. He was a philosopher as well as outright activist.

### **St. Thomas Aquinas**

Aquinas was born in 1225 AD near Naples, Italy and died in 1274 AD. Aquinas tried to steer a middle course between Plato and Aristotle over the nature of human person. He maintained that sensation was not just an activity of the soul, but a body was needed as well. He said that man is not only a soul, but is something composed of soul and body. He also wanted to draw contrast between animals and humans.

### **Sigmund Freud**

Freud was born of a Jewish family in Moravia in 1856 and died in Austria in 1939. A constant theme in Freud's work was that the psychological development of the individual parallel to the history of the human race. Freud's particular concern was the way in which inner conflict can give rise eventually to mental illness. Freud himself recognized that science laid claim to rationality and truth. No thinker in the twentieth century has had such an effect on how we all perceive ourselves and each other. After Freud, human nature can never be seen quite the same again.

### **Al Ghazali**

Ghazali was born in 1058 A.C. in a small town of Khorasan called "Toos". He died in 1111 A.C. at Tehran. Al-Ghazali was one of the most eminent philosopher of Islam. He had the rare distinction of being appointed as the Principal of Nijamiah University of Baghdad, the highly reputed seat of learning in that period at an early age of 34. Later on he turned into a sceptic and roamed about for 12 years in research of truth and mental peace, ultimately finding solace in 'Sufism'. Ghazali, undoubtedly immensely contributed to cultivating the social, culture, political, ethical and metaphysical outlook of Islam.

### **Ibne Khaldun**

Ibne Khaldun was born in Tunis in 1332 A.C. and died in Cairo in 1406 A.C. Ibne Khaldun, is the gifted Muslim philosopher of history and the renowned intellectual of his age. History, before Khaldun, was confined to the simple recording of events, without distinguishing between the probables and improbable. Being the founder of the science of sociology, Ibne Khaldun had the unique distinction of treating history as a science and supporting his facts with reasoning. Thus the world is immensely indebted to the learned Tunisian, for the lead given by him in diverse fields of sociology, historical and political economy which paved the way for later development in these sciences.

### Ibne Sina

Ibne Sina was born in 980 A.C. at Bukhara, Uzbekistan. He died at the age of 57 in 1037 A.C in Hamadan. Ibne Sina, the intellectual giant of the Middle Ages was versatile genius who influenced the course of thought in diverse ways. Being an outstanding encyclopaedist, he made lasting contributions to medical sciences, philosophy, logic, occult sciences, mathematics, astronomy, music and poetry. He was an eminent rational philosopher, whose invaluable discoveries in varied branches of knowledge forestalled many later discoveries and won for him an immortal place among the galaxy of eminent scientist and thinkers of the world.

### Muhammad Iqbal

Iqbal was born in 1877 at Sialkot and died in Lahore in 1938. Iqbal, the poet of East is, in fact, the poet of humanity in the wider sense, as his thoughts transcends all political, secretarian and color barriers. Iqbal was, undoubtedly, the greatest Islamic thinkers of the modern times and one of the greatest of all times. He was a versatile genius-poet, philosopher, lawyer, educationist, politician and reformer. As a thinkers and philosopher, he has made a lasting contribution to human thought. As a politician, he was the dreamer of Pakistan and in 1930 elaborated his scheme of an independent Muslim state. Iqbal gave a message of hope, self-respect and action to mankind. He has a vision behind his poetry. His dynamic philosophy will continue to inspire mankind to hope and action.

### Shah Waliullah

He was born in Delhi in 1703, and died in 1762. Shah Waliullah possessed a multi-facet and versatile personality. His real greatness lies in the cumulative effect produced by his writings. In religious matters, he struck a mean between extremes. In social affairs, he strove to introduce in the Muslim society, the simplicity and purity of early Islam. In the sphere of economics, he advocated the revolutionary Islamic Socialism. In the political field, he forged a united Muslim front against the non Muslims forces which were threatening to storm Muslim India.

### Edward O. Wilson

Wilson was born in Birmingham, Alabama, in 1929. He received his BS and MS in biology from the University of Alabama and, in 1955, his Ph.D. in biology from Harvard, where he has since taught, and where he has received both of its college-wide teaching awards. He is currently Pellegrino University Research Professor and Honorary Curator in Entomology of the Museum of Comparative Zoology at Harvard. He is the author of two Pulitzer prize-winning books, *On Human Nature* (1978) and *the Ants* (1990, with Bert Holldobler.) He has received many awards and distinctions. He has been awarded King Faisal Prize for Science & Technology. He gives many lectures throughout the world. He lives in Lexington, Massachusetts.

### Ibne Miskawayh

Miskawayh was born in 320/932 in Ravy and died in 421/1030. Miskawayh was an active scholar in many fields of knowledge, especially in history and ethics. He wrote some important books in these two fields. Miskawayh teaching on 'spiritual medicine' is to be found in his famous ethical work *Tahdhib Al-Akhlaq*, notably in its Sixth Discourse. He emphasized that mental disquietude and dissatisfaction can be overcome frequently by the persistent and diligent pursuit of knowledge by keeping the mind hard at work. He also

## BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES

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suggested physical exercises in the preservation of the health of body and mind. He further emphasized the need of intellectual exercises, reflection and speculations. Miskawayh suggests dealing with the four sciences geometry, arithmetic, music and astronomy.

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This bibliography consists of the following sections:

- Section 1: Primary Sources in Philosophy
- Section 2: Secondary Sources in Philosophy
- Section 3: Primary Sources in Science
- Section 4: Secondary Sources in Science
- Section 5: Primary Sources in Islam
- Section 6: Secondary Sources in Islam
- Section 7: Related Sources

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